Donald A. Earles, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 30 2020, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Raeane L. Pryor Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Tiffany A. McCoy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Donald A. Earles, Jr., September 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-786
v. Interlocutory Appeal from the
Switzerland Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable W. Gregory Coy,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
78C01-1804-CM-146
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Donald A. Earles, Jr. (“Earles”) brings this interlocutory appeal from the order
of the Switzerland Circuit Court denying his motion for discharge under
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Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Earles presents one issue on appeal, which we
restate as whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 20, 2018, the State charged Earles in the present case in Switzerland
County with Class A misdemeanor interfering with reporting a crime and Class
B misdemeanor criminal mischief. On April 23, 2018, the trial court issued a
summons for Earles to appear in court for an initial hearing to be held on May
7, 2018. Earles was personally served with the summons on April 26, 2018.
[4] On May 4, 2018, three days before the scheduled initial hearing in Switzerland
County, Earles was arrested and charged in neighboring Dearborn County with
Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony obstruction of
justice, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On May 7,
2018, the day his initial hearing was scheduled in Switzerland County, the
Dearborn Superior Court held an initial hearing in that case, and that court
ordered Earles to be held on a $7,500 cash bond. Earles therefore failed to
appear at the initial hearing in Switzerland County.1 For whatever reason,
however, the Switzerland Circuit Court did not issue a warrant for Earles’s
1
In his Appellant’s Brief, Earles notes that there is no mention in the Switzerland County CCS entry for May
7, 2018 indicating that he failed to appear. But when questioned by the trial court in the present case about
his failure to appear at the initial hearing, Earles admitted that he was incarcerated at the time. And Earles
admitted in his motion for discharge that he “failed to appear at the initial hearing on May 7, 2018, despite
service of Summons.” Appellant’s App. p. 30.
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arrest at that time. And Earles did not inform the trial court in Switzerland
County of his incarceration in Dearborn County.
[5] On August 7, 2018, Earles pleaded guilty to both Level 6 felony charges in
Dearborn County, and the State dismissed the misdemeanor charge. Two days
later, the Dearborn Superior Court sentenced Earles to consecutive terms of 910
days on both counts, with credit for time served, and suspended to probation
700 days of the sentence imposed on the possession charge and all of the
sentence on the obstruction charge.
[6] The Switzerland Circuit Court did not issue a warrant for Earles’s arrest in the
present case until January 28, 2020. Earles was served with this warrant on
February 3, 2020, and an initial hearing was held the following day. Earles then
filed a motion for discharge on March 2, 2020, claiming that the State had
failed to bring him to trial within the one-year time limit imposed by Criminal
Rule 4(C). The trial court denied Earles’s motion that same day. On March 9,
2020, Earles filed a motion asking that the trial court certify its order for
interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted the next day.
[7] On April 7, 2020, Earles filed a motion in this court requesting that we accept
interlocutory jurisdiction. We granted Earles’s motion on May 4, 2020, and this
appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
[8] Earles argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge
under Criminal Rule 4(C). This rule provides in relevant part:
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No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer
a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than
one year from the date the criminal charge against such
defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge,
whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his
motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was
not sufficient time to try him during such period because of
congestion of the court calendar.
Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C).
[9] Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for discharge under Criminal
Rule 4(C) is de novo. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008). The one-year period fixed by Rule 4(C) will be extended only by
the defendant’s own act or a continuance had on the defendant’s motion.
Johnson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We
have explained that “[t]he purpose of this rule is to assure criminal defendants
of early trials, not to provide them with a technical means of avoiding trial.” Id.
at 915.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Earles claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge
because the one-year time limit set forth in Criminal Rule 4(C), within which
the State had an affirmative duty to bring him to trial, has expired. Earles
argues that the one-year time limit began to run on April 23, 2018—the date the
trial court issued the summons in this case. According to Earles, the State had
to bring him to trial no later than April 23, 2019, which it did not do. Thus, he
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argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for discharge. We
disagree.
[11] The plain text of Criminal Rule 4(C) says that the State must bring a defendant
to trial within one year of either: (1) the date the charge was filed, or (2) the date
of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Here, the charges against Earles
were filed on April 20, 2018, but he was not arrested on this charge until
February 3, 2020. Thus, the State had until February 3, 2021 (one year from the
date Earles was arrested) in which to bring him to trial. When Earles filed his
motion for discharge on March 2, 2020, the one-year time period had not yet
run.
[12] As noted, however, Earles claims that the one-year time period began to run on
the date he was summoned. In support of his argument, Earles cites Johnson v.
State, 708 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. The defendant in that
case had been charged with a misdemeanor on September 29, 1996 and was
served with a summons that ordered her to appear in court on November 17 of
that year. The State did not bring Johnson to trial within one year of the date
Johnson had been charged, so Johnson moved for discharge, arguing that the
one-year period commenced on the day she was charged. The trial court denied
the motion, and Johnson appealed.
[13] On appeal, we noted that when a person is charged with a misdemeanor, the
trial court may issue a summons instead of an arrest warrant. Id. at 915 (citing
Ind. Code § 35-33-4-1). We held that this statute provides a benefit to a
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defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor because “it eliminates the need
for an arrest.” Id. Because Johnson benefitted from this statute by avoiding the
need for arrest, we held that the one-year time period of Criminal Rule 4(C) did
not run from the date the charge was filed, but from the date the summons
ordered her to appear in court, as that was the date that her liberty was truly
restrained, i.e., she was ordered to appear in court and was subject to arrest if
she failed to appear. Id.
[14] Earles argues that, pursuant to Johnson, the one-year time period of Criminal
Rule 4(C) began to run on April 23, 2018—the date the trial court issued the
summons ordering him to appear for an initial hearing. However, here, Earles
failed to appear on the date he was summoned. There is no indication that the
defendant in Johnson similarly failed to appear. We therefore do not find
Johnson to be controlling in a situation such as here, where the defendant fails to
appear when summoned. We agree with the State that, because Earles failed to
appear, “he was not held, nor was his liberty ‘truly restrained,’ under the
current cause on May 7, 2018, like it would have been had he appeared or been
arrested.” Appellee’s Br. p. 12.
[15] We recognize that Earles failed to appear because he was arrested and charged
in Dearborn County. But Earles failed to inform the trial court in the present
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case of his arrest and conviction in the neighboring county. We will not permit
Earles to benefit from his continued criminal activity. 2
[16] Indeed, even if we were to agree with Earles that the one-year time limit began
to run on the date the summons was issued, he would not prevail, as the one-
year time limit of Criminal Rule 4(C) is tolled when a defendant fails to appear
due to his incarceration in another county yet fails to inform the trial court of
his incarceration. Ratliff v. State, 132 N.E.3d 41, 43–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019),
trans. denied. In Ratliff, the defendant failed to appear for a pre-trial hearing
because he was incarcerated in another county. The trial court therefore
canceled the scheduled jury trial. Almost four years later, the trial court held a
status hearing and reset the jury trial date. Ratliff then filed a motion for
discharge, claiming that the State had failed to bring him to trial within one
year. The trial court denied Ratliff’s motion.
[17] On interlocutory appeal, we affirmed the trial court. We noted that the one-year
time limit is tolled when a “defendant does not appear before the trial court and
his whereabouts are unknown.” Id. (citing Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26, 31
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). Although an unidentified speaker informed
the trial court that Ratliff was incarcerated in another county, Ratliff himself did
2
We note that with the implementation of Indiana’s statewide computerized Odyssey case-management
system, it is relatively simple for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial court judges to check if a defendant
who fails to appear has been charged in another county. Such a simple check in the present case could have
alerted all parties interested of Earles’s status, thereby prompting the trial court to issue an arrest warrant for
Earles much earlier.
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not provide written notification of his incarceration to the trial court. In fact,
Ratliff did not communicate with the trial court to indicate his whereabouts
until approximately four years after he failed to appear. We therefore held that
any delay was attributable to Ratliff and that the trial court therefore did not err
in denying Ratliff’s motion for discharge. Id. at 45; see also Werner, 818 N.E.2d
at 31 (holding that trial court did not err in denying motion for discharge where
defendant failed to appear at initial hearing due to his incarceration in another
county because defendant failed to notify the court in writing of his
incarceration, even though two people orally informed the trial court of
defendant’s incarceration).
Conclusion
[18] The trial court did not err by denying Earles’s motion for discharge. The trial
court scheduled Earles’s trial to begin within one year of the date Earles was
arrested in the present case. The one-year time limit did not begin to run when
the trial court issued the summons because Earles failed to appear at the initial
hearing. Although his failure to appear was due to his incarceration in another
county, Earles failed to provide written notification to the trial court of his
incarceration. Therefore, any delay in bringing him to trial was attributable to
Earles. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[19] Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.
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