Cross-Road Farms, LLC v. Peggy Whitlock ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                    FILED
    Sep 30 2020, 10:00 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    John J. Schwarz                                           Eric M. Wilkins
    Schwarz Law Office, P.C.                                  Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros, LLP
    Royal Center, Indiana                                     Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Cross-Road Farms, LLC,                                    September 30, 2020
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-CT-106
    v.                                                Appeal from the LaGrange
    Superior Court
    Peggy Whitlock,                                           The Honorable Lisa Bowen-
    Appellee-Respondent.                                      Slaven, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    44D01-1804-CT-9
    Pyle, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Cross-Road Farms, LLC (“Cross-Road Farms”) appeals the trial court’s order
    denying its motion to correct error, which Cross-Road Farms filed after the trial
    court had denied Cross-Road Farms’: (1) Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief
    from judgment; and (2) motion to amend its complaint against Peggy Whitlock
    (“Whitlock”). Cross-Road Farms argues that the trial court abused its
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020                            Page 1 of 13
    discretion by denying these motions. Concluding that there was no abuse of
    discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Cross-
    Road Farms’ motion to correct error after denying Cross-Road
    Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B) motion and motion to amend the
    complaint.
    Facts1
    [3]   Cross-Road Farms operates a farm in Greenfield Township, LaGrange County,
    Indiana. This farm is adjacent to Anderson Cemetery (“the Cemetery”), which,
    pursuant to statute, is overseen by Greenfield Township.2 Whitlock is the
    acting township trustee for Greenfield Township. In August 2017, Whitlock
    had a fence erected around the Cemetery.
    [4]   On April 2, 2018, Cross-Road Farms filed a complaint against Whitlock,
    personally and in her capacity as the Greenfield Township Trustee. Cross-
    Road Farms’ complaint alleged the following counts: (1) breach of contract; (2)
    promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance; (3) easement by
    1
    We direct Cross-Road Farms’ attention to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(c), which provides that an
    appellant’s Statement of Facts “shall be in narrative form” and Appellate Rule 50 regarding the required
    contents of an Appellant’s Appendix.
    2
    INDIANA CODE § 36-6-4-3(9) provides that a township executive shall “[p]rovide and maintain cemeteries
    under IC 23-14.” INDIANA CODE § 23-14-33-1 through 23-14-76-2 is “referred to as the Indiana general
    cemetery law.” I.C. § 23-14-31-1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020                            Page 2 of 13
    necessity/prescriptive easement; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) damages. The
    complaint’s main assertion was that Whitlock’s erection of the fence around the
    Cemetery had prevented Cross-Road Farms from using its “center pivot
    irrigation system” (“irrigation system”) that “traverses [Whitlock’s] real estate
    [i.e., the Cemetery] in a circular motion.” (App. Vol. 2 at 9). Cross-Road
    Farms alleged that it and the former township trustee had entered into an oral
    agreement that had given Cross-Road Farms a “perpetual right” to have the
    outer wheels of its irrigation system “traverse over” the Cemetery property.
    (App. Vol. 2 at 9). Cross-Road Farms also alleged that it had designed its
    irrigation system based on the former trustee’s “assurances” that the irrigation
    system’s wheels could traverse over the Cemetery. (App. Vol. 2 at 9).
    Additionally, Cross-Road Farms alleged that it had used its irrigation system
    for more than ten years in an “open” and “continuous” manner. (App. Vol. 2
    at 11).
    [5]   Whitlock then filed an answer and a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings
    pursuant to Trial Rule 12(C) and motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule
    12(B)(6). In this joint motion, Whitlock sought to have Counts 1, 3, and 4
    dismissed with prejudice. Whitlock argued that the breach of contract claim in
    Count 1—alleging that Whitlock had breached an oral contract that Cross-Road
    Farms had made with a former township trustee for a right to have Cross-Road
    Farms’ irrigation system’s wheels traverse the Cemetery property—should be
    dismissed because the claim failed as a matter of law. Whitlock argued, that
    even if an oral contract had existed, Cross-Road Farms had failed to indicate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020    Page 3 of 13
    whether it was claiming that a license or an easement had been created under
    the oral agreement and that, under either theory, Cross-Road Farms’ claim
    would fail as a matter of law. Specifically, Whitlock argued that a license was
    revocable and that Cross-Road Farms could not satisfy the statute of frauds,
    which required for any contract granting an easement to be in writing.
    [6]   In regard to the easement by necessity/prescriptive easement claims in Count 3,
    Whitlock first argued that Cross-Road Farms had failed to plead any facts that
    would support its easement by necessity claim because it had made no
    allegations that there had ever been a unity of title between the Cemetery and
    Cross-Road Farms’ property or that its property was inaccessible to a public
    roadway. Whitlock also argued that Cross-Road Farms could not raise the
    prescriptive easement claim in Count 3 against Whitlock in regard to the
    township property of the Cemetery because “Indiana law does not allow a
    person to claim a prescriptive easement over property owned by the Township.”
    (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 10) (citing INDIANA CODE § 32-21-7-2).
    [7]   Thereafter, on August 28, 2018, Cross-Road Farms filed a response to
    Whitlock’s joint motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings
    and a brief in support thereof. In Cross-Road Farms’ response and brief, it
    challenged the dismissal of Count 4 but agreed to the dismissal “with prejudice”
    of Counts 1 and 3 (“Agreement to Dismissal with Prejudice”). (Appellee’s
    App. Vol. 2 at 13, 15, 17). Specifically, Cross-Road Farms’ response provided:
    1. [Cross-Road Farms] hereby agrees to dismiss Count I of its
    Complaint, with prejudice.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020    Page 4 of 13
    2. [Cross-Road Farms] hereby agrees to dismiss Count III of its
    Complaint, with prejudice.
    (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 13). In Cross-Road Farms’ introduction to its brief,
    it stated “[Cross-Road Farms], in its . . . response, agreed to dismissal of Counts
    I and III of its Complaint, with prejudice. Therefore, this Brief will not address
    [Whitlock’s] Brief as such relates to Counts I and III.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2
    at 15). Additionally, in the conclusion section of its brief, Cross-Road Farms’
    again acknowledged its agreement to dismiss with prejudice the two counts,
    stating, “For the reasons stated herein, Counts I and III of [Cross-Road Farms’]
    Complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice[.]” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at
    17).
    [8]   On September 19, 2018, the trial court entered an order dismissing Counts 1
    and 3 with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on Whitlock’s
    joint motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding
    Count 4. On November 14, 2018, the trial court denied Whitlock’s motions
    challenging Count 4. Accordingly, Cross-Road Farms’ Counts 2, 4, and 5
    against Whitlock remain.
    [9]   Nine months later, on August 1, 2019, Cross-Road Farms filed a Motion to
    Revive Dismissed Counts Pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) (“Trial Rule 60(B)
    Motion”) and a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Conform to the
    Evidence (“Motion to Amend”). In its Trial Rule 60(B) Motion, Cross-Road
    Farms’ attorney stated that he had dismissed Counts 1 and 3 because he had
    “felt that [the two counts] could not be sustained.” (App. Vol. 2 at 29). Cross-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020     Page 5 of 13
    Road Farms argued, however, that Counts 1 and 3 should be “revive[d]”
    pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1) as a “mistake” or “excusable neglect” because
    Cross-Road Farms’ attorney had made a “scrivener error” when he had
    dismissed Counts 1 and 3 with prejudice. (App. Vol. 2 at 30, 31).
    Alternatively, Cross-Road Farms asked the trial court to reinstate the two
    counts pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Specifically, Cross-Road Farms
    requested the trial court to consider its’ attorney’s prior “serious health issues”
    as “any reason justifying relief” from the trial court’s judgment. (App. Vol. 2 at
    30, 31). In regard to counsel’s health issues, Cross-Road Farms’ counsel stated
    that he had returned to work in mid-August 2018 after “feel[ing] very ill” and
    following a two-week hospitalization. Two weeks after returning to work, he
    had filed the Agreement to Dismissal with Prejudice. (App. Vol. 2 at 29).
    Although Cross-Road Farms relied on Trial Rule 60(B)(1) and (8), it did not
    allege that it had meritorious claims as required under Trial Rule 60(B).
    [10]   In Cross-Road Farms’ Motion to Amend, it stated that “in addition to a
    prescriptive easement existing, [Cross-Road Farms] believes there is a claim to
    be made for a prescriptive right of way[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20). Cross-Road
    Farms alleged that previous owners of Cross-Road Farms’ real estate had used
    an irrigation system that crossed onto the Cemetery property “in the
    approximate same path[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20). Cross-Road Farms asserted
    that Whitlock would not be prejudiced by the amended complaint because she
    “ha[d] already taken the position that a prescriptive property right cannot be
    made against a governmental entity” and that “[a]ll [Whitlock] ha[d] to do is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020      Page 6 of 13
    apply [her] prior argument to the claim asserting a prescriptive right of way.”
    (App. Vol. 2 at 21). Along with its Motion to Amend, Cross-Road Farms
    submitted a proposed amended complaint that included its previously dismissed
    Counts 1 and 3 and included an additional count for prescriptive right of way.
    [11]   Whitlock filed a brief in opposition to Cross-Road Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B)
    Motion and Motion to Amend. Whitlock argued, in relevant part, that the trial
    court should deny the Trial Rule 60(B) Motion because Cross-Road Farms had
    failed to show that there was a scrivener’s error that would amount to excusable
    neglect and because Cross-Road Farms had “failed to show any meritorious
    claim as required by Trial Rule 60(B).” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 28).
    Additionally, Whitlock argued that the trial court should deny the Motion to
    Amend because the proposed count for prescriptive right of way was
    “cumulative of the already-dismissed claim for ‘prescriptive easement’” and
    because the proposed amendment was “futile as Indiana statutes specifically
    forbid [a party from] obtaining rights to governmental property via
    prescription.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 29).
    [12]   On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Cross-Road
    Farms’ two motions. In regard to Cross-Road Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B) Motion,
    the trial court stated: “Even if [Cross-Road Farms’] mistake in dismissing
    Counts I and III was ‘excusable neglect’ under Trial Rule 60(B), [Cross-Road
    Farms] has failed to allege that Counts I and III of its original Complaint are
    meritorious claims.” (App. Vol. 2 at 7). When denying Cross-Road Farms’
    Motion to Amend, the trial court found that “no prescriptive right can be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020     Page 7 of 13
    obtained against the government and therefore [Cross-Road Farms’] proposed
    amendment is futile.” (App. Vol. 2 at 7).
    [13]   Thereafter, Cross-Road Farms filed a motion to correct error, which the trial
    court also denied. Cross-Road Farms now appeals.
    Decision
    [14]   Cross-Road Farms argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to
    correct error, which Cross-Road Farms filed after the trial court had denied its
    Trial Rule 60(B) Motion and Motion to Amend.
    [15]   We review a trial court’s denial of all these motions for abuse of discretion, and
    will reverse only where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and
    effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court has
    misinterpreted the law. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 
    989 N.E.2d 758
    , 761 (Ind. 2013)
    (discussing standard of review for trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct
    error); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 
    975 N.E.2d 805
    , 812 (Ind. 2012) (discussing
    standard of review for a trial court’s Trial Rule 60(B) ruling), reh’g denied;
    Williams v. Inglis, 
    142 N.E.3d 467
    , 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (discussing standard
    of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend a complaint under
    Trial Rule 15), reh’g denied, trans. denied.3
    3
    We are somewhat perplexed by Cross-Road Farms’ citations to the standard of review for a trial court’s
    decision on a Trial Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to
    dismiss. This appeal is not from the trial court’s rulings on those two motions, which had been filed by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020                           Page 8 of 13
    [16]   We first turn to Cross-Road Farms’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of its
    Trial Rule 60(B) Motion. Here, Whitlock filed a joint motion for judgment on
    the pleadings and motion to dismiss, seeking to have Counts 1, 3, and 4 of
    Cross-Road Farms’ complaint dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, in late
    August 2018, Cross-Road Farms filed a response and specifically agreed to
    dismiss Counts 1 and 3 with prejudice. On September 19, 2018, the trial court
    entered an order dismissing Counts 1 and 3 with prejudice. Almost eleven
    months later, on August 1, 2019, Cross-Road Farms filed its Trial Rule 60(B)
    Motion, seeking to set aside the trial court’s September 2018 order and reinstate
    Counts 1 and 3 that had been dismissed with prejudice.
    [17]   “[A] dismissal with prejudice constitutes a dismissal on the merits and is
    therefore conclusive of the rights of the parties and res judicata as to the
    questions that might have been litigated.” Staff Source, LLC v. Wallace, 
    143 N.E.3d 996
    , 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted). See also Ilagan v. McAbee, 
    634 N.E.2d 827
    , 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
    Indiana Trial Rule 41(F) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] dismissal with
    prejudice may be set aside by the court for the grounds and in accordance with
    the provisions of Rule 60(B).”
    [18]   Trial Rule 60(B) provides in relevant part:
    Whitlock. Instead, this appeal is from the trial court’s denial of Cross-Road Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B) Motion
    and its Motion to Amend. Accordingly, we will focus our appellate review on those two trial court rulings.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020                           Page 9 of 13
    On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve
    a party or his legal representative from a judgment . . . for the
    following reasons:
    (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;
    *****
    (8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
    judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-
    paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).
    The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons
    (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the
    judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons
    (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1),
    (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense.
    (Emphasis added). “The burden is on the movant to establish ground for Trial
    Rule 60(B) relief.” In re Paternity of P.S.S., 
    934 N.E.2d 737
    , 740 (Ind. 2010).
    [19]   In its Trial Rule 60(B) Motion, Cross-Road Farms sought to have Counts 1 and
    3 “revive[d]” under either Trial Rule 60(B)(1) or (8). (App. Vol. 2 at 29, 31).
    Trial Rule 60(B) requires that allegations of mistake or excusable neglect under
    Trial Rule 60(B)(1) or any reason justifying relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), as
    Cross-Road Farms alleged, must be supported by a showing of a meritorious
    claim. See Munster Cmty. Hosp. v. Bernacke, 
    874 N.E.2d 611
    , 614 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2007). “That requires a showing ‘that vacating the judgment will not be an
    empty exercise.’”
    Id. (quoting Outback Steakhouse
    of Florida v. Markley, 
    856 N.E.2d 65
    , 73 (Ind. 2006)) (internal quotation marks and other citation
    omitted). “The movant must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious
    claim, that is, a showing that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020         Page 10 of 13
    other evidence.” Munster Cmty. 
    Hosp., 874 N.E.2d at 614
    (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    [20]   Here, however, Cross-Road Farms did not allege, nor even mention, that it had
    meritorious claims as required under Trial Rule 60(B). Based on this failure,
    the trial court denied Cross-Road Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B) Motion. We
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm its denial of
    Cross-Road Farms’ Trial Rule 60(B) Motion. See, e.g., Munster Cmty. 
    Hosp., 874 N.E.2d at 614
    (holding that a movant’s “bald assertion that he ‘ha[d] a
    meritorious claim’” was insufficient under Trial Rule 60(B)).
    [21]   Next, we turn to Cross-Road Farms’ argument that the trial court abused its
    discretion by denying its Motion to Amend.
    Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) provides that a party may amend his
    pleading once as a matter of course if within a certain time frame.
    Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
    or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
    given when justice so requires. Although amendments to
    pleadings are to be liberally allowed, the trial court retains broad
    discretion in granting or denying amendments to pleadings. We
    will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend only upon
    a showing of an abuse of that discretion, which occurs if the trial
    court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
    and circumstances before the court, or if the court has
    misinterpreted the law. Our Court reviews whether a trial court’s
    ruling on a motion to amend is an abuse of discretion by
    evaluating a number of factors, including undue delay, bad faith,
    or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
    cure deficiency by amendment previously allowed, undue
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020      Page 11 of 13
    prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the amendment, and
    futility of the amendment.
    
    Williams, 142 N.E.3d at 475
    (internal quotation marks, bracket, and citations
    omitted).
    [22]   Here, the trial court denied Cross-Road Farms’ Motion to Amend, finding that
    “no prescriptive right can be obtained against the government and therefore
    [Cross-Road Farms’] proposed amendment is futile.” (App. Vol. 2 at 7). We
    agree with the trial court. INDIANA CODE § 32-21-7-2(a) provides that “[t]itle to
    real property owned by the state or a political subdivision . . . may not be
    alienated by adverse possession.” See also Verrill v. Sch. City of Hobart, Lake
    Cnty., 
    222 Ind. 214
    , 216, 
    52 N.E.2d 619
    , 620 (1944) (“In the absence of a
    statute, . . . an easement cannot be acquired by prescription against the
    government.”); Sims v. Town of New Chicago, 
    842 N.E.2d 830
    , 834 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2006) (explaining that “Verrill continues to be good law” and applying the
    holding in Verrill to a party’s prescriptive claim against a political subdivision).
    Accordingly, Cross-Road Farms’ proposed amendment to add a prescriptive
    claim would have been futile. Additionally, Cross-Road Farms’ proposed
    amendment was futile because Cross-Road Farms had already dismissed its
    prescriptive claim with prejudice. See 
    Ilagan, 634 N.E.2d at 829
    (explaining that
    a dismissal with prejudice, which constitutes a dismissal on the merits, is
    conclusive of the rights of the parties and res judicata as to the questions that
    might have been litigated). Because Cross-Road Farms’ proposed amendment
    to add a prescriptive claim would have been futile, we conclude that the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020      Page 12 of 13
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cross-Road Farms’ motion to
    amend it complaint. See, e.g., 
    Williams, 142 N.E.3d at 476
    (affirming the denial
    of a party’s motion to amend a complaint where the amendment would have
    been futile).
    [23]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-106 | September 30, 2020   Page 13 of 13