Richard N. Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 26 2020, 10:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Richard N. Bell Paul B. Overhauser
Indianapolis, Indiana Melanie Eich
Overhauser Law Offices, LLC
Maura K. Kennedy Greenfield, Indiana
Law Office of Maura K. Kennedy, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Richard N. Bell, May 26, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-PL-2008
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Vacuforce, LLC, The Honorable Timothy W.
Appellee-Defendant. Oakes, Judge
The Honorable Caryl F. Dill,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D02-1903-PL-8733
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-2008 | May 26, 2020 Page 1 of 7
Statement of the Case
[1] Richard Bell appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the court’s
dismissal of Bell’s complaint against Vacuforce, LLC for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Bell presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Bell’s motion to set aside the dismissal of his
complaint.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered Bell to pay Vacuforce’s attorney’s fees.
[2] Vacuforce cross-appeals and asserts that it is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees.
We affirm and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In an appeal of the underlying federal lawsuit in this matter, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set out the relevant facts as follows:
Richard Bell brought a copyright infringement lawsuit against
Vacuforce, LLC, accusing it of publishing his photograph of the
Indianapolis skyline on its website without a license. Vacuforce
hired attorney Paul Overhauser to defend it. The parties quickly
settled, so the federal lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice.
That was not the end of the story. Overhauser then moved to
recover attorney fees from plaintiff Bell. He argued that since the
settlement produced a dismissal with prejudice, Vacuforce was
the “prevailing party” for purposes of fees under the Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. The district court considered Overhauser’s
motion frivolous and misleading. The court denied the motion
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and ordered two monetary sanctions against Overhauser: one
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and another under 28
U.S.C. § 1927[ to recover Bell’s attorney’s fees incurred in
responding to Overhauser’s motion].
Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2018).
[4] On March 4, 2019, Bell filed a complaint with the Marion Superior Court
alleging that, when it sought attorney’s fees in the federal court proceeding,
Vacuforce breached the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. The trial
court granted extensions of time to Vacuforce to respond to the complaint. And
on June 21, Vacuforce filed a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). In
particular, Vacuforce alleged that Bell had not stated a claim for a breach of
contract. On July 25, the court granted Vacuforce’s motion to dismiss Bell’s
complaint with prejudice.
[5] On July 28, Bell filed a motion to set aside the dismissal alleging that his
counsel, Maura Kennedy, “did not have knowledge of [either the motion to
dismiss or] the Court’s order granting dismissal on July 25, 2019, because
[Kennedy] did not receive electronic service of either of said documents.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46. In that motion, Bell asserted that Kennedy had
provided the trial court with her proper contact information on her appearance
form in this matter but only discovered the dismissal after checking the docket
four days prior to the dismissal order. Bell did not assert a meritorious claim in
his motion to set aside the dismissal.
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[6] In its response to Bell’s motion, Vacuforce pointed out that Kennedy had not
updated her contact information with the Indiana Supreme Court Roll of
Attorneys as required under Trial Rule 86(O), which had led to Kennedy’s
failure to receive the electronic notifications. The trial court denied Bell’s
motion to set aside. And the court awarded attorney’s fees to Vacuforce. This
appeal ensued. 1
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Motion to Set Aside
[7] Bell first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to set aside the dismissal of his complaint. Bell purports to allege that
the dismissal should be set aside under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), which provides that
the court may relieve a party from an entry of a final order for “mistake,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” We review the grant or denial of a Trial Rule
60(B) motion for relief from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.
Ross v. Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[8] Bell maintains that his attorney was not served a copy of Vacuforce’s motion to
dismiss because of a “clerical error[,] as the Indiana E-filing System sent notice
of Vacuforce’s Motion to Dismiss to [Bell’s] Counsel’s wrong email address.”
1
Bell also appealed the trial court’s order granting Vacuforce’s motion to dismiss. Vacuforce filed with this
Court a motion to dismiss Bell’s appeal as untimely. We agreed, in part, and granted that motion in part. In
particular, in our March 20, 2020, Order, we “dismissed with prejudice” Bell’s appeal of the trial court’s July
25, 2019, order “because it was not timely initiated.” Accordingly, the sole issues in this appeal relate to the
court’s order denying Bell’s motion to set aside and granting Vacuforce’s motion for attorney’s fees.
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Appellant’s Br. at 11. Thus, Bell asserts that he is entitled to have the dismissal
set aside due to mistake or surprise. However, as Vacuforce points out, Trial
Rule 86(O)(2) expressly provides in relevant part that, in her appearance form,
Bell’s attorney was required both to certify “that the contact information listed
on the Indiana Supreme Court Roll of Attorneys . . . [was] current and accurate
as of the date the appearance [wa]s filed” and to acknowledge “that orders . . .
will be sent to the attorney at the email address(es) on the Roll of Attorneys
regardless of other contact information supplied by the attorney.” Vacuforce
asserts, and Bell does not dispute, that Bell’s attorney had failed to update her
contact information, including her email address, with the Roll of Attorneys at
the time she filed her appearance in this matter. Thus, Bell’s attorney’s failure
to receive either Vacuforce’s motion to dismiss or the court’s order dismissing
the complaint was not due to any clerical error but, rather, was due to her own
mistake. 2
[9] As this Court has explained,
Trial Rule 60(B) requires that an allegation of mistake or
excusable neglect be supported by a showing of a meritorious
claim. That requires a showing “‘that vacating the judgment will
not be an empty exercise.’” Outback Steakhouse of Florida v.
Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 2006) (quoting 12 Moore’s
2
In support of his contention that the trial court should set aside the dismissal due to the trial court’s
“clerical error,” Bell cites to case law addressing Trial Rule 60(A), which permits a trial court to correct
technical clerical errors in judgments or orders. However, Trial Rule 41(F) makes clear that where, as here, a
complaint is dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal may be set aside “in accordance with the provisions of
[Trial] Rule 60(B).” Accordingly, to the extent that Bell asserts that the court should set aside the dismissal
based upon Trial Rule 60(A) alone, that claim is without merit.
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Federal Practice, § 60.43[1][c] (3d ed.1997)). The movant must
make a prima facie showing of a meritorious claim, “that is, a
showing that ‘will prevail until contradicted and overcome by
other evidence.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d
1259, 1265 (Ind. 1999)).
Munster Cmty. Hosp. v. Bernacke, 874 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(emphasis added).
[10] Here, in his motion to set aside, Bell asserted that his counsel had “just
discovered the E-service mistake” and that she had been “surprise[d]” to discover
the dismissal when she checked the docket in late July. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 45-46 (emphasis added). On appeal, Bell states that he moved to set aside the
dismissal under Trial Rule 60(B)(1). However, Bell did not assert a meritorious
claim in his motion to set aside to the trial court, let alone make a prima facie
showing of a meritorious claim. Munster Cmty. Hosp., 874 N.E.2d at 613. To
the extent Bell asserts for the first time on appeal that he has a meritorious
claim, the issue is waived. Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 533 (Ind. 2006)
(holding that, to properly preserve an issue on appeal, “a party must, at a
minimum, ‘show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass
upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal.’”) Bell
cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
to set aside the dismissal under Trial Rule 60(B)(1). 3
3
We note that Bell makes no contention that the trial court’s dismissal order is void.
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Issue Two: Attorney’s Fees
[11] Bell next contends, without any citation to the record or to authority, and
without any reference to our standard of review, that the trial court “should
reverse the judgment” due to the same “‘clerical error’ described in the Motion
to Dismiss.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. Again, Bell has not shown that a clerical
error occurred. Indeed, Bell does not dispute that the problem arose because
Bell’s attorney had not updated her contact information pursuant to Trial Rule
86(O). And, in any event, Bell does not support his contention on this issue
with cogent argument, and it is waived. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
award of attorney’s fees to Vacuforce.
Cross-Appeal
[12] Vacuforce cross-appeals and contends that it is entitled to appellate attorney’s
fees under the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. Bell does not contest
Vacuforce’s contention on this issue. As Vacuforce points out, the parties’
agreement provides in relevant part that, in any action seeking relief from an
alleged breach of the agreement, “the prevailing party shall recover all of such
party’s reasonable attorney’s fees” incurred, including appellate attorney’s fees.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 78. We hold that Vacuforce is entitled to appellate
attorney’s fees under the parties’ agreement, and we remand to the trial court
for a determination of the appropriate award.
[13] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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