Company v. C.R. (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 23 2020, 8:32 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frank R. Martinez, III REVIEW BOARD OF THE
Highland, Indiana INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Tuyêñ-Kim T. Lê
Review Board Staff Attorney
Abigail R. Recker
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Company, October 23, 2020
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-EX-1126
v. Appeal from the Review Board of
the Indiana Department of
C.R., et al., Workforce Development
Appellees. The Honorable Larry A. Dailey,
Chairperson
The Honorable Heather D.
Cummings, Member
Case No.
20-R-687
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Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Company reduced the work hours of C.R. (“Claimant”) by one-half and
advised her to seek other employment. Claimant found other part-time
employment and left her position with Company. An Indiana Department of
Workforce Development claims investigator preliminarily determined that
Claimant left her employment with Company without good cause and was
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to
Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1. An Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”)
reversed that determination, applying Section 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(B), a
simultaneous employment provision modifying the disqualification provision.
The Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“the
Board”) adopted and affirmed the ALJ decision. Company appeals, presenting
the sole issue of whether the decision is contrary to law because Claimant,
although simultaneously employed, voluntarily left her initial – as opposed to
successive – employment, outside the scope of the statutory modification. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 25, 2014, Claimant began working for Company as a legal assistant,
working thirty-two hours per week. She was assigned to work for Attorney M
and Attorney A, who each contributed to Claimant’s pay of $21.00 per hour.
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In late 2019, Attorney A relocated to Florida and began transitioning toward
retirement; he no longer contributed to Claimant’s salary. Attorney M
informed Claimant that he could not afford her services on a full-time basis and,
if she could not pay her bills based upon a sixteen-hour work week, she should
be “looking elsewhere.” (Tr. at 11.)
[3] Claimant interviewed at the Porter County Prosecutor’s Office, but was not
offered that position, purportedly for conflict of interest concerns.1 However,
during the week of February 22, 2020, Claimant began working ten hours per
week for a newly-practicing, non-Company attorney, at a rate of $18.00 per
hour. Claimant also worked that week at Company. On February 27, 2020,
Claimant worked her last day at Company. When she left, Claimant informed
an attorney and Company’s bookkeeper of her departure, but did not personally
inform Attorney M.
[4] Claimant filed for unemployment benefits. On March 28, 2020, a claims
investigator made an initial determination that Claimant was not eligible for
unemployment benefits because she had left Company’s employ without good
cause. Claimant appealed that determination. On April 14, 2020, the ALJ
conducted a telephonic hearing at which Claimant and Attorney M testified.
On April 17, 2020, the ALJ rendered a decision reversing the determination of
the claims investigator and finding Claimant eligible for unemployment
1
Attorney M had provided services to the Prosecutor’s office while Claimant was his legal assistant.
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benefits. Company appealed that decision. On May 7, 2020, the Review Board
adopted the decision of the ALJ. Company now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Indiana Code Section 22-4-17-12(a) provides: “Any decision of the review
board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Either party to
the dispute or the commissioner may, within thirty (30) days after notice of
intention to appeal as provided in this section, appeal the decision to the court
of appeals of Indiana for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as
govern appeals in ordinary civil actions.” The facts in this case are undisputed;
the parties disagree about the application of Indiana Code Section 22–4–15-
1(c)(1)(B) to those undisputed facts. As such, this appeal involves only
interpretation of the statute, a question of law, and we review conclusions of
law made by the Review Board under a de novo standard. Indiana State Univ. v.
LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2008). The interpretation of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled
to great weight unless the agency’s interpretation would be unreasonable or
inconsistent with the statute itself. Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 2012). Also, we “regularly
construe provisions of the Act liberally to favor the unemployed and promote
the Act’s humanitarian purpose.” Id. at 126; see also Ind. Code § 22–4–1–1
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(declaring public policy behind the Act to be protecting against economic
insecurity due to unemployment).2
[6] Indiana Code Section 22-4-2-22 defines a valid claim for unemployment
benefits as “a claim filed by an individual who has established qualifying wage
credits and who is totally, partially, or part-totally unemployed.” Indiana Code
Section 22-4-3-2 provides: “An individual is ‘partially unemployed’ when,
because of lack of available work, he is working less than his normal customary
full-time hours for his regular employer and his remuneration is less than his
weekly benefit amount in any calendar week, but no individual shall be deemed
totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed in any week which he is regularly
and customarily employed full-time on a straight commission basis.” An
employee must first have established customary full-time hours that are then
reduced in order to be considered partially unemployed. Mitchell v. Review Bd. of
2
Our Indiana Supreme Court approved the liberal construction to favor the unemployed:
Our General Assembly declared “[e]conomic insecurity due to unemployment ... to be a
serious menace to the health, morale, and welfare of the people of this state and to the
maintenance of public order within this state” and that “[p]rotection against this great hazard
of our economic life can be provided in some measure by the required and systematic
accumulation of funds ... to provide benefits to the unemployed during periods of
unemployment.” Ind. Code § 22–4–1–1. Thus, courts regularly construe provisions of the Act
liberally to favor the unemployed and promote the Act’s humanitarian purpose. See, e.g.,
Quakenbush v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 891 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008); Bailey v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 668 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996); Holmes v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div. 451 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind.Ct.App.1983).
Chrysler Group, LLC v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 126 (Ind. 2012).
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Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 6 N.E.3d 477, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Consistent with this definition, Claimant became partially unemployed in
December of 2019. She left this reduced-hours position in February of 2020
and first applied for unemployment benefits upon her departure.
[7] The claims investigator initially denied Claimant benefits in reliance upon
Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1, which provides in relevant part:
Regarding an individual’s most recent separation from
employment before filing an initial or additional claim for
benefits, an individual who voluntarily left the employment
without good cause in connection with the work or was
discharged from the employment for just cause is ineligible for
waiting period or benefit rights for the week in which the
disqualifying separation occurred and until:
(1) the individual has earned remuneration in employment in at
least eight (8) weeks; and
(2) the remuneration earned equals or exceeds the product of the
weekly benefit amount multiplied by eight (8).
[8] After hearing testimony, the ALJ issued a written decision reversing the
determination of the claims investigator. The ALJ articulated the issue as
“whether the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause in
connection with the work,” Appealed Order at 1, and recited a corresponding
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standard of review.3 However, although the ALJ found that Claimant
voluntarily left her employment with Company, she made no explicit finding as
to whether the voluntary separation was with or without good cause. Rather,
the ALJ implicitly found a lack of good cause when she applied the
modification to non-eligibility found in Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-
1(c)(1)(B), which incorporates the “without good cause” language:
(c) The disqualifications provided in this section shall be subject
to the following modifications:
(1) An individual shall not be subject to disqualification because
of separation from the individual’s employment if: …
(B) having been simultaneously employed by two (2) employers,
the individual leaves one (1) such employer voluntarily without
good cause in connection with the work but remains in
employment with the second employer with a reasonable
expectation of continued employment[.]
[9] Company argues that the Act aims to protect those unemployed through no
fault of their own, and it is not intended to reward an employee who secures a
second job and then voluntarily quits their first position. Company describes
the situation to which the statutory modification is applicable as “simultaneous
3
See Brown v. Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 919 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that a
claimant demonstrates good cause for leaving employment upon establishing two components: “(a) that her
reasons for abandoning her employment would impel a reasonably prudent person to terminate under the
same or similar circumstances; and (b) that these reasons or causes are objectively related to the
employment.”)
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employment by two employers, quitting one with the expectation of continued
employment with the other, and subsequent unemployment by the second
employer through no fault of the employee.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. In support
of this statutory construction, Company directs our attention to Winder v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 528 N.E.2d 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
[10] The appellant in Winder had been employed full-time as a Trustee caseworker,
accepted a part-time retail job which she quit without good cause in connection
with the work, and continued to work as a caseworker for a number of days
before she was discharged. After she was denied unemployment benefits
pursuant to the disqualification provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1,
the appellant pursued an equal protection challenge. A panel of this Court
concluded that Winder had been denied equal protection under the law:
We must give the Act “a liberal construction in favor of
employees because it is social legislation meriting such
construction in order to promote its underlying humanitarian
purposes.” Horvath v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division (1987) 2d Dist. Ind. App., 503 N.E.2d 441, 443.
Winder argues that denial of benefits pursuant to I.C. 22–4–15–1
is not rationally related to two of the goals of the Indiana
Employment Security Act. We agree. These goals are to provide
benefits to those unemployed through no fault of their own and
to encourage employment stability. Winder was unemployed
through no fault of her own when a new trustee fired her from
her full-time job as a caseworker. Though she had earlier quit a
seasonal part-time position at Frank’s, she did so reasonably
expecting to maintain full-time employment at the Trustee’s
office. Thus, she was attempting to maintain stable employment.
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Id. at 857. The Court recognized that the Employment Security Act (“the Act”)
sought to “encourage stable employment” and “Winder never voluntarily
became unemployed.” Id.
[11] Company contends that the simultaneous employer provision should not be
subject to manipulation and must be construed to apply only when, as in
Winder, the last separation from employment was outside the employee’s
control. Without acknowledging that Claimant’s reduction in hours was
outside her control, Company argues that Claimant failed to act to maintain
stable employment because she should have continued to work for Company
until finding a full-time position.
[12] The Board responds that the Act broadly defines unemployment to include
partial unemployment, the plain language of the simultaneous employment
provision does not restrict the modification to a particular sequence of job loss,
and it must be applied in accordance with the humanitarian objective of the
Act. The Board acknowledges that Winder describes one situation in which a
simultaneously employed claimant may receive benefits – quitting a part-time
job, continuing a full-time job with the expectation of continued employment,
and having that expectation thwarted – but notes that the decision does not
exclude a corollary situation – obtaining a part-time job with the expectation of
continued employment and quitting a prior-held part-time job.
[13] “Our first task when interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain
meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.” In re Doe, 148
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N.E.3d 1147, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We ‘“avoid interpretations that
depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and
disharmonizing results.”’ Id. (quoting West v. Office of Indiana Sec’y of State, 54
N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016)). We are mindful of both what a statute “does
say” and “does not say,” and we “do not presume that the Legislature intended
any language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an
unjust or absurd result.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
[14] We observe that the initial focus of Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1 is upon the
most recent job loss, employing the language: “regarding an individual’s most
recent separation from employment before filing an initial or additional claim
for benefits.” The simultaneous employment provision requires “a reasonable
expectation of continued employment,” see id., but does not – as the Board
points out – explicitly limit application of the modification to voluntary
separation from the last-acquired employment. That said, Company’s
argument as to manipulation is not without merit. We are not persuaded that
the Legislature intended to render wholly irrelevant the circumstances under
which a simultaneous employee left any particular position. The goals of the
Act are “to provide benefits to those unemployed through no fault of their own
and to encourage employment stability.” Winder, 528 N.E.2d at 857. Should,
for example, a full-time employee accept a part-time position with a continued
expectation of employment there, while at the same time anticipating quitting
the full-time position without good cause, subsequent blanket application of the
modification to disqualification would not encourage employment stability.
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[15] But here a manipulation scenario is not borne out by the facts. After working
thirty-two hours per week at Company for five and one-half years, Claimant’s
work hours were drastically reduced. The reduction was attributed to reduced
Company income and not the fault of Claimant. Her immediate supervisor
informed her that, if she needed more income, she should look for other
employment. Claimant acted to maintain employment stability,
notwithstanding the fact that she was not immediately offered full-time
employment. The ALJ did not, as Company contends, misapply the
simultaneous employee modification provision.
Conclusion
[16] The decision of the Review Board, adopting the decision of the ALJ, is not
contrary to law.
[17] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
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