Corey Allen Greenlee v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 30 2020, 10:19 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore J. Minch Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Sovich Minch, LLP Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Benjamin J. Shoptaw
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Corey Allen Greenlee, October 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-411
v. Appeal from the
Shelby Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Trent Meltzer, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
73C01-1708-FA-2
Vaidik, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Corey Allen Greenlee was convicted of three counts of child molesting and four
other sex offenses and sentenced to 101 years. He now appeals, raising several
issues. We find that Greenlee’s sentence is inappropriate and revise it to forty-
nine years but otherwise affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Danielle Greenlee and John Huber have a daughter, A.H., born in March 1999.
After Danielle and John got divorced, Danielle married Greenlee in August
2005. A.H. split time between her parents. When she stayed with her mother
and Greenlee, they lived in three houses in southern Shelby County. They
moved to (1) a “house by Southwestern” Elementary when A.H. was “7 or 8”
years old, (2) a house in Flat Rock in “2010” when A.H. was “eleven” years
old, and (3) a house on Del Char Drive in “2012.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 153-54, 202.
[3] On July 4, 2017, A.H., then eighteen years old, disclosed to her boyfriend that
Greenlee had molested her when she was younger. A.H. then told her parents,
and her mother took her to the police station to make a report. The next day, a
detective with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department interviewed A.H.
[4] The State charged Greenlee with seven counts:
• Count I: Class C felony child molesting (“placing A.H.’s hands on his
penis and telling A.H. to masturbate him” between January 2007 and
December 2010)
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• Count II: Class A felony child molesting (“placing his mouth and/or
tongue on A.H.’s bare vagina” between January 2010 and December
2011)
• Count III: Class D felony child solicitation (between January 2012 and
March 2013)
• Count IV: Class D felony child solicitation (between March 2013 and
June 2014)
• Count V: Level 5 felony child solicitation (between July 2014 and March
2015)
• Count VI: Class D felony vicarious sexual gratification (touched or
fondled his own body in A.H.’s presence between January 2007 and
December 2011)
• Count VII: Class A felony child molesting (“having A.H. place anal
beads in his butt” between January 2010 and December 2011)
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 21-22, 53. On August 11, Greenlee’s mother
posted a $5,000 cash bond for him. The bond agreement, signed by Greenlee’s
mother, provides:
I understand that pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-8 et seq. any
fines, fees, forfeitures, restitution, or costs imposed against the
Defendant shall be paid out of the cash bond without further
notice. . . . I understand that by posting this bond, this money
will be treated as if it is the defendant’s own money.
Id. at 33.
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[5] A jury trial was held in November 2019. A.H. testified about what Greenlee did
to her at each house. Specifically, A.H. testified that when they lived at the
house by Southwestern Elementary, Greenlee had her come into his bedroom
and shut the door. Greenlee then had her remove her clothes and lie on the bed
with her “legs spread.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204. Greenlee then “jack[ed] off,” or
rubbed his penis. Id. According to A.H., this happened several times a week
while they lived at this house. In addition, at least once Greenlee had A.H. lie
next to him and rub his penis.
[6] In 2010, the family moved to a house in Flat Rock. A.H. testified that Greenlee
did the same things to her at this house, plus new things. A.H. testified that on
a few occasions, Greenlee had her watch pornography while he rubbed his
penis. At least once, Greenlee retrieved “anal beads” from his dresser and had
A.H. put them in his anus, instructing her how far to “push” them in. Id. at 207,
208. And once, Greenlee had A.H. lie naked on the bed and licked her “private
area.” Id. at 208.
[7] In 2012, the family moved to a house on Del Char Drive. A.H. testified that
although Greenlee did not molest her at this house, he asked her to come into
his bedroom so they could do things like “old times.” Id. at 209. A.H. said
Greenlee asked her this “almost every day.” Id. at 210.
[8] On November 13, 2019, the jury found Greenlee guilty as charged. The
sentencing hearing was set for December 10 but was moved to December 12.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. When the parties appeared for sentencing on
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December 12, the State asked for a continuance because it hadn’t been able to
contact A.H., who was pregnant and due that month.1 Defense counsel said he
would not object to “a brief continuance.” Supp. Tr. p. 3. The parties then
discussed when to have the hearing, given that A.H. would likely have her baby
soon. When the parties discussed early January, defense counsel said he was
“fine with that” and would “make it work.” Id. at 4, 5. The trial court
rescheduled the sentencing hearing for January 9, 2020. That day, the State and
defense counsel “jointly” moved for another continuance. Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 12. The court rescheduled the sentencing hearing for January 21.
[9] At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued for a sentence of thirty years,
with twenty years executed and ten years suspended to probation. Tr. Vol. III p.
42. In contrast, the State argued for a sentence of 100 years. Id. at 45. The trial
court found five aggravators: (1) Greenlee had several prior felony convictions
(including Class C felony burglary, Class D felony criminal confinement, and
Class D felony residential entry) and several prior misdemeanor convictions
(including battery, possession of marijuana, and reckless driving); (2) Greenlee
was in a position of trust with A.H.; (3) A.H. experienced “emotional” harm;
(4) Greenlee committed “other uncharged acts” against A.H.; and (5) Counts
III-VI were “committed repeatedly.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 18. The court
1
Greenlee says there is no evidence in the record that he was “even present” on December 12. Appellant’s
Reply Br. p. 10. To the contrary, the CCS reflects that Greenlee appeared “in person/custody” on December
12. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11.
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found no mitigators. It sentenced Greenlee, then forty-one years old, as
follows:
• Count I: Class C felony child molesting, 6 years
• Count II: Class A felony child molesting, 40 years
• Count III: Class D felony child solicitation, 3 years
• Count IV: Class D felony child solicitation, 3 years
• Count V: Level 5 felony child solicitation, 6 years
• Count VI: Class D felony vicarious sexual gratification, 3 years
• Count VII: Class A felony child molesting, 40 years
The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total sentence of 101
years. The trial court also ordered the cost of A.H.’s deposition transcripts—
$666—to “be paid from [Greenlee’s] bond.” Id. at 11.
[10] Greenlee now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] Greenlee first contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his seven
convictions. He doesn’t challenge any particular elements of the offenses;
rather, he argues the evidence is insufficient to support all of his convictions
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because they are based on “the uncorroborated testimony of A.H.” Appellant’s
Br. p. 12. The State disputes that A.H.’s testimony is uncorroborated. For
example, it notes that Danielle “testified that [Greenlee] had anal beads and
pornographic DVDs” and that Greenlee’s daughter testified that she “witnessed
[Greenlee] take A.H. into his room.” Appellee’s Br. p. 12. But even if Greenlee
were right that A.H.’s testimony is uncorroborated, it is well settled that a
conviction, including a conviction for child molesting, may rest solely upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Rose v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1055, 1061
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Accordingly, Greenlee’s sufficiency challenge fails.2
II. Sentencing Within Thirty Days
[12] Greenlee next contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him within
thirty days of the jury’s verdict. Indiana Criminal Rule 11 provides, “Upon
entering a conviction, whether the acceptance of a guilty plea or by finding or
by verdict, the court shall sentence a defendant convicted in a criminal case
within thirty (30) days of the plea or the finding or verdict of guilty, unless an
extension for good cause is shown.” See also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(b). When a
defendant fails to object to the scheduling of a sentencing hearing for a day
beyond the thirty-day deadline, he cannot later claim error on appeal. Waters v.
State, 65 N.E.3d 613, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Here, Greenlee not only failed
2
Greenlee does not argue that the incredible-dubiosity doctrine applies to A.H.’s testimony. See Moore v State,
27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015).
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to object on December 12 when the sentencing hearing was scheduled beyond
the thirty-day deadline, he also agreed to it. In addition, he asked for a
continuance on January 9. There is no error on this issue.
III. Cost of Deposition Transcripts
[13] Greenlee next contends that the trial court erred in ordering that “the costs of
the [deposition] transcripts be taken from the bond posted in this [c]ase”
without holding another indigency hearing. Appellant’s Br. p. 19. The State
responds that another indigency hearing wasn’t required because the cost of the
deposition transcripts was paid out of the $5,000 bond under the bond
agreement and Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2. As noted above, the bond
agreement, signed by Greenlee’s mother, provides:
I understand that pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-8 et seq. any
fines, fees, forfeitures, restitution, or costs imposed against the
Defendant shall be paid out of the cash bond without further
notice. . . . I understand that by posting this bond, this money
will be treated as if it is the defendant’s own money.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. In addition, Section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2) permits the
trial court to require the defendant to execute:
(A) a bail bond by depositing cash or securities with the clerk of
the court in an amount not less than ten percent (10%) of the bail;
and
(B) an agreement that allows the court to retain all or a part of
the cash or securities to pay fines, costs, fees, and restitution that
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the court may order the defendant to pay if the defendant is
convicted.
Because the bond agreement in this case allows costs and fees to be paid out of
the $5,000 bond (even though Greenlee himself didn’t post it), the court
properly ordered the cost of the deposition transcripts to be paid out of the bond
without holding another indigency hearing. See Wright v. State, 949 N.E.2d 411,
414-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that “[i]n executing the cash bail bond
agreement [under Section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2)], Wright agreed to give the trial
court the authority to retain all or a part of the $1000 placed in escrow to pay
fines, costs, fees, restitution, and publicly paid costs of representation if she . . .
was convicted” without conducting an indigency hearing). There is no error.
IV. Inappropriate Sentence
[14] Last, Greenlee contends that his 101-year sentence is inappropriate and asks us
to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate
court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The
appellate court’s role under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” and “we
reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158,
159-60 (Ind. 2019) (quotation omitted). “Ultimately, our constitutional
authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of
what is appropriate.” Id. at 160 (quotation omitted).
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[15] A person who commits a Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
between twenty to fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-4(a). A person who commits a Class C felony shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two and eight years, with an advisory
sentence of four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a). A person who commits a Class
D felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six months and three
years, with an advisory sentence of one-and-a-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
7(a). A person who commits a Level 5 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed
term of between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Id.
at (b). Here, the trial court sentenced Greenlee to an above-advisory sentence of
forty years for each Class A felony, an above-advisory sentence of six years for
the Class C felony, the maximum sentence of three years for each Class D
felony, and the maximum sentence of six years for the Level 5 felony. The trial
court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of
101 years.3
[16] As for the nature of the offenses, Greenlee molested his stepdaughter on
numerous occasions between January 2007 and December 2011. The
molestations included Greenlee licking A.H.’s vagina, having A.H. place anal
beads in his anus, and having A.H. fondle his penis. Greenlee also fondled
3
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel said the probation department recommended a sentence of thirty
years. Tr. Vol. III p. 42. Although the PSI includes a recommendation for each count, it is silent as to
whether the sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 150. In any
event, when the State spoke after defense counsel, it didn’t dispute defense counsel’s statement that the
probation department recommended thirty years.
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himself while A.H. was naked. Notably, however, there was never any sexual
intercourse or penetration of A.H. The molestations stopped in 2012; however,
Greenlee solicited A.H. for sexual things for several years thereafter.
[17] Although there is nothing particularly redeeming about Greenlee’s character,
there is nothing particularly egregious about it either. Greenlee has several prior
felony and misdemeanor convictions; however, none are sexual or child-
molesting related. In any event, his criminal history does not warrant a 101-year
sentence.
[18] After considering the nature of the offenses and Greenlee’s character, our
collective sense is that his 101-year sentence is inappropriate and an outlier. The
cases that the State rely upon to argue that Greenlee’s sentence is not an outlier
are distinguishable. For example, in Reyes v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1124 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), the State charged the defendant with fifty counts of sexual-related
offenses for molesting his daughter for several years. The defendant pled guilty
to three counts of Class A felony child molesting, one of which involved sexual
intercourse. The trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of
fifty years for the sexual-intercourse count and the advisory term of thirty years
for the other two counts, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of 110
years. On appeal, we revised the sentence to ninety years. Specifically, we
found
the enhanced fifty-year sentence for child molestation by sexual
intercourse and the imposition of consecutive sentences are
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the
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character of the offender. Therefore, we determine that [a] thirty-
year sentence for molestation by sexual intercourse is
appropriate. However, based upon [the defendant’s] particular
psychological abuse of the victim, we do not consider the
imposition of consecutive sentences to be inappropriate.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the imposition of an
aggregate sentence of ninety years.
Id. at 1129. There are several key differences between Reyes and this case: (1)
Greenlee did not engage in sexual intercourse with A.H.; (2) the “emotional”
harm to A.H. was not like the “psychological abuse” in Reyes, which “took the
perverse form of [the defendant] making the victim look at graphic pictures of
her nude body, her genitalia, and the molestations,” id.; and (3) Greenlee has
above-advisory and consecutive sentences.
[19] In Stetler v. State, 972 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, the jury
found the defendant guilty of two counts of Class A felony child molesting for
molesting two victims, and the defendant admitted being a habitual offender.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to the advisory term of thirty years for
each Class A felony and enhanced one count by thirty years for being a habitual
offender. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for a
total sentence of ninety years. On appeal, we found that this sentence was not
inappropriate. Here, however, there was no habitual-offender finding. In Stetler,
thirty years of the defendant’s ninety-year sentence was for being a habitual
offender. In addition, Stetler involved two victims, not one.
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[20] Here, we believe that the nature of the offenses and Greenlee’s character justify
a sentence below those in both Reyes and Stetler and more like the fifty-year
sentence in Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008) (revising the defendant’s
100-year sentence for five counts of Class A felony child molesting for
molesting his girlfriend’s daughter on several occasions over a two-year period
to fifty years). Accordingly, we keep the individual above-advisory sentences on
each count the same but order the child-molesting sentences (Counts I, II, and
VII) to be served concurrently and the child-solicitation sentences (Counts III,
IV, and V) to be served concurrently. We then order each category of offenses—
child molesting (forty years), child solicitation (six years), and vicarious sexual
gratification (three years)—to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of
forty-nine years.
[21] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
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