In the Matter of the Paternity of B.L.H.: B.F.H. v. K.E.G. (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                  FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                          Oct 30 2020, 8:58 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                       and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Joe Keith Lewis                                           STATE OF INDIANA
    Lewis & Foust, LLP                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion, Indiana                                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Natalie F. Weiss
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Paternity of                         October 30, 2020
    B.L.H.:                                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-JP-1122
    Appeal from the Grant Superior
    B.F.H.,                                                   Court
    Appellant,                                                The Honorable Dana J. Kenworthy,
    Judge
    v.
    The Honorable Brian F. McLane,
    Magistrate
    K.E.G., et al.,
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Appellees.                                                27D02-1908-JP-113
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020            Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   B.F.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court order denying his petition to rescind
    his paternity affidavit and request for genetic testing. He raises two issues on
    appeal, but we address only the following restated, dispositive issue: whether
    the trial court erred when it denied his petition.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   B.L.M. (“Child”) was born on September 4, 2018. K.E.G. (“Mother”) and
    Father executed a paternity affidavit for Child two days later, on September 6,
    2018. In December 2018, when Child was three months old, Father and
    Mother ended their romantic relationship. Father subsequently obtained a
    mail-in two-party genetic test through DNA Direct Solutions that involved only
    him and Child. Father obtained this test on his own more than sixty days after
    he signed the paternity affidavit. The test results allegedly indicated that there
    was a zero probability that Father was Child’s biological father. Father did
    nothing with the test results when he first received them.
    [4]   On August 1, 2019, the State of Indiana, on behalf of Mother, filed a petition to
    establish child support. At the September 26, 2019, hearing on the petition,
    Father requested genetic testing, and his request was denied. On October 7,
    2019, the trial court entered a judgment of support directing Father to pay $285
    per week and established an arrearage of $2,568. On November 8, 2019, Father
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 2 of 9
    filed a petition to rescind his paternity affidavit and a request for genetic
    testing,1 attaching the private DNA test as an exhibit. 2
    [5]   On January 9, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s petition. At the
    hearing, Mother testified in relevant part as follows:
    [Father] knew in the hospital when he signed that paternity
    affidavit that there was a chance that [Child] was not his. He
    knew and he refused a DNA test at the hospital.… He knew
    there was a chance due to us breaking up for three months, that
    there was a chance that he wasn’t the father because we got back
    together. He said that he didn’t want a DNA test, he did not
    want a DNA test, he was her’s [sic] regardless[,] those was [sic]
    his words.… This is not about him not wanting to be [Child’s]
    dad, this is about his paycheck and not wanting to, he was
    perfectly fine being her legal father, he came to my house
    multiple times saying he did want to be her dad and asking me if
    he could be her dad. And it was all his idea to be her father until
    I put him on child support.
    Tr. at 15-16. Mother further testified that she had reached out to Child’s
    alleged biological father and he “refuses to be [Child’s] father.”
    Id. at 18.
    Father testified that he “didn’t think there was any chance that [he] was not the
    Father,” although Mother had “told [him] that she had been sleeping with
    somebody else.”
    Id. at 17. 1
            Although Father’s petition does not state a request for genetic testing, the trial court “interpret[ed it] as a
    request for genetic testing.” Tr. at 17.
    2
    Father offered the private DNA test as an exhibit at the hearing on his petition, but it was not entered into
    evidence. Tr. at 13-14.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020                        Page 3 of 9
    [6]   In an order dated May 11, 2020, the trial court denied Father’s petition to
    rescind his paternity affidavit and request for genetic testing. In doing so, the
    court cited the parties’ testimony and stated, in relevant part:
    ***
    13. Respondent seeks to bolster his allegation of a material
    mistake of fact by relying on a genetic test he obtained without
    court approval.
    14. The court recognizes there is a substantial public policy
    favoring the correct identification of a biological father.
    15. However, Respondent[’s] reliance on the genetic test obtained
    without court approval is unjustified. Respondent’s argument, if
    accepted by the court, would render any burden on a man
    executing a paternity affidavit meaningless. Any man who
    properly executes a paternity affidavit could obtain a genetic test,
    without court approval, and then rely on that test to justify their
    request for a court-ordered genetic test.
    16. Further, Respondent was aware that he may not have been
    the biological father of the child when he executed the paternity
    affidavit. The court acknowledges that he may have been
    mistaken when he indicated he thought there was no possibility
    he was not the father. However, the testimony from both parties
    indicates Mother informed Respondent that she was involved in
    a relationship with another man.
    The Respondent has failed to show there was duress, fraud or a
    material mistake of fact to justify the rescission of the paternity
    affidavit. ACCORDINGLY, Respondent’s request to rescind the
    paternity affidavit and request for genetic testing is denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 4 of 9
    [7]    App. at 8. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]    Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to rescind his paternity
    affidavit and request for genetic testing. Thus, he appeals from a negative
    judgment, and we will reverse the trial court only if the judgment is contrary to
    law. Burnell v. State, 
    56 N.E.3d 1146
    , 1150 (Ind. 2016). A judgment is contrary
    to law if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an
    opposite conclusion.
    Id. In determining whether
    the trial court’s judgment is
    contrary to law, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom.
    Id. [9]
       Moreover, the trial court entered special findings and conclusions pursuant to
    Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Thus, our standard of review is two-tiered: first, we
    determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second whether the
    findings support the judgment. In re Paternity of B.M., 
    93 N.E.3d 1132
    , 1135
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court’s findings and conclusions will be set aside
    only if they are clearly erroneous, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor
    reassess the credibility of the witnesses.
    Id. Rather, we must
    accept the
    ultimate facts as stated by the trial court if there is evidence to sustain them.
    Id. [10]
      A paternity affidavit conclusively establishes paternity without further
    proceedings by a court and gives rise to parental rights and responsibilities
    regarding the right to obtain child support, health insurance, and parenting
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 5 of 9
    time. Ind. Code § 16-37-2-2.1(j), (p). Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1(k) gives
    a man sixty days after executing a paternity affidavit to file a court action to
    request genetic testing. After sixty days have passed, a court may only rescind a
    paternity affidavit when: (1) the court has determined that fraud, duress, or
    material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit; and
    (2) at the request of the man seeking rescission of his affidavit, the court has
    ordered a genetic test, which yields a result indicating that the man is excluded
    as the father of the child. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(l); see also In re Paternity of T.M., 
    953 N.E.2d 96
    , 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[A] man who executed a paternity
    affidavit may not fail to timely request genetic testing under Indiana Code
    section 16-37-2-2.1 and then, as a matter of course, request such testing as a
    fishing expedition.”), trans. denied. Moreover, a man who is the legal father by
    reason of a paternity affidavit may challenge paternity only “in extreme and
    rare instances,” and the challenge must be made by “evidence that has become
    available independently of court action.”
    Id. (quotations and citations
    omitted);
    see also J.O. v. Ortiz, 
    141 N.E.3d 1246
    , 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
    [11]   Here, the trial court found that no fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
    existed in Father’s execution of the paternity affidavit. That conclusion is
    supported by the testimony of both Mother and Father. While Father claims
    that he made a material mistake of fact when he executed the paternity affidavit
    because he believed he was Child’s biological father, it is undisputed that
    Mother told Father there was a possibility that he was not the biological father
    and that Father was aware of that possibility at the time he executed the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 6 of 9
    paternity affidavit. As is true in other areas of the law, a mistake of fact must be
    reasonable, and a reasonable mistake of fact is not one in which a party
    willfully ignores all or some of the relevant facts. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-41-3-7
    (emphasis added) (“It is a defense [to a criminal charge] that the person who
    engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of
    fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the
    offense.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Mistake Defined § 151 (Am.
    Law Inst. 1981) (emphasis added) (defining, in the context of contracts, a
    “mistake” as an “erroneous belief” as to a fact when the party “makes an
    assumption with respect to [the fact], without being aware of alternatives.”).
    [12]   Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Father did not
    mistakenly believe at the time he signed the paternity affidavit that he was the
    only possible biological father of Child; rather, Father was aware of the
    possibility that he was not. And that finding supports the conclusion that
    Father failed to prove a mistake of fact pursuant to Indiana Code Section 16-37-
    2-2.1(l). See In re Paternity of B.M., 
    93 N.E.3d 1132
    , 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
    (holding that the father failed to prove a material mistake of fact existed at the
    time he executed a paternity affidavit where he knew there was a possibility that
    he was not the child’s biological father).
    [13]   The trial court also correctly concluded that the genetic test Father obtained
    without court approval did not “bolster” his claim of mistake of fact. App. at 8.
    First, the results of the test were not admitted into evidence, and Father does
    not challenge that ruling on appeal. Second, even if it had been admitted, the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 7 of 9
    result of the genetic test obtained over three months after the paternity affidavit
    was signed cannot be evidence that a “material mistake of fact existed in the
    execution of the paternity affidavit,” i.e., at the time Father signed the affidavit.
    I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(l) (emphasis added). And third, any challenge to paternity
    must be made by evidence that has become “available independently of court
    action,” i.e., by “externally obtained clear medical proof.” Fairrow v. Fairrow,
    
    559 N.E.2d 597
    , 600 (Ind. 1990); see also In re Paternity of E.M.L.G., 
    863 N.E.2d 867
    , 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “‘Externally obtained’ means that the evidence
    establishing non-paternity was not actively sought by the putative father but
    was discovered almost inadvertently in a manner that was unrelated to child
    support proceedings.” Tirey v. Tirey, 
    806 N.E.2d 360
    , 363 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004), trans. denied. Here, there is no question that Father obtained the genetic
    test solely to challenge his paternity of Child, not inadvertently in the course of
    obtaining ordinary medical care; thus, the genetic test was not valid medical
    proof of non-paternity. Id.; see also In re Paternity of K.M., 
    651 N.E.2d 271
    , 276
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that “one who comes into court to challenge an
    otherwise valid order establishing paternity, without medical proof
    inadvertently obtained through ordinary medical care, should be denied relief as
    outside the equitable discretion of the trial court”).
    Conclusion
    [14]   The trial court did not err when it denied Father’s petition to rescind his
    paternity affidavit and request for genetic testing on the grounds that Father
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 8 of 9
    failed to prove that fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the
    execution of the paternity affidavit per Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1(l).
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1122 | October 30, 2020   Page 9 of 9