Dominique Quinn Brisker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 30 2020, 10:36 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul J. Podlejski Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Steven Hosler
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dominique Q. Brisker, October 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-707
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C04-1711-F4-2743
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20-CR-707 | October 30, 2020 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] Dominique Q. Brisker appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for level 4
felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Brisker
asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
and abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial. Finding no
constitutional violation or abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On the afternoon of November 1, 2017, Malachi Carter and his girlfriend went
to a gas station in Madison County to meet two friends, Antonio Moore and
Jason Nave. Moore and Nave sat in their cars with a space between them, and
Carter exited his vehicle and stood between the two cars. Carter’s girlfriend
stayed in the vehicle. As Carter stood between the cars, other individuals
approached him, including Brisker and Deonta Anderson. Carter knew both
Brisker and Anderson well. Carter and Anderson began fighting and shoving
each other. Brisker then pulled out a gun, and Anderson took the gun from him
and fired at Carter as Carter ran away. Carter was not hit by any bullets, but
Moore was struck in the leg with a bullet. Carter ran across the street and hid
under a porch. As he hid, Carter could see and hear that Anderson and Brisker
were looking for him.
[3] Police were dispatched to the scene based upon a report of “shots fired,” and
Anderson Police Department Detective Chris Frazier was the first to arrive. Tr.
Vol. 4 at 87. A female witness identified Carter, who at the time was walking
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back toward the gas station, as being involved in the altercation because she
“saw him running” from the scene. Id. at 91. Carter was immediately taken
into custody and transported to the Anderson Police Department, where he
gave a detailed recorded statement identifying himself as a victim, Anderson as
the shooter, and Brisker as the individual who originally possessed the gun that
Anderson used to shoot at Carter. Carter identified both men in a photo array,
and his girlfriend identified Brisker in a photo array. 1
[4] Five days after the shooting, on November 6, 2017, the State charged Brisker
with level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon
and level 6 felony pointing a firearm. In a separate case, the State charged
Anderson with the attempted murder of Carter. That same day, Carter went to
the Anderson Police Department and met with Detective Norman Rayford.
Carter recanted his earlier statement identifying Brisker and Anderson, and he
denied being the victim of any shooting. When Carter recanted, he stated that
he was not going to be a witness or “go to court on nobody,” and he refused to
be a “snitch.” State’s Forfeiture Ex. 1. Carter implored Detective Rayford to
tell Anderson and Brisker that he was not cooperating with police. Id.
[5] On March 28, 2018, the State filed a motion for a forfeiture by wrongdoing
hearing. In the motion, the State alleged that it would prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that both Brisker and Anderson engaged in or
1
Police also spoke to Moore, who was in the hospital, but he refused to provide any information regarding
the shooting.
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encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of Carter as a witness for the purpose of preventing Carter from
testifying. The trial court granted the motion and held a forfeiture hearing on
May 15 and 31, 2018. On August 3, 2018, the court issued its order finding that
“the State has met its burden to establish forfeiture by wrongdoing” and that
both Brisker and Anderson “forfeited their rights to confront and cross-
examine” Carter, resulting in the State being permitted “to introduce at trial
otherwise hearsay statements from [Carter], subject to possible limitations of
relevance” and the Evidence Rule 403 balancing test. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 87-88.
[6] The case proceeded to trial, and Carter’s out-of-court statements to police,
including his recorded statement identifying Brisker as the individual who
possessed the gun, were admitted during the State’s case-in-chief over Brisker’s
continuing objection. The defense subsequently called Carter as a witness, and
he claimed that his initial statement to police was incorrect and based upon
faulty assumptions on his part, and that he was high on drugs at the time of the
statement. The jury thereafter found Brisker guilty of level 4 felony unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.2 Following a hearing, the
trial court sentenced Brisker to twelve years, with ten years executed and two
years suspended to probation. The trial court also imposed a six-month
2
The State dismissed the pointing a firearm charge.
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sentence for two counts of contempt due to Brisker’s disruptive and extremely
disrespectful behavior in court. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Brisker asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into
evidence Carter’s out-of-court statements to police. In general, a trial court has
broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will disturb a
trial court’s evidentiary rulings only upon an abuse of discretion. Id. Speers v.
State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied (2014). An abuse of
discretion occurs only where the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the court misinterprets the law.
Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015). We may affirm a trial court’s
evidentiary decision if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State,
695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998).
[8] We first address Brisker’s argument that the admission of Carter’s out-of-court
statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. When a
defendant contends that a constitutional violation has resulted from the
admission of evidence, our standard of review is de novo. Speers, 999 N.E.2d at
852. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides, in relevant part,
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right
allows the admission of an absent witness’s testimonial out-of-court statement
only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity
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to cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
However, “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [the declarant’s]
prior testimonial statements.... The Clause does not bar admission of a
statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Id.
at n. 9. And, our supreme court has clarified that claimed losses of memory at
trial have no effect on availability for purposes of the Confrontation Clause:
Although some courts and commentators contended that a
witness who asserts an inability to recall any significant
information is for all practical purposes unavailable for
confrontation, this issue was settled in United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554, 558 (1988). In Owens, the Supreme Court ... held that
as long as the declarant testifies the Confrontation Clause has
been satisfied even if the declarant is unable to recall the events in
question. Id. at 558.… The feigned or real absence of memory is
itself a factor for the trier of fact to establish, but does not render
the witness unavailable. Rather, as Owens explained, it is a factor
for the trier of fact to consider in evaluating the witness’s current
and earlier versions. Id. at 559….We conclude that a witness who
is present and responds willingly to questions is “available for
cross-examination” as that term is used in Crawford in discussing
the Confrontation Clause, just as Owens observed that such a
witness is “subject to cross-examination” under the common
understanding of that phrase. We believe no significance
attaches to these slightly different verbal formulations.
Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 466 (Ind. 2005) (parallel citations omitted), cert.
denied (2006).
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[9] Brisker concedes that Carter in fact appeared and testified at trial. Defense
counsel was able to thoroughly examine Carter regarding his out-of-court
statements to police identifying Brisker as possessing the gun, and his
subsequent statement and current trial position recanting that identification.
Brisker explained away his prior statements saying, “[A]fter I later did a[n]
evaluation of what happened that day … and kinda sobered up, I couldn’t really
tell exactly … where the bullets was comin’ from[,]” and upon reflection, “No,
I did not see [Brisker] with any handgun or any kind of other weapon that day.”
Tr. Vol. 5 at 79. This is more than sufficient for the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, and we fail to see how Brisker can now claim that his
right to confrontation was violated due to the admission of Carter’s out-of-court
statements. 3
[10] Aside from his confrontation claim, Brisker briefly argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to limit the admissibility of Carter’s out-of-court
statements to impeachment evidence as opposed to substantive evidence.
However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defense counsel made a
specific objection on that basis or requested an admonishment or a jury
3
Brisker premises the entirety of his Sixth Amendment argument on the trial court’s ruling, both pretrial and
at the outset of the State’s case-in-chief, that Carter’s out-of-court statements to police would be admitted as
substantive evidence pursuant to the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine, which provides that if the
defendant’s own wrongdoing caused the declarant to be unavailable to testify at trial, then the defendant has
forfeited his right to confront that witness. Scott v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020),
trans. denied; see also Ind. Evidence Rule 804(b)(5) (known as the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay
exception, which permits admission of a “statement offered against a party that has engaged in or encouraged
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness for the
purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.”). However, because Carter did, in fact,
attend trial and testify, we find Brisker’s claim that his right to confrontation was somehow violated by the
trial court’s ruling regarding forfeiture to be wholly inapposite.
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instruction limiting the use of any of Carter’s out-of-court statements to
impeachment only. Accordingly, any challenge to the use of Carter’s prior
statements as substantive evidence is waived. See Lawrence v. State, 959 N.E.2d
385, 389-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 839
(Ind.1997) (failure to object or request proper admonishment as to limited
admissibility of evidence results in waiver of error on appeal)), trans. denied; see
also Ind. Evidence Rule 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible
against a party or for a purpose—but not against another party or for another
purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
[11] Waiver notwithstanding, it is well settled that a prior out-of-court statement is
admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is “an
identification of a person shortly after perceiving the person.” Ind. Evidence
Rule 801(d)(1)(C). Carter’s prior statements to police identifying Brisker as the
individual who possessed the gun, check all of those boxes, and, on the record
before us, Brisker would be unable to formulate a viable argument that they do
not. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements. See
Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122, 127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (witness’s prior
statement to police identifying defendant as driver of car used in crime was
admissible as substantive evidence under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) where
witness recanted her prior identification statement at trial identifying
defendant), trans. denied; see also Robinson v. State, 682 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. Ct.
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Ohio App. 1997) (no error in allowing police detective to testify regarding witness’s
identification of defendant where witness testified at trial and recanted his prior
identification statement and claimed that his prior statement to police was a
fabrication). Based upon the foregoing, we affirm Brisker’s conviction.
[12] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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