Omar Dominguez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                 FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                         Nov 05 2020, 8:46 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                           Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                      and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Elizabeth A. Flynn                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Braje, Nelson & Janes, LLP                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Michigan City, Indiana                                  Angela N. Sanchez
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Omar Dominguez,                                         November 5, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-387
    v.                                              Appeal from the
    La Porte Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Thomas J. Alevizos, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    46C01-1603-F4-194
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020           Page 1 of 7
    [1]   Omar Dominguez (“Dominguez”) was convicted after a jury trial of one count
    of dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug 1 as a Level 4 felony and two counts of
    dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug,2 each as a Level 5 felony. He was
    sentenced to a nine-years executed. Dominguez appeals and raises two issues
    challenging his sentence. Because the sentencing statement is not clear on how
    the nine-year sentence is applicable to the three convictions, we remand for
    clarification of the sentencing statement.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On September 9, October 6, and October 28, 2015, law enforcement officers in
    La Porte County, who were part of a multi-department anti-drug task force,
    utilized confidential informant 692 (“CI 692”) to purchase cocaine from
    Dominguez through three separate transactions. Tr. Vol. II at 118-21, 123-42.
    Prior to each transaction, law enforcement would meet CI 692 at a
    predetermined location, conduct a pre-buy briefing, search CI 692’s vehicle and
    person for drugs and money, outfit CI 692 with a disguised video and audio
    recording device, and provide CI 692 with pre-recorded U.S. currency for the
    drug purchase. Id. at 122-23. For each transaction, CI 692 was followed by law
    enforcement from the meeting location to Dominguez’s residence, and CI 692
    was under constant surveillance during the entire drive. Id. at 125. Once the
    1
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1
    (a), (c)(1).
    2
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1
    (a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 2 of 7
    transaction had occurred, and CI 692 had purchased cocaine from Dominguez,
    CI 692 would get back into his vehicle and drive back to the same pre-
    determined meeting location, at which time he would be searched, the
    purchased cocaine would be seized by law enforcement officers, and the
    recording device was retrieved so that the footage could be downloaded. 
    Id. at 129, 133-34, 137-38
    .
    [3]   At the September 9, 2015 drug buy, CI 692 purchased 3.6 grams of cocaine
    from Dominguez. State’s Exs. 2A, 2B; Tr. Vol. II at 139-40. At the October 6,
    2015 drug buy, CI 692 purchased 1.0 grams of cocaine from Dominguez.
    State’s Exs. 3A, 3B; Tr. Vol. II at 139-40. During the October 28, 2015 drug buy,
    CI 692 purchased 1.2 grams of cocaine from Dominguez. State’s Exs. 4A, 4B;
    Tr. Vol. II at 139-40. Dominguez was identified as the individual selling
    cocaine to CI 692 on each occasion. Tr. Vol. II at 124-42; State’s Exs. 5-8.
    [4]   On March 1, 2016, the State charged Dominguez with one count of Level 4
    felony dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug and two counts of Level 5 felony
    dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15-17. On March
    5 and 6, 2018, a jury trial was held. 
    Id. at 43-47
    . Dominguez failed to appear at
    trial and was tried in absentia. 
    Id.
     At the conclusion of the jury trial,
    Dominguez was found guilty as charged. Tr. Vol. III at 29. A warrant was
    issued for Dominguez’s arrest, and he was apprehended on July 24, 2018.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 48-51.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 3 of 7
    [5]   On October 17, 2018, the sentencing hearing was held. The trial court found the
    following aggravating circumstances: (1) Dominguez’s prior criminal history;
    (2) his recent violation of probation; (3) his commission of subsequent crimes;
    and (4) the fact that he was a fugitive and did not attend his trial. Tr. Vol. III at
    62. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and specifically rejected
    Dominguez’s proffered mitigation argument that incarceration would be a
    hardship on his dependents, reasoning that nothing supported that the burden
    was undue and rose to the status of a mitigating circumstance. 
    Id. at 61-62
    . In
    its oral sentencing statement, the trial court stated: “The aggravating factors
    outweigh the mitigating factors. The Court sentences the defendant to a
    determinant [sic] sentence of nine years in the Indiana Department of
    Correction.” 
    Id. at 62
    . In its written judgment of conviction and sentencing
    order, the trial court stated that
    Dominguez shall be committed to the custody of the Indiana
    Department of Correction for a period of three (3) years on
    Count I - Dealing in Cocaine or a Narcotic Drug, Level 4
    Felony; [Dominguez] is sentenced to three (3) years on Count II -
    Dealing in Cocaine or a Narcotic Drug, Level 5 Felony, and to
    three (3) years on Count III - Dealing in Cocaine or a Narcotic
    Drug, Level 5 Felony. Said sentence shall be served
    consecutively.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 75. Dominguez now appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 4 of 7
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Dominguez raises two issues regarding his sentence, that his sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character and that the
    trial court abused its discretion by not considering certain mitigating
    circumstances in sentencing him. As to his inappropriateness argument,
    Dominguez poses two different challenges, one of which is that his nine-year
    sentence is inappropriate because the trial court ordered his sentences to be
    served consecutively, which violated established case law set out in Beno v.
    State, 
    581 N.E.2d 922
     (Ind. 1991) and its progeny.
    [7]   In Beno, our Supreme Court found that, although the trial court properly
    sentenced Beno to the maximum term on each count, the trial court
    erroneously ordered the sentences to be served consecutively because the Court
    noted that, although a trial court has discretion to impose both maximum and
    consecutive sentences, where a defendant is enticed by the police to commit
    nearly identical crimes as a result of a police sting operation, consecutive
    sentences are inappropriate. 
    Id. at 924
    . Since then, Indiana courts have
    repeatedly held that “[c]onsecutive sentences are not appropriate when the State
    sponsors a series of virtually identical offenses.” Gregory v. State, 
    644 N.E.2d 543
    , 544 (Ind. 1994); see also, Eckelbarger v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 169
    , 170 (Ind.
    2016); Davis v. State, 
    142 N.E.3d 495
    , 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); Rios v. State, 
    930 N.E.2d 664
    , 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Williams v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 621
    , 635
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Hendrickson v. State, 
    690 N.E.2d 765
    , 767 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1998). Dominguez contends that his sentence is inappropriate because the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 5 of 7
    court ordered that his sentences be served consecutively for his three
    convictions resulting from a State-sponsored series of virtually identical
    offenses.
    [8]   There is a conflict between the oral and written sentencing statements, which
    makes the trial court’s intent unclear. In its oral sentencing statement, the trial
    court stated as follows: “[T]he aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
    factors. The Court sentences the defendant to a determinant [sic] sentence of
    nine years in the Indiana Department of Correction.” Tr. Vol. II at 62. The oral
    statement, therefore, did not specify to which counts the nine-year aggregate
    sentence would apply. 
    Id.
     However, in the trial court’s written sentencing
    statement, it ordered Dominguez to serve three years on each of his conviction
    with the sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate sentence of nine years.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 74-75.
    [9]   When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them
    together to discern the intent of the sentencing court. Vaughn v. State, 
    13 N.E.3d 873
    , 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Rather than presuming the
    superior accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it alongside the written
    sentencing statement to assess the conclusions of the trial court. Murrell v. State,
    
    960 N.E.2d 854
    , 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Here, the oral and written
    sentencing statements are in conflict. “Where we find an irregularity in a trial
    court’s sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for
    clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error
    is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 6 of 7
    independently at the appellate level.” Clippinger v. State, 
    54 N.E.3d 986
    , 992
    (Ind. 2016). Here, we choose to remand to allow the trial court to clarify its
    sentencing statement as to how it intended the nine-year sentence to be
    apportioned between Dominguez’s three convictions.
    [10]   Remanded with instructions.
    Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020   Page 7 of 7