Michael D. Williams v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )

FILED
Nov 12 2020, 8:44 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Andrew J. Sickmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Boston Bever Forrest Cross & Sickmann Attorney General
Richmond, Indiana
Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael D. Williams, November 12, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1209
v. Appeal from the
Wayne Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Darrin M. Dolehanty, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D03-1911-CM-1124
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Michael D. Williams appeals his conviction for theft, which is based on him
finding and taking money left at a grocery-store self-checkout station by a
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previous customer. We reverse, concluding that Williams’s conduct does not
constitute theft under Indiana law.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 30, 2019, a man at the Kroger store in Richmond used a self-
checkout station to make a purchase totaling $16.67. He paid with a $100 bill,
resulting in change of $83.33. The $83 in cash and the coins were dispensed into
separate trays. The man took the coins but got distracted and left the store
without the cash. A second customer then approached the station and used a
debit card to complete a transaction. After several minutes passed, Williams, an
off-duty Kroger employee, approached the station and completed a transaction.
He used a credit card, but he noticed the cash, put it in his pocket, and left the
store. The man who left the cash behind later returned to the store to report
what had happened. The store reviewed surveillance footage of the transactions
and saw that Williams had taken the money. The store gave the man $83
“because it was an off-duty associate that had taken the money,” Tr. p. 34, and
then reported the incident to police.
[3] The State charged Williams with Class A misdemeanor theft, alleging that he
“did knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the property of
Roger Stinson, to-wit: cash with the intent to deprive Roger Stinson of any part
of the use or value of the property, contrary to Indiana law.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 11. The case proceeded to a bench trial. While the charging
information identified the victim as Roger Stinson, no person named Roger
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Stinson testified, and no witness or exhibit identified Roger Stinson as the man
who left the money behind. Nonetheless, the trial court found Williams guilty
as charged and sentenced him to 180 days in jail, all suspended to probation.
[4] Williams now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Williams contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. When
reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind.
2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction
will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support
each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[6] Williams argues his conviction must be reversed because the State did not
present evidence establishing the identity of the man who left the $83 at the self-
checkout station. The State does not dispute it failed to identify the man.
Instead, it asserts it was not required to do so under the theft statute, which
provides, “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized
control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person
of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind.
Code § 35-43-4-2(a). According to the State, this language “requires only that
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the State establish that the property was ‘of another’ and does not require proof
of the victim’s name.” Appellee’s Br. p. 8. But as Williams notes, “it is well
settled that the name of the owner or possessor of property alleged to have been
stolen is a material allegation which must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Pryor v. State, 889 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying an
auto-theft statute that included language similar to the theft statute). We could
reverse Williams’s conviction for this reason alone.
[7] But there is a more fundamental problem with Williams’s conviction. Indiana’s
theft statute does not criminalize the taking of lost or mislaid property, unlike
statutes in many other states. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 19.2(f) (3d ed. 2017). Indiana used to have such a statute, which provided:
A person who obtains control over lost or mislaid property
commits theft when he:
(1) knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows or
learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner,
and
(2) fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property
to the owner, and
(3) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property.
Reasonable measures shall include, but not necessarily be limited
to, notifying the identified owner or any peace officer.
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Ind. Code § 35-17-5-5 (1976). However, the legislature repealed that statute over
forty years ago. Acts 1976, P.L. 148 § 24. If such conduct is to be re-
criminalized, that is a decision for the legislature. Under the existing theft
statute, Williams’s conviction cannot stand.
[8] Reversed.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
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