Terry G. Baugh v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 17 2020, 7:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Brooklyn, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Josiah Swinney
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Terry G. Baugh, November 17, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2978
v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Lewis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D06-1804-F2-1090
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 1 of 13
[1] Terry G. Baugh appeals his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine, a
Level 2 felony, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Baugh also claims
that his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine and maintaining a
common nuisance violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On March 29, 2018, Terre Haute Police Department Detectives Brian Bourbeau
and James Palmer were conducting surveillance of a residence on Seventh
Street. The detectives patrolled the block, anticipating that a black Chevrolet
S10 truck with an Illinois license plate parked near the residence would leave.
The detectives knew that Baugh owned the vehicle, was a habitual traffic
offender, and did not have a driver’s license. They also learned that Baugh had
been selling methamphetamine from this residence.
[4] At some point, the detectives noticed that the truck was no longer parked in
front of the Seventh Street residence. However, they saw Baugh driving the
truck approximately ten blocks away. The detectives stopped the truck and
ordered Baugh from the vehicle. Baugh’s son, Terry Baugh Jr. (Baugh Jr.), and
Jessica McCullough, who were passengers in the truck, were also told to exit
the vehicle.
[5] The detectives arrested Baugh, searched him, seizing 2.99 grams of
methamphetamine from his pants pocket. Baugh Jr. was also arrested after the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 2 of 13
detectives saw him drop a bag at his feet that was determined to contain
methamphetamine mixed with dimethyl sulfone.1 McCullough was not
charged with any criminal offenses and was permitted to leave.
[6] During an inventory search of the truck, the police seized three cell phones.
The detectives then returned to the Seventh Street residence and saw
McCullough walk inside. McCullough allowed the detectives inside, and she
told them that Joshua Baugh was also there. When performing a protective
sweep, the detectives noticed a locked door to an upstairs apartment. Both
Joshua and McCullough told the detectives that neither one of them had a key.
[7] The detectives obtained a warrant to search the upstairs apartment. During the
search, the detectives seized a bag from the bedroom that contained three
smaller plastic bags with crystal-like substances that tested positive for
methamphetamine. A forensic scientist determined that two of the bags
contained a total of 36.73 grams of methamphetamine and the third bag
contained a substance weighing 8.45 grams. 2 The methamphetamine had a
street value of approximately $4,000.
[8] The detectives also seized a scale, some empty plastic bags, and various
documents addressed to Baugh from the apartment. Those documents included
1
Dimethyl sulfone is a commonly used anti-inflammatory agent that is a non-controlled substance.
2
The third bag, weighing 8.4 grams was not tested, as the aggregate net weight of the other two bags that tested
positive for methamphetamine exceeded “any statutory or any legal limit for legal purposes.” Transcript Vol. III at
81.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 3 of 13
a bill from January 2018 and a handwritten card with the name, “Terry G.
Baugh,” that bore his date of birth and a social security number. Transcript Vol.
III at 44, 46. They also discovered a rent receipt dated March 7, 2018, with
Baugh’s name on it. One of the detectives testified that “[n]othing was located
in [the] upstairs apartment that belonged to anyone, [other than Baugh].” Id. at
69.
[9] A photo on one of the phones that the police had seized from Baugh’s truck
showed him sleeping on a bed with a pillowcase that matched the pillowcases
on the bed in the upstairs apartment. The picture also showed the “same
curtain” that was hanging in the apartment when the detectives executed the
warrant. Id.
[10] On April 4, 2018, the State charged Baugh with dealing in methamphetamine, a
Level 2 felony, possession of methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony, maintaining
a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony, and operating a vehicle as a habitual
traffic violator, a Level 6 felony. The State also alleged that Baugh was a
habitual offender.
[11] Following the presentation of evidence at Baugh’s jury trial on August 26, 2019,
the trial court gave the following instruction regarding the offense of
maintaining a common nuisance:
The Crime of Maintaining a Common Nuisance as charged in
Count 3 is defined by law as follows: A person who knowingly
or intentionally maintains a building, structure, vehicle, or other
place that is used for the purposes of unlawfully using,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 4 of 13
manufacturing, keeping, offering for sale, selling, delivering or
financing the delivery of a controlled substance or an item of
drug paraphernalia. To convict the Defendant, the State must
have proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
Number 1; the Defendant, number 2; knowingly or intentionally,
Number 3; maintained a building, structure, vehicle, or other
place, number 4; that was used for the purpose of unlawfully
using, manufacturing, keeping, offering for sale, selling,
delivering or financing the delivery of a controlled substance or
item of drug paraphernalia.
Id. at 166-67. Baugh was found guilty as charged and was determined to be a
habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing on November 21, 2019, the trial
court merged the possession of methamphetamine count into the dealing count
and sentenced Baugh to twenty years of incarceration. The trial court enhanced
the sentence by ten years in light of the habitual offender finding.
[12] Baugh was also sentenced to one-and-one-half years on the maintaining a
common nuisance and habitual traffic offender counts. Those sentences were
ordered to run concurrently with each other and with the sentence that was
imposed on the dealing count, resulting in an aggregate thirty-year term of
incarceration. Baugh now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[13] Baugh claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
dealing in methamphetamine. His sole contention is that the State failed to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 5 of 13
show that he possessed the drug because the evidence “did not establish that he
had either the intent or the capability to maintain dominion and control over an
upstairs apartment where the methamphetamine was discovered.” Appellant’s
Brief at 8.
[14] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane
v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d
124, 126 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. We will not assess witness credibility or
weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.
Casey v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the element of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146-47.
[15] While Baugh argues that the evidence failed to show that he possessed the
methamphetamine seized from the upstairs apartment, we note that even
though Baugh did not actually possess the drugs, constructive possession of the
contraband may support a conviction for a drug offense. Goliday v. State, 708
N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). To prove constructive possession, the State must show
that the defendant had both the intent to maintain dominion and control over
the drugs, as well as the capability to do so. Id. The factfinder may infer that a
defendant had the capability to maintain dominion and control over contraband
from the simple fact that the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 6 of 13
on which an officer found the item. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind.
2011); Ross v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. Ap. 2020).
[16] When a defendant’s possessory interest in the premises is non-exclusive, intent
is established by evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the
defendant’s knowledge of the drugs’ presence. Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175. Such
“additional circumstances” include the mingling of contraband with other items
the defendant owns or other circumstances that may just as reasonably
demonstrate the requisite knowledge. Id.
[17] In this case, the evidence demonstrated that the upstairs apartment contained
only Baugh’s personal property that included mail addressed to him and a
handwritten card that accurately reflected Baugh’s birth date. Additionally, the
photo from a phone found in Baugh’s truck showed him resting his head on the
same pillowcase next to the same curtains that were present when the police
officers searched the apartment. Moreover, neither Joshua nor McCullough—
the other residents in the building—had a key to the upstairs apartment.
[18] Contrary to Baugh’s assertions, this evidence renders the possibility that
someone else absconded with Baugh’s documents and stored them in the
apartment extremely remote. And while Baugh contends that the documents
found in the apartment “could” have referred to Baugh’s son, and that it would
be “unusual for a person to carry around a card as a reminder of his own
birthdate,” Appellant’s Brief at 13, those arguments are requests for this court to
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Purvis v. State, 87 N.E.3d 1119,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 7 of 13
1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Hence, the evidence established that Baugh had an
exclusive possessory interest in the upstairs apartment.
[19] The State further established that the documents belonging to Baugh were
found in the vicinity where the three bags of methamphetamine and other items
connected to drug dealing were seized, and there was no evidence that these
items were hidden or difficult to locate. Hence, the documents were sufficiently
mingled with the methamphetamine to support Baugh’s knowledge of the
drugs’ location, as well as his intent to maintain “dominion or control” over
them. See, e.g., Watt v. State, 412 N.E.2d 90, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming
the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana where the evidence
showed that the drugs were found in the defendant’s dresser drawer).
[20] In conclusion, the State proved that Baugh had a possessory interest in the
upstairs apartment, and the evidence established his intent to maintain
dominion and control over the methamphetamine that was found in that
apartment. For all of these reasons, the evidence was sufficient to show that
Baugh was in constructive possession of the methamphetamine, and his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this basis, fails.
II. Double Jeopardy
[21] Baugh claims that his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine and
maintaining a common nuisance cannot stand because a conviction on both
counts violates the prohibition against double jeopardy under the Indiana
Constitution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 8 of 13
[22] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “no person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” While this case was pending on
appeal, our Supreme Court expressly overruled the test set forth in Richardson v.
State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), when resolving claims of substantive double
jeopardy. The Richardson court recognized that “two or more offenses are the
‘same offense’ in violation of [Indiana’s Double Jeopardy provision] if, with
respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual
evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also
establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id. at 49
(emphasis in original).
[23] In Wadle v. State, the Court observed that the Richardson tests “have proved
largely untenable, ultimately forcing the Court to retreat from its all-inclusive
analytical framework. What we’re left with today is a patchwork of conflicting
precedent and inconsistent standards, ultimately depriving the Indiana bench
and bar of proper guidance in this area of the law.” 151 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind.
2020). In overruling Richardson, the Court in Wadle adopted an analytical
framework that applies statutory rules of construction. Wadle observed that
when deciding whether a single criminal transaction violates multiple statutes
with common elements, the first step is to examine the statutory language for
each offense to determine whether the language of either statute expressly or
impliedly permits multiple punishments. The Court explained that
This framework, which applies when a defendant’s single act or
transaction implicates multiple criminal statutes (rather than a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 9 of 13
single statute), consists of a two-part inquiry: First, a court must
determine, under our included-offense statutes, whether one
charged offense encompasses another charged offense. Second, a
court must look at the underlying facts—as alleged in the
information and as adduced at trial—to determine whether the
charged offenses are the ‘same.’
If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there’s no
violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is,
by definition, ‘included’ in the other. But if the facts show only a
single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in
the other, then the presumption is that the legislation intends for
alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions.
Id. at 235.
[24] In this case, the State concedes—and we agree—that neither the dealing statute
nor the maintaining a common nuisance statute permits multiple punishment.
Thus, when applying the appropriate framework to the facts and circumstances
here, we next determine whether either offense is an included offense of the
other. As defined by our legislature, an included offense is one that: (1) “is
established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material
elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged,” (2)
“consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise
included therein,” or (3) “differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public
interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.”
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168. “If neither offense is an included offense of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 10 of 13
other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double
jeopardy.” Wadle, 151 N.E.2d at 248.
[25] Pursuant to I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1, the elements required to prove dealing in
methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony include a defendant’s (1) knowing or
intentional; (2) possession with the intent to deliver; (3) methamphetamine; (4)
in the amount of at least ten grams. The offense of maintaining a common
nuisance is committed when the State proves that the defendant: (1) knowingly
or intentionally; (2) maintains a residence or vehicle; (3) that was used for the
purpose of unlawfully using, keeping, selling, or delivering a controlled
substance or drug paraphernalia. I.C. § 35-45-1-5(c).
[26] While Baugh would have us conclude that the greater offense of dealing in
methamphetamine is included in the maintaining a common nuisance offense,
we cannot agree, as each of these offenses is separate and distinct. More
specifically, Baugh’s possession of more than ten grams of methamphetamine
with the intent to sell it supports the dealing charge, and the apartment he
rented or the vehicle he used for the use or sale of the drugs supports the
maintaining a common nuisance charge. The charging information for dealing
in methamphetamine did not contain any reference to maintaining a building,
structure, vehicle, or other place to unlawfully keep or sell methamphetamine.
Therefore, under the included offense statute, neither the possession of the
methamphetamine with the intent to sell it, nor maintaining a common
nuisance, is an included offense of the other.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 11 of 13
[27] We also reject Baugh’s claim that he was wrongfully convicted of committing
the “same offense,” under the “very same act” or “single transaction test.” See
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6. This test applies when the facts reveal only one
continuous crime and the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of
time, place, singleness of purpose and continuity of action as to constitute a
single transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.2d at 249.
[28] Baugh asserts that he cannot be convicted of both offenses because the only
evidence the State presented to show that he maintained a common nuisance
was “the methamphetamine in his home and in his vehicle.” Appellant’s Reply
Brief at 6 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Baugh’s claim, the State
presented evidence and facts of each offense that were not material to the other.
For instance, although Baugh contends that the methamphetamine seized from
his apartment established the basis for both offenses, the State offered ample
evidence demonstrating that Baugh was conducting an ongoing
methamphetamine sales operation with the use of his vehicle.
[29] Baugh possessed nearly forty grams of methamphetamine, a scale, and empty
plastic bags in his apartment. The detectives testified that the large amount of
the drug, along with the other items that were seized, was indicative of dealing
in the substance rather than possessing it for personal use. Baugh left the
residence in his truck with a smaller portion of methamphetamine and three
different cell phones. The jury could readily infer that Baugh was transporting
a portion of the methamphetamine that he stored in the apartment to sell, thus
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 13
satisfying the elements required to prove the offense of maintaining a common
nuisance.
[30] Given this evidence, it is only speculation that the methamphetamine seized
from Baugh’s apartment was important in establishing the elements necessary to
prove the maintaining a common nuisance offense. See, e.g., Rowland v. State,
No. 19A-CR-2761, slip op. at 8, (Ind. Ct. App. September 8, 2020) (finding no
double jeopardy violation and affirming the defendant’s convictions for both
possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia when the State
presented evidence that marijuana found in the pipes was separate and distinct
from the additional marijuana found in the vehicle). In short, the State proved
that Baugh committed two distinct criminal acts.
[31] For all these reasons, Baugh has failed to show that his convictions on both
offenses violated the prohibition against double jeopardy.
[32] Judgment affirmed.
Riley, J. and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2978 | November 17, 2020 Page 13 of 13