In the Matter of J.M. and P.M. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services, and V.M. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                FILED
    Jun 03 2016, 6:18 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                          Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Dylan A. Vigh                                             Gregory F. Zoeller
    Law Offices of Dylan A. Vigh, LLC                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of J.M. and P.M.                            June 3, 2016
    (Minor Children), Children in                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    Need of Services,                                         49A02-1510-JC-1763
    Appeal from the Marion Superior
    and                                                       Court
    The Honorable Marilyn A.
    V.M. (Father),                                            Moores, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Trial Court Cause Nos.
    49D09-1505-JC-1486, -1487
    v.
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016     Page 1 of 9
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   V.M. (“Father”) appeals a trial court adjudication designating his children J.M.
    and P.M. (collectively “the Children”) as children in need of services
    (“CHINS”). Finding the evidence sufficient to support the CHINS designation,
    we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2012, Father and A.M. (“Mother”) dissolved their marriage. Pursuant to the
    dissolution decree, they had joint custody of their daughter J.M. (born April 21,
    2006) and son P.M. (born March 21, 2008), with the Children together
    alternating between the parents on a weekly basis.
    [3]   In April 2015, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) investigated a report
    that Father had inappropriately touched the Children and that there was a
    history of domestic violence in the home. Seven-year-old P.M. told a DCS case
    manager that Father had touched him “on the inside of his butt,” and it made
    him feel “uncomfortable and sad.” Appellant’s App. at 37-39. A few days
    later, the Children underwent forensic interviews, during which P.M. disclosed
    that Father had touched him inside his buttocks while he and J.M. were lying
    on a bed watching a movie. J.M. reported that she did not see Father touch
    P.M.’s buttocks but that P.M. had told her about it. P.M. also reported that
    Father had touched his penis while giving him an oil massage.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016   Page 2 of 9
    [4]   In May 2015, DCS filed a CHINS petition, alleging that Father had touched
    P.M. inside his buttocks and had touched his penis during an oil massage; that
    Father had bitten J.M. on her cheek and kissed her lips; that Father’s new wife
    had given J.M. an oil massage while J.M. was naked; and that Father had a
    history of abuse and control over Mother. The trial court reviewed the petition,
    removed the Children from each parent’s care, and granted temporary wardship
    to DCS.
    [5]   At a child hearsay hearing in July 2015, Mother admitted to the CHINS
    allegations based on the Children’s exposure to Father’s acts of domestic
    violence, the reports of his inappropriate touching, and her inability to protect
    the Children due to Father’s unsupervised parenting time. She agreed to
    participate in home-based services, therapy, and a domestic violence
    assessment. Father requested that the trial court admit the forensic interviews
    of the Children and render its decision based on that evidence in lieu of a
    contested factfinding hearing. The trial court admitted the forensic interviews
    and indicated that it would render its decision based on those interviews and
    Mother’s admissions. Father did not request the admission of additional
    evidence.
    [6]   In July 2015, the trial court issued an order designating the Children as CHINS.
    The court held a hearing and issued a dispositional order placing the Children
    with Mother, giving Father supervised parenting time, and ordering both
    parents to participate in home-based therapy.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016   Page 3 of 9
    [7]   On August 26, 2015, Father filed a motion to correct error as to the trial court’s
    CHINS designation, asserting that the trial court erred in ruling primarily on
    the forensic interviews and in failing to consider additional information that
    was not part of the hearing record. He attached to his motion an opinion letter
    from a clinical psychologist and copies of DCS reports not previously in the
    hearing records. Father’s motion to correct error was deemed denied pursuant
    to Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A). He now appeals the CHINS designation. 1
    Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   Father challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the CHINS
    determination. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we give due regard
    to the trial court’s ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. In re Des.B., 
    2 N.E.3d 828
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge
    witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
    inferences most favorable to the trial court’s decision. In re K.D., 
    962 N.E.2d 1249
    , 1253 (Ind. 2012). Where, as here, the trial court sua sponte issues
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a clearly erroneous standard
    for matters covered by the trial court’s findings. In re S.D., 
    2 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1287
    (Ind. 2014). In so doing, we apply a two-tiered standard of review, considering
    first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings
    1
    Mother admitted to the CHINS designation and is not participating in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016     Page 4 of 9
    support the judgment. 
    Id.
     As for matters not covered in the findings, we apply
    a general judgment standard, pursuant to which a judgment “will be affirmed if
    it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” 
    Id.
    [9]    In a CHINS proceeding, the State bears the burden of proving by a
    preponderance of the evidence that a child meets the statutory definition of a
    CHINS. In re N.E., 
    919 N.E.2d 102
    , 105 (Ind. 2010). To meet its burden of
    establishing CHINS status, the State must prove that the child is under age
    eighteen,
    (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
    the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A) the child is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1
    .
    [10]   A CHINS designation focuses on the condition of the child rather than on an
    act or omission by the parent. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. Whereas the acts or
    omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court
    intervention,
    [a] CHINS adjudication can also come about through no
    wrongdoing on the part of either parent, e.g., where a child
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016   Page 5 of 9
    substantially endangers the child’s own health or the health of
    another individual; or when a child is adjudicated a CHINS
    because the parents lack the financial ability to meet the child’s
    extraordinary medical needs. While we acknowledge a certain
    implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the
    truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—
    a determination that a child is in need of services.
    Id. (citations omitted). A trial court need not wait until a tragedy occurs to
    intervene. In re A.H., 
    913 N.E.2d 303
    , 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [11]   Here, Father has not specifically challenged any of the trial court’s findings but
    instead makes general denials of inappropriate conduct and general assertions
    concerning the strength of the evidence and inferences drawn from the forensic
    interviews. The trial court’s findings include the following: 2
    4. Father maintained his denial of the allegations but stipulated
    to the authenticity and admissibility of the video of his children’s
    forensic interviews regarding some of the allegations.
    5. And the Court having reviewed the video and being duly
    advised in the premises thereof, now finds:
    6. Father inappropriately touched the inside of P.M.’s buttocks
    and it felt “bad” to the child.
    2
    To the extent that the findings include proper names for Mother, Father, J.M., and P.M., we have removed
    those designations.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016            Page 6 of 9
    7. Father touched his son P.M. in an inappropriate and sexual
    manner while giving him an oil massage.
    8. Father’s wife … gave J.M. an oil massage while [J.M.] was
    naked.
    9. P.M. did not seem coached in any way during the video. On
    the contrary, the child provided details that would have been very
    difficult for a child his age to remember, if he were lying and
    made time errors that are also very common among children his
    age when they are telling the truth.
    10. P.M. came across as very natural, forthright, embarrassed,
    troubled and … confused by his father’s and his wife’s actions.
    11. J.M., a teenager made no disclosures during her forensic
    interview, but apparently made disclosures once she was reunited
    with her mother.
    ….
    13. Accordingly, the Court finds that the children’s physical and
    mental conditions are seriously impaired and seriously
    endangered as a result of the Father’s commission of sexual
    abuse against at least P.M. and that Mother is unable to protect
    the children while they are in Father’s care because he has
    unsupervised parenting time under the terms of their divorce.
    Appellant’s App. at 5.
    [12]   Interestingly, after stipulating to the trial court basing its ruling on the forensic
    interviews in lieu of a factfinding hearing, Father now argues that the trial court
    accorded too much weight to those interviews. As support, he relies on
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016   Page 7 of 9
    documents attached to his motion to correct error. These documents – an
    opinion letter from a child psychologist and several DCS reports – were not part
    of the record when the trial court ruled on the CHINS petition. “[Indiana Trial]
    Rule 59(H)(1) requires a motion to correct error that is based on evidence
    outside the record to be ‘supported by affidavits showing the truth of the
    grounds set out in the motion.’” Stoffel v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
    3 N.E.3d 548
    , 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Father could have submitted these documents
    before or during the factfinding hearing, but instead, he stipulated to a
    procedure that dispensed with the factfinding hearing altogether. See Mid-States
    Aircraft Engines, Inc. v. Mize Co., 
    467 N.E.2d 1242
    , 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
    (“T.R. 59(H)(1) affidavits may not be used to present evidence the party
    neglected to offer during the proceeding.”). Even so, the documents that Father
    attached to his motion to correct error do not comply with Trial Rule 59(H)(1)
    because they are not themselves affidavits, nor were they accompanied by
    affidavits. 3 As such, they are not properly considerable under the Rule.
    [13]   Simply put, Father’s arguments amount to an invitation to reweigh evidence
    and assess witness credibility, which we may not do. Having agreed to the
    abbreviated procedure and then disagreed with the trial court’s decision, Father
    3
    One of the documents is an opinion letter from child psychologist Dr. Steven J. Couvillion. Although it is
    titled, “Affidavit,” it is clearly an expert opinion provided for purposes of litigation. Appellant’s App. at 50-
    54. It does not contain a signed verification, under penalty of perjury, of the truth of matters asserted therein
    and therefore does not satisfy the requirements of an affidavit. Ind. Trial Rule 11(B). Similarly, the attached
    DCS reports of other unsubstantiated neglect and abuse allegations against Father are not accompanied by
    affidavits and thus do not comply with Trial Rule 59(H)(1).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016                   Page 8 of 9
    attempted to bolster his position by attaching unverified documents to his
    motion to correct error. The unchallenged findings support the CHINS
    designation. The Children were seriously impaired or endangered by Father’s
    conduct 4 and Mother’s inability to supervise them while they were with Father.
    Being subject to the dissolution court’s joint custody order, Mother could not
    legally deny Father his parenting time. As such, absent the coercive
    intervention of the trial court, it is unlikely that the Children would have
    received much-needed care and treatment. Based on the foregoing, we
    conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in designating the Children
    CHINS. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [14]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
    4
    Father cites as support for his insufficiency claim the State’s decision not to bring criminal charges against
    him. We remind him that a determination of criminal liability requires a more rigorous standard of proof
    than a CHINS designation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1510-JC-1763 | June 3, 2016                   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1510-JC-1763

Filed Date: 6/3/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021