Mark A. Emerson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 07 2018, 5:39 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William Byer, Jr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Byer & Byer Attorney General of Indiana
Anderson, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mark A. Emerson, August 7, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
48A02-1706-CR-1430
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark K. Dudley,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C06-1506-MR-962
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Following a jury trial in Madison Circuit Court, Mark A. Emerson
(“Emerson”) was convicted of one count of murder, four counts of Level 3
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felony kidnapping, and one count each of Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 5
felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, Level 6 felony auto theft, and
Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting of a crime. Emerson
appeals and presents two issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether
the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury, and (2) whether the
State presented evidence sufficient to support Emerson’s convictions for
kidnapping.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In June 2015, Emerson and his then-wife Lara had separated but not yet
divorced. The two had one child together, and Lara had two other children
from a previous relationship. After the split, Lara and her children remained in
the marital home in Anderson, while Emerson stayed with a friend in
Indianapolis. At this time, Lara was in a romantic relationship with Cody Gay
(“Gay”). Emerson was aware that Lara was dating Gay and that Lara had been
in sexual relationships with other men.
[4] On June 21, 2015, Emerson sent Lara a text message asking if he could come
over to the house to see the children for Father’s Day, a request she denied.
Later that day, she had a friend, Willard Chilton (“Chilton”), drive her to a
local auto dealership to pick up her vehicle, which had been in the shop. After
picking up the vehicle, she stopped at a Walmart. But when she came back out
of the store, she noticed that the left side tires of her vehicle were flat. Lara
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called Chilton, who came to pick her up. Chilton told Lara that she could
borrow his car after dropping him off at work. Lara then drove Chilton to work
and went to Gay’s apartment afterward. At Gay’s apartment, her cell phone
began to lock her out and repeatedly ask for a passcode. Although she did not
know it at the time, Emerson later told Lara that he had access to her phone
and had been locking her out. Lara drove Gay and her children back to her
home. She put the children in the play room to watch a movie while she and
Gay went to her bedroom in the basement to engage in sexual activity.
[5] Emerson knew that Lara and Gay were on their way to Lara’s house, as he had
access to her phone messages. Emerson bought an air pistol that looked like a
real firearm so that he could frighten Gay. He had also stopped by Lara’s home
earlier in the day and placed a machete in the basement because he thought he
“might have to have a weapon.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 74. He also placed a hatchet,
which he already owned, inside the garage. He then waited behind the garage
as Lara and Gay arrived.
[6] As Lara and Gay were engaged in sexual activities, they heard a loud bang
come from upstairs as Emerson came down the stairs and into the bedroom,
brandishing the air pistol and the machete. Emerson caught the couple engaged
in sexual activity and told Lara that she “could have waited ‘til we were at least
divorced[.]” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 143. Gay backed up from the bed on which Lara was
lying and held up his hands. Gay claimed that he thought Lara was divorced
and stated, “If I was in your situation, I’d be mad.” Id. Emerson with the pistol
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still pointed at Gay’s head, pulled the trigger several times, shooting Gay with
BBs. Only then did Lara realize the pistol was an air pistol and not a firearm.
[7] Emerson dropped the gun and began to swing the machete at Gay, who
defended himself by holding up his arms. Gay was injured but managed to take
the machete away from Emerson. Emerson then began to attack Gay with the
hatchet, which he brought with him from the garage. Gay was again able to
disarm Emerson by taking the hatchet from him. Emerson then pulled out a
knife from his pocket. Gay asked Emerson if he could wash the blood off his
hand, which had sustained a substantial cut as a result of grabbing the machete.
Emerson agreed and told Gay to go over to a nearby sink.
[8] As the two men talked by the sink, Lara asked them to give the weapons to her,
but they declined. As Gay washed the blood off his hands, Lara grabbed her
phone to call 911, but Emerson snatched the phone from her hands. Gay then
“jumped right on top of [Emerson].” Id. at 151. Although Gay was armed with
the machete and hatchet, he did not strike Emerson with these weapons.
Emerson stabbed Gay in the chest with the knife. Lara ran up the stairs, and
heard Gay shout, “Oh my God, Lara, call the cops!” Id. at 151–52. Lara ran
outside to seek assistance but saw no one. Emerson then followed her outside,
covered in blood, and told her that Gay was bleeding profusely. Emerson asked
Lara, who had first aid training in the Army National Guard, to help him.
[9] When Lara went back downstairs, she saw Gay at the bottom of the stairs lying
in a pool of blood. Gay’s knife wound was still bleeding profusely, and Lara
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attempted to stop the bleeding by pressing a towel on the wound. Lara told
Emerson that they needed to telephone the police, and Emerson initially
agreed, saying, “Yeah, we’ll call the cops.” Id. at 156. He then went upstairs for
a few minutes as Lara tended to the dying Gay. Lara saw Gay’s phone and
picked it up to call for help, but the phone was locked. Emerson returned
downstairs, saw Lara with the phone, took it from her, and threw it across the
bed. Emerson then spoke of cleaning up and leaving the scene, saying, “We’re
gonna clean up. We’re gonna get outta here.” Id. Lara initially objected. She
soon realized, however, that Emerson would not let her leave him, so she
agreed to his plan, and the two attempted to clean the blood off their hands.
[10] After cleaning up, Emerson and Lara went upstairs. Emerson still had the knife
in his pocket, and Lara attempted to grab the knife from him. When she did,
Emerson grabbed her by the hair and made her go back downstairs. Emerson
then began to talk about leaving and suggested that they dispose of Gay’s body.
Lara objected to this plan, so Emerson instead covered Gay’s body with a
blanket. Lara was scared of Emerson, so when he told her to prepare to leave
the house, she got the children and prepared to leave. Lara’s thought at that
time was, “if we got in the front yard with the kids, I could try again and
scream for help. And at the same time, I was also scared. I was just gonna do
everything he told me to do.” Id. at 161.
[11] Lara testified that, once they got in the front yard:
I started screaming, just looking around screaming for someone
to come out here and call the cops. And then [Emerson] looked
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at me with this extreme look of panic on his face and said that we
needed to just get in the car. And he told me that he would let me
drive to the police station.
Id. at 162.
[12] Once the children were in the car, Lara got into the driver’s seat and began to
drive. When she asked Emerson if she could go to the police station like he
said, Emerson responded, “No.” Id. at 189. Instead, Emerson stated that he
wanted to drive to Canada. Because Emerson still had the knife in his hands at
his side, Lara complied.
[13] Lara drove until she had to stop to refuel the car. When she did, Emerson took
the car keys with him into the gas station to pay. Lara did not attempt to flee
because she was afraid that Emerson would kill her if she did. As they
continued northward, Emerson tore the OneStar system out of the vehicle so
that they could not be tracked. That night, they pulled the car into a field in the
country to sleep. Emerson stayed awake until Lara fell asleep before he slept.
The next morning Emerson got out of the car. Seeing a chance to escape, Lara
jumped into the driver’s seat and tried to drive away. Emerson, however, was
able to quickly get back into the car before Lara could get away. Emerson
threatened Lara with the knife and warned her “not to pull anything like that
ever[] again.” Id. at 196.
[14] As they continued to drive north, Emerson told Lara that, once they got to
Canada, he would let her and the children go. In Minnesota, the car began to
run low on fuel again, but neither Emerson nor Lara had enough money to buy
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gasoline. Lara suggested that they stop at a Walmart, steal something inside,
then return it for a gift card they could use to purchase gasoline. Emerson
agreed, but took the children with him inside, apparently believing that Lara
would not run away if he had the children. Lara, however, had already planned
to try to find help once Emerson went inside the store.
[15] Once Emerson was inside, Lara ran away from the car and went to a nearby car
dealership and asked them if she could use their telephone to call 911. The
dealership employees allowed Lara to call 911, and Lara told the dispatcher
that, “I think he killed him, and he kidnapped me and my kids and took us all
the way here, and he’s trying to make it to Canada. And he took my kids into
Walmart[,] and this is the first time I got to get away[.]” Id. at 207. Police from
Hermantown, Minnesota arrived on the scene and arrested Emerson as he
exited the store.
[16] The Minnesota police advised Emerson of his Miranda rights and questioned
him. Emerson proceeded to give them his version of events. Emerson told the
police that he knew he was not supposed to be at Lara’s house.1 Emerson
admitted that he knew Gay was there and bought the air pistol to scare him. He
also admitted that he placed the machete in the basement earlier so he could
have access to a weapon when he confronted Gay. Emerson also told the police
that when he confronted Gay, he did not believe Gay’s protestations that he
1
In fact, both Lara and Emerson were under the mistaken belief that there was a protective order issued
against Emerson.
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was unaware that Emerson and Lara were still married, as he had had previous
conversations with Gay in which he referred to Lara as Emerson’s wife.
Emerson claimed that Gay was first injured trying to take the machete away
from him and that he then grabbed the hatchet. Emerson claimed that, after
cleaning his hand, Gay lunged at him and took the hatchet away from him and
that he stabbed Gay only when Gay raised the hatchet into the air to attack
him. Emerson claimed that he did not call the police because his phone was
dead, Gay’s phone was locked, and Lara’s phone was not available. Emerson
also told the police that Lara had told him to run so he would not have to go to
prison. However, Emerson further admitted that Lara was afraid of him and
that the car they took was not Lara’s or Gay’s but belonged to Lara’s friend.
[17] The State subsequently charged Emerson as follows: Count I, Level 5 felony
intimidation; Count II, Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon;
Count III, Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting of a crime;
Count IV, murder; Counts V–VIII, Level 3 felony kidnapping; and Count IX,
Level 6 felony auto theft.
[18] A jury trial was held on April 25–28 and May 1–4, 2017. At the conclusion of
the presentation of evidence, Emerson tendered jury instructions on the defense
of mistake of fact, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. The
trial court rejected these instructions as unsupported by the evidence. Emerson
also tendered an instruction on self-defense, but the trial court instead chose to
give to the jury its own self-defense instruction, which was based on the pattern
jury instruction on self-defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
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Emerson guilty as charged. On June 1, 2017, the trial court sentenced Emerson
to an aggregate term of eighty-six years and nine months of incarceration.2
Emerson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[19] On appeal, Emerson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
declined to give his tendered jury instructions and also argues that the evidence
is insufficient to support his convictions for kidnapping.
I. Jury Instructions
[20] It is well settled that instructing the jury lies within the trial court’s sound
discretion, and we review the trial court’s decisions with regard to jury
instructions only for an abuse of that discretion. Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345,
360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to give a tendered instruction we consider: (1)
whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in
the record supporting the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the
instruction is covered by other instructions. Id. To constitute an abuse of
discretion, an instruction that is given to the jury must be erroneous, and the
2
Specifically, the trial court imposed the following sentences: Count I, four and one-half years; Count II, four
and one-half years; Count III, eleven months; Count IV, sixty years; Counts V–VIII, twelve and one-half
years each; and Count IX, twenty-one months. The sentences on Counts I, II, and IV were ordered to run
concurrently for a total of sixty years; the sentences on Counts III and V were ordered to be served
concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentences on Counts I, II, and IV, for an additional
twelve and one-half years; the sentences on Counts VI, VII, and VIII were ordered to run for a concurrent
twelve and one-half years, but consecutive to the sentences on Counts I, II, and IV and on Counts III and V;
and the sentence on Count XI was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an aggregate
sentence of eighty-six years and nine months.
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instructions viewed as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the
jury. Id. When a defendant seeks reversal based on instructional error, he must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that his substantial rights have been
adversely affected. Id.[21] Here, Emerson claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing three
of his tendered instructions covering the subjects of mistake of fact, self-defense,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. We address each of
these tendered instructions in turn.
A. Mistake of Fact
[22] Emerson first claims that, with regard to the auto theft charge, the trial court
should have instructed the jury on the defense of mistake of fact. Pursuant to
Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7, “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged
in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the
mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Once
the State has made a prima facie case of guilt, “the burden is on the defendant to
establish an evidentiary predicate of his mistaken belief of fact, which is such
that it could create a reasonable doubt in the fact-finder’s mind that the
defendant had acted with the requisite mental state.” Saunders v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571,
575 (Ind. 1990)), trans. denied. “Upon invoking mistake of fact as a defense, the
burden shifts to the defendant to satisfy three elements: ‘(1) that the mistake be
honest and reasonable; (2) that the mistake be about a matter of fact; and (3)
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that the mistake negate the culpability required to commit the crime.’” Chavers
v. State, 991 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Potter v. State, 684
N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied.
[23] Still, the State retains the ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the charged crime, including culpability or intent, which
would in turn entail proof that there was no reasonably held mistaken belief of
fact. Saunders, 848 N.E.2d at 1121 (citing Hoskins, 563 N.E.2d at 575–76). And
the State may meet its burden by directly rebutting evidence, by affirmatively
showing that the defendant made no such mistake, or by simply relying upon
evidence from its case-in-chief. Id. (citing Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653,
660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).
[24] To convict Emerson of auto theft, the State was required to prove that he
knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Chilton’s motor
vehicle with the intent to deprive Chilton of the vehicle’s value or use. See Ind.
Code § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1) (2014)3; Appellant’s App. p. 22. Emerson argues that
there was no evidence indicating that Lara did not have authority to use
Chilton’s auto without restriction. Thus, he argues that he was mistaken with
regard to the scope of Lara’s permission to use the car, thereby vitiating any
possible intent he may have had to use the vehicle without authorization. The
State makes no argument that Emerson’s tendered mistake-of-fact instruction
3
This statute was repealed effective July 1, 2018. See P.L. 176-2018, § 7. The theft of a motor vehicle is now
encompassed in the general theft statute. See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2018).
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contained an incorrect statement of law.4 It instead argues that there was no
evidence in the record to support giving the instruction. We agree with the
State.
[25] Lara testified that she had Chilton’s permission to drive his car to and from
work the following day, and Chilton testified that Lara was supposed to return
his car the following day and that he did not give Lara or Emerson permission
to drive his car to Minnesota. Thus, contrary to Emerson’s claims, there was
ample evidence adduced at trial that he did not have permission to drive
Chilton’s vehicle and that Lara’s permission to use the car was limited to
driving to and from work for one day. Emerson testified that although he did
not personally know who owned the car, he knew it was not his. His testimony
also indicates that he knew it did not belong to Lara, as he claimed that Lara
told him she could use the car “as long as she needed while her car was done.”
Tr. Vol. VI, p. 218. Emerson argues that this testimony raised the mistake-of-
fact defense regarding his knowledge of the scope of Lara’s permission to use
4
Emerson’s tendered instruction provided:
The defense of mistake of fact is defined as follows:
It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably
mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for the
commission of the offense.
The reasonable mistake about a fact must have prevented the defendant from[:]
forming the intent to commit the offense of which he is charged, or
knowing that the offense charged was being committed, or
being reckless in his conduct.
The State has the burden of disproving this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s App. p. 70.
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the car. But the question before the jury was not the extent of Lara’s permission
to use Chilton’s car. The question was whether Emerson exerted unauthorized
control over Chilton’s vehicle with the intent to deprive Chilton of the vehicle’s
value or use. Although Emerson claims the he did not drive the car, he forced
Lara to do so at knifepoint. Suffice it to say that there was no evidence that
Emerson was honestly and reasonably mistaken that he had permission to use
the car to force Lara to drive him away from a murder scene and flee to
Canada.
[26] Thus, there was no evidence that would support giving a mistake-of-fact
instruction regarding Emerson’s claim that he believed that either he or Lara
had unrestricted use of the vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing Emerson’s tendered instruction on the defense of mistake
of fact.
B. Self-Defense Instruction
[27] Emerson also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give
the jury his tendered instruction on self-defense, which provided in relevant
part:
The defense of self-defense is defined by law as follows:
a. A person is justified in using reasonable force against another
person to protect himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he
reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious
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bodily injury to himself or a third person or the commission of a
felony.
No person in this State shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any
kind whatsoever for protecting himself or his family by
reasonable means necessary.
b. A person is justified in using reasonable force, including
deadly force, against another person if he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person’s
entry of or attack on his dwelling or curtilage.
c. With respect to property other than a dwelling or curtilage, a
person is justified in using reasonable force against another
person if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
immediately prevent or terminate the other person’s trespass on
or criminal interference with property lawfully in his possession,
lawfully in possession of a member of his immediate family, or
belonging to a person whose property he has authority to protect.
However, a person is not justified in using deadly force unless the
force is justified under subsection (a) of this section.
d. Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, a
person is not justified in using force if:
1. he is committing, or is escaping after the commission, of a
crime;
2. he provokes unlawful action by another person with intent
to cause bodily injury to the other person; or
3. he has entered into combat with another person or is the
initial aggressor, unless he withdraws from the encounter and
communicates to the other person his intent to do so and the
other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue
unlawful action.
The State has the burden of disproving this defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Appellant’s App. p. 72.
[28] The trial court instead gave the following self-defense instruction:
USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT A PERSON
A person may use reasonable force against another person to
protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the
imminent use of unlawful force.
A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a
duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself.
However a person may not use force if:
• He is committing a crime that is directly and immediately
connected to the confrontation, or
• He provokes a fight with another person with intent to cause
bodily injury to that person, or
• He has willingly entered into a fight with another person or
started the fight, unless he withdraws from the fight and
communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and the
other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the
fight.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant did not act in self-defense.
Id. at 64–65 (emphasis added).
[29] Emerson’s only complaint about the trial court’s instruction is that it includes
the word “only” when describing when a person is justified in using deadly
force. That is, the trial court’s instruction informed the jury that “[a] person is
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justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he
reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily
injury to himself.” Id. (emphasis added). The word “only” does not appear in
the text of the self-defense statute itself.5 Thus, Emerson contends that the trial
court’s instruction was an incorrect statement of the law.
[30] The addition of the word “only,” however, does not materially alter the
meaning of the instruction. Informing the jury that a person is justified in using
deadly force if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
serious bodily injury is not meaningfully different from informing the jury that a
person is justified in using deadly force only if he reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury. Both convey the same
essential meaning that the defendant be required to have a reasonable belief that
deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury before he may resort to
the use of deadly force.
5
Prior to 2006, the self-defense statute provided in relevant part “a person is justified in using deadly force
only if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the
person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
Effective July 1, 2006, the statute was amended to provide in relevant part, “a person: (1) is justified in using
deadly force; and (2) does not have a duty to retreat; if the person reasonably believes that that force is
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible
felony.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a) (2006). Thus, the word “only” was removed from the statute in 2006, but as
explained infra, this did not materially change the meaning of the statute.
The statute was amended again in 2012, moving the language at issue from subsection (a) to (c). It was
amended yet again the following year, but the changes did not affect subsection (c).
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[31] We further note that the language of the trial court’s self-defense instruction
was taken from the Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions.6 Compare Appellant’s
App. pp. 64–65 with Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 10.0300. “The Indiana
Pattern Jury Instructions are prepared under the auspices of the Indiana Judges
Association in conjunction with the Indiana Judicial Conference Criminal and
Civil Instruction Committees. Although they are not formally approved for use,
they are tacitly recognized by Indiana Trial Rule 51(E).” Campbell v. State, 19
N.E.3d 271, 275 n.3 (Ind. 2014). Thus, although the Pattern Jury Instructions
have not been formally approved by our supreme court, and certain pattern
6
The pattern jury instruction on self-defense provides:
It is an issue whether the Defendant acted in [self-defense] [defense of another
person].
A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect (himself/herself from
what he/she) or (someone else) from what the Defendant reasonably believes to be the
imminent use of unlawful force.
A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if
he/she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary [to prevent serious bodily injury
to himself/herself or a third person] [to prevent the commission of a forcible felony].
[However, a person may not use force if:
(he/she is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the
(confrontation) (use a descriptive term based on evidence). (or)
(he/she is escaping after the commission of a crime that is directly and immediately
connected to the (confrontation) (use a descriptive term based on evidence).)
(or)
(he/she provokes a fight with another person with intent to cause bodily injury to that
person).
(or)
(he/she has willingly entered into a fight with another person or started the fight, unless he
withdraws from the fight and communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and
the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the fight).]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not
act in self-defense.
Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 10.0300. The trial court’s self-defense instruction merely eliminated the
introductory sentence from this pattern instruction.
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instructions have even been held to not be a correct statement of the law,
pattern jury instructions are given “preferential treatment” during litigation, and
the preferred practice is to use the pattern instructions. Harrison v. State, 32
N.E.3d 240, 252 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
[32] The trial court here followed the preferred practice to use the pattern instruction
on self-defense, and the trial court’s instruction was not an incorrect statement
of the law. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing
the jury regarding self-defense.
C. Voluntary Manslaughter
[33] Emerson next contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
regarding the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. As set forth in
Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566–67 (Ind. 1995), a trial court should instruct
the jury regarding a lesser-included offense if the lesser offense is either
inherently or factually included in the greater offense and there is a serious
evidentiary dispute about an element that distinguishes the two offenses.
[34] A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits
murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). But a person who knowingly or intentionally
kills another human being while acting under “sudden heat” commits voluntary
manslaughter. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a). “Sudden heat occurs when a defendant
is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to
obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and
premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Conner v.
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State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind. 2005). “Sudden heat excludes malice, and neither
mere words nor anger, without more, provide sufficient provocation.” Id. Since
voluntary manslaughter is simply murder mitigated by evidence of sudden heat,
it is an inherently included offense of murder. Wilkins v. State, 716 N.E.2d 955,
956–57 (Ind. 1999); see also Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2008)
(“[V]oluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder[.]”).
[35] The only question before the trial court was therefore whether there was a
serious evidentiary dispute regarding the existence of sudden heat. And here,
the trial court made an explicit finding that there was an absence of any
evidence of sudden heat. Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 27–29. Thus, we review the trial court’s
decision on this matter only for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 808
N.E.2d 617, 626 (Ind. 2004).
[36] Emerson argues that there was a serious evidentiary dispute as to the existence
of sudden heat because the evidence showed that he walked in on his estranged
wife and her lover engaged in sexual activity. We have stated before that
“discovery of alleged infidelity can ‘introduce the element of sudden heat.’”
Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Evans v.
State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. Thus, if Emerson had
simply walked in unawares and caught Lara with Gay, the evidence might have
supported a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. But this is not what
happened.
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[37] Instead, Emerson was already well aware that Lara was dating Gay and
admitted that he knew she had been in sexual relationships with other men.
Emerson stored weapons in the home and even bought an air pistol in his plan
to scare Gay. We agree with the State that this demonstrates a degree of
planning and forethought that belies a claim of sudden heat. Moreover,
Emerson himself testified that he was “[n]ot really mad” about Lara and Gay’s
sexual activity because he had known about it “for a while.” Tr. Vol. 6, p. 198.
Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding the existence
of sudden heat. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to instruct the jury with regard to the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter.
D. Involuntary Manslaughter
[38] Emerson’s final claim of evidentiary error is that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining his tendered instruction on the lesser-included offense of
involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is committed when a
person kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit
(1) a Level 5 or Level 6 felony that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily
injury, (2) a Class A misdemeanor that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily
injury, or (3) battery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-4(b). In contrast to voluntary
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently included lesser
offense of murder. Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1081. However, involuntary
manslaughter may be a factually included lesser offense of murder if the
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charging information alleges that the killing was accomplished by means that
would be a battery. Id. Where, however, the charging information merely
alleges that the defendant killed the victim, without specifically alleging that the
killing was accomplished by means that would be a battery, involuntary
manslaughter is not a factually included offense. See Champlain v. State, 681
N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 1997) (holding that involuntary manslaughter was not a
factually included lesser offense of the charged crime of murder because the
charging information did not assert a battery but merely alleged that the
defendant knowingly killed the victim).
[39] Here, the charging information alleged simply that “Mark Alyn Emerson
knowingly or intentionally killed Cody Gay.” Appellant’s App. p. 51. This does
not allege a battery, nor does it allege a Class A misdemeanor, Level 6 felony,
or Level 5 felony that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury.
Accordingly, involuntary manslaughter was not a factually included offense of
the charged crime of murder, and the trial court properly declined to instruct
the jury on involuntary manslaughter.
[40] Emerson appears to argue that involuntary manslaughter was factually included
in the charged crime of murder because the State also charged him with Level 5
felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. See Appellant’s Brief at 33
(arguing that “involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of the
charged battery and murder.”). However, the charged battery alleged that
Emerson battered Gay with a “BB gun or a machete or a hatchet.” Appellant’s
App. p. 50. Notably, none of these are the weapon that inflicted the fatal wound
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to Gay, which was instead a knife. Thus, the State charged Gay with a separate
and distinct act of battery—the initial attack on Gay with the air pistol,
machete, and hatchet—in addition to the subsequent stabbing with the knife.
The State did not allege that the killing was accomplished by means that would
constitute a battery. Therefore, despite the additional charge of battery, the
information charging Emerson with murder did not factually include the lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting Emerson’s tendered instruction on involuntary
manslaughter.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[41] Emerson also contends that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to
support his convictions for kidnapping. When reviewing a claim that the
evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Harrison, 32 N.E.3d at 247. We
instead respect the exclusive province of the jury to weigh any conflicting
evidence. Id. We consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict
and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this evidence, and we
will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
[42] To convict Emerson of kidnapping, the State was required to prove that he
knowingly or intentionally removed Lara and the three children by fraud,
enticement, force, or threat of force from one place to another, and committed
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that offense while armed with a deadly weapon, i.e., a knife. See Ind. Code §§
35-42-3-2(a), (b)(2)(A); Appellant’s App. pp. 52–53. Emerson argues that there
was no evidence that he removed any individual by a threat of force or that he
was armed with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
[43] Emerson claims that Lara was not forced against her will to travel with him and
that she participated in his plan to escape. But the evidence favorable to the
jury’s verdict shows that Emerson was armed with a knife—the very knife he
had just used to fatally stab Lara’s boyfriend—and that he initially told Lara
that they would drive to the police station. When Lara asked if she could drive
to the police station, Emerson told her no and instead that he wanted to drive to
Canada. Lara complied because Emerson was still armed with a knife.
[44] The evidence also reveals that Emerson was well aware that Lara was not a
willing participant in his plans to escape. When they stopped for fuel, Emerson
took the keys with him when he went to pay for the gasoline. After they slept in
the car in a field, Lara attempted to drive off without Emerson after he exited
the car. When he managed to jump in the car before Lara could leave, he
threatened her with the knife and warned her “not to pull anything like that
ever[] again.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 196. Emerson was also well aware that Lara’s three
children were in the car when he threatened Lara and asked her to drive toward
Canada.
[45] From this evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this
evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Emerson knowingly removed
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Lara and her children by the threat of force from one place to another and did
so while armed with a knife, which is a deadly weapon.
[46] Emerson’s citation to Clayton v. State, 658 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), is
unavailing. In that case, the armed defendant approached the victim outside her
home while she was unloading her car, which still contained two sleeping
children: her son and her niece. Id. at 83. The defendant pointed his gun at the
victim and demanded her money and purse. Id. The victim told the defendant
that her purse was in the house, grabbed her niece, and went into her house with
the defendant to find her purse. Id. Unable to find any money in the victim’s
purse, the defendant ordered the victim to go back outside and place the keys into
the ignition. Id. He then ordered her to get the other child out of the car. Id. at
83–84. The victim did so, grabbed her son, and ran back into her house as the
defendant drove her car away. Id. at 84. The defendant was subsequently
convicted of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, and criminal confinement. Id.[47] On appeal, the defendant argued inter alia that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for kidnapping. A panel of this court agreed, noting that
there was no evidence that the defendant used force to keep either of the
children in the car. Id. at 88. Instead, the victim voluntarily took one of the
children into her house when she went to look for her purse. Id. And the
defendant told the victim to remove the other child from the car before driving
away. Id. Because the defendant permitted the victim to remove one child and
ordered the victim to remove the other before her took the car, we held that
there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1430 | August 7, 2018 Page 24 of 25
[48] The facts of Clayton stand in stark contrast to the facts present in the case before
us. As noted above, Emerson was aware that Lara and her children were in the
car when he forced her at knifepoint to drive north and not stop at the police
station as he had earlier told her. He kept the keys with him when he left the
car, and he threatened Lara when she attempted to drive away without him.
Accordingly, we do not find Clayton to be controlling, and we conclude that the
State presented sufficient evidence to support Emerson’s convictions for
kidnapping.
Conclusion
[49] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury because: there
was no evidence that would support a mistake-of-fact instruction regarding
Emerson’s claim that he mistakenly believed that Lara had unrestricted use of
the vehicle; the trial court’s self-defense instruction, which was based on the
pattern jury instruction, was a correct statement of the law; there was no
evidence supporting a finding of sudden heat and an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter was therefore properly rejected; and the State did not allege the
murder was accomplished by means of a battery, and involuntary manslaughter
was therefore not a factually included offense. Lastly, the State presented
evidence sufficient to support Emerson’s convictions for kidnapping.
[50] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
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