Christopher R. Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Feb 17 2015, 9:59 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    David M. Payne                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Ryan & Payne                                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Marion, Indiana
    J.T. Whitehead
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Christopher R. Hall                                      February 17, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    27A05-1406-CR-267
    v.                                               Appeal from the Grant Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Dana J. Kenworthy,
    Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff
    The Honorable Brian McLane,
    Judge Pro Tempore
    Case No. 27D02-1310-FD-449
    Vaidik, Chief Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 1 of 11
    [1]   Christopher R. Hall was convicted of domestic battery, strangulation, and
    invasion of privacy. On appeal, Hall argues that the trial court erred by
    admitting two pieces of evidence at his trial. We find no error in the admission
    of the challenged evidence, yet we note that any error would have been
    harmless in light of the substantial evidence of Hall’s guilt. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Hall met and married his wife, Erin, in 2011. Their relationship was
    tumultuous; they often fought over Erin’s employment at a local strip club.
    Hall was controlling and discouraged Erin from seeing her family. Tr. p. 113-
    14. During her marriage to Hall, Erin “d[idn’t] really feel like [she] had [a
    life].” 
    Id. at 116.
    [3]   In October 2013 Erin “went and got divorce papers.” 
    Id. When Hall
    learned
    what Erin had done, he “blew up,” began screaming and ripping up the papers,
    and threatened to kill her. 
    Id. at 116-17.
    Erin filed a police report and obtained
    a no-contact order against Hall, but she and Hall later reconciled. 
    Id. at 118.
    [4]   Two months later, Erin returned home one day to find an angry Hall waiting
    for her. Hall called her “a crappy mom” and accused her of “screwing some
    guys.” 
    Id. at 119.
    Erin tried to ignore Hall, but he only became angrier. He
    threw an ashtray and a box of crackers at her, calling her a “f***ing whore,” a
    “f****ing liar,” and a “f****ing cheater.” 
    Id. at 119-20.
    He also hit her in the
    face and head and kicked her. 
    Id. at 120,
    124-25. At one point, he pinned Erin
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 2 of 11
    down and held her neck in “a choke[-]hold type thing,” and had “his hand over
    [her] mouth and nose . . . .” 
    Id. at 123.
    Hall repeatedly told Erin, “if you want
    to act like a whore, I’ll treat you like one.” 
    Id. [5] Erin
    called her friend Sasha for help. 
    Id. at 121.
    Hall began hitting Erin
    repeatedly and trying to take her phone. 
    Id. When he
    got her phone, Hall
    ended the call and stomped on the phone, breaking it. 
    Id. at 122.
    Hall and
    Erin’s children witnessed the dispute, and Hall hit Erin while she was holding
    their one-year-old daughter. 
    Id. at 120,
    125. Hall eventually released Erin and
    left the home. 
    Id. at 124.
    [6]   During Erin’s call to Sasha, Sasha overheard Hall screaming and calling Erin
    names. Sasha asked her boyfriend David to go pick Erin up. When David
    arrived at the house a few minutes later, Erin answered the door. 
    Id. at 77.
    Her
    “eyes [were] real red where she’d been crying, her face was real red, her neck
    was real red, [and] her hair was all messed up.” 
    Id. One of
    the children told
    David that “her dad had her mom down choking her, and told her to go
    downstairs so she wouldn’t see it . . . .” 
    Id. at 79.
    David called the police.
    [7]   Police arrived a short time later. They interviewed Erin and photographed her
    injuries. One of the children reported that “Daddy hit Mommy again.” 
    Id. at 279.
    An officer observed Erin hunched over and holding her midsection. 
    Id. at 282-83.
    He also observed injuries to her neck, cheek, and ribs. 
    Id. at 283.
    [8]   Police located Hall and arrested him. The State charged Hall with Class D
    felony intimidation, Class D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 3 of 11
    Class D felony strangulation, Class A misdemeanor interference with reporting
    of a crime, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, and Class A
    misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Appellant’s App. p. 28-30 (charging
    informations). Hall filed a motion for a speedy trial. See 
    id. at 66-67.
    [9]   Hall’s jury trial began in April 2014. The State sought to introduce a recording
    of a jail telephone call between Hall and his mother and grandfather. Defense
    counsel objected and argued that the recording lacked probative value. The
    State responded that it was extremely probative because in the recording, Hall
    discussed the dispute, denied the charges against him, and threatened suicide.
    Tr. p. 203. Defense counsel also objected on the grounds that he had not
    received the recording until the day before trial.1 
    Id. at 189-91.
    The State
    responded that it was “common to turn over jail calls days before trial because
    it is one of the things we look at last when we’re putting together a case.” 
    Id. at 188.
    Defense counsel then requested that the court exclude certain portions of
    the recording—specific statements made by Hall’s mother and grandfather—
    and the court did so.2 
    Id. at 192-95,
    205-09. Defense counsel conceded that
    Hall’s statements were admissible as statements of a party opponent. 
    Id. at 198,
    204.
    1
    The trial court’s only response to this argument appears to be its statement that “I do find, and again I know
    there was late notice on this . . . .” Tr. p. 205.
    2
    Counsel also asked that the recording not be played in full; the end of the recording contained inadmissible
    hearsay statements made by one of the children. The trial court granted this request as well. See Tr. p. 189,
    199.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015            Page 4 of 11
    [10]   In addition to redacting portions of the recording, the trial court admonished
    the jury before the recording was played:
    The statements, opinions, questions, and conduct of the other
    individuals participating in the telephone call are hearsay and are
    being admitted for a limited purpose. They are being admitted to
    provide context for any statements made by the defendant. Those
    statements, opinions, questions, or conduct of the other participants in
    the telephone call may not be considered as substantive evidence to
    establish any fact expressed by them. Just as with other forms of
    evidence introduced during the trial, the evidence on the recording of
    the call must conform to the rules of evidence. Because of that, there
    may be times when you notice the effects of the editing process when
    the recording is played in court. You are not to consider any such
    technical imperfections or any of the editing process. The only
    evidence actually presented to you, mainly Mr. Hall’s statements
    during the phone call, should be considered.
    
    Id. at 340-41.
    During the call, Hall discussed the dispute, blamed Erin, and
    claimed that Erin injured him. See State’s Ex. 11. He also threatened to
    commit suicide. 
    Id. Hall’s mother
    and grandfather suggested that Hall battered
    Erin, but Hall repeatedly denied any wrongdoing. 
    Id. [11] The
    State also called Linda Wilk, director of Hands of Hope, a domestic-
    violence program. Tr. p. 218. Wilk testified that she ran domestic-violence,
    sexual-violence, and stalking programs, as well as a domestic-violence shelter,
    and had more than twenty years of experience working in this field. 
    Id. at 218-
    19. Wilk provided a chart illustrating the “escalation of violence”:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 5 of 11
    State’s Ex. 7. Wilk testified that the chart would aid the jury in understanding
    her testimony about how domestic violence progresses and why a victim might
    not end a violent relationship. Tr. p. 225-26. The State moved to admit the
    chart for illustrative purposes. 
    Id. at 227.
    Defense counsel objected, arguing
    that the chart included severe offenses not implicated in this case. 
    Id. In response,
    the State argued that Wilk was
    not here [to talk] about this case specifically, she’s here to educate the
    jury on what domestic violence is, and the escalation of violence is
    closely connected to what happens in domestic violence. She in no
    way knows any facts about this case, and if he wants to ask her about,
    you know, “does it always end in death?” “No,” that’s fine, but I think
    this is just used as a tool for her to educate the jury on what happens
    generally.
    
    Id. at 227-28.
    Defense counsel then objected again based on the fact that Wilk
    did not know Erin. 
    Id. at 228.
    The State reiterated that Wilk had only been
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 6 of 11
    called to educate the jury about domestic violence and not to opine about Hall’s
    case. 
    Id. at 231.
    The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections. 
    Id. Wilk proceeded
    to discuss the chart and the cyclical nature of domestic violence
    over defense counsel’s continuing objection. During her testimony, Wilk stated
    that she was “not talking about this case” and “honestly [did] not know
    anything about this case.” 
    Id. at 237.
    [12]   At the close of the State’s case, Hall testified in his own defense and claimed
    that Erin was the aggressor. See 
    id. at 415-18.
    To support this theory, defense
    counsel utilized Wilk’s escalation-of-violence chart, asking Hall’s mother to
    note any behaviors on the chart that Erin had engaged in. 
    Id. at 362-66.
    [13]   The jury found Hall guilty of domestic battery, strangulation, and invasion of
    privacy. The trial court sentenced Hall to an aggregate four-year term.
    [14]   Hall now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [15]   Hall argues that the trial court erred by admitting the recording of the telephone
    call he made from jail to his mother and grandfather as well as the escalation-
    of-violence chart.
    [16]   We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence for an
    abuse of discretion. Herron v. State, 
    10 N.E.3d 552
    , 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
    (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is
    clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. 
    Id. We do
    not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 7 of 11
    reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to
    the trial court’s ruling. 
    Id. [17] Hall
    first challenges the admission of his recorded conversation with his mother
    and grandfather. He argues that it should not have been admitted because it
    lacked probative value and was not provided to defense counsel in a timely
    fashion. We disagree.
    [18]   The recording had probative value. In the recording, Hall discussed the
    dispute, blamed Erin, and claimed that Erin injured him. He also threatened to
    commit suicide. Hall’s mother’s and grandfather’s statements provided the
    necessary context for Hall’s statements. See Evans v. State, 
    643 N.E.2d 877
    ,
    882 (Ind. 2006) (the purpose of the doctrine of completeness is “to
    provide context for otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires
    it.”). As for the timeliness issue, Hall sought to exclude the recording at trial,
    but he did not request a continuance. “[A]s a general proposition, the proper
    remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance.” Warren v. State, 
    725 N.E.2d 828
    , 832 (Ind. 2000). “Failure to alternatively request a continuance upon
    moving to exclude evidence, where a continuance may be an appropriate
    remedy, constitutes a waiver of any alleged error pertaining to noncompliance
    with the court’s discovery order.” 
    Id. Here, Hall
    moved to exclude the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 8 of 11
    recording, but he did not request a continuance.3 Consequently, this issue is
    waived. See 
    id. [19] Waiver
    notwithstanding, Hall succeeded in excluding certain portions of the
    recording. And before the rest of the recording was played, the trial court
    admonished the jury as follows:
    The statements, opinions, questions, and conduct of the other
    individuals participating in the telephone call are hearsay and are
    being admitted for a limited purpose. They are being admitted to
    provide context for any statements made by the defendant. Those
    statements, opinions, questions, or conduct of the other participants in
    the telephone call may not be considered as substantive evidence to
    establish any fact expressed by them. Just as with other forms of
    evidence introduced during the trial, the evidence on the recording of
    the call must conform to the rules of evidence. Because of that, there
    may be times when you notice the effects of the editing process when
    the recording is played in court. You are not to consider any such
    technical imperfections or any of the editing process. The only
    evidence actually presented to you, mainly Mr. Hall’s statements
    during the phone call, should be considered.
    [20]   Tr. p. 340-41. Although Hall’s mother and grandfather suggested that Hall
    battered Erin during the call, Hall repeatedly denied any wrongdoing. See
    State’s Ex. 11. We conclude that the trial court’s admonishment—which
    directed the jury to focus on Hall’s statements—cured any possible prejudice
    3
    According to Hall, “the scheduled trial date . . . was the 70th day after filing for the [] speedy trial.”
    Appellant’s Br. p. 20. Hall argues that he needed more time to examine the recording and prepare for its use
    at trial, yet he admits that he did not wish to delay his trial. Ultimately, Hall prioritized his speedy-trial date
    over having additional time to prepare.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015                Page 9 of 11
    or potential for unfair harm from the statements made by Hall’s mother and
    grandfather. See Walker v. State, 
    988 N.E.2d 341
    , 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (a
    trial court’s timely and accurate admonishment to the jury is presumed
    to cure any alleged error in the admission of evidence), trans. denied. We find
    no error here.
    [21]   Hall also argues that the trial court erred by admitting the escalation-of-violence
    chart. We need not determine whether the trial court erred in this respect,
    however, because although Hall challenges the chart’s admission, he does not
    challenge the evidence accompanying it—Wilk’s detailed testimony about the
    cyclical nature of domestic violence and the progression of violent relationships.
    Because the challenged evidence was cumulative of Wilk’s testimony, any error
    in its admission would be harmless. See Cole v. State, 
    970 N.E.2d 779
    , 784 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2012) (An error in the admission of evidence does not justify reversal
    if the evidence is cumulative of other evidence presented at trial). Moreover,
    Hall used the challenged evidence to further his defense theory that Erin was
    actually the aggressor. See Tr. p. 362-66 (defense counsel referencing the chart
    and asking Hall’s mother to note any behaviors on the chart that Erin had
    engaged in). Because the escalation-of-violence chart was cumulative of Wilk’s
    testimony and Hall attempted to use the chart to his benefit, Hall’s argument on
    this issue fails.
    [22]   Although we reject Hall’s claims of error, we note that any error would be
    harmless in light of the substantial evidence of Hall’s guilt. See Hape v.
    State, 
    903 N.E.2d 977
    , 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (an error in the admission of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 10 of 11
    evidence is harmless if the conviction is supported by substantial independent
    evidence of guilt that satisfies the reviewing court that there is no substantial
    likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction) (citation
    omitted), trans. denied. Specifically, Erin testified that Hall hit, kicked, and
    choked her in front of the children. She also testified that Hall called her
    degrading names and tried to stop her from calling for help. Despite Hall’s
    efforts, Erin’s friend Sasha overheard the dispute and sent her boyfriend to the
    house. When he arrived, he observed that Erin’s eyes, face, and neck were red
    and her hair was disheveled. One of the children said that “her dad had her
    mom down choking her, and told her to go downstairs so she wouldn’t see it . .
    . .” When police arrived, they observed injuries to Erin’s neck, cheek, and ribs,
    and a child reported that “Daddy hit Mommy again.” In light of this evidence
    of Hall’s guilt, any error in the admission of the challenged evidence would
    have been harmless.
    [23]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1406-CR-267 | February 17, 2015   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27A05-1406-CR-267

Filed Date: 2/17/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021