Christal Trowbridge v. Everett Thomas Trowbridge, In Re The Estate of Everett Thomas Trowbridge (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 11 2019, 8:58 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
W. Edward Skees John D. Cox
The Skees Law Office Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Goodman,
New Albany, Indiana P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael M. Maschmeyer
Jeffersonville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christal Trowbridge, September 11, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-DR-856
v. Appeal from the
Clark Circuit Court
Everett Thomas Trowbridge, The Honorable Marsha Owens
Appellee-Respondent Howser, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
In Re The Estate of Everett 10C04-1108-DR-440
Thomas Trowbridge,
Appellee-Respondent
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-856 | September 11, 2019 Page 1 of 3
[1] Christal L. Trowbridge (“Christal”) and Everett Thomas Trowbridge
(“Tommy”) divorced in 2012. According to the parties’ property-settlement
agreement, Christal agreed to “Quit Claim her interest in all property” to
Tommy, including a house on Tucker Avenue in Clarksville (“the property”).
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 22. Following the divorce, Christal never executed
a quitclaim deed. In addition, the property-settlement agreement was never
modified.
[2] Tommy died in June 2018. Shortly thereafter, Tommy’s brother opened an
estate. See 10C01-1807-ES-32. In September 2018, the estate filed a motion in
the divorce case to substitute itself for Tommy and to appoint a commissioner
to “sign a [d]eed transferring [Christal’s] interest in the [property]” to the estate.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. In March 2019, without holding a hearing, the
trial court allowed the substitution and “appointed [a] Commissioner to
immediately act for and on behalf of [Christal] to effectuate [the] transfer of the
property . . . pursuant to the parties’ written Property Settlement Agreement[.]”
Id. at 45.
[3] Christal now appeals, arguing that the trial court violated her due-process rights
by not holding a hearing before appointing a commissioner because if the court
had held a hearing, it would have learned that (1) even though she agreed to
quitclaim her interest in the property to Tommy as part of the divorce, after the
divorce she and Tommy orally modified the property-settlement agreement so
that she was no longer required to quitclaim her interest in the property and (2)
after the divorce Tommy executed a will leaving the property to her anyway.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-856 | September 11, 2019 Page 2 of 3
But as the estate argues in its brief, any oral modification of the property-
settlement agreement regarding the property would have been prohibited by the
statute of frauds, Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1. Notably, Christal doesn’t
dispute the estate’s claim in her reply brief. And as for Christal’s argument that
she is entitled to the property under Tommy’s will, this issue is currently being
litigated in the estate case. See Trowbridge v. Estate of Trowbridge, No. 19A-ES-
265 (Ind. Ct. App. July 15, 2019) (remanding the case to the trial court). While
it may be the case that Christal is entitled to the property under the will in the
estate case, she has no marital interest in the property under the property-
settlement agreement (and therefore no due-process rights were implicated).
We therefore affirm the trial court’s order appointing a commissioner to transfer
the property to the estate pursuant to the property-settlement agreement.
[4] Affirmed.
Riley, J, and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-856 | September 11, 2019 Page 3 of 3