Mary Eve Kassen Moriarty v. Catherine C. Moriarty and Paula A. Bowers ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    Jun 16 2020, 8:37 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    Michael Einterz, Jr.                                       Brian C. Hewitt
    Mike Einterz                                               Christopher J. Mueller
    Einterz & Einterz                                          Hewitt Law & Mediation, LLC
    Zionsville, Indiana                                        Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mary Eve Kassen Moriarty,                                  June 16, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-PL-2342
    v.                                                 Appeal from the Hamilton
    Superior Court
    Catherine C. Moriarty and Paula                            The Honorable Matthew C.
    A. Bowers,                                                 Kincaid, Special Judge
    Appellees-Plaintiffs                                       Trial Court Cause No.
    29D01-1709-PL-8319
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Mary Eve Kassen Moriarty (Eve) appeals the trial court’s order entering
    judgment in favor of Catherine C. Moriarty (Cathy) and Paula A. Bowers
    (Paula) (collectively Daughters) on their claim to reject the probate of the
    purported last will and testament of William J. Moriarty (the Purported Will)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                           Page 1 of 27
    on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and/or undue influence and on
    their claim of tortious interference with inheritance. Eve contends that the trial
    court abused its discretion at trial by allowing Daughters to reopen their case-in-
    chief to call her as a witness. She also argues that the trial court’s legal
    conclusions are clearly erroneous. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The unchallenged findings of fact show that William and Doreen Moriarty are
    Daughters’ parents. 1 On April 1, 2016, Doreen died. William and Doreen had
    been married for fifty-eight years.
    [3]   The Moriarty family was a “closely knit, loving family.” Appealed Order at 18
    (finding #175). William was a devoted husband and father. Cathy and Paula
    had close relationships with both parents, although at times Paula and William
    would disagree. Paula has two children, Nicholas and Jackson, who both had
    loving relationships with William and Doreen. Based on numerous specific
    statements by William over many years, Paula and Cathy each expected to
    1
    The trial court, for the most part, adopted Daughters’ proposed findings and conclusions thereon. Eve
    argues that the trial court’s order is clearly erroneous because the citations in the trial court’s order do not
    correspond with the official transcript on appeal. It appears that Daughters obtained a certified transcript to
    prepare their proposed findings, and that that transcript was paginated differently than the official transcript
    on appeal. Daughters were kind enough to provide a key in their appellees’ appendix as an aid to locating
    the citations in the trial court’s order in the transcript on appeal. Of the order’s more than 250 findings and
    conclusions, Eve contends that only the footnote in finding 223 is not supported by the record on appeal.
    That footnote is immaterial to the resolution of the issues on appeal. There is nothing in the findings that we
    rely on in this opinion that is not accurately represented in the transcript on appeal. In her reply brief, Eve
    requests that we strike Daughters’ appellees’ appendix. Despite her failure to make this request as a motion
    as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 34, we deny her request.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                    Page 2 of 27
    inherit one-half of William’s assets. In addition, William discussed his
    intention that everything he and Doreen owned would be split between Cathy
    and Paula with Doreen’s sister, Elaine Suurendonk, who had significant
    interaction with the Moriarty family over several decades.
    [4]   Dr. Edward Fry is a cardiologist who treated both Doreen and William.
    Doreen was his patient from 2007 until her death. In April 2015, William
    became Dr. Fry’s patient when William was hospitalized and diagnosed with
    congestive heart failure (CHF). At an appointment in May 2016, William
    reported to Dr. Fry that he had been under a great deal of stress due to the
    prolonged and complex illness of his wife who had recently passed away.
    [5]   Eve, who had met William at Holy Spirit Parish when Doreen was still living,
    began dating him within weeks after Doreen died. Cathy learned about Eve in
    an email from William but did not realize that they were dating. William never
    mentioned Eve by name to Paula or invited Paula to meet Eve. Paula noticed a
    change in her relationship with William when he stopped calling, emailing, and
    otherwise communicating with her after Father’s Day 2016. William had never
    stopped communicating with Paula before. Cathy did not understand why
    William suddenly stopped communicating with Paula. In June 2016, William
    did not want Cathy to visit him in Indianapolis, and she thought that was very
    strange. In August 2016, Cathy visited William, and he told her that he was
    engaged to be engaged, but she did not understand what he meant.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020           Page 3 of 27
    [6]   On October 25, 2016, Eve married William. This was Eve’s fourth marriage.
    William’s daughters, grandsons, sister, sister-in-law, and longtime close friends
    were not invited to the wedding. Sometime before the wedding, “Cathy found
    out that Eve planned to marry William,” but Paula was not informed about the
    wedding, and she was shocked to learn that William married Eve so soon after
    Doreen’s death.
    Id. at 4,
    21 (#32, #214, #215). Although Suurendonk had
    maintained regular contact with William following Doreen’s death, he did not
    tell her that he was going to be married, and she was surprised to learn that
    William had married Eve so soon after Doreen’s death. William’s longtime
    friend Danial Kocher, who maintained regular contact with William, was not
    informed that William was going to marry Eve and was shocked to learn that
    William married Eve. Eve never invited Paula or Cathy to her home, did not
    invite them to William’s surprise birthday party, and did not meet Paula until
    the day before William died.
    [7]   “After Eve married William, Paula and Cathy were not permitted to participate
    in William’s medical care as they had previously with William and with
    Doreen.”
    Id. at 11
    (#100). “Dr. Fry viewed this as a significant change from
    the family dynamic over the previous nine years.”
    Id. “Eve was
    present at the
    office visit when William told Dr. Fry that he did not want Paula and Cathy
    involved in his medical care.”
    Id. “During the
    course of Dr. Fry’s treatment of
    William, Dr. Fry diagnosed William with anxiety and depression, and Dr.
    Fry’s medical records reference symptoms of anxiety and depression nine times
    from April 2016 through William’s death in May 2017.”
    Id. (#108). Court
    of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020         Page 4 of 27
    [8]    On November 17, 2016, William and Eve closed on the purchase of a home on
    Glen Ridge Circle (Glen Ridge House) in Fishers for $412,620.11. The Glen
    Ridge House was paid for by wire transfer from an account owned solely by
    William, which had been funded by the sale of his prior home and a money
    market account owned solely by him. The amount of money William spent on
    the Glen Ridge House was out of character for him.
    [9]    “A patient with CHF, like William, would become physically reliant on others
    for assistance with activities of daily living.”
    Id. at 12
    (#112). In March 2017,
    Eve fired William’s home healthcare service provider, the same provider who
    had served Doreen. William said nothing, which was out of character for him.
    [10]   On March 20, 2017, William signed a request to surrender his Prudential life
    insurance policy. Eve initially testified that she had not seen the request before
    William died, but she admitted to writing everything on it except William’s
    signature. The policy’s surrender value of $11,591.80 was deposited into an
    account, which was owned jointly by William and Eve.
    [11]   On April 6, 2017, William executed the Purported Will. Ex. 3. The Purported
    Will directs all tangible personal property and the entire residue of William’s
    estate to be distributed to Eve if she survives him and nominates Eve to serve as
    personal representative of his estate. The Purported Will also provides that if
    Eve does not survive William, then the personal property and residue of his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 5 of 27
    estate are to be distributed to Daughters, per stirpes. The Purported Will
    included a self-proving clause. 2
    [12]   The Purported Will was prepared by attorney Greg Cagnassola. Eve had been
    a client of Cagnassola for eight to ten years. Cagnassola departed significantly
    from his ordinary practices when meeting with and preparing an estate plan for
    William. Other than dropping off a draft of the Purported Will at William’s
    house, Cagnassola did not have in-person interaction with William until the
    signing of the Purported Will at William’s house. Eve was home when the
    Purported Will was signed. Eve prepared the check that William signed to pay
    for the preparation of the Purported Will. Also on April 6, William signed a
    general durable power of attorney naming Eve as his attorney-in-fact and a
    healthcare power of attorney naming Eve as his healthcare power of attorney,
    both effective immediately. Eve never signed a will or trust naming William as
    a beneficiary. Eve never named William as her healthcare power of attorney or
    healthcare representative or attorney-in-fact.
    [13]   In April 2017, although he was no longer driving, William owned a 2015
    Lincoln MKX truck that was paid for and had low mileage. Eve leased an
    Acura, which had a net amount of $4860.38 due to the dealership. On April
    27, 2017, William and Eve traded in their cars and purchased a 2017 Lexus RX
    2
    “A self-proving clause creates a rebuttable presumption that the will was properly executed.” Scribner v.
    Gibbs, 
    953 N.E.2d 475
    , 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “[P]roper execution of a will requires a writing, a
    signature, acknowledgment, publication, presence, and attestation by capable witnesses.”
    Id. (citing HENRY’S
    INDIANA PROBATE LAW & PRACTICE § 29.03 (2010)).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                  Page 6 of 27
    350 for $62,973.01. The net amount due to purchase the Lexus, after credit for
    the value of William’s truck and the amount due on Eve’s Acura were applied,
    was $44,533.39. A check for $40,000 was written from a bank account owned
    solely by William. It was out of character for William to trade in his truck and
    to spend that amount of money on a new car.
    [14]   On May 7, 2017, William died. On May 22, 2017, Daughters filed a verified
    petition for supervised administration of William’s estate. The following day,
    Eve filed a petition for probate of the Purported Will without court supervision.
    Ultimately, the two causes were consolidated, and a special administrator was
    appointed.
    [15]   In September 2017, Daughters initiated the underlying action by filing a verified
    complaint alleging that the Purported Will was invalid because William was of
    unsound mind when he executed it and/or the Purported Will was a product of
    undue influence and alleging that Eve tortiously interfered with their
    inheritance. Prior to trial, Daughters requested that the trial court issue findings
    and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).
    [16]   On July 29, 2019, a three-day hearing was commenced. Daughters presented
    their case-in-chief, calling nine witnesses. When Daughters rested, Eve moved
    for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B), which the trial
    court denied. Eve then presented her defense, calling five witnesses. She did
    not call herself as a witness although she was named in her final witness list.
    After Eve rested, Daughters moved to reopen their case-in-chief to call Eve as a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 7 of 27
    witness. Tr. Vol. 3 at 243. The trial court granted the request, over Eve’s
    objection, for the limited purpose of examining Eve and gave Eve the
    opportunity for cross-examination and to call additional witnesses.
    Id. at 245-
    48. Eve’s counsel did not ask Eve any questions on cross-examination, call any
    additional witnesses, or ask for a continuance to call or recall other witnesses.
    [17]   On September 26, 2019, following the parties’ submissions of proposed findings
    of facts and conclusions thereon, the trial court issued a twenty-eight-page
    order, consisting of over 250 findings and conclusions, which in relevant part
    provides as follows:
    K. Testimony of Dr. Stephen Rappaport
    158. Dr. Stephen Rappaport is a geriatrician and has been an
    expert witness in legal disputes for over twenty years. He
    frequently determines patients’ decision-making capacity and
    treats patients regularly who are suffering from anxiety,
    depression, and cardiac conditions, including CHF.
    ….
    160. Dr. Rappaport reviewed extensive medical records and
    other case records in order to render an opinion concerning the
    impact of William’s physical and affective (mood) abnormalities
    on his psychological vulnerability to undue influence.
    ….
    172. This Court adopts the opinion of Dr. Rappaport and finds
    that William’s physical and psychological impairments and the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 8 of 27
    under-treatment of his depression and anxiety impacted
    William’s ability to reasonably evaluate and judge the treatment
    of him by third parties.
    173. This Court adopts the opinion of Dr. Rappaport and finds
    that William’s physical and psychological impairments and the
    under-treatment of his depression and anxiety impacted
    William’s psychological vulnerability and susceptibility to undue
    influence.
    174. The Court adopts the opinion of Dr. Rappaport and finds
    that, on April 6, 2017, (a) William’s ability to reasonably
    evaluate and judge the treatment of him by third parties was
    impaired, and (b) William suffered increased psychological
    vulnerability and susceptibility to undue influence.
    ….
    S. William lacked the mental capacity to determine Paula and
    Cathy’s deserts, with respect to their treatment of and conduct
    toward him.
    236. Based on all the evidence, and specifically based on, among
    other things (a) the testimony of [Daughters], Ms. Suurendonk,
    and William’s long-time friends that William would never have
    excluded [Daughters] from his life or estate plan, (b) the expert
    medical testimony of Dr. Rappaport that William lacked the
    capacity to reasonably evaluate and judge the treatment of him
    by third parties, and (c) William giving Doreen’s sentimental
    personal property to Scott Bowers at a time when he and Paula
    were in the midst of a highly contentious, drawn-out divorce, the
    Court finds that William lacked the mental capacity to determine
    Paula and Cathy’s deserts, with respect to their treatment of and
    conduct toward him.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020           Page 9 of 27
    T. William was susceptible to undue influence.
    237. Based on all the evidence, and specifically based on, among
    other things, (a) the death of Doreen, (b) William’s virtually
    untreated anxiety and depression, (c) William’s severe CHF and
    other medical conditions, (d) William’s isolation from his family
    and long-time friends, [and] (e) William’s dependency on others,
    this Court finds that William was susceptible to undue influence.
    U. Eve exercised undue influence over William.
    238. The Court finds that Eve exercised undue influence over
    William and bases that finding upon all of the evidence and
    specifically upon (a) Eve’s marriage to William less than seven
    months after Doreen died, (b) Eve’s involvement in the grief
    ministry at Holy Spirit in which William was a participant, (c)
    the Purported Will and non-probate transfers representing a
    dramatic shift in William’s intent regarding the passing of his
    estate less than six months after the wedding and only one month
    before his death, (d) the testimony of Eve that she contributed at
    least $232,500 in physical cash to William toward the purchase of
    the Glen Ridge House and the Lexus, which this Court found not
    credible, (e) the involvement by Eve in the procurement of and
    payment for the Purported Will, (f) the involvement of Eve in the
    surrendering of William’s Prudential life insurance policy, (g) the
    purchase of the Lexus only ten days before William’s death when
    William was no longer driving, (h) the lack of any effort by Eve
    to form relationships with Paula, Cathy, and William’s other
    family and long-time friends, (i) Eve’s firing of William’s long-
    time medical caregiver, (j) William’s significant reliance on Eve,
    (k) the wedding occurring without any of William’s family or
    long-time friends attending or even being invited, (l) Eve
    inheriting virtually all of William’s assets to the exclusion of his
    daughters and grandsons, and (m) Eve’s demeanor in court,
    which consisted of a flat affect during emotional testimony of
    Paula and Cathy about their father’s last hours and during Eve’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020         Page 10 of 27
    own testimony, which leaves this factfinder with no confidence
    that Eve married William because she loved him and with the
    conclusion that Eve planned to take all of William’s money all
    along.
    II.     CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    ….
    i. Capacity to Execute a Will
    241. Every person is presumed to be of sound mind to execute a
    will until the contrary is shown. Hays v. Harmon, 
    809 N.E.2d 460
    , 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. To rebut this
    presumption, a party must show that the testator lacks mental
    capacity at the time of executing his will to know: (1) the extent
    and value of his property; (2) those who are the natural objects of
    his bounty; (3) their deserts, with respect to their treatment of and
    conduct toward him, and (4) to retain such facts in mind long
    enough to have a will prepared and executed. [Gast v. Hall, 
    858 N.E.2d 154
    , 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)] (internal citations
    omitted); McReynolds v. Smith, 
    86 N.E. 1009
    , 1010 (Ind. 1909);
    Barr v. Sumner, 
    107 N.E. 675
    , 679 (Ind. 1915). While it is the
    testator’s soundness of mind at the time of executing the will that
    is controlling, evidence of the testator’s mental condition prior to
    the date of execution is admissible, as it relates to the testator’s
    mental state when executing his will. 
    Gast, 858 N.E.2d at 165
            (internal citations omitted). A testator must possess all essential
    elements of testamentary capacity; if one essential element is
    lacking, the will of the testator is not valid. Lowe v. Talbert, 
    177 N.E. 339
    , [340] (Ind. Ct. App. 1931) (en banc).
    242. Based on the findings above, the Court concludes that
    William lacked the mental capacity to determine Paula and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020           Page 11 of 27
    Cathy’s “deserts, with respect to their treatment of and conduct
    toward him.”
    243. Accordingly, the Court concludes that William lacked
    sufficient mental capacity to validly execute the Purported Will.
    ii. Undue Influence
    244. Undue influence is defined as “the exercise of sufficient
    control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into
    question, to destroy his free agency and constrain him to do what
    he would not have done if such control had not been exercised.”
    In re Estate of Wade, 
    768 N.E.2d 957
    , 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
    trans. denied. It is an intangible thing that only in the rarest
    instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive
    proof. McCartney v. Rex, 
    145 N.E.2d 400
    , 402 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1957) (“The difficulty is also enhanced by the fact universally
    recognized that he who seeks to use undue influence does so in
    privacy”). As such, undue influence may be proven by
    circumstantial evidence, and the only positive and direct proof
    required is of facts and circumstances from which undue
    influence may reasonably be inferred. Haas v. Haas, 
    96 N.E.2d 116
    , 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1951), reh’g denied. “As circumstances
    tending in a slight degree to furnish ground for inference of fraud
    or undue influence, it is proper to consider the character of the
    proponents and beneficiaries, and interest or motive on their part
    to unduly influence the testator, and facts and surroundings
    giving them an opportunity to exercise such influence.” Davis v.
    Babb, 
    125 N.E. 403
    , 406 (Ind. 1919). Where a person makes
    false statements and accusations to a testator concerning the
    objects of the testator’s bounty, with the intention and effect of
    alienating the testator’s affections and causing the testator to
    make certain testamentary dispositions of property, the will may
    be declared void for undue influence. Friedersdorf v. Lacy, 
    90 N.E. 766
    (Ind. 1910).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020           Page 12 of 27
    245. Based on the evidence, including reasonable inferences the
    Court draws from the facts and circumstances and further based
    on the findings above, the Court concludes that: William was
    susceptible to undue influence, Eve exercised undue influence
    over William at the time he executed the Purported Will, and the
    Purported Will was a product of Eve’s exercise of undue
    influence over William.
    B. Tortious Interference with Inheritance
    ….
    247. Here, Paula and Cathy have filed an action to contest the
    validity of the Purported Will, which, if successful, would allow
    them to inherit assets from William’s probate estate. However,
    the will contest remedy would not allow Paula and Cathy to
    inherit or benefit from any of William’s assets that pass outside
    his probate estate. The Court concludes that Paula and Cathy
    have stated a valid claim for tortious interference with
    inheritance. William was susceptible to undue influence and Eve
    exercised undue influence at the time that (a) the Glen Ridge
    House was purchased and deeded to William and Eve as
    husband and wife, (b) the Lexus was purchased and titled to
    William and Eve as joint owners, (c) Eve became a joint owner
    in the bank account ending 0541 at The National Bank of
    Indianapolis, the bank account ending 864 at Fifth Third Bank,
    and the bank account ending 1434 at PNC Bank (the “Joint
    Accounts”). Eve’s exercise of undue influence over William is
    tortious interference with Paula’s and Cathy’s expected
    inheritance.
    248. But for Eve’s tortious interference with Paula and Cathy’s
    expected inheritance, the Glen Ridge House, the Lexus, and the
    Joint Accounts would have passed through William’s probate
    estate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020       Page 13 of 27
    249. The Court concludes that [Daughters] have, by clear and
    convincing evidence, established that William did not intend for
    Eve to inherit the value of the Joint Accounts.
    Appealed Order at 16-18, 24-28 (some citations omitted).
    [18]   The trial court entered judgment in favor of Daughters, declared the Purported
    Will to be invalid, rejected the probate of the Purported Will, and ordered that
    William’s estate be distributed as an intestate estate.
    Id. at 28.
    The trial court
    also entered judgment in favor of Daughters on their claim for tortious
    interference with inheritance, ordered Eve to transfer title of the Glen Ridge
    House and Lexus to William’s estate, and entered a money judgment against
    Eve in constructive trust in favor of William’s estate in the amount reflecting
    the value of the Joint Accounts received by Eve: $54,665.83.
    Id. This appeal
    ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [19]   Initially, we note that where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and
    conclusions thereon at a party’s request pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A),
    our standard of review is well settled:
    First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings
    and second, whether the findings support the judgment. In
    deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb
    the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the
    findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not
    reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to
    the trial court’s judgment. Challengers must establish that the
    trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 14 of 27
    erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced
    a mistake has been made. However, while we defer substantially
    to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law.
    Additionally, a judgment is clearly erroneous under Indiana Trial
    Rule 52 if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We evaluate
    questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s
    determination of such questions.
    Trabucco v. Trabucco, 
    944 N.E.2d 544
    , 548-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
    Balicki v. Balicki, 
    837 N.E.2d 532
    , 535-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied
    (2006)), trans. denied. In addition, when findings of fact are unchallenged, this
    Court accepts them as true. 3 Henderson v. Henderson, 
    139 N.E.3d 227
    , 232 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support
    the judgment, we will affirm. See Kitchell v. Franklin, 
    26 N.E.3d 1050
    , 1059
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that even if appellate court disregarded the
    challenged findings, unchallenged findings were sufficient to support trial
    court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s claim was unreasonable and groundless so as
    to support trial court’s award of attorney fees), trans. denied.
    Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    permitting Daughters to reopen their case-in-chief.
    [20]   We first address Eve’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to allow Daughters
    to reopen their case-in-chief to call her as a witness. We observe, “it is within
    3
    In a footnote in her reply brief, Eve argues that certain findings are unsupported by the evidence, but
    arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. See Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 
    755 N.E.2d 589
    , 593, n.6 (Ind. 2001) (concluding that issue raised for first time in reply brief was waived); Ind. Appellate
    Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                   Page 15 of 27
    the discretion of the trial court to permit a party to present additional evidence
    or testimony once the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after
    the close of all of the evidence.” Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 
    105 N.E.3d 176
    , 186 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2018); Quigg Trucking v. Nagy, 
    770 N.E.2d 408
    , 413 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2002); Preuss v. McWilliams, 
    141 Ind. App. 602
    , 606, 
    230 N.E.2d 789
    , 791
    (1967). In arguing whether the trial court abused its discretion, both parties cite
    to Flynn v. State, 
    497 N.E.2d 912
    (Ind. 1986), wherein our supreme court stated,
    Among the factors which weigh in the exercise of discretion are
    whether there is any prejudice to the opposing party, whether the
    party seeking to reopen appears to have rested inadvertently or
    purposely, the stage of the proceedings at which the request is
    made, and whether any real confusion or inconvenience would
    result from granting the request.
    [21]
    Id. at 914.
    4 “Two conditions must be shown to exist to justify a court of
    appellate jurisdiction in setting aside a ruling made by a trial court in the
    exercise of judicial discretion: 1) that the action complained of must have been
    unreasonable in light of all attendant circumstances or it must have been clearly
    untenable or unreasonable; and 2) that such action was prejudicial to the rights
    of the complaining party.”
    Id. at 916.
    4
    All the cases citing the Flynn factors are criminal cases: Walker v. State, 
    587 N.E.2d 675
    , 677 (Ind. 1992);
    Ford v. State, 
    523 N.E.2d 742
    , 745-46 (Ind. 1988); Alvarado v. State, 
    89 N.E.3d 442
    , 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017),
    trans. denied (2018); Gilman v. State, 
    65 N.E.3d 638
    , 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Moss v. State, 
    13 N.E.3d 440
    ,
    446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; Saunders v. State, 
    807 N.E.2d 122
    , 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); White v.
    State, 
    726 N.E.2d 831
    , 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Although criminal cases differ from civil cases
    in many respects, the Flynn factors, while not an exclusive or comprehensive list, may be helpful in civil
    cases. We consider them here because both parties rely on them.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                  Page 16 of 27
    [22]   Eve argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not apply the
    Flynn factors. We are unpersuaded. We note that when a trial court exercises
    its discretion in ruling on a party’s motion to reopen its case-in-chief, there is no
    requirement that the court specifically articulate the reasons for its ruling.
    Furthermore, the “trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it
    correctly.” Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 
    944 N.E.2d 502
    , 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
    We also note that while the Flynn factors may be helpful in many cases, each
    case presents its own unique circumstances that a trial court must weigh in
    exercising its discretion: “Matters committed to judicial discretion are those
    requiring an on-the-spot decision made in light of the trial judge’s knowledge,
    sense of fairness and equity, and the facts and circumstances present in the
    courtroom.” White v. White, 
    655 N.E.2d 523
    , 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). We
    find no error on this basis.
    [23]   Eve also argues that Daughters intentionally rested their case without calling
    her as a witness and that she was severely prejudiced because Daughters had
    the benefit of hearing her evidence. At trial, Eve objected to Daughters’ motion
    to reopen their case-in-chief on the grounds that Daughters had the opportunity
    to call all the witnesses they wanted and chose not to call her, and permitting
    them to call her as a witness after the close of evidence would prejudice her case
    because she had based her defense on the evidence Daughters presented in their
    case-in-chief and Daughters had the benefit of hearing her witnesses. Tr. Vol. 3
    at 243, 245-46. The trial court was clearly aware of these circumstances and
    took them into account in exercising its discretion. In addition, the trial court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 17 of 27
    considered Indiana Evidence Rule 611, which governs the mode and order of
    examining witnesses and presenting evidence.
    Id. at 245.
    The trial court
    explained that the rule required it to “exercise reasonable control over the mode
    and order of examining witnesses and presenting the evidence so as to make
    those procedures effective for determining the truth, avoid wasting time, and
    protecting witnesses from harassment and undue embarrassment.”
    Id. The trial
    court mitigated the threat of prejudice to Eve by granting her the
    opportunity for cross-examination and to call additional witnesses. She
    declined to do either.
    [24]   This Court has previously observed that
    “[w]hile a trial judge has some discretion in refusing a request to
    reopen the case to supply testimony adequate to avoid a nonsuit,
    yet this discretion should be liberally exercised in behalf of
    allowing the whole case to be presented. It is the usual course to
    allow the additional evidence, and, whenever the trial judge
    refuses to allow it, some good reason should appear for such
    exercise of his discretion. The trial of a case is not a mere game
    for testing the skills and vigilance of contesting lawyers, but is an
    investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining truth.”
    Sanders v. Ryan, 
    112 Ind. App. 470
    , 
    41 N.E.2d 833
    , 836 (1942) (reversing trial
    court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to reopen evidence made after defendant’s
    motion for judgment on the evidence had been granted). Under the
    circumstances present here, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020           Page 18 of 27
    allow Daughters to reopen their case was unreasonable. 5 See Gorman v. State,
    
    463 N.E.2d 254
    , 257 (Ind. 1984) (no prejudice found in reopening case where
    witness was known to defense and defense was given opportunity to cross-
    examine witness and call additional witnesses in his behalf); Gilman v. State, 
    65 N.E.3d 638
    , 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    allowing State to reopen its case, after defendant’s closing argument, to present
    rebuttal evidence); Quigg 
    Trucking, 770 N.E.2d at 413
    (trial court did not abuse
    its discretion by allowing plaintiffs to reopen their case after defendant moved
    for judgment on the evidence). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
    Section 2 –The trial court’s legal conclusions that the
    Purported Will is invalid are not clearly erroneous.
    [25]   Eve also contends that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the
    Purported Will is invalid because William lacked sufficient mental capacity and
    Eve exercised undue influence over William. Initially, we note that any
    5
    Eve argues that she was called as a witness “only to impugn her character and attempt to impeach her
    credibility without foundation” and that this was improper pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-45-4-1 and
    Slayton v. State, 
    481 N.E.2d 1300
    , 1303 (Ind. 1985). Appellant’s Br. at 35. However, she did not object to
    Daughters’ motion to reopen their case on this basis. Therefore, this argument is waived. See Anonymous,
    M.D. v. Hendricks, 
    994 N.E.2d 324
    , 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Generally, a party cannot raise an argument
    for the first time on appeal.”). Also, in her appellant’s reply brief, Eve argues that she objected to certain
    testimony and documentary evidence on the basis of relevancy. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 27 n.7 (citing
    Tr. Vol. 4 at 2, 4, and 6). In fact, the trial court sustained Eve’s objection to the documentary evidence on the
    basis of relevancy. Tr. Vol. 4 at 6. In any event, whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
    specific evidence on the basis of relevancy is a different question from whether the trial court abused its
    discretion in permitting Daughters to reopen their case. We conclude that the issue whether the trial court
    abused its discretion in admitting specific evidence on the basis of relevancy is waived for failure to present a
    cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that contentions in appellant’s brief be
    supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record
    on appeal); Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 
    764 N.E.2d 658
    , 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to present cogent
    argument waives issue for appellate review), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                   Page 19 of 27
    interested person may contest the validity of a will based on “(1) the
    unsoundness of mind of the testator; (2) the undue execution of the will; (3) that
    the will was executed under duress or was obtained by fraud; or (4) any other
    valid objection to the will’s validity or the probate of the will.” Ind. Code § 29-
    1-7-17. The burden of proof in a will contest is on the opponent of the will.
    Ind. Code § 29-1-7-20. Thus, Daughters bore the burden of proof on the issues
    they raised: that the Purported Will is invalid because William lacked the
    mental capacity to execute it and/or that it was a product of Eve’s undue
    influence over William. 6 Testamentary capacity and undue influence represent
    two separate grounds for invalidating a will, and the trial court found that the
    Purported Will was invalid on both grounds. Accordingly, if the judgment can
    be supported on either ground, we may affirm. Because we conclude that the
    trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the Purported Will is the
    product of Eve’s undue influence over William, we need not address her
    arguments relating to his testamentary capacity.
    [26]   “Undue influence is defined as ‘the exercise of sufficient control over the
    person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to destroy his free
    agency and constrain him to do what he would not have done if such control
    had not been exercised.’” In re Estate of Compton, 
    919 N.E.2d 1181
    , 1185-86
    6
    Undue influence is a type of undue execution. Matter of Estate of Parlock, 
    486 N.E.2d 567
    , 569 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1985).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                 Page 20 of 27
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Trent v. Nat’l City Bank of Ind., 
    918 N.E.2d 646
    ,
    651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied (2010)), trans. denied.
    In order to affect a will, undue influence must subjugate the mind
    of a testator to the wishes of the person exerting the influence. It
    must be such as to control the mental operations of the testator in
    the making thereof, overcome his power of resistance and oblige
    him to make a disposition of his property which he would not
    have made if left freely to act according to his own wishes and
    pleasures.
    Lindinger v. Lindinger, 
    126 Ind. App. 463
    , 466, 
    130 N.E.2d 75
    , 77 (1955). “It
    may flow from the abuse of a confidential relationship in which ‘confidence is
    reposed by one party in another with resulting superiority and influence
    exercised by the other.’” 7 Carlson v. Warren, 
    878 N.E.2d 844
    , 851 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2007) (quoting In re Neu, 
    588 N.E.2d 567
    , 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)).
    [27]   When considering whether a will is invalid because it is a product of undue
    influence, the mental state of the testator is a factor the courts consider. Nichols
    v. Estate of Tyler, 
    910 N.E.2d 221
    , 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Gast, 858
    7
    Although not discussed by the parties, we note that “[u]nder Indiana law, a confidential relationship
    sufficient to support an undue influence claim may arise either as a matter of law or may arise under the
    particular facts of a case.” Scribner v. Gibbs, 
    953 N.E.2d 475
    , 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). A confidential
    relationship as a matter of law creates a presumption of undue influence.
    Id. “Confidential relationships
    as a
    matter of law include relationships such as attorney-at-law and client, attorney-in-fact and the one granting
    the power of attorney, guardian and ward, principal and agent, pastor and parishioner, and parent and
    child.”
    Id. Here, there
    was no confidential relationship as a matter of law between Eve and William, and
    therefore a presumption of undue influence did not arise. “Where there is no confidential relationship as a
    matter of law, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing either that “the dominant party dealt with superior
    knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relationship, or dealt from a position of overpowering
    influence as to the subordinate party.”
    Id. (quoting Carlson,
    878 N.E.2d at 851).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                   Page 21 
    of 27 N.E.2d at 166
    ). However, “[c]omplete unsoundness of mind is not necessary to
    support a finding of undue influence; rather, weakness of mind when combined
    with other factors is sufficient.” 8
    Id. As we
    have often explained,
    Undue influence is an intangible thing that only in the rarest
    instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive
    proof. That difficulty is enhanced by the fact that one who seeks
    to use undue influence does so in privacy. Accordingly, undue
    influence may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and the only
    positive and direct proof required is of facts and circumstances
    from which undue influence reasonably may be inferred. The
    following circumstances tending to support an inference of undue
    influence may be properly considered by our Court: (1) the
    character of the beneficiary; (2) any interest or motive the
    beneficiary might have to unduly influence the testator; and (3)
    the facts and surrounding circumstances that might have given
    the beneficiary an opportunity to exercise such influence.
    In re Rhoades, 
    993 N.E.2d 291
    , 300-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation marks
    omitted) (citing 
    Gast, 858 N.E.2d at 166
    ). See also Davis v. Babb, 
    190 Ind. 173
    ,
    
    125 N.E. 403
    , 406 (1919) (“[I]t is proper to consider the character of the
    proponents and beneficiaries, and interest or motive on their part to unduly
    8
    Eve argues that the trial court’s conclusions as to undue influence are clearly erroneous because the trial
    court applied an incorrect legal standard in finding #241 by relying on Lowe, 
    177 N.E. 339
    . The legal
    principles recited in finding 241 apply to determining whether a testator has sufficient mental capacity to
    execute a will. To prove testamentary capacity, we have explained that “‘unless the failure of understanding
    be quite total, reaching to the testator’s forgetfulness of his immediate family and property, he is not
    disqualified from making a will,’ for the weak and aged must be accorded the same rights as the strong-
    minded to dispose of their property.” Hays v. Harmon, 
    809 N.E.2d 460
    , 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
    Farner v. Farner, 
    480 N.E.2d 251
    , 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). Undue influence need not be premised on
    complete lack of testamentary capacity. See 
    Nichols, 910 N.E.2d at 229
    . Accordingly, Eve’s argument
    regarding Lowe does not apply to the separate issue of undue influence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                Page 22 of 27
    influence the testator, and facts and surroundings giving them an opportunity to
    exercise such influence.”). 9
    [28]   Here, the trial court found that William was susceptible to undue influence
    based on the death of Doreen, his untreated anxiety and depression, his severe
    CHF and other medical conditions, his isolation from family and friends, and
    his dependency on others. Appealed Order at 24-25 (#237). Eve does not
    contend that this finding is clearly erroneous. As for whether Eve exercised
    undue influence over William, the trial court found that she did based on the
    following: Eve married William only seven months after Doreen died, and
    none of William’s family or longtime friends were invited to the wedding; Eve
    made no effort to form relationships with William’s family and friends; Eve
    fired William’s longtime caregiver; William significantly relied on Eve; Eve was
    involved with the procurement and payment of the Purported Will; the
    Purported Will and the non-probate transfers represented a dramatic departure
    from what William had previously and consistently expressed as his intent with
    regard to his assets; Eve inherited virtually all of William’s assets to the
    exclusion of his daughters and grandsons; and the Lexus was purchased when
    William was no longer driving and just ten days before he died.
    Id. at 25
    (#238). In addition, the trial court found that Eve’s testimony that she made
    substantial contributions toward the purchase of the Glen Ridge House and the
    9
    Eve repeatedly attacks the trial court’s consideration of her character. However, Eve’s character is a
    permissible consideration as it relates to whether she exercised undue influence over William.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                 Page 23 of 27
    Lexus was not credible. Finally, the trial court made the following finding
    regarding Eve’s demeanor, which is the only finding Eve challenges: 10
    Eve’s demeanor in court, which consisted of a flat affect during
    emotional testimony of Paula and Cathy about their father’s last
    hours and during Eve’s own testimony, which leaves this
    factfinder with no confidence that Eve married William because
    she loved him and with the conclusion that Eve planned to take
    all of William’s money all along.
    Id. [29] Eve
    argues that it was inappropriate for the trial court to consider her demeanor
    in court because it is not admissible evidence, and that it was also inappropriate
    for the trial court to make a determination on whether she loved William.
    Appellant’s Br. at 46-47. As to the latter, we note that because the issue before
    the trial court was whether Eve exercised undue influence over William, her
    interests and motives were relevant to the resolution of the issue. See 
    Rhoades, 993 N.E.2d at 300-01
    . As to the trial court’s consideration of Eve’s demeanor,
    our legal system attaches great significance to the trier of fact’s “ability to
    observe the demeanor of witnesses and thereby evaluate their credibility.”
    Addison v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 
    397 N.E.2d 1037
    , 1039 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1979). We have explained,
    10
    Eve raises new challenges to the trial court’s finding of undue influence in her appellant’s reply brief, but
    an appellant may not raise new arguments in her reply brief. See 
    Felsher, 755 N.E.2d at 593
    ; Ind. Appellate
    Rule 46(C).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020                                    Page 24 of 27
    Countless times our Appellate Courts defer to findings of fact
    made by administrative agencies, judges or juries, reviewing
    evidence only in a light most favorable to the decision below.
    This standard of review is in recognition of the trier of fact’s
    intelligence and understanding, coupled with their opportunity to
    personally hear the witnesses and observe their conduct in the act
    of testifying. In legal concept, the appearance and demeanor of a
    witness is assumed to be in evidence.
    Id. (citation and
    quotation marks omitted).
    [30]   Assuming, without deciding, that it was inappropriate for the trial court to
    consider Eve’s demeanor when she was not testifying, any error is harmless
    because the remaining findings support the trial court’s conclusion that Eve
    exercised undue influence over William at the time he executed the Purported
    Will. Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that the Purported Will was a
    product of Eve’s exercise of undue influence over William is not clearly
    erroneous, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of Daughters on
    their claim that the Purported Will is invalid.
    Section 3 – The trial court’s conclusions regarding tortious
    interference with inheritance are not clearly erroneous.
    [31]   The trial court concluded that William was susceptible to undue influence and
    that Eve exercised undue influence over William at the time she became a joint
    owner of the Glen Ridge House, the Lexus, and the three bank accounts, and
    that her exercise of undue influence over William is tortious interference with
    Daughters’ expected inheritance. Appealed Order at 27-28 (#246-49). Eve
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020        Page 25 of 27
    argues that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard in reaching
    this conclusion.
    [32]   Tortious interference with an inheritance occurs when “[o]ne who by fraud or
    other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
    person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to
    liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.” Minton v. Sackett, 
    671 N.E.2d 160
    , 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
    TORTS § 774B (1979)). This action is prohibited “where the remedy of a will
    contest is available and would provide the injured party with adequate relief.”
    Id. [33] According
    to Eve, the trial court properly relied on Minton but failed to apply
    the clear and convincing evidence standard to the joint accounts, citing Womack
    v. Womack, 
    622 N.E.2d 481
    (Ind. 1993). Specifically, Eve directs us to the
    following language: “the party challenging the survivor’s right to the proceeds
    of the joint account must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
    decedent did not intend the survivor to receive the proceeds of the account
    without the benefit of a presumption of undue influence.”
    Id. at 483;
    see also
    Ind. Code § 32-17-11-18 (“Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to
    a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of
    the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
    intention at the time the account is created.”). Although the trial court did not
    specifically cite Womack or Section 32-17-11-18, it indisputably applied the clear
    and convincing standard to the joint accounts in finding 249: “The Court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020            Page 26 of 27
    concludes that [Daughters] have by clear and convincing evidence established
    that William did not intend for Eve to inherit the value of the Joint Accounts.”
    Appealed Order at 28. We find no error on this basis.
    [34]   Eve also contends that the evidence and findings fail to support the conclusion
    that William did not intend for Eve to receive the inter vivos transfers. Eve’s
    argument ignores findings 237 and 238 pertaining to undue influence, many of
    which apply to the inter vivos transfers as well as to the execution of the
    Purported Will. Given our discussion above, we need not repeat those findings
    here. We conclude that Eve’s argument is a request to reweigh the evidence,
    which we must decline. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in
    favor of Daughters on their tortious interference of inheritance claim.
    [35]   Affirmed.
    May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2342| June 16, 2020          Page 27 of 27