In the Matter of: M.J., Minor Child, and K.M., Mother v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                             FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                 May 05 2017, 6:30 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                           CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William W. Gooden                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Mt. Vernon, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of:                                        May 5, 2017
    M.J., Minor Child,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    65A01-1612-JC-2786
    and
    Appeal from the Posey Circuit
    K.M., Mother,                                            Court
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    The Honorable James M.
    Redwine, Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause No.
    65C01-1606-JC-110
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017     Page 1 of 12
    [1]   K.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order determining that M.J. is a child
    in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother raises one issue which we revise and
    restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s determination
    that M.J. is a CHINS. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   M.J. was born in March 2004. The Indiana Department of Child Services
    (“DCS”) received a report of abuse or neglect regarding M.J. and conducted an
    assessment in June 2016. Mother submitted to a drug screen which returned
    positive for methamphetamine. On June 22, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging
    M.J. was a CHINS.1 The petition alleged Mother tested positive for
    methamphetamine on or about June 16, 2016; Mother admitted to the use of
    methamphetamine and use of hydrocodone in an attempt to self-medicate due
    to struggles with prescription medication; Mother reported her struggle to
    obtain services has resulted in the use of methamphetamine as a coping
    mechanism; and the exposure of M.J. to involvement with illegal and impairing
    substances indicates an ongoing lack of appropriate supervision which has not
    been remedied.
    [3]   On October 5, 2016, the court held a fact-finding hearing at which it heard
    testimony from Mother and the DCS family case manager assigned to M.J.,
    Lindsey Huffer (“FCM Huffer”). Mother testified that M.J. was twelve years
    1
    DCS’s pre-dispositional report states that the date of removal of M.J. was June 20, 2016, and that M.J. was
    placed in relative foster care.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017              Page 2 of 12
    old, FCM Huffer and another person made contact with Mother in June 2016
    and asked her to submit to a drug screen, and she submitted to the screen the
    following day. Mother indicated that they asked about her drug use and she
    told them she had recently used methamphetamine. She also stated she was
    using prescription medication, Lortab, for which she did not have a
    prescription at that time and that Lortab is opiate. When asked how long she
    had been using opiates at that point without a prescription, Mother said “I
    don’t know exact amount. A year or two.” Transcript Volume 2 at 8. When
    asked why she did not attempt to obtain a prescription for the medication, she
    replied “I don’t, I can’t answer that, honestly,” and when asked how she
    obtained the medications, she answered “[o]ff of the streets.” Id.
    [4]   Mother indicated she is obtaining substance abuse treatment through Raintree
    Counseling, that she obtained “help with the pain pills through [her] pain
    management doctor,” and that she has tested negative on “all of their drug
    tests.” Id. at 9. She stated she had been seeing a doctor at Southwestern
    Indiana Mental Health since she was fifteen years old, she has anxiety and
    depression, she had been receiving counseling every three months for her
    anxiety and depression earlier in the year, and that she was now off medicines.
    When asked about her methamphetamine use, Mother answered “I messed up
    and used that one weekend. [M.J.] was gone and I was trying to numb myself
    from everything going around me.” Id. at 11. She said she smoked
    methamphetamine “[t]hat one time and got caught.” Id. When asked if she
    had ever previously used methamphetamine, Mother responded “[w]ay in the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 3 of 12
    past, Um, years” and “I did it in 2011. I did it one other time, maybe 2009.”
    Id. When asked if she felt like she still needed to go to counseling, she
    answered in the negative, and when asked if she believed the drug screens
    helped hold her accountable, she testified “[n]o. It’s this whole lesson learned”
    and “I did it one time and got caught. And now my daughter is paying for it.”
    Id. at 12.
    [5]   On cross-examination, Mother indicated that M.J. was not present when she
    used methamphetamine in June, 2016 and had been gone with a friend for that
    weekend. Id. at 13. Mother further testified that she had been prescribed
    Lortab “a year or two prior to being on them, with a prescription.” Id. at 14.
    She stated the last time she had used Lortab without a prescription was when
    she started pain management “[a]bout a month and a half ago.” Id. She
    indicated she never used Lortab in the presence of her child and that her child
    never knew. Mother also testified that she is now thirty-three years old, she is
    no longer in counseling with a doctor due to DCS, and she recently attempted
    to see the doctor but was told she could not obtain their counseling while
    obtaining help with opiates and that DCS had contacted that office.
    [6]   Mother stated that M.J. is twelve years old, during her lifetime has never gone
    without food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, has attended school, and has
    never been unsupervised when she should have been supervised. Mother
    indicated she did not know of any care, treatment, or rehabilitation that M.J.
    needs that she was not providing, and that M.J. started talking to a counselor at
    school since she was taken out of the home and it is fair to say that DCS’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 4 of 12
    involvement has created a problem for M.J. She further indicated the DCS
    workers inspected her home and did not indicate it was unsafe for M.J., that
    something needed to be corrected, or that there was some care M.J. needed but
    was not receiving. On redirect examination, when asked if she felt like she
    needed any kind of counseling for her substance abuse issues, Mother replied “I
    don’t feel like I need them but I’m getting them.” Id. at 21.
    [7]   FCM Huffer testified that she walked through M.J.’s home, the home was not
    dirty, and there were appropriate beds in the home. She testified that on June
    20, 2016, she discussed with Mother that she had testified positive for
    methamphetamine and needed to discuss the removal of M.J. According to
    FCM Huffer, Mother indicated to her that June 6th was her last use of
    methamphetamine, Mother gave her prescription bottles to FCM Huffer and
    stated that her doctor had taken her off “cold turkey, but she couldn’t stop the
    usage,” and Mother stated that she attempted to obtain help and needs help
    with the opiates but not the methamphetamine. Id. at 27.
    [8]   FCM Huffer also testified that on June 27th, 2016 Mother “wanted to talk to me
    about the paperwork that was filed that stated that the methamphetamine was
    not a coping strategy it was recreational usage.” Id. FCM Huffer further
    indicated that, after the CHINS case was filed, DCS offered Mother a drug
    assessment, that Mother asked to begin the drug assessment on August 2nd,
    and Mother officially started with the drug screens on August 23rd. With
    respect to the assessment, FCM Huffer testified “the first time she went she did
    end up walking out so the counselor told me that she couldn’t give me any
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 5 of 12
    information as far as what she’s recommending,” “we had her come in like a
    week later I believe, and she finished out the assessment,” and “they were
    recommending outpatient intensive services” in a sixteen-week program. Id. at
    29. FCM Huffer stated that Mother believed the outpatient program was too
    intense for her, she was given a couple of different options, and she decided on
    Raintree Counseling. She testified Mother had attended Raintree once and that
    she had not received any recommendations from Raintree as of that day. When
    asked if, since Mother had been screening, “has she been positive,” FCM
    Huffer answered “No. Well, besides the medication she’s currently
    prescribed.” Id. at 31.
    [9]    On cross-examination, Mother’s counsel asked if Mother had admitted to any
    other methamphetamine use other than in June 2016 and “other than maybe
    five (5) or six (6) years ago,” and FCM Huffer replied “[n]o.” Id. at 35. When
    asked “what treatment does she need that she is not getting,” FCM Huffer
    answered “[t]he counseling,” and when asked “[w]hat does that have to do with
    [Mother] having tested positive for meth on one (1) occasion? Anything?” she
    replied “[n]ot that I’m aware of.” Id. at 37-38. When asked “How about
    having used Loritab [sic] without a prescription? Is that anxiety connected to
    that?” she answered “[n]ot that I’m aware of.” Id. at 38.
    [10]   FCM Huffer testified she was recommending that the family participate in
    services to maintain Mother’s stability, that Mother has not yet completed her
    substance abuse treatment and has been doing drug screens for about a month
    and a half, and DCS has not yet received a recommendation from Raintree.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 6 of 12
    [11]   The trial court found:
    Mother admitted to one (1) time use of methamphetamine. She
    also admitted to using methamphetamine in the past, in 2011 and
    2009. But more importantly to the Court, she admitted to
    contemporary use of Loritabs [sic] when she had no prescription
    for Loritabs [sic] and indicating she was getting those drugs off of
    the streets. Meaning that every time that she bought a Loritab
    she was committing a felony. So, this is not a case of a single use
    by the Mother. . . . Mother is using Loritabs [sic] on a regular
    basis. The Court finds that it is proven by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the Mother’s ability to provide care and custody of
    the child is impaired or likely to be impaired by her ongoing use
    of prescription medications without a prescription. And that is
    one of the allegations in the Petition. It says child’s Mother
    admitted to use of amphetamine and use of hydrocodone in an
    attempt to self medicate, due to struggle with prescription
    medication. So, [DCS] has proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the child is a child in need of services.
    Transcript Volume 2 at 47-48. The court states in its chronological case
    summary entry for the fact-finding hearing that it finds DCS acted reasonably in
    becoming involved in the lives of the family and it would have been
    unreasonable and contrary to the health, safety, and welfare of the child for it to
    not have intervened.
    Discussion
    [12]   The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination
    that M.J. is a CHINS. In reviewing a trial court’s determination that a child is
    in need of services, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
    witnesses. In re S.D., 
    2 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 7 of 12
    Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court’s decision
    and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
    Id. at 1287
    . As to issues covered
    by findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports
    the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. 
    Id.
     We review
    remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which a judgment
    will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the
    evidence. 
    Id.
    [13]   
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1
     provides:
    A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
    eighteen (18) years of age:
    (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
    child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A) the child is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court.
    The CHINS statute, however, does not require that a court wait until a tragedy
    occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 
    913 N.E.2d 303
    , 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or
    inaction. 
    Id.
     The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the
    parents, but to protect the child. 
    Id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 8 of 12
    [14]   Mother contends there is no evidence “that Mother’s drug usage, minimal as it
    was, caused M.J. to lack food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or
    supervision.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. She argues that DCS’s case was based
    solely on her drug usage and that “[t]he evidence supporting this consists in its
    entirety on a positive test for methamphetamine on June 16, 2016, Mother’s
    admission that she had used opiates for which she had no prescription ‘about a
    month and a half ago,’ and her admission that prior to the June 16 positive
    methamphetamine screen she had last used that drug in 2011.” 
    Id.
     at 7 (citing
    Transcript Volume 2 at 14). She also argues that DCS acknowledged it had no
    evidence that she ever used methamphetamine or opiates when she was caring
    for M.J. and that there was no evidence she was impaired while M.J. was in her
    care.
    [15]   DCS maintains that the evidence shows Mother had a pervasive substance
    abuse problem with illegally acquired opiate pain medication for a year or two
    while caring for M.J., and that there is no question that, during the entire time
    Mother was and is using opiates, she had responsibility for M.J.’s care and
    custody. In reply, Mother contends that nothing in the record indicates she had
    custody of M.J. during the one- or two-year period she was using non-
    prescribed drugs. Mother argues that DCS did not address her argument that
    there was no evidence that M.J. was deprived of necessary food, clothing,
    shelter, medical care, education, or supervision and that perhaps the failure of
    the DCS to address the issue is a concession that such evidence was in fact
    lacking.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 9 of 12
    [16]   The record reveals that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on or
    about June 16, 2016, and she indicated that she previously used
    methamphetamine in 2009 and 2011. Mother indicated that M.J. was living
    with her when DCS visited her in June 2016 and that at the time she was using
    prescription medication, Lortab, which was an opiate, for which she did not
    have a prescription. She testified that she had been using opiates without a
    prescription for “[a] year or two” and that she obtained the medication “[o]ff of
    the streets.” Transcript Volume 2 at 8. Mother had previously had a
    prescription but could not stop her usage after she no longer had a prescription.
    Although she indicated M.J. was not present when she used the
    methamphetamine or Lortab, when asked if she believed her use of opiate
    medication without a prescription was an issue, Mother answered affirmatively,
    that she had been trying to obtain help, and that she is now obtaining help for
    that. When later asked if she felt like she needed any kind of counseling for her
    substance abuse issues, Mother answered “I don’t feel like I need them but I’m
    getting them.” Id. at 21. FCM Huffer testified that, on June 20, 2016, Mother
    had indicated to her that she needs help with the opiates but not the
    methamphetamine, and that a parent’s drug use would affect the parent’s ability
    to supervise her child. We also note Mother ended up walking out of her first
    substance abuse assessment and, after she later completed the assessment,
    believed the recommended sixteen-week outpatient program was too intense for
    her.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 10 of 12
    [17]   To the extent Mother characterizes her drug use as minimal, we note the trial
    court expressly found that “this is not a case of a single use by the Mother,” she
    is using illegally-obtained prescription medication “on a regular basis,” and
    Mother’s ability to provide care is impaired or likely to be impaired by her
    ongoing use of prescription medications without a prescription. Transcript
    Volume 2 at 47. The evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing supports the
    court’s determination. The evidence does not establish a mere single or isolated
    instance of proscribed drug use but rather reveals Mother’s use of and struggle
    with prescription medication over a meaningful period of time, which she was
    unable to or did not satisfactorily address prior to DCS’s involvement.2 As
    noted, the CHINS statute does not require that a court wait until a tragedy
    occurs to intervene. See In re A.H., 
    913 N.E.2d at 306
    . Based upon the record,
    we conclude that the judgment reached by the trial court is not clearly
    erroneous.
    2
    In support of her argument, Mother cites In re S.M., 
    45 N.E.3d 1252
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), and In re S.K., 
    57 N.E.3d 878
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In finding that the evidence did not support the CHINS determinations,
    the court in those cases, observed that the evidence showed either a prior history of sporadic substance abuse
    or an isolated instance of drug use without more. See In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d at 1256 (noting that the mother
    had a history of sporadic marijuana use but stopped using marijuana as soon as she realized she was pregnant
    and that the substance abuse assessment did not recommend substance abuse treatment); In re S.K., 57
    N.E.3d at 883 (observing that the court’s findings indicate nothing more than an isolated use). Here, the trial
    court found and the evidence supports the conclusion that Mother had used prescription medication without
    a prescription which she obtained off the streets for one or two years prior to DCS’s involvement. Her use of
    prescription drugs without a prescription was not sporadic, not an isolated instance, and had not ended prior
    to DCS’s assessment. We find In re S.M. and In re S.K. to be distinguishable.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017               Page 11 of 12
    Conclusion
    [18]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s determination that M.J. is
    a CHINS.
    [19]   Affirmed.
    May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1612-JC-2786 | May 5, 2017   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 65A01-1612-JC-2786

Filed Date: 5/5/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021