In the Matter of: V.G. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services and R.G. (Mother) v. The Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                           Dec 28 2016, 9:08 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                            CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                        Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Megan Shipley                                             Gregory F. Zoeller
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Robert J. Henke
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of:                                         December 28, 2016
    V.G. (Minor Child),                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    Child in Need of Services                                 49A02-1605-JC-1071
    Appeal from the Marion Superior
    and                                                       Court
    R.G. (Mother)                                             The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Moores, Judge
    The Honorable Rosanne Ang,
    v.                                                        Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    The Indiana Department of Child
    49D09-1511-JC-3428
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 1 of 13
    Case Summary and Issues
    [1]   R.G. (“Mother”), a minor, is the mother of two-year-old V.G. A few weeks
    after V.G was born, he began living with his father, L.C. (“Father”), and his
    paternal grandmother (“Paternal Grandmother”). Mother asked Father to care
    for V.G. because the electricity was shut off at her residence, where she lived
    with her mother (“Maternal Grandmother”). In October 2015, Maternal
    Grandmother kicked Mother out of the house, leaving her with no choice but to
    spend a night outside before ultimately ending up in a shelter. The Indiana
    Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a verified petition alleging Mother
    to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and Mother was subsequently
    adjudicated a CHINS. DCS also filed a verified petition alleging V.G. to be a
    CHINS due to Mother’s inconsistent housing and inability to provide for V.G.’s
    basic needs. Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated
    V.G. a CHINS. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of V.G. as a
    CHINS, raising two issues for our review: (1) whether DCS presented sufficient
    evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination V.G. is a CHINS; and (2)
    whether the juvenile court’s dispositional order complied with Indiana Code
    section 31-34-19-6. Concluding there is sufficient evidence and the juvenile
    court’s dispositional order complied with the statute, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 2 of 13
    [2]   V.G. is the child of Mother and Father.1 For the first few weeks following
    V.G.’s birth, he lived with Mother and Maternal Grandmother at a relative’s
    home. However, when the relative failed to pay the electric bill, the electricity
    was shut off and Mother asked Father to care for V.G. V.G. has lived with
    Father and Paternal Grandmother ever since.
    [3]   Following V.G.’s birth, Mother had an inconsistent and unstable housing
    situation. From April 2014 to June 2014, Mother lived in her aunt’s home with
    Maternal Grandmother and Mother’s siblings. In June 2014, Mother, Maternal
    Grandmother, and Mother’s siblings moved into a different relative’s house and
    lived there until August 2014. From August 2014 to September 2014, Mother’s
    family lived in a shelter. In September 2014, Mother and her family lived with a
    different aunt, and lived there until Maternal Grandmother found an apartment
    in October 2015.
    [4]   In October 2015, Mother wanted to see V.G. and repeatedly asked Maternal
    Grandmother to take her to pick him up. However, Maternal Grandmother
    refused and told Mother she had given Paternal Grandmother guardianship of
    V.G. without Mother’s knowledge or consent. On Halloween, Mother wanted
    to take V.G. trick-or-treating with their family and asked Maternal
    Grandmother to pick V.G. up from Father’s house. Maternal Grandmother
    initially agreed, but later refused. Mother and Maternal Grandmother then
    1
    V.G.’s date of birth is April 6, 2014.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 3 of 13
    began to argue and Maternal Grandmother “hit [Mother] in [the] head with a
    pan.” 
    Id. at 68.
    Mother called the police, and she and her siblings went to stay
    with their father (“Maternal Grandfather”) for the weekend.
    [5]   The following week, Maternal Grandfather attempted to drop Mother off at
    Maternal Grandmother’s house, but Maternal Grandmother refused to let her
    come inside. Maternal Grandfather told her to “tell [Maternal Grandmother]
    that she needs to let you in . . . she is your mother and she need[s] to let you in.
    . . . If not, call my grandma.” 
    Id. at 69.
    Maternal Grandfather left and Maternal
    Grandmother did not let Mother inside the home, so Mother spent the
    night outside. Mother went to school the next day and reported the incident
    to her high school’s social worker who called DCS. Mother was placed at
    Stopover, Inc., a local Indianapolis youth shelter, for “about a week” before
    Maternal Grandfather picked her up. 
    Id. at 70.
    During Mother’s stay at
    Stopover, DCS opened a case and began investigating whether she was a
    CHINS. Ultimately, Mother was adjudicated a CHINS and custody was
    awarded to Maternal Grandfather. Mother began living with Maternal
    Grandfather at a relative’s home, and DCS deemed that home “appropriate”
    for Mother and approved her living there. 
    Id. at 154.
    [6]   On November 24, 2015, DCS filed a verified petition alleging V.G. to be a
    CHINS. The petition alleged:
    1. [Mother], mother of [V.G.], has failed to provide the child
    with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 4 of 13
    2. [Mother] has not been providing the child with basic care and
    necessities.
    3. [V.G.] has been residing with [Paternal Grandmother] . . . but
    [Paternal Grandmother] lacks guardianship for the child and
    is unable to meet his medical needs.
    4. [Mother] lacks stable housing, and she has not taken
    necessary action to adequately address the above-mentioned
    issues.
    5. [Father], alleged father of [V.G.], is unable to ensure the
    child’s safety and well being while in the care and custody of
    [Mother].
    6. Due to the foregoing reasons, the coercive intervention of the
    Court is necessary to ensure the child’s safety and well being.
    Appellant’s Appendix at 24.
    [7]   The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on March 28, 2016. At the
    hearing, Mother testified that instead of staying with Maternal Grandfather, she
    had been staying at her half-sister’s house with several other relatives. This
    house had not yet been approved by DCS for Mother to reside there. Mother
    also testified she did not have a job, although she was currently looking for one.
    As to who would provide monetary support for V.G., Mother testified Maternal
    Grandfather and her half-sister’s mother would help provide for V.G.’s basic
    needs such as diapers, food, and clothing.
    [8]   DCS family case manager Shavon Flemmons testified her original concern for
    V.G. was that “we had a minor mom and we had a minor child. . . . [M]om
    had no place to go. [V.G.] was placed with [Paternal Grandmother] and
    [F]ather, but they didn’t have any type of guardianship or custody of him.” Tr.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 5 of 13
    at 136. She further testified of her concerns with Mother’s new housing
    situation, stating,
    I haven’t been able to be in her home and I haven’t been able to
    verify actually where they are staying and when we came to our
    last hearing, that was when . . . it was just brought to my attention
    that she was staying [at her half-sister’s house]. So, she
    told me . . . [Maternal Grandfather] and her sister’s mother had
    spoken and, I guess, they had said that . . . she could stay there. I
    told her that was not an issue, however, I need to know that
    because if that’s where you’re living, we have to do the proper
    background checks and fingerprints and things for you to be living
    there. And . . . that has—has been the only issue that
    we’ve had, which is just the continued [sic] of not knowing, being
    able to verify, actually. They say that [Maternal Grandfather’s
    house] is the address, but I’ve never seen them in that address.
    
    Id. at 143-44.
    [9]   At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the
    petition to be true and adjudicated V.G. as a CHINS. On April 28, 2016, the
    juvenile court issued a dispositional order leaving V.G. in relative care. The
    juvenile court further ordered Mother to participate in home-based case
    management, parent education, and to follow DCS’ recommendations. As to
    Father, the juvenile court ordered him to participate in the Father Engagement
    program and to follow DCS’ recommendations. Mother now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 6 of 13
    I. CHINS Adjudication
    [10]   Mother argues DCS did not present sufficient evidence to support the juvenile
    court’s determination V.G. is a CHINS. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1
    provides circumstances under which a child may be deemed a CHINS. It
    states,
    A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
    eighteen (18) years of age:
    (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
    child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A) the child is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court.
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a
    child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. Further, the CHINS statutes do not
    require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. Roark v. Roark, 
    551 N.E.2d 865
    , 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or
    she is endangered by parental action or inaction. 
    Id. The purpose
    of a CHINS
    adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect the children. In re L.C.,
    
    23 N.E.3d 37
    , 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 7 of 13
    [11]   When we review the sufficiency of the evidence in a CHINS determination,
    “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
    In re K.D., 
    962 N.E.2d 1249
    , 1253 (Ind. 2012). Instead, “[w]e consider only the
    evidence that supports the [juvenile] court’s decision and reasonable inferences
    drawn therefrom.” 
    Id. We reverse
    only upon a showing that the decision of the
    juvenile court was clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A. Mother’s
    Ability to Care for V.G.
    [12]   Mother first argues there is insufficient evidence to establish V.G. “was
    deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, [or]
    education[.]” Brief of Appellant at 15. Specifically, she argues because she
    placed V.G. with Father and Paternal Grandmother, she did not fail to provide
    a safe and stable home for V.G. Initially, we note Father and Paternal
    Grandmother both lack a guardianship for V.G., and as of the date of the fact-
    finding hearing, Father had not established paternity. Further, the evidence
    presented at the fact-finding hearing indicates Mother lived in a shelter on two
    separate occasions and spent the night outside alone once—albeit not while
    V.G. was in her care—as a result of her parents’ refusal to support her. From
    April 2014 until the fact-finding hearing in March of 2016, Mother has lived in
    at least six different places and often with different members of her extended
    family. Even after her own CHINS proceeding in which DCS determined
    Maternal Grandfather’s residence was appropriate for her, Mother decided she
    would rather live at her half-sister’s home, which, at the time of the fact-finding
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 8 of 13
    hearing, DCS had not yet inspected, approved, or determined was suitable for
    Mother.
    [13]   The evidence further establishes Mother has no ability to provide for V.G.’s
    basic needs such as food and clothing. Mother testified she is still a junior in
    high school and currently does not have a job or income. As for who would
    provide for V.G.’s basic needs, Mother testified Maternal Grandfather and her
    half-sister’s mother have offered to help with expenses. Maternal Grandfather
    testified, “I could give him all the support that any grandparent would give . . .
    their grandchild.” Tr. at 163. However, given the fact Mother has decided to
    move out of Maternal Grandfather’s home and his past reluctance to assist
    Mother when she needed a place to stay, the juvenile court did not find his offer
    to help to be credible. The juvenile court stated,
    And, realistically, I do have to wonder, if [Maternal Grandfather]
    is now saying that he is a positive support, I would have to
    wonder where that support was when [Mother] had to sleep
    somewhere—I still don’t know—when he dropped [Mother] off
    at [her] mom’s. And so I definitely doubt the veracity of that
    testimony.
    Tr. at 196; see also In re 
    K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253
    (appellate courts will not
    reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
    [14]   Based upon our review of the record, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to
    support the juvenile court’s determination V.G. is a CHINS. For most of his
    young life, V.G. has been left in the care of Father and Paternal Grandmother,
    neither of whom have established a guardianship, nor has Father established
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 9 of 13
    paternity. Further, Mother is unable to provide V.G. with basic care that he
    needs such as shelter, food, and clothing. Mother has lived in multiple
    residences in the last two years, including two stints in local shelters because
    she had nowhere to live. She has no income to provide V.G. with his basic
    needs, and the juvenile court simply did not find Maternal Grandfather’s
    testimony that he would provide for V.G. to be credible. The juvenile court’s
    determination V.G. is a CHINS is not clearly erroneous.
    B. Coercive Authority of the Court
    [15]   Mother also argues there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that
    coercive intervention of the court is necessary to ensure V.G.’s safety. DCS
    must prove “the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the
    child, that the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those
    needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 
    2 N.E.3d 1283
    ,
    1287 (Ind. 2014). The requirement that the child’s needs are unlikely to be met
    without the intervention of the court guards against unwarranted State
    interference with family life, reserving interference for families “where parents
    lack the ability to provide for their children,” not merely where they “encounter
    difficulty in meeting a child’s needs.” Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children Servs. v.
    Charlton, 
    631 N.E.2d 526
    , 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original).
    [16]   Here, DCS has demonstrated Mother has more than mere difficulty in
    providing for V.G.’s needs. Mother has provided little to no care for V.G. since
    he was born, nor did she have the ability to, despite the fact she has sole legal
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 10 of 13
    custody of V.G. See Ind. Code § 31-14-13-1 (stating a biological mother of a
    child born out of wedlock has sole legal custody of the child). As noted above,
    Mother has no income and, until recently, has not had a stable living situation
    since V.G. was born. Since DCS became involved in Mother’s life, Mother has
    found suitable housing which has been approved for her to have unsupervised
    parenting time with V.G, and we commend Mother for her recent
    improvements and for complying with DCS. However, in light of the fact
    Mother is a minor, has no job or source of income, has never consistently taken
    care of V.G., and has struggled in the past to find or maintain suitable housing,
    the juvenile court’s conclusion that coercive intervention is necessary is not
    clearly erroneous.
    II. Dispositional Order
    [17]   Finally, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding continued supervision
    was necessary to protect V.G., and asserts the dispositional order does not
    comply with Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6, which states,
    If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
    interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
    decree that:
    (1) is:
    (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most
    appropriate setting available; and
    (B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best
    interest and special needs of the child;
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 11 of 13
    (2) least interferes with family autonomy;
    (3) is least disruptive of family life;
    (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
    (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
    [18]   We disagree with Mother that the juvenile court’s dispositional order does not
    comply with Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6 or that it erred in ordering
    continued supervision. The dispositional order granted wardship of V.G. to
    DCS and maintained V.G.’s placement in relative care. The juvenile court
    ordered Mother to participate in home-based case management, parent
    education, and to follow DCS’ other recommendations. The dispositional
    order also recognizes it is in V.G.’s best interest to remain outside of Mother’s
    care; however, the juvenile court authorized Mother to have unsupervised
    parenting time with V.G.
    [19]   As to Mother’s argument the order was not the least disruptive of family life or
    the least restrictive of family autonomy, we note that V.G.—aside from a few
    weeks following his birth—has not lived with Mother and the juvenile court
    maintained V.G.’s placement in relative care where he has been for almost two
    years. Aside from Mother’s ordered participation in parental education and
    home-based case management, minimal change occurred in Mother’s or V.G.’s
    family life. Further, the juvenile court permitted Mother to exercise
    unsupervised parenting time with the ultimate goal of reunification with V.G.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 12 of 13
    In sum, Mother has failed to demonstrate the dispositional order did not
    comply with the statute or that continued supervision was unnecessary.
    Conclusion
    [20]   DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove V.G. is a CHINS and the juvenile
    court’s order complied with Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6. Accordingly, we
    affirm the juvenile court’s judgment and order.
    [21]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-JC-1071 | December 28, 2016   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1605-JC-1071

Filed Date: 12/28/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021