In the Matter of: R.F. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services and A.P. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Aug 26 2015, 8:39 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael B. Troemel Gregory F. Zoeller
Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
James D. Boyer
Deputies Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: August 26, 2015
Court of Appeals Case No.
R.F. (Minor Child), Child in Need of 79A04-1412-JC-601
Services
And Appeal from the Tippecanoe
A.P. (Mother), Superior Court
The Honorable Faith A. Graham,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
The Honarable Crystal A. Sanders,
v. Magistrate
Cause No. 79D03-1407-JC-201
The Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] A.P. (“Mother”), appeals the juvenile court’s ruling that her six-year-old son,
R.F., is a child in need of services (“CHINS”), pursuant to Indiana Code
sections 31-34-1-1 and -2. Mother raises three issues on appeal that we restate
as whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support
the judgment. Concluding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s findings and that those findings support the judgment, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother knew C.B. (“Boyfriend”) in high school and began dating him in March
2014. Beginning in May of that year, Mother left R.F. and her fourteen-month-
old daughter, S.F., in Boyfriend’s care for up to nine hours at a time while
Mother went to work. Boyfriend cared for the children on three or four
occasions prior to the events at issue here.
[3] On Friday, July 18, 2014, S.F. was not feeling well. The next morning, S.F.
was still not feeling well and was not eating normally. Mother gave S.F. some
Tylenol. Mother went to work around 9:30 a.m., leaving R.F. and S.F. in
Boyfriend’s care. S.F. then napped off and on through the day. When she
awoke from her last nap, S.F. appeared to Boyfriend to be back to normal.
Boyfriend held S.F. on his lap while the other children 1 played. S.F. leaned
1
Boyfriend’s three-year-old son was also present that day.
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back to take a drink from her sippy cup and then went limp in Boyfriend’s arms.
Boyfriend called Mother, who was on her way home from work. After she
arrived home and saw S.F., Mother called her mother, T.D. (“Grandmother”).
Boyfriend wanted to call 9-1-1, but Mother wanted to wait for Grandmother’s
opinion.
[4] Grandmother arrived shortly thereafter. By that time, S.F. was conscious but
appeared dazed. Mother decided to wait until the next day to go to the hospital
to see if S.F.’s condition improved. Grandmother recommended that they give
S.F. Tylenol and that they keep an eye on the child. Grandmother noticed that
S.F. had a bite mark on her right hand and what appeared to be fingerprints on
her upper left arm. Grandmother asked Boyfriend and Mother about the marks
but received no explanation. S.F. spent most of the next day, Sunday, with
Grandmother and appeared to be acting normally. Monday morning S.F. had
a mild temperature. Mother administered more Tylenol before putting S.F. in
her crib. Mother placed S.F. and R.F. in Boyfriend’s care and left the home for
an appointment.
[5] Later that day, S.F. became unresponsive. S.F. was treated at a local hospital
and then was airlifted to Riley Hospital in Indianapolis. S.F. had twenty
separate areas of bruising on her body, including on the left and right side of her
forehead, on her right ear, behind her left ear, on the right side of her neck, on
her right hand, wrist, forearm, and armpit, on her left arm near the armpit and
elbow, on her chestwall, on her abdomen in multiple places, up and down her
right and left legs, and on her right buttock. In addition, S.F. had sustained a
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subdermal hematoma. She could no longer breathe on her own, and her pupils
had ceased to react to light. S.F. died from her injuries on July 22, 2014. It was
the opinion of the physician who treated S.F. that S.F.’s injuries were non-
accidental and consistent with child abuse.
[6] Following S.F.’s death, R.F. was removed from Mother’s home and placed
with a relative. A CHINS petition was filed. At the fact-finding hearing on the
petition, Mother and Boyfriend denied inflicting S.F.’s injuries. Neither
Mother nor Boyfriend offered an explanation as to how S.F. sustained her
injuries. The juvenile court found that R.F. was a CHINS. Additional facts
will be added as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[7] When, as here, the juvenile court enters findings of fact and conclusions
thereon in a CHINS determination, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.
In re J.V., 875 N.E.2d 395, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. First, we
determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we
determine whether the findings support the conclusions. Id. In making this
determination, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility.
Id. We will reverse only if, considering the evidence favorable to the juvenile
court’s judgment, the evidence does not support the findings or the findings do
not support the judgment. Id. We may not set aside the findings or judgment
unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App.
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2014) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d
1206, 1210 (Ind. 2000)). “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record
contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id. (quoting
Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)).
II. Evidence Supporting the Findings
[8] Regarding the Saturday incident when S.F. first lost consciousness, the juvenile
court found that
[b]oth Mother and Grandmother went to the home and, upon arrival,
both report [S.F.] was breathing and did not appear to be in distress,
though she was unconscious.
Appellant’s Appendix at 40 (emphasis added). Mother argues that this finding
was not supported by evidence.
[9] Boyfriend testified as follows:
Q: So that was about 15 minutes later after you called the Mother for
the – or since you had spoken to her and she was on her way home?
A: Yes.
Q: And then was [S.F] still unconscious?
A: By the time her mom - by the time her mom showed up there she was
like, she had come to. It was like a switch flipped, like you know she
was responsive, she was looking around and everything, smiling, like
back to normal.
Q: How long did it take for [S.F.] to become responsive again?
A: Probably like – as soon as – for about like two minutes or so before
her mom pulled up to that apartment is when she like started coming to.
She was like –
Q: When you say her do you mean the Mother or the grandmother?
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A: The grandmother, the grandmother.
Transcript at 79 (emphasis added).
[10] With respect to Mother, the evidence showed that she arrived at the home and
then called Grandmother. Grandmother arrived five or ten minutes later.
Thus, according to Boyfriend’s testimony, there was a period of time between
Mother’s and Grandmother’s arrival during which S.F. was still unconscious.
This evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that S.F. was still
unconscious when Mother arrived. In her Brief, Mother does not address the
fact that Boyfriend clarified that he was referring to the grandmother’s arrival in
his testimony.
[11] We agree with Mother that the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s
finding as to Grandmother. No one testified that S.F. was still unconscious
upon Grandmother’s arrival. However, given the other findings supporting the
judgment, the partial insufficiency of this finding does not undermine the
CHINS determination.
III. Findings Supporting the Judgment
[12] A CHINS determination requires that the juvenile court find that a child is
endangered and that court intervention is necessary. Ind. Code §§ 31-34-1-1, -2.
The juvenile court’s Fact-Finding Order provided in relevant part as follows:
The Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [R.F. is a
CHINS], as defined by Indiana law:
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. . . wherein the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian to supply the
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education,
or supervision.
. . . wherein the child’s physical or mental health is seriously
endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian.
In that: [sic] Court finds [R.F.] to be a CHINS based on Mother’s
failure to seek medical care for [S.F.], Mother’s failure to supervise the
children, and Mother’s failure to protect the child from the supervising
custodian.
The Court further finds that the child need [sic] care, treatment, or
rehabilitation that the child is not receiving; and that is unlikely to be
provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.
Appellant’s App. at 42. Mother argues that the juvenile court’s findings that
she failed to supply medical care, failed to supervise, and failed to protect do
not support the judgment.
A. Failure to Seek Medical Care
[13] The findings pertaining to Mother’s failure to seek medical care for S.F. are as
follows:
8. Sometime Satuday afternoon, [Boyfriend] contacted Mother and
Grandmother because [S.F.] passed out while in his care.
9. Both Mother and Grandmother went to the home and, upon
arrival, both report [S.F.] was breathing and did not appear to be in
distress, though she was unconscious. Neither Mother, Grandmother
nor [Boyfriend] took [S.F.] to the hospital or a physician to be
examined.
10. Grandmother reports she noticed a bite mark and bruising on
[S.F.’s] arm but [S.F.] was unable to articulate the source of the
bruising due to her age. Neither Mother nor Grandmother reported
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the bite marks or bruising to CPS or law enforcement. Further, the
only explanation offered by [Boyfriend] to Mother for the bruising was
that [R.F] grabbed [S.F.’s] arm and would not let go.
***
23. Further, Mother did not seek medical treatment for [S.F.] after
[S.F.] was unresponsive on the first occasion.
Appellant’s App. at 40-42. Mother argues that, because S.F. eventually
appeared to act normally after she passed out on Saturday, there was seemingly
no reason to take S.F. for medical treatment. Mother also briefly argues that
any failure on her part to seek medical care for S.F. would not repeat itself
because R.F. is old enough to speak.
[14] We disagree. There was no evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing that
S.F. had a history of losing consciousness. Although it is unclear from the
record precisely how long S.F. was unconscious, it was for more than just a
moment. The sustained loss of consciousness, especially in a child who has no
prior history of it, is a significant health event, even if the child does
subsequently appear normal. Given that S.F. had not been feeling well, passed
out, and exhibited a bite mark and bruises on her arm, the juvenile court’s
conclusion that Mother should have been alerted that something was wrong
with S.F. that merited medical attention was not clearly erroneous. To the
extent that Mother argues that the intervention of the court was not necessary
because R.F. can speak, we note that the potential capability of a child to
explain why he lost consciousness would not alter the fact that the child had
passed out and needed medical attention. We conclude that the juvenile court’s
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findings regarding Mother’s failure to seek medical care support the judgment
that R.F. was endangered and that court intervention was necessary.
B. Failure to Supervise/Protect from Custodian
[15] The juvenile court’s order provided the following regarding Mother’s failure to
supervise the children and/or protect them from her chosen custodian,
Boyfriend:
7. On Saturday, July 19, 2014, Mother had [Boyfriend] babysit the
children.
8. Sometime Saturday afternoon, [Boyfriend] contacted Mother and
Grandmother because [S.F.] passed out while in his care.
***
11. On Monday, July 21, 2014, Mother again left [S.F.] home with
[Boyfriend] while she went for a manicure. Mother was gone
approximately one to one and one-half (1 ½ ) hours….
***
22. It is unknown whether Mother or [Boyfriend] inflicted the injuries
upon [S.F], however, a child is now deceased after being in the care of
Mother and/or a custodian approved by Mother. In addition, Mother
continued to leave the children in the care of [Boyfriend] without
sufficient information to explain the injuries to [S.F.] in the form of a
bite mark and bruising on her arm.
***
24. Mother either failed to supervise the children or failed to protect
the children from exposure to injury, and the result is the tragic death
of a child.
25. The Court is not required to wait until [R.F.] suffers a similar
harm before intervening.
Appellant’s App. 40-42. Mother argues that the juvenile court’s findings do not
support the conclusion that she failed to supervise the children or to protect
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them from Boyfriend because “it amounts to a finding that [M]other should
have foreseen the harm coming to S.F.” Brief of Appellee at 10. Mother argues
that nothing would have caused her to foresee that S.F. would become ill or
injured, and she directs us to evidence supporting her decision to allow
Boyfriend to care for her children.
[16] Mother’s argument is unpersuasive in that it focuses only on her version of the
events that preceded S.F.’s death. In making a CHINS determination, a
juvenile court considers the circumstances surrounding the events that caused
the petition to be filed as well as the circumstances at the time of the fact-
finding hearing. In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing
a CHINS determination where juvenile court failed to consider improvement
made by parents by the time of the fact-finding hearing). Mother has never
disputed that she had custody of S.F. and that S.F. died after being in the care
of Boyfriend. It was the opinion of the physician who treated S.F. at Riley
Hospital that S.F. was the victim of abuse and that her injuries were non-
accidental.
[17] At the fact-finding hearing, Mother denied inflicting S.F.’s injuries, and she had
no explanation as to how those injuries had occurred. Since the cause of S.F.’s
injuries was unknown, we cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the
juvenile court to conclude that Mother had failed to supervise or protect her
children and that removal was necessary to protect R.F. This is particulary true
in light of the fact that “‘[a] CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability
on the part of a particular parent.’” In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 835 (quoting N.L.
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v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). “Said
differently, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not
punish parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106.
Conclusion
[18] We conclude that the juvenile court’s finding that S.F. was unconscious when
Grandmother arrived is unsupported by the evidence, but that the insufficiency
does not undermine the CHINS determination. The trial court’s judgment that
Mother failed to seek medical care for S.F. and failed to supervise or protect her
children, endangering R.F. and requiring the coercive intervention of the court,
was supported by the findings.
[19] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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