In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of, M.W., (Minor Child) and, J.W., (Mother) v. The Ind. Dept. of Child Services ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM
    DECISION
    Jun 04 2015, 10:15 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for
    the purpose of establishing the defense of res
    judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Erin L. Berger                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Evansville, Indiana                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Abigail R. Miller
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the                                 June 4, 2015
    Termination of the Parent-                           Court of Appeals Cause No.
    Child Relationship of,                               82A01-1410-JT-456
    Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior
    M.W., (Minor Child)                                  Court
    Cause No. 82D01-1406-JT-66
    and,                                       The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, Judge
    The Honorable Renee Ferguson,
    Magistrate
    J.W.,      (Mother)
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision |82A01-1410-JT-456 June 4, 2015        Page 1 of 6
    v.
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Barnes, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   J.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to
    M.W. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its
    discretion by denying her motion to continue.
    Facts
    [3]   M.W. was born in December 2012, and shortly after M.W.’s birth, the Indiana
    Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that M.W. was a
    child in need of services (“CHINS”) based on Mother’s erratic behavior,
    Mother’s positive drug test, and Mother’s arrest on outstanding warrants.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision |82A01-1410-JT-456 June 4, 2015   Page 2 of 6
    Mother had a pending CHINS case for another of her children, A.W. 1 In
    January 2013, the trial court found that M.W. was a CHINS. In February
    2013, the trial court entered a dispositional order that ordered Mother to
    participate in services. Between February and June 2013, Mother failed to
    make progress on the services and visited M.W. only one time. Beginning in
    June 2013, Mother was incarcerated on various charges, including dealing in
    methamphetamine, and received mental health treatment during her
    incarceration.
    [4]   In June 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
    M.W. At the July 29, 2014 pre-trial hearing, Mother requested a continuance
    of the scheduled August 6, 2014 hearing on the termination petition. Mother
    contended that she expected to be released from incarceration in October 2014,
    that she had received extensive mental health treatment, and that she desired to
    participate in services upon her release. The State objected to the continuance,
    arguing that Mother had a considerable amount of time prior to her
    incarceration to participate in services and failed to do so. The trial court
    denied Mother’s motion for a continuance. Mother did not renew her motion
    to continue at the August 6, 2014 hearing. After the hearing, the trial court
    entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting the termination of
    parental rights. Mother now appeals.
    1
    Mother’s parental rights to A.W. were terminated in November 2013. On appeal, we affirmed the
    termination of parental rights. In re A.W., 82A05-1311-JT-581 (Ind. Ct. App. July 30, 2014).
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    Analysis
    [5]   Mother argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a
    continuance of the termination of parental rights hearing. A trial court’s
    decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion
    review. In re K.W., 
    12 N.E.3d 241
    , 243-44 (Ind. 2014). “An abuse of discretion
    may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving
    party has shown good cause for granting the motion,” but “no abuse of
    discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or
    she was prejudiced by the denial.” 
    Id. at 244.
    [6]   In support of her argument, Mother relies on Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office
    of Family & Children, 
    841 N.E.2d 615
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.2 In
    Rowlett, we concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
    father’s motion to continue a hearing on the termination of his parental rights.
    The father was set to be released from incarceration six weeks after the hearing,
    and he had not had the opportunity to participate in services directed at
    reunifying him with his children. During his incarceration, the father had
    participated in numerous services and programs that would be helpful to him in
    reaching his goal of reunification with his children. Also, the children had been
    in the care and custody of their maternal grandmother since they were
    determined to be CHINS nearly three years prior to the hearing, and the
    2
    Mother also relies on A.J. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 
    881 N.E.2d 706
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),
    trans. denied. However, A.J. did not involve a motion for continuance.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision |82A01-1410-JT-456 June 4, 2015                   Page 4 of 6
    children were to be adopted by their maternal grandmother. Thus, we noted
    that the continuation of the dispositional hearing until sometime after the father
    was released would have had little immediate effect upon the children. We
    concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion
    by denying the father’s motion for continuance.
    [7]   This case, however, is distinguishable from Rowlett. Here, Mother was
    incarcerated awaiting trial. At the pre-trial hearing, Mother’s attorney stated:
    “She tells me that she has trial in October of this year, so just a couple of
    months from where we are now. And expects that even if she is unsuccessful at
    trial that her sentence will be time served. So she expects to be released from
    incarceration in October of 2014.” Tr. p. 5. Unlike in Rowlett, where the father
    was set to be released in six weeks, Mother’s release in October was speculative.
    There was no guarantee that Mother’s trial would take place in October, and
    there was no guarantee as to her sentence. Moreover, even if Mother was
    released in October, Mother would still have to demonstrate over many months
    her ability to maintain her mental health, avoid substance abuse, avoid
    additional criminal arrests and convictions, and participate in services. More
    importantly, in Rowlett, the father had not been able to participate in services
    due to his incarceration. Here, Mother had the opportunity for several months
    to participate in services and visit M.W. prior to her incarceration, but she
    failed to do so.
    [8]   We acknowledge that Mother claims to have received mental health treatment
    and claims that she is doing better. However, she presented no specifics of that
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    treatment at the time of her motion to continue. Given these facts, we are
    unwilling to keep M.W. on a shelf until Mother is capable of caring for her
    properly. See In re Campbell, 
    534 N.E.2d 273
    , 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). The
    trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue
    because she has not shown good cause or that she was prejudiced by the denial.
    Conclusion
    [9]    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to
    continue the hearing. We affirm.
    [10]   Affirmed.
    [11]   Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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