in-the-matter-of-the-termination-of-the-parent-child-relationship-of-wm ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       Dec 29 2015, 7:47 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    James T. Knight                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    Andrew A. Achey                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Hillis, Hillis, Rozzi & Achey
    Robert J. Henke
    Logansport, Indiana                                      Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                         December 29, 2015
    of the Parent-Child Relationship                         Court of Appeals Case No.
    of:                                                      25A03-1503-JT-78
    W.M. (Minor Child),                                      Appeal from the Fulton Circuit
    Court
    and
    The Honorable A. Christopher
    T.O. (Mother)                                            Lee, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    25C01-1406-JT-100
    v.
    Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015        Page 1 of 7
    Bailey, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   T.O. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to W.M.
    (“Child”), upon the petition of the Fulton County Department of Child Services
    (“the DCS”). She presents the sole issue of whether the trial court clearly erred
    in terminating her parental rights because her release from incarceration was
    imminent. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Child was born in July of 2007 to Mother and B.M. (“Father”). On July 12,
    2013, DCS caseworkers and law enforcement visited the residence of Mother,
    Father, and Child. Police officers discovered an active methamphetamine lab
    and twenty-five weapons. Mother refused a drug screen. She was arrested and
    Child was taken into DCS custody. Father was already in the Fulton County
    Jail.
    [3]   Subsequently, Mother and Father admitted that Child was a Child in Need of
    Services. Both parents were ordered to participate in services. However,
    Father remained incarcerated and did not participate. Mother participated in
    some services, albeit sporadically. She was arrested on separate drug-related
    charges in November of 2013. She tested positive for methamphetamine on
    nine occasions and refused several other drug screens. She entered an in-patient
    treatment program but, after four days, left against medical advice. She was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 2 of 7
    removed from an outpatient treatment program after she tested positive for
    methamphetamine. On July 18, 2014, her supervised visits with Child were
    terminated.
    [4]   On June 25, 2014, the DCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of
    Mother and Father. On October 1, 2014 and on November 25, 2014, fact-
    finding hearings were conducted. Father, who remained incarcerated,
    telephonically testified that he agreed to the DCS plan of adoption of Child by
    his paternal grandmother. Mother, who was also then incarcerated, testified
    that she wanted the opportunity to parent Child after her anticipated release
    from incarceration in April of 2015.
    [5]   On February 5, 2015, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions,
    and order terminating the parental rights of Father and Mother. Mother now
    appeals.1
    Discussion and Decision
    Standard of Review
    [6]   Our standard of review is highly deferential in cases concerning the termination
    of parental rights. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). This
    Court will not set aside the trial court’s judgment terminating a parent-child
    relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. In re A.A.C., 
    682 N.E.2d 542
    , 544
    1
    Father is not an active party to this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 3 of 7
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility
    of the witnesses and consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and
    the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. Requirements for
    Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
    [7]   Parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, but the law provides for the
    termination of those rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet
    their parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not
    to punish the parents, but to protect their children. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    ,
    208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
    [8]   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that the DCS must
    allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a
    parent-child relationship:
    (A) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i)     The child has been removed from the parent for at least six
    (6) months under a dispositional decree.
    (ii)    A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that
    reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not
    required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date
    of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.
    (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
    under the supervision of a local office or probation department
    for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22)
    months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 4 of 7
    home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
    services or a delinquent child;
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i)    There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii)   There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of
    the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
    the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    [9]    If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described above are true, the
    court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). A trial
    court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the
    termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.
    In re J.T., 
    742 N.E.2d 509
    , 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial
    court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine
    the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” 
    Id. Analysis [10]
      The trial court found that Mother was charged with drug-related offenses in
    July of 2013 and again in November of 2013; she had submitted nine drug
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 5 of 7
    screens that tested positive for amphetamine or methamphetamine; on
    numerous occasions, she failed to comply with drug testing protocol; she left
    inpatient treatment against medical advice; she was discharged from outpatient
    treatment for failure to maintain sobriety; she failed to successfully complete
    other programs or services; several parental visits were cancelled due to
    Mother’s impairment; and Child was thriving in the pre-adoptive home of his
    paternal grandmother.
    [11]   Mother does not allege that the trial court’s findings lack evidentiary support,
    nor does she challenge the trial court’s legal conclusions. Rather, Mother
    argues error in that “the trial court neglected to consider Mother’s release date
    when it issued a decision terminating her parental rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at
    3.) Mother directs our attention to the language of H.G. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    959 N.E.2d 272
    , 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011): “the court is not prohibited
    from considering the possibility of a parent’s early release, nor should it
    disregard a parent’s voluntary efforts while in prison.” Beyond this, Mother
    does not develop an argument such that we could find error in the trial court’s
    decision.
    [12]   Nevertheless, it is apparent that the trial court did not ignore the testimony that
    Mother had been offered a plea agreement for six months executed time and
    two and one-half years’ probation, which meant that she expected to be
    released from incarceration in April of 2015. Indeed, the trial court made the
    following factual finding:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 6 of 7
    As a result of the events leading to removal of the Child on July
    12, 2013, Mother was charged in cause number 25C01-1307-FB-
    463 with: Ct. 1 Dealing in Methamphetamine, Ct. II Possession
    of Methamphetamine; Ct. III Illegal Drug Lab, Ct. IV Neglect of
    a Dependent. Mother entered a plea of guilty to Possession of
    Methamphetamine in the cause and was awaiting sentencing at
    the point of the termination hearing. The plea agreement
    “capped” any executed time at six months and called for 25C01-
    1307-FB-463 and 25C01-1311-FD-708 to run consecutively.
    On November 20, 2013, Mother was arrested again and charged
    in cause number 25C01-1311-FD-708 with Ct. I Possession of
    Methamphetamine; Ct. II Possession of Marijuana with a Prior
    Conviction; and Ct. III Possession of a Controlled Substance.
    Mother entered a plea of guilty to Possession of
    Methamphetamine in the cause and was awaiting sentencing at
    the point of the termination hearing. The plea agreement
    “capped” any executed time at six months and called for 25C01-
    1307-FB-463 and 25C01-1311-FD-708 to run consecutively.
    (App. at 8-9.) It appears that Mother is actually asking that this court reweigh
    the evidence and accord greater weight to the testimony of her wishes and
    future aspirations to effectively parent. This we cannot do. In re 
    A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d at 544
    .
    Conclusion
    [13]   Mother has not shown clear error in the termination decision.
    [14]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1503-JT-78 | December 29, 2015   Page 7 of 7