In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.F. (Minor Child) and J.B. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                                  FILED
    Apr 02 2019, 10:21 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                             and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Small                                                Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Natalie F. Weiss
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                          April 2, 2019
    of the Parent-Child Relationship                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    of A.F. (Minor Child) and J.B.                            18A-JT-1647
    (Mother);                                                 Appeal from the Montgomery
    Circuit Court
    J.B. (Mother),                                            The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
    Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Trial Court Cause No.
    v.                                                54C01-1712-JT-340
    Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019                            Page 1 of 8
    May, Judge.
    [1]   J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.F.
    (“Child”). Mother argues termination is not in Child’s best interests. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Child was born to Mother and J.A. (“Father”) 1 on July 20, 2016. At the time of
    Child’s birth, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that
    Mother tested positive for opiates when Child was born. On July 27, 2016,
    DCS removed Child from Mother’s care because Father overdosed on heroin
    and Mother would not tell DCS where the family lived. DCS placed Child with
    Child’s maternal grandparents. On July 29, 2016, DCS filed a petition to
    declare Child a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on Mother’s drug
    use, the fact she would not tell DCS where the family lived, and the voluntary
    termination of her parental rights to another child in 2013.
    [3]   On August 11, 2016, Mother admitted Child was a CHINS and the trial court
    adjudicated Child as such on September 22, 2016. The trial court also held a
    dispositional hearing on September 22, 2016, and ordered Mother to complete
    the following services: substance abuse assessment, random drug screens,
    1
    J.A., Child’s father, consented to the termination of his parental rights and does not participate in this
    appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019                         Page 2 of 8
    counseling, and supervised visitation with Child. Mother was never in
    compliance with services.
    [4]   Between August 2016 and March 2017, Mother tested positive for marijuana
    eleven times. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on June 5, 2017,
    July 3, 2017, and July 7, 2017. Mother tested positive for opiates on June 16,
    2017, and June 29, 2017. Mother refused to take a drug screen multiple times
    despite being ordered to do so by the court.
    [5]   Between August 2016 and October 2017, Mother was offered fifty-nine
    appointments for substance abuse and mental health counseling. She attended
    only forty of those appointments. Mother last visited with Child on July 3,
    2017. On August 6, 2017, Mother was arrested for violating her probation on
    an earlier conviction by committing another crime, Level 6 felony possession of
    a narcotic drug. On November 27, 2017, Mother was convicted of Level 6
    felony possession of a narcotic drug and sentenced to 728 days probation. She
    was then admitted to Amethyst House, an in-patient drug rehabilitation center.
    Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from the program on January 22, 2018,
    for violation of the center’s zero fraternization policy. Mother relapsed into
    drug use shortly thereafter. Mother went to another drug rehabilitation center,
    Harbor Lights, after she left Amethyst House, but left after one day.
    [6]   On December 4, 2017, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
    parental rights to Child. On February 14, 2018, Mother was admitted to the
    Seeds of Hope drug recovery facility, where she was actively engaged in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019   Page 3 of 8
    treatment at the time of the fact-finding hearings. The trial court held fact-
    finding hearings on DCS’s termination petition on March 2, 2018, and June 1,
    2018. On July 10, 2018, the trial court entered an order involuntarily
    terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S.,
    & B.G., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh
    evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and
    reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id.
     In deference to the
    juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a
    judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,
    
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied
    
    534 U.S. 1161
     (2002).
    [8]   “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
    protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In
    re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must
    subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children, however, when
    evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d at 837
    . The right to raise one’s own children should not be terminated solely
    because there is a better home available for the children, 
    id.,
     but parental rights
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019   Page 4 of 8
    may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet parental
    responsibilities. 
    Id. at 836
    .
    [9]    To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof
    of these allegations. In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g
    denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must
    terminate the parent-child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    .
    [10]   When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019   Page 5 of 8
    Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the
    evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment.
    
    Id.
     “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to
    support them either directly or by inference.” 2 Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    ,
    102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s
    decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d at 208
    . Mother argues the
    involuntary termination of her parental rights is not in Child’s best interests.
    [11]   In determining what is in Child’s best interests, the juvenile court is required to
    look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the
    evidence. See In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d 212
    , 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    dismissed. A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment,
    along with the parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination
    of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 
    774 N.E.2d 896
    , 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager
    and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to
    evidence that conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are
    sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in
    Child’s best interests. In re J.S., 
    906 N.E.2d 226
    , 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [12]   In its order, the trial court concluded:
    2
    Herein, Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings, and thus we accept them as true. See Madlem v.
    Arko, 
    592 N.E.2d 686
    , 687 (Ind. 1992) (“Because Madlem does not challenge the findings of the trial court,
    they must be accepted as correct.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019                      Page 6 of 8
    40. The DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
    in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the
    home of the parents will not be remedied. The child was
    removed from her parents on July 27, 2016. The DCS has
    offered reunification services to both parents but neither parent
    was able to participate in these services in order to overcome
    their parenting deficits. Father consented to termination of his
    parental rights. Mother failed to take advantage of reunification
    services offered to her. She continued an unstable lifestyle. She
    continued to abuse drugs. At the time of the termination hearing
    it is true that mother was doing well in her rehab treatment at
    Seeds for Hope and she should be commended for maintaining
    her sobriety and employment. However, she has not had the
    responsibility to care for Child since Child was five weeks old.
    Mother has not seen the child since July 3, 2017. Mother’s
    absence from Child’s life is due to her inability to maintain a
    stable, sober life. She has had frequent drug abuse interventions
    in the past and she relapsed every time. Hopefully this time will
    be different. Unfortunately, Child cannot wait. Child has been
    cared for and nurtured by others for the past two years. Child
    would not recognize mother as her parent.
    41. The DCS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that
    termination is in the best interests of the child. Neither parent is
    in any better position to provide the child with appropriate care,
    supervision or a safe, nurturing and stable home than they were
    at the beginning of DCS’ involvement with the family. Neither
    parent can meet the child’s needs. Both the DCS case manager
    and the CASA believe that termination is in the bet interest of the
    child.
    (App. Vol. II at 11) (errors in original). Mother argues, based on her recent
    progress with substance abuse treatment at Seeds of Hope and current
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019   Page 7 of 8
    employment, that termination of her parental rights is not in Child’s best
    interests.
    [13]   However, as the trial court noted, Child cannot be left in a state of parental
    instability indefinitely. See In re G.Y., 904 NE.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009),
    (“Permanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a
    child.”), reh’g denied. Additionally, termination being the Child’s best interests
    is supported by the testimony of the Court Appointed Special Advocate
    (“CASA”) who said Child was “clean, healthy, happy and very well cared for
    and loved” by maternal grandparents, with whom she had been placed since
    she was removed from Mother’s care. (Tr. Vol. II at 90.) See A.F. v. Marion Cty.
    Office of Family & Children, 762 NE.2d 1244, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
    (termination in child’s best interests in part because child was thriving in foster
    placement), trans. denied. Mother’s arguments are invitations for us to reweigh
    the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d at 265
     (appellate
    court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
    Conclusion
    [14]   DCS presented evidence to support the trial court’s findings, which support the
    trial court’s conclusion that the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental
    rights was in Child’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1647 | April 2, 2019   Page 8 of 8