In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.C. (Minor Child) and J.R. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Dec 27 2018, 10:12 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Danielle Sheff INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Indianapolis, Indiana CHILD SERVICES
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.
Toby Gill
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1250 | December 27, 2018 Page 1 of 15
In Re the Termination of the December 27, 2018
Parent-Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JT-1250
D.C. (Minor Child)
Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
J.R. (Mother), The Honorable Gary Chavers,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge Pro Tem
The Honorable Larry Bradley,
v. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
Indiana Department of Child 49D09-1709-JT-818
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,
and
Child Advocates, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to D.C.
(“Child”). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Issue
[2] On appeal, Mother raises three issues, of which we find the first to be
dispositive. We restate the dispositive issue as whether the trial court erred in
failing to disqualify counsel for Child Advocates from his representation in the
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termination proceedings where counsel previously represented Mother in a
2013 child in need of services (“CHINS”) matter.
Facts
[3] Mother is the biological parent of the Child. In 2013, after Mother tested
positive for illegal substance use, the Marion County Office of Family and
Children (“DCS”) opened a CHINS action (the “2013 CHINS action”) as to
the Child and another child of Mother’s, M. At the time, Mother was pregnant
with twins. The 2013 CHINS action ended with a guardianship after Mother
agreed to allow her brother, B.B., to serve as guardian for the Child and M.
Attorney Ryan Gardner represented Mother in the 2013 CHINS action and
prepared guardianship filings on behalf of B.B.
[4] On May 31, 2016, the Henry County Office of Family and Children initiated a
CHINS action (“the 2016 CHINS action”) as to the Child and M. due to
“allegations of abandonment and educational and medical neglect” by Mother. 1
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. The Child and M. were “ordered detained and
placed outside [Mother’s] home” at the June 1, 2016, initial hearing. Id. On
December 22, 2016, the trial court determined that the Child was a CHINS
1
On July 14, 2016, the 2016 CHINS action was transferred to Marion County, where the Child resided.
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after Mother admitted that she lacked housing and financial means to provide
for the Child. 2
[5] On January 20, 2017, the trial court entered a dispositional order, in which it
adopted DCS’ recommendation and ordered Mother to participate in various
services. In August 2017, citing Mother’s lack of progress, DCS and the
guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Child Advocates, recommended that the
permanency plan for the Child should be changed from reunification to
adoption.
[6] On December 2, 2017, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother’s
parental rights to the Child. The trial court conducted the evidentiary fact-
finding hearing on DCS’ petition on April 23, 2018. DCS appeared by counsel,
and Attorney Gardner appeared as counsel for Child Advocates. During a
break in DCS’ presentation of its case-in-chief, Attorney Gardner disclosed his
previous representation of Mother in the 2013 CHINS action as follows:
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor before DCS calls the next
witness I wanted to . . . . I have a bit of candor toward the
tribunal, so I wanted to make sure the court was aware. I don’t
believe that there’s a conflict. I do not remember this case but
apparently as I look through DCS’ exhibits. If you’ll remember
this case was initially set before hand [sic], Jennifer Balhon, from
our office was covering it once it got continued out it fell on my
docket, but it looks like from the 2013 case I’m the one who
2
According to the order of termination, M. “is still involved in a CHINS proceeding” and the permanency
plan as to M. “is other than reunification.” App. Vol. II p. 16.
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handled the Guardianship or at least drafted it before it was two
months before I left the Child Advocates, two months before I
left I prepared the Guardianship for Mom’s brother and was the
Public Defender appointed to represent Mom, so I was on the
case for a couple of months and I left I have had no involvement
with this particular case obviously. I don’t believe that my
limited involvement with that case creates a conflict where I
would not be able to continue on this case, but I did want to let
everyone know that I was apparently the public defender in 2013
who was appointed to this case and I’m just realizing that.
THE COURT: That was the previous case?
MR. GARDNER: Yeah, the 2013.
THE COURT: Okay.
[Counsel for DCS]: We have no objection.
THE COURT: You just did the Guardianship paperwork? You
really had nothing to do with . . . .
MR. GARDNER: I did [sic] really have anything to do with
most of that case. As I read through the documents that were
shown . . . . I left the Public Defender’s office in June 2013. It
looks [sic] I did the . . . I was appointed the 18th of May in 2013
so I was on there very briefly the fact finding rolled around and it
looked like the plan was a Guardianship with her brother so I
went ahead and prepared the paperwork for that but that was the
extent of my involvement. I did want to let the court know that
at least that I was and let the party know that I was appointed as
Mother’s PD for that brief period of time.
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[Counsel for Mother]: And Mom believes that is a conflict based
on at that [sic] in her words he was trying to help her out and
now he’s trying to take the kids away from her in her words, so
she believes that is a conflict of interest.
MR. GARDNER: I would not [find a conflict of interest,] your
Honor though it was two separate cases five years apart um I had
very limited contact with Mom except for to prepare the
paperwork for the Guardianship for her brother and after that
actually after I prepared the paperwork I left the public defender’s
office. Mr. Hayden took over my docket and actually did the
Guardianship hearing and since then I’ve had zero contact or
involvement with the children or with mother, so I don’t believe
that context is recent enough or consistent enough to create the
type of conflict that would require that I would not be able to
cover this case, but I will defer to the courts, Judge.
THE COURT: Oh well you’ll be on the case. . . . .
Tr. Vol. II pp. 30-32.
[7] The evidentiary hearing proceeded. DCS called witnesses and presented
evidence, and Child Advocates agreed that adoption was in the Child’s best
interest. In an order, dated January 17, 2018, the trial court granted DCS’
petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child.
[8] On August 17, 2018, Mother submitted her brief of appellant. On September
17, 2018, Child Advocates filed a verified motion to reverse and remand and
moved, in the alternative, for a new briefing schedule. Child Advocates argued
that “remand is appropriate and ‘necessary for the administration of justice.’”
See Verified Motion to Remand, p. 2. Child Advocates further stated:
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If Child Advocates, Inc. were to file its brief, it would concede
that the circumstances of this case create an appearance of
impropriety, and that once it was determined that [Attorney]
Gardner had represented Mother in a previous child in need of
services case, even without any memory of mother or
recollection of the facts of her previous case, because mother did
not waive the potential conflict, he should have been disqualified
as counsel for Child Advocates, Inc.
Id. at 3. 3
[9] On October 4, 2018, DCS filed its brief of appellee, wherein DCS “agree[d]
with Mother’s statement of the facts relating to the attorney conflict of interest
issue” and concurred with Child Advocates’ concession of reversible error. 4
Appellee’s Br. p. 5.
Analysis
[10] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion to disqualify Attorney Gardner from representing Child Advocates in
the termination proceedings. We agree. Child Advocates concedes reversible
error on the resulting conflict of interest issue, and DCS concurs.
3
On November 27, 2018, Child Advocates filed a notice of intent to rest on verified motion to remand and to
forgo filing a response to Mother’s brief of appellant. We accepted Child Advocates’ notice on October 2,
2018.
4
DCS also argued that, “[t]o the extent this Court does not find Mother’s issue dispositive regarding the
conflict of interest . . . the evidence otherwise clearly and convincingly supports termination of Mother’s
parental rights. Mother does not challenge the court’s findings of fact. The unchallenged findings—which
must be accepted as correct—demonstrate the trial court’s termination order is not clearly erroneous.”
Appellee’s Br. p. 13.
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[11] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re
K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225,
1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is
‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e]
[c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054
(2000)).
[12] “When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so
in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d
1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted). “Likewise, due process
protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are vital because every CHINS
proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the
upbringing of their children.” Id. (quotation omitted). Our supreme court has,
thus, urged exercise of the utmost caution in “interfering with the makeup of a
family and entering a legal world that could end up in a separate proceeding
with parental rights being terminated.” In re K.D. & K. S., S.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1259 (Ind. 2012).
[13] It is well-settled that a trial court may disqualify an attorney for a violation of
the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct that arises from the attorney’s
representation before the court. XYZ, D.O. v. Sykes, 20 N.E.3d 582, 585 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014). This authority to disqualify “has been described as necessary to
prevent ‘insult and gross violations of decorum . . . .’” Id. We review a trial
court’s decision regarding disqualification for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An
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abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or it has misinterpreted
the law.” Id.
[14] Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) states, “A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in
the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
[15] In Sykes, the plaintiffs sued a doctor and his employer-hospital for medical
malpractice. The doctor subsequently moved to disqualify the law firm that
represented the plaintiffs because that law firm employed an attorney who had
previously represented the doctor in multiple medical malpractice cases.
Although the imputed disqualification issue in Sykes arose in the context of a
law firm, the panel’s analysis is nonetheless instructive here.
[16] The Sykes court analyzed the issue under the following three-part test employed
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
First, we must determine whether a substantial relationship exists
between the subject matter of the prior and present
representations. If we conclude a substantial relationship does
exist, we must next ascertain whether the presumption of shared
confidences with respect to the prior representation has been
rebutted. If we conclude this presumption has not been rebutted,
we must then determine whether the presumption of shared
confidences has been rebutted with respect to the present
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representation. Failure to rebut this presumption would also
make disqualification proper.
Sykes, 20 N.E.3d at 586 (quoting Gerald v. Turnock Plumbing, Heating, & Cooling,
LLC, 768 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
[17] As to whether the prior and present representations were substantially related
for purposes of Rule 1.9, the Sykes panel determined that (1) the attorney’s prior
representations of the doctor involved defending the doctor against claims of
medical malpractice; and (2) the present representation – in which the
attorney’s new employer, the law firm, was representing the plaintiffs –
involved one claim of medical malpractice and various related claims arising
from the hospital’s alleged failure to investigate the doctor’s previous
malpractice cases. The Sykes panel, thus, found “[t]he issues in the prior and
present cases are undoubtedly closely interwoven . . . [and] there is a substantial
risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained
in the prior representations would materially advance the Plaintiffs’ position in
the present case.” Id. at 587. Accordingly, on the first prong of the test, the
Sykes panel concluded that the prior and present cases were substantially
related.
[18] Next, the Sykes panel considered the rebuttable presumption that the attorney
had actually received confidential information from the doctor during the prior
representation. As the Sykes panel stated, “we must determine whether the
attorney whose change of employment created the disqualification issue was
actually privy to any confidential information [her] prior law firm received from
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the party now seeking disqualification of [her] present firm.” Id. at 588 (quoting
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)).
[19] Citing comment three to Rule 1.9, for the proposition that “[a] conclusion as to
whether a lawyer possesses such confidential information ‘may be based on the
nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information
that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such
services,’” the Sykes panel found that the presumption of shared confidences in
the prior representations was not rebutted. Prof. Cond. R. 1.9, cmt. 3. The
panel reasoned:
It is undisputed that [the attorney] was the primary and, at times,
only attorney representing Doctor in each of those prior medical
malpractice cases. As such, [the attorney] was privy to much
confidential information, including but not limited to Doctor’s
personal thoughts and mental impressions regarding the facts and
circumstances and the strengths and weaknesses of those cases.
Id. at 588.
[20] As to the final prong, whether “‘there is a rebuttable presumption that the
knowledge possessed by one attorney in a law firm is shared with the other
attorneys in the firm,’” the Sykes panel concluded, pursuant to Rule 1.10(c), that
no effort by the attorney’s new employer, the law firm, to screen or “insulate
against any flow of confidential information from [the attorney] to any member
of her present law firm,” would suffice because “imputed disqualification is per
se and screening is not possible where the personally disqualified lawyer had
‘primary responsibility’ for the prior ‘matter that causes the disqualification.’”
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Id. (quoting Gerald, 768 N.E.2d at 505); id. (quoting Prof. Cond. R. 1.10(c)).
The Sykes panel reasoned that, because the attorney served as the doctor’s
primary, and often only, attorney in the previous six medical malpractice cases,
the law firm could not merely screen the attorney to avoid imputation of the
conflict to the law firm.
[21] In rendering its judgment, the Sykes panel cautioned, “we must be cognizant
that ‘public trust in the integrity of the judicial process requires that any serious
doubt be resolved in favor of disqualification’” and found that the doctor’s
claim raised “serious doubt” about the law firm’s involvement in the litigation.
Id. at 589. Accordingly, the Sykes panel concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the doctor’s motion to disqualify his former attorney’s
new employer-law firm from the proceedings. The Sykes panel reversed the trial
court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. We feel similarly
constrained here.
[22] Here, as to whether the prior and present representations are substantially
related for purposes of Rule 1.9, the 2013 CHINS action and the 2016 CHINS
action each arose from DCS’ claims that the Child was a CHINS and that
Mother was unable to meet the Child’s basic needs. There can be no
reasonable dispute regarding this prong. The prior and present CHINS matters
were substantially related.
[23] Nor can there be any doubt as to the second prong -- the rebuttable presumption
that Attorney Gardner actually received confidential information from Mother
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during the prior representation. By Attorney Gardner’s admission, he served as
Mother’s primary counsel for approximately two months of the 2013 CHINS
action; his recollection is that his role was limited to preparing guardianship
materials for Mother’s brother, B.B. Attorney Gardner’s role was more
involved, however, as Mother contends, without challenge from Child
Advocates or DCS:
In fact, Mr. Gardner did appear at a pre-trial hearing in the 2013
CHINS [action] as [Mother]’s counsel unrelated to the
guardianship . . . and he also represented [Mother] at the CHINS
fact-finding hearing. [ ] At the subsequent guardianship hearing,
Mr. Gardner appeared as [Mother]’s brother’s private counsel.
Appellant’s Br. p. 25. Mother argues further, and we agree, that:
In the ordinary course of such representation, the attorney would
necessarily learn information about [Mother]’s relationship with,
and acts or omissions with regard to, [the Child]. The only
logical conclusion that could be reached from Mr. Gardner’s
representation of [Mother] in the CHINS proceedings is that
confidential information had been disclosed in the course of his
representation of [Mother].
Id. at 26. In recognition of the practical aspects of representing a parent in
CHINS proceedings, with the not-insignificant potential for termination of
parental rights, we find that the presumption that Attorney Gardner actually
received confidential information from Mother during the prior representation
has not been rebutted here.
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[24] As to the final prong of the Gerald test, whether “there is a rebuttable
presumption that the knowledge possessed by one attorney in a law firm is
shared with the other attorneys in the firm,” we need only look to Child
Advocates’ concession below:
. . . [T]he circumstances of this case create an appearance of
impropriety, and that once it was determined that [Attorney]
Gardner had represented Mother in a previous child in need of
services case, even without any memory of mother or
recollection of the facts of her previous case, because mother did
not waive the potential conflict, [Attorney Gardner] should have
been disqualified as counsel for Child Advocates, Inc.
Verified Motion to Remand, p. 3.
[25] For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Mother’s motion to disqualify Attorney Gardner from representing
Child Advocates, an adverse party to Mother, in the 2016 CHINS action, where
Attorney Gardner previously represented Mother in the 2013 CHINS action.
Conclusion
[26] Given Attorney Gardner’s previous representation of Mother in a substantially
related matter, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion
to disqualify Attorney Gardner from his subsequent representation of an
adverse party, Child Advocates, in an action involving Mother. We reverse the
trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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[27] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[28] Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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