In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.J. and A.C., (Minor Children), and M.J., (Father) v. The Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 24 2016, 8:43 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ana M. Quirk Gregory F. Zoeller
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In The Matter Of The March 24, 2016
Termination Of The Parent- Court of Appeals Case No.
Child Relationship Of: A.J. and 18A02-1510-JT-1581
A.C., (Minor Children), Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
and Court
The Honorable Kimberly S.
M.J., (Father), Dowling, Judge
The Honorable Brian M. Pierce,
Appellant-Respondent,
Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause Nos.
18C02-1410-JT-43
The Indiana Department of 18C02-1410-JT-44
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Brown, Judge.
[1] M.J. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights with
respect to his children A.J. and A.C. (the “Children”). Father raises one issue,
which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
termination of his parental rights. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and S.J. (“Mother”) had a daughter, A.J., born on August 28, 2006, and
a son, A.C., born on November 17, 2009.
[3] In January 2013, the State charged Father with criminal confinement, domestic
battery, strangulation, and criminal mischief, and Father later pled guilty to
criminal mischief. On January 31, 2014, the State charged Father with theft
and receiving stolen property, and Father pled guilty to theft on June 17, 2014.
In March 2014, the State charged Father with theft and resisting law
enforcement, and Father pled guilty to theft on June 11, 2014. In October
2014, the State charged Father with theft and resisting law enforcement while
Father was “under probation and under house arrest.” Transcript at 75. On
April 13, 2015, Father pled guilty to theft as a misdemeanor.
[4] Meanwhile, on January 23, 2014, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
filed petitions alleging that A.J. and A.C. were children in need of services
(“CHINS”) due to Mother being hospitalized after injecting herself with bleach
while the Children were in her care, that Father and Mother have a history of
abusing drugs, specifically morphine, in the Children’s presence, that Father
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and Mother have a history of domestic violence in the Children’s presence, and
that DCS was unable to physically locate Father.
[5] On February 17, 2014, the court held an initial hearing at which Father failed to
appear and Mother admitted the allegations that she was hospitalized in
January 2014 after injecting herself with bleach while the Children were in her
care, and that she and Father had a history of domestic violence in the
Children’s presence.
[6] On March 17, 2014, the court held a hearing, and DCS reported that Father
was incarcerated in the Howard County Jail and was unable to appear. On
April 14, 2014, the court held a hearing, Father admitted that the Children were
CHINS, and the court adjudged the Children to be CHINS.
[7] On April 25, 2014, the court entered Dispositional and Parental Participation
Orders with respect to Father which ordered him to follow the
recommendations of the DCS and providers, participate in home-based case
work focusing on parenting, participate in individual counseling, participate in
the recommendations of the substance abuse counselor at Meridian Services,
and submit to random drug screens. On June 25, 2014, the family case
manager filed a Notice of Parent Living in the Relative Home which stated that
Father was released from the Delaware County Jail on June 17, 2014, had
signed a safety plan concerning the Children, and had fully cooperated with
DCS since his release from incarceration.
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[8] In July 2014, Father was referred to the intensive outpatient treatment program
(the “IOT program”), completed that program in September 2014, and was
then referred to an aftercare program which he did not complete. Al Adams, an
addictions counselor, scheduled a meeting for September 26, 2014, to discuss
Father’s positive drug screen and discrepancies regarding Father’s statements
regarding the last time he used drugs, and sent Father a letter and left him a
voicemail, but Father failed to appear. Father did not meet with Adams after
September 16, 2014, until February 26, 2015.
[9] Meanwhile, on August 5, 2014, the family case manager filed a Notice of
Placement in Foster Care which asserted that Father had not been in contact
with the family case manager since July 31, 2014, was considered non-
compliant with his substance abuse treatment, missed his fifth scheduled drug
screen on August 4, 2014, and failed to participate in individual counseling at
Meridian Services. The Notice also asserted that A.J. had twenty-eight tardies
and five absences since being placed in the grandmother’s home from February
11, 2014, to the end of the school year.
[10] On October 1, 2014, DCS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of
Father’s parental rights to the Children.1 On November 5, 2014, the court
ordered the Children to be placed with the maternal grandparents.
1
DCS also filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
Mother later consented to adoption.
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[11] On February 3, 2015, DCS filed a Motion to Terminate Reunification Services
alleging that the Children had not been returned to the care of either parent
since being removed on February 11, 2014, that parents failed to comply with
substance abuse treatment, parents had failed to consistently make themselves
available to the family case manager for drug screens, neither parent complied
with individual therapy, and that the parents had not improved their ability to
safely parent the Children.
[12] On February 4, 2015, the court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) filed an
Emergency Petition for Suspension of Visitation alleging that the Children
reported seeing Father dropping off Mother for Mother’s visit, there is a long
history of domestic violence between Father and Mother, Mother shared adult
information with the Children and cursed at them, and that Father admitted on
January 28, 2015, that he had too many emotional issues to raise the Children,
that he was working on reuniting with Mother even though she was not good
for him, and that they tend to focus on drugs when together. The CASA stated
that A.J. reported being frightened by the news of her parents’ renewed
relationship, and that the grandparents reported they were concerned that
Mother was under the influence of some illicit substance on January 28, 2015.
On February 6, 2015, the court held a hearing and ordered that the permanency
plan for the Children be adoption.
[13] On February 26, 2015, Adams recommended to Father that he complete the
IOT program, and Father said that he wanted to take soboxone. Adams then
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referred Father to the Opioid Addiction Treatment program (the “OAT
program”).
[14] On March 9, 2015, Aaron Mocherman, a mental health therapist and
addictions counselor at Meridian Health Services, met with Father, discussed
the requirements of the OAT program, and scheduled several months of
individual and group appointments. Father did not attend the next individual
session or the next group session. Mocherman did not have any contact with
Father until June 2015. Due to Father’s lack of attendance, Mocherman did
not consider Father to be a part of the OAT program.
[15] At some point, Father told Adams that his probation officer would not allow
him to have soboxone. On June 9, 2015, Adams met with Father, and Father
stated that he wanted to return to aftercare. Adams reviewed what had
happened and informed Father that he would not place him back in the
aftercare group, and Father asked to speak with his supervisor. Adams’s
supervisor explained the OAT program and referred Father back to
Mocherman.
[16] On June 15, 2015, Father completed another informed consent to restart the
OAT program. Father stated that he had obtained a soboxone prescription
outside of the OAT program which concerned Mocherman because it was not
the preferred way that they administered treatment through the OAT program.
[17] On July 24, 2015, the court held a termination hearing on DCS’s petitions. The
court heard testimony from Patricia Duncan, the program director of the child
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advocacy center at Meridian Health Services, Adams, Mocherman, Father,
Father’s parents, Gail Baker, a behavioral clinician, and family case manager
Susan Garrison-Brown (“FCM Garrison-Brown”).
[18] Father testified that he did not comply with the drug screening schedule. He
admitted that his case manager appeared at his home on May 4, 2015, and
requested a drug screen, and he refused. He conceded that while he completed
an IOP program, there were issues with regard to aftercare, he did not complete
the IOP program a second time, and that he did not comply with Adams’s
recommendations for substance abuse treatment. Father also stated that he
wanted the court to believe that his own father, the grandfather of the Children
and his employer, would not let him conduct a drug screen before he went to
work at 7:30 a.m.
[19] During Father’s testimony, the court stated:
All you want to do is talk. And it doesn’t help to be honest with
you. Because you blame everybody else. Even if you’re in
treatment, you rarely if any of your testimony accepts [sic]
responsibility. You blame your ex-wife, the mother of these
children for being involved in the system when it was equal
participation and equal failure on both you’re [sic] parts. And
you will sit here in the courtroom and blame her. You blame
your father. You blame the case manager for not setting up drug
screens when they work for you. When I don’t believe for a
minute that a painter, who paints, can’t be at the job site at 7:45
and not 7:30 a.m.
Transcript at 101-102.
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[20] Father’s father testified that he would expect Father to attend the drug screens
twice a week and that the job was secondary. He also testified that Father
never told him that he needed to take a drug screen at 7:30 a.m. twice a week.
The court asked: “[D]id [Father] ever say, hey boss, I need to be at DCS at 7:30
a.m. to take a drug screen twice a week, can we work . . . .” Id. at 117. Father’s
father stated: “Not twice a week. There might have been a time or two he
mentioned it earlier. I don’t know. It hasn’t been something I’ve thought about
much of cause he’s not asked me much about it.” Id.
[21] On September 1, 2015, the court entered orders terminating Father’s parental
rights, making detailed findings of fact, and concluding that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children’s
removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, that
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s
well-being, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s
best interests, and that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the Children.
Discussion
[22] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of
Father’s parental rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS
is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
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(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition
described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-
child relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[23] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases
“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-
1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a
‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social
consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,
904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that
heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our well-
settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. “We do not reweigh the
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the
evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592
N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). “We confine our review to two steps: whether
the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether
the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id.[24] “Reviewing whether the evidence ‘clearly and convincingly’ supports the
findings, or the findings ‘clearly and convincingly’ support the judgment, is not
a license to reweigh the evidence.” Id. “[W]e do not independently determine
whether that heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional
harmless error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be
sufficiently confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
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Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), reh’g denied)). “Our review must
‘give “due regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly
erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Office,
989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a
case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in
person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640.
[25] Father asserts that DCS failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence
that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from the home
would not be remedied. He argues that he was incarcerated until June 17,
2014, he then obtained employment painting houses, and was living with his
mother. Without citation to the record, Father states that he “had completed
one IOT program and was beginning an OAT program” and had participated
in individual and group counseling. Appellant’s Brief at 20. He contends that
he was participating in a Suboxone clinic, participated in visitation with the
Children, did a good job on his visits, and was attempting to turn his life around
and become a better parent.
[26] DCS asserts that Father does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of
fact and that the unchallenged findings support the court’s judgment. DCS also
notes that Father challenges only one of the trial court’s legal conclusions, i.e.,
that there was a reasonable probability that Father would not remedy
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conditions, that he does not challenge the conclusion that continuation of the
parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being, and that
accordingly, this court is obliged to affirm the trial court’s order.
[27] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive
and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-
2-4(b)(2)(B). Father does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that there is
a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. Nonetheless, we will address
the merits of Father’s argument and review whether DCS established that there
was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or
reasons for placement of the Children outside the home will not be remedied.
See In re J.G. and C.G., 4 N.E.3d 814, 820 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that
mother did not challenge the trial court’s finding that continuation of the
parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the children and
addressing the merits of mother’s argument that the court erred when it
concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the removal of the children were not remedied), trans. denied; In re
J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 511-512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that mother did
not challenge the trial court’s finding that continuation of the parent-child
relationship posed a threat to the child’s well-being and that the statute was
written in the disjunctive requiring the trial court to find only one of the two
requirements of subsection (B) by clear and convincing evidence, but
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nonetheless reviewing the evidence supporting the conclusion challenged by
mother), trans. denied.
[28] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal
will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at
642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will
not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a
parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent
improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there
is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that
delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior
history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id.
Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not
preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of
their future behavior. Id.
[29] A court may properly consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history,
drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack
of adequate housing and employment. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013). A trial court can reasonably consider the services offered by
DCS to the parent and the parent’s response to those services. Id. Further,
where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct
shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the
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circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve. Id. A trial court
need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such
that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are permanently impaired
before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 469
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[30] The trial court’s orders addressed Father’s participation in therapy and services.
Specifically, the court entered substantially similar separate orders with respect
to A.J. and A.C. and in the order related to A.J. found:
5. This Court ordered that [Father] participate in home based
case management, refrain from using illicit substances,
participate in individual counseling, obtain a substance abuse
evaluation and participate in the Intensive Outpatient Treatment
Program, submit to random drug screens, participate in a
visitation plan with the child, report to the DCS case manager
any changes in his contact information, and to obtain sufficient
income in order to maintain a home appropriate for the child. At
the time of the dispositional hearing, [Father] was still
incarcerated. Therefore, he was supposed to begin his services as
soon as he was released from incarceration.
6. [Father] was released from incarceration on or about June 17,
2014 and began living with his mother, which was where [A.J.]
was placed at that time. [Father] and [his mother] entered into a
safety plan with DCS whereby [Father] agreed not to have any
unsupervised contact with [A.J.] and not engage in the use of
illegal drugs. However, by the next review hearing held on July
28, 2014, this court found that [Father] had not participated in
court ordered services, had not regularly visited with [A.J.] and
had not complied with [A.J.’s] case plan. Based upon the lack of
cooperation with the placement and [Father’s] lack of
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compliance with services, this court authorized DCS to remove
[A.J.] from the care of the paternal grandmother . . . .
7. On August 5, 2014 DCS provided notice to the court that
[Father] had been non-compliant with his drug treatment, failed
to maintain regular contact with the case manager, missed five
(5) scheduled drug screens and failed to participate in individual
therapy.
8. Father has a long history of substance abuse and [Father]
continues to struggle with his addiction. Additionally, [Father]
has been non-compliant with this court regarding drug screens
and drug treatment. During the course of this case, [Father]
missed ninety-one (91) drug screens, tested positive three (3)
occasions and tested negative ten (10) times. Refusals or missed
screens are considered to be positive screens. Therefore, [Father]
tested positive on approximately eighty-eight (88) percent of his
drug screens.
9. The depth of [Father’s] non-compliance is demonstrated by
his refusal to take a screen for FCM [Garrison-Brown] on May 4,
2015 and his missed screen on May 18, 2015. Both requested
and refused screens occurred less than three (3) months prior to
this termination fact-finding.
10. [Father] was not honest with the addictions counselor about
a positive screen and relapse that occurred with [sic] he was in
the Intensive Outpatient Treatment (IOT) program. When the
addictions counselor attempted to set up a meeting to address the
issue of the failed drug screen, [Father] failed to show up at the
meeting. Between September 16, 2014 and February 26, 2015,
[Father] failed to make any contact with his addictions
counselor.
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11. When [Father] did once again make contact with his
addictions counselor in February 2015, [Father] requested to be
put back into the aftercare program. When the counselor
reminded [Father] that his recommendation was to place [Father]
back into the IOT program due to his previous dishonesty,
[Father] demanded to see the counselor’s supervisor. This
particular counselor, Al Adams, has over thirty-four years of
experience in treating substance abuse. This action by [Father] is
demonstrative of the attitude that he has had during this entire
case. His refusal to comply with this court’s orders, refusal to
make himself available for drug screens, and refusal to comply
with the recommendations of a treatment specialist with thirty-
four years of experience all indicate to this court that [Father]
will not comply with any future orders of this court.
12. [Father’s] distortion of reality is reflected in his testimony
concerning the Opioid Addiction Treatment (OAT) Program.
After [Father] refused to re-enroll in IOT, [Father] was referred
to the OAT Program. This intensive program consists of weekly
individual and group therapy sessions and frequent drug
screening to address opioid addiction. After a month to six
weeks of this treatment, participants are evaluated to see if they
would be an appropriate candidate for buprenorphine
(Suboxone), which would be administered and regulated in
conjunction with the OAT Program. The drug replacement
therapy is one possible component of the OAT Program, but
certainly not the main tool or a necessary component of the
program. [Father] testified that his probation officer at that time
would not allow him to take Suboxone and insinuated that his
probation officer would not allow him to participate in the OAT
Program. However, there was nothing keeping [Father] in [sic]
fully participating in every other component of the OAT
Program. When [Father] found out the strict requirements of the
OAT Program prior to even being evaluated as a possible
candidate to be placed on a drug replacement therapy regimen,
he failed to follow through. [Father] made his initial
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appointment on March 9, 2015 and then failed to appear for any
subsequent therapy sessions until the middle of June.
13. Even after [Father] re-engaged in counseling in June, [he]
was dishonest with his counselor when he indicated that FCM
Garrison-Brown was regularly drug screening him. And instead
of being evaluated for drug replacement therapy and monitored
through the OAT program, [Father] instead chose to obtain a
prescription for Suboxone through a physician located in another
county. Such behavior illustrates the lengths to which [Father]
will go to avoid accountability when it comes to treating his
opioid addiction.
14. [Father] did not meaningfully participate in individual
counseling, despite being court ordered to do so. [Father]
participated in four (4) out of a possible forty-eight (48)
counseling sessions. Because of [Father’s] failure to take
advantage of this service, individual counseling has not improved
or enhanced [his] ability to provide proper care and treatment for
[A.J.].
15. This court also ordered that [Father] participate in home-
based case management services. [Father] kept and participated
in three (3) out of fifty-two (52) possible appointments. Given
[Father’s] lack of participation, this service did not enhance his
ability to safely and effectively parent [A.J.].
16. The one service for which [Father] has been the most
consistent in attending has been his supervised visitation, making
approximately seventy-five (75) percent of his recently scheduled
visits. However, [Father] fails to appreciate how his missed
visitations have negatively impacted [A.J.]. When [Father] no
called and no showed one visit and then cancelled a second visit
after [A.J.] had been transported to the visit site, DCS and the
service provider instituted a procedure whereby [Father] had to
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call the day before a visit to confirm that he was going to be
there. [Father] was very resistant to this requirement and does
not appreciate how this requirement was instituted in order to
protect [A.J.’s] emotional well-being. [A.J.] was emotionally
distraught after the missed visits and this requirement was put
into place not to inconvenient [sic] [Father], but to protect [A.J.].
[Father] fails to appreciate this fact.
17. [Father] has a history of engaging in criminal behavior. In
October 2014 [Father] was charged with theft and resisting law
enforcement. [Father] pled guilty to theft in March 2015 and is
currently on probation. After [Father] originally attended the
CHINS hearings, he was soon thereafter charged with theft and
resisting law enforcement in Howard County. In June 2014
[Father] pled guilty to theft and was sentenced in that matter. In
June 2014, three (3) separate cases in Delaware County were
combined and [Father] pled guilty to two (2) counts of theft, and
criminal mischief. The chronological case summaries (CCSs) of
[Father’s] most recent criminal convictions have been entered
into evidence and made part of the record.
18. [Father] testified that his behavior over the last ten (10) years
has been terrible, that he suffers from substance abuse and
emotional issues, and that he is unable to currently care for
[A.J.]. The court agrees with this assessment, but disagrees with
[Father’s] request to extend him additional time to address these
issues. [Father] has had ample opportunities to address his
substance abuse, even while this termination case has been
pending. In fact, the termination fact finding was originally
scheduled to be heard on February 6, 2015. [Father] admitted
that he was not engaged in any drug treatment program at that
time. [Father] was also not engaged in drug treatment on March
20, 2015, when this matter was reset. This hearing was once
again continued to May 22, 2015. And again, [Father] had not
participated in any drug treatment during that time. The fact that
[Father] re-engaged in treatment for his addiction in the last six
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weeks or so does not supercede [sic] [his] pattern of failing to
successfully complete or even engage in drug treatment during
the approximately eighteen (18) months of the open CHINS case.
Appellant’s Appendix at 95-98.
[31] As pointed out by DCS, Father does not challenge the court’s specific findings.
The record reveals that Father failed to attend mental health therapy sessions,
failed to complete an aftercare program following an IOT program, failed to
appear for meetings, failed to attend individual and group therapy sessions, and
refused a drug screen as recently as May 4, 2015. On January 28, 2015, less
than six months before the termination hearing, Father admitted to the CASA
that he had too many emotional issues to raise the Children and that he was
working on reuniting with Mother even though she was not good for him and
that they tend to focus on drugs when together. At the July 24, 2015 hearing,
Mocherman testified that Father missed a group session in the OAT program
“[j]ust since June.” Transcript at 62. FCM Garrison-Brown testified that she
believed that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the Children will
not be remedied. The CASA indicated that it was in the best interest of the
Children to have the parental rights terminated.
[32] Based upon the court’s findings and the record, we conclude that clear and
convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there was a
reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal
would not be remedied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1510-JT-1581 | March 24, 2016 Page 19 of 20
Conclusion
[33] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and affirm.
[34] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1510-JT-1581 | March 24, 2016 Page 20 of 20