John D. May v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Carrie T. Ingram, and Direnda Winburn (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 29 2016, 9:45 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
John D. May Gregory F. Zoeller
Greencastle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Andrea E. Rahman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John D. May, January 29, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1509-PL-1405
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Indiana Department of Child The Honorable Heather A. Welch,
Services, Carrie T. Ingram, and Judge
Direnda Winburn, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Defendants. 49D01-1503-PL-7634
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] On March 9, 2015, Appellant-Plaintiff John D. May, an inmate at the
Putnamville Correctional Facility, filed a lawsuit, pro se, against Appellees-
Defendants the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), Carrie T.
Ingram, and Direnda Winburn (collectively, the “Appellees”), alleging that the
Appellees had violated Indiana’s Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”),
Indiana Code chapter 5-14-3. The parties filed competing motions for summary
judgment and supporting memoranda. After reviewing each of the motions for
summary judgment, the trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees and denied May’s request for summary judgment. The trial court
subsequently denied a request by May to clarify the term “pleading.”
Concluding that the trial court properly granted the Appellees’ request for
summary judgment, denied May’s request for summary judgment, and denied
May’s motion to clarify the meaning of the term “pleading,” we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The undisputed facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: May is
currently incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility. On November
24, 2014, May submitted letters to Ingram, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) with DCS, and Winburn, a Hearings and Appeals Coordinator with
DCS, requesting copies of certain documents under the APRA. In the letter to
Ingram, May requested the following:
(1) A copy of any and all dismissal Orders/documents;
(2) I am trying to re-file the appeals — so I am requesting a copy
of any of the forms that I would need to file in order to re-initiate
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it, or reinstate it;
(3) And a copy of any and all laws, policies, procedures, statutes,
rules, etc,. that I would need knowledge of to challenge the
dismissals, re-instate or refile the appeals, and to perfect the
same. A copy of all applicable Rules and Forms.
Appellant’s App. p. 65 (underlining in original). May also indicated that he
was “indigent” and was therefore “requesting any costs or fees be waived.”
Appellant’s App. p. 65 (underlining in original). In the letter to Winburn, May
requested the following:
1. A copy of the policies and procedures of DCS & CPS;
2. A copy of all applicable rules and statutes that pertain to
Appeals in this office. I need a copy of all
documents/laws/rules, etc., that I would need to learn how to
litigate such an appeal, and to be able to do business with you.
3. A copy of any and all documents within your Office and
File(s) that have my name on them or that pertain to me in any
way.
4. A copy of any dismissals or Orders.
5. A copy of all appeal forms or other state or DCS forms that I
might need in interacting with this agency.
6. The last time I corresponded with you, you stated: “attach
dismissals Highlight bottom of dismissals”; I am requesting more
information or documents that would explain to me just how to
attack the dismissals.
Appellant’s App. pp. 67-68 (underlining in original). May again asserted that
he was “indigent” and requested that “any costs and fees be waived.”
Appellant’s App. p. 68 (underlining in original).
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[3] On or about December 4, 2014, May submitted amended formal complaints
against DCS, Ingram, and Winburn to the Office of the Public Access
Counselor, claiming that his request for access to public records had been
denied. In support of this claim, May asserted that DCS had failed to respond
to his requests within seven days. May renewed his formal complaints in a
letter dated December 22, 2014.
[4] On January 16, 2015, John Wood, Deputy General Counsel for DCS,
responded to the formal complaints filed by May in a letter sent to Dale L.
Brewer of the Office of the Public Access Counselor. In this letter, Wood
explained that he was out of the office when DCS received May’s requests, that
DCS’s response was initially delayed due to unintentional circumstances
internal to DCS, and that the volume of May’s request necessitated significant
time to generate an appropriate response. Upon completing the task of
gathering the documents requested by May, DCS promptly provided the
requested documents and information to May. Wood also provided the Office
of the Public Access Counselor with a copy of DCS’s response to May.
[5] Also on January 16, 2015, Wood responded to May’s request. Included with
this response was the requested documents and an explanation of what was
being provided to May. The response indicated that DCS had waived any fees
and costs relating to the records and other documents enclosed in its response.
DCS also acknowledged the delayed response, explained the reason for the
delay, and apologized for any inconvenience the delay might have caused.
DCS further acknowledged, however, that “any rights [May] may have had or
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may currently have concerning determinations made by DCS affecting you
have not been reduced or otherwise affected by our delay in providing this
response to your letters.” Appellant’s App. p. 63.
[6] With regard to May’s request for a copy of all of DCS’s policies and
procedures, DSC’s response provided May with a copy of the policies and
procedures relating to administrative appeal hearings and indicated that “[a]
complete set of the DCS policies and procedures would contain several hundred
pages of documents, nearly all of which would appear to be irrelevant to the
hearings and appeals procedure” which had been the focus of May’s previous
contacts with DCS. Appellant’s App. p. 61. The response directed May to the
DCS website where all current policies were available for downloading and
notified May that DCS would provide paper copies of any additional necessary
policies and procedures could be provided given that May “narrow his request
to the specific topics for which [May wanted] to review applicable policies.”
Appellant’s App. p. 61. The response also provided May with a copy of the
Child Protection Index, which contained “the statutory provisions regarding
administrative hearings and appeals relating to substantiated determination of
child abuse or neglect” and a copy of the forms used for requesting an
administrative review or hearing concerning a determination of substantiated
child abuse or neglect. Appellant’s App. p. 61.
[7] With regard to May’s request for a copy of any and all documents pertaining to
May, DCS’s response provided May with “the complete files maintained by our
Hearings and Appeals Office concerning the two cases in which [May had]
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been involved.” Appellant’s App. p. 62. The response indicated that some of
the records requested by May were not available for production under the
APRA because the documents contained statutorily-specified confidential
information. However, given that May was a party to the assessments and
related appeals, May was entitled to a copy of the records subject to certain
redactions. Thus, the response included redacted versions of the documents at
issue. The response further indicated that to the best of DCS’s knowledge and
belief, it had no other documents pertaining to May.
[8] On February 2, 2015, Public Access Counselor Luke H. Britt issued an advisory
opinion to May in response to May’s complaints. In this response, Britt noted
that DCS had responded to May’s letters to Ingram and Winburn on January
16, 2015. Britt concluded that DCS acted contrary to the APRA by failing to
acknowledge receipt of May’s request within seven days, but further noted the
following:
DCS has acknowledged that internal routing issues led to the
delay in acknowledging your request. Their eventual response
and partial production of documents was released on January 16,
2015. While the delay in acknowledgment was a violation of the
APRA, the time taken to produce the records was reasonable. It
is my sincere hope that the lack of an acknowledgement did not
substantively affect your quest for access.
Appellant’s App. p. 74.
[9] On March 9, 2015, May initiated the underlying lawsuit, claiming that the
Appellees had violated the APRA and requested a declaratory order, injunctive
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relief, civil penalties, and compensation for his litigation expenses. The
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss May’s lawsuit and a supporting
memorandum on May 1, 2015. On May 14, 2015, May filed a motion for
summary judgment. The Appellees responded to May’s motion for summary
judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 15, 2015.
Both motions were supported by memoranda and designated evidence. May
subsequently filed a response to the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment
and the Appellees filed a reply to May’s response.
[10] The trial court conducted a hearing on the competing motions for summary
judgment, after which it denied May’s motion for summary judgment and
granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. May moved the trial
court to clarify the definition of the term “pleading” on August 27, 2015. The
trial court denied May’s motion on September 2, 2015. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
I. Summary Judgment
[11] On appeal, May contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
summary judgment and in granting the Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment.
A. Standard of Review
[12] Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
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when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heritage Dev.
of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
“On appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment,
we apply the same standard applicable in the trial court.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We
therefore must determine whether the record reveals a genuine
issue of material fact and whether the trial court correctly applied
the law. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts
concerning an issue, which would dispose of the litigation are in
dispute, or where the undisputed material facts are capable of
supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. If the material
facts are not in dispute, our review is limited to determining
whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed
facts. When there are no disputed facts with regard to a motion
for summary judgment and the question presented is a pure
question of law, we review the matter de novo.”
Clary v. Lite Machines Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Bd. of Tr. of Ball State Univ. v. Strain, 771 N.E.2d 78, 81-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and case citations omitted)).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a
prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
American Management, Inc. v. MIF Realty, L.P., 666 N.E.2d 424,
428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Once the moving party satisfies this
burden through evidence designated to the trial court pursuant to
Trial Rule 56, the non-moving party may not rest on its
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pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
Heritage Dev., 773 N.E.2d at 888 (emphasis added). “On appeal, the trial court’s
order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a
presumption of validity.” Van Kirk v. Miller, 869 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied. However, we are not limited to reviewing the trial
court’s reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather may
affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is sustainable on any theory found in the
evidence designated to the trial court. See Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-
Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 263, 267 (Ind. 2014) (citing Wagner v. Yates,
912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009)).
[13] Further, “[t]he fact that the parties made cross motions for summary judgment
does not alter our standard of review. MacGill v. Reid, 850 N.E.2d 926, 928-29
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d
285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). “When considering cross motions
for summary judgment, we consider each motion separately, construing the
facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance and determine
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 929
(citing Hartford, 690 N.E.2d at 291).
B. Analysis
[14] In arguing that the trial court erred in granting the Appellees’ cross-motion for
summary judgment, May asserts that the trial court’s decision is improper as a
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matter of law because the Appellees denied his request for certain documents.
While May does not specify what, if any, requested documents the Appellees
refused to tender, it appears that May’s assertion is based on DCS directing
May to the agency website to find all DCS policies and procedures and in
redacting certain confidential information from other documents.
[15] With respect to an individual’s right to inspect and copy public agency records,
Indiana Code section 5-14-3-3 provides as follows:
(a) Any person may inspect and copy the public records of any
public agency during the regular business hours of the agency,
except as provided in section 4 of this chapter. A request for
inspection or copying must:
(1) identify with reasonable particularity the record
being requested; and
(2) be, at the discretion of the agency, in writing on or
in a form provided by the agency.
No request may be denied because the person making the request
refuses to state the purpose of the request, unless such condition
is required by other applicable statute.
(b) A public agency may not deny or interfere with the exercise of
the right stated in subsection (a). Within a reasonable time after
the request is received by the agency, the public agency shall
either:
(1) provide the requested copies to the person making
the request; or
(2) allow the person to make copies:
(A) on the agency’s equipment; or
(B) on the person’s own equipment.
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1. DCS Policies and Procedures
[16] With respect to May’s request for all of DCS’s policies and procedures, DCS
explained that a copy of all of DCS’s policies and procedures would contain
hundreds of pages, most of which would be irrelevant to the procedures relating
to hearings and appeals, which appeared to be the focus of May’s request.
DCS’s response directed May to an electronic version of all of the requested
information. It also included an offer to provide paper copies of any specific
policies or procedures that May might desire, given that he narrow his request
to specific topics and policies.
[17] “Implicit in Indiana Code § 5-14-3-3 is practicality.” Smith v. State, 873 N.E.2d
197, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It would be impractical to require DCS to
provide May with paper copies of hundreds of pages of seemingly irrelevant
information. Thus, like the trial court, we conclude that by providing May with
access to electronic versions of the requested documents, coupled with an offer
to provide paper copies of any specific policies or procedures that might be
included in a narrowed request by May, DCS has adequately complied with the
requirements of the APRA. See id. (providing that the State did not violate the
APRA by providing the plaintiff with a summary of the requested documents
when the plaintiff was incarcerated in punitive segregation and, as a result of
this placement, it would have been impractical to allow him to inspect the
requested records).
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2. Redacted Confidential Information
[18] May requested documents relating to all prior assessments and related appeals
to which he was a party. Some of the requested documents, however,
contained statutorily-specified confidential information. Indiana Code section
5-14-3-4 provides that records that are declared confidential by state statute are
excepted from the APRA and “may not be disclosed by a public agency.”
[19] In its response, DCS indicated that some of the requested records were not
subject to the APRA because the documents contained confidential
information. However, given that May was a party to the assessments and
related appeals, DCS provided May with copies of the documents in which the
statutorily-specified confidential information was redacted. 1 May provides no
argument explaining how DCS acted inappropriately in providing him with the
redacted versions of the requested documents.
3. Civil Penalties
[20] With regard to civil penalties for a failure to comply with APRA, Indiana Code
section 5-14-3-9.5(c) provides:
If an individual:
(1) continues to deny a request that complies with
section 3(b) of this chapter for inspection or copying
of a public record after the public access counselor
has issued an advisory opinion:
1
DCS also noted that in light of May’s status as a party, May should have previously received copies of each
of these documents.
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(A) regarding the request for inspection
or copying of the public record; and
(B) that instructs the public agency to
allow access to the public record; and
(2) denies the request with the specific intent to
unlawfully withhold a public record that is subject to
disclosure under this chapter;
the individual and the public agency employing the individual
are subject to a civil penalty under subsection (h).
Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9.5(h) provides that “In an action under this
section, a court may impose the following civil penalties: (1) Not more than one
hundred dollars ($100) for the first violation. (2) Not more than five hundred
dollars ($500) for each additional violation.”
[21] The trial court determined that, as a matter of law, it would be improper to
assess civil penalties against the Appellees because the Appellees did not
continue to deny a request after the public access counselor had issued an
advisory opinion which instructed the Appellees to allow access to the records
in question. Indeed, the designated evidence demonstrates that DCS responded
to May’s request and provided the requested documents before the public access
counselor issued his advisory opinion, a fact that was noted by the public access
counselor in his advisory opinion. In addition, nothing in the designated
evidence establishes that the Appellees acted with the specific intent to
unlawfully withhold disclosure of any information requested by May.
Furthermore, the minor delay in responding to May’s request was not
intentional and the documents he was entitled to receive were provided to him.
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C. Conclusion
[22] In sum, contrary to May’s assertions, DCS did not deny any part of May’s
request without explanation or continue to deny access to the requested records
after having been ordered to allow access by the public access counselor. The
designated evidence demonstrates that DCS provided a detailed explanation for
why it responded in the manner it did. DCS’s response indicated that May’s
request for all DCS policies and procedures was too broad and voluminous;
directed him to an electronic version of said policies and procedures; and
offered to provide paper copies of the documents if May were to narrow his
request to a specific topic, policy, or procedure. Further, upon determining that
certain requested documents were not subject to disclosure under the APRA
because the documents contained statutorily-specified confidential information,
DCS provided May with copies of the documents in which the statutorily-
specified confidential information was redacted. The designated evidence also
reveals that DCS responded to May’s request and provided access to the
requested documents before being instructed to do so by the public access
counselor. Nothing in the designated evidence suggests that DCS continued to
refuse access to any documents after having been ordered to provide access by
the public access counselor.
[23] Because the designated evidence demonstrates that DCS responded to May’s
request by providing access to the requested information and that an assessment
of civil penalties is not justified under Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9.5(c), we
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conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the Appellees’ cross-motion
for summary judgment or in denying May’s motion for summary judgment. 2
II. Trial Court’s Determination that Appellees Did Not
Violate the APRA and Denial of Request to Assess Civil
Penalties
[24] We next turn to May’s contention that the trial court erred in determining that
the Appellees had not violated the APRA and in denying May’s request for the
assessment of civil penalties against the Appellees. In raising this contention,
May argues that the trial court’s determination that the Appellees did not
violate the APRA is contrary to law and that that the civil penalties should have
been assessed against the Appellees. Specifically, May argues that the
Appellees acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner when they “picked and
chose” what documents to give to him. Appellant’s Br. p. 36.
[25] Upon review, we find May’s argument relating to whether the Appellees
violated the APRA appears to be little more than a re-statement of his claims
relating to the propriety of the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor
of the Appellees. In ruling on the competing motions for summary judgment,
the trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Appellees did not violate the
2
To the extent that May argues that the trial court did not rely on properly designated evidence in reaching
its decision on the competing summary judgment motions, our review of the record reveals otherwise.
Furthermore, to the extent that May attempts to challenge the evidence designated by the Appellees, we note
that May stated in his response to the Appellees’ cross-motion for summary judgment that he agreed with the
Appellees’ designation of evidence and that both May and the Appellees previously agreed that there were no
genuine issues of fact.
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APRA. Upon review, we concluded that this ruling was proper. Because May
did not succeed on the merits of his claim, we further conclude that May is not
entitled to recover costs, damages, or injunctive relief. See Anderson v.
Huntington Cnty. Bd. of Com’rs, 983 N.E.2d 613, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(providing that an individual is only entitled to receive attorney’s fees and court
costs if he “substantially prevails”); Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos. Phase
I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (providing that an individual is
only entitled to permanent injunctive relief if he has succeeded on the merits of
his claim); Irving Materials, Inc. v. Carmody, 436 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982) (providing that “[t]he law does not ward damages where no legal
wrong was found”).3
III. Trial Court’s Denial of May’s Motion to Clarify
[26] May also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to clarify the
term “pleadings.” In raising this contention, May asserts that the motion to
clarify should have been treated as a motion to correct error.
A trial court has wide discretion to correct errors, and we will
reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Kashman v. Haas, 766
N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s action is against the logic and effect
3
Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court failed to respond to his request for a declaratory judgment
regarding his rights and privileges under APRA, review of the record reflects that the trial court clearly set forth
May’s rights and privileges under APRA in its order.
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of the facts and circumstances before it and the inferences that
may be drawn therefrom. Id.
Williamson v. Williamson, 825 N.E.2d 33, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[27] In his motion to clarify, May requested the trial court to clarify its ruling on the
parties’ summary judgment motions by clarifying “the definition and
application of the term ‘pleadings.[4]’” Appellant’s App. p. 97. In making this
request, May inquired into whether the term pleading was “understood by the
Court and used in a broad sense to include any papers/documents? And, if so
what papers in particular did the Court relied [sic] on?” Appellant’s App. p. 97.
Review of May’s motion to clarify indicates that his request seems to be based
on the belief that the trial court could only consider the pleadings of the instant
matter when deciding the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment.
This belief is incorrect.
[28] Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the parties may submit, and the trial
court may consider, designated evidence in support of the motion consisting of
all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the
motion.” (Emphasis added). Review of the record reveals that the parties
designated evidence in support of their respective summary judgment motions.
4
Indiana Trial Rule 7(A) provides that “[t]he pleadings shall consist of: (1) a complaint and an answer; (2) a
reply to a denominated counterclaim; (3) an answer to a cross-claim; (4) a third-party complaint, if a person
not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and (5) a third-party answer.”
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This designated evidence included not just the pleadings but also various other
types of appropriate designated evidence as outlined in Trial Rule 56(C). The
record further reveals that May previously indicated that he agreed with the
Appellees’ designation of evidence.
[29] Upon review, we observe that nothing in the record suggests that the trial court
applied any meaning for the term “pleadings” other than the definition
provided in Indiana Trial Rule 7 or considered any documents or exhibits
outside of the designated evidence in considering the parties’ competing
summary judgment motions. As such, we conclude that the trial court acted
within its discretion in denying May’s motion to clarify.
[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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