James W. Geary, II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                        FILED
    May 30 2018, 6:50 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                 Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Derick W. Steele                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Deputy Public Defender                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Kokomo, Indiana
    Angela N. Sanchez
    Supervising Deputy Attorney
    General
    Lyubov Gore
    Deputy Attorney General
    Craig C. Siebe
    Certified Legal Intern
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    James W. Geary, II,                                     May 30, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    34A02-1711-CR-2724
    v.                                              Appeal from the Howard Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Lynn Murray,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    34C01-1306-FB-89
    Mathias, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018            Page 1 of 7
    [1]   James W. Geary, II (“Geary”) pleaded guilty to Class C felony child
    solicitation in the Howard Circuit Court in 2014. He received an eight-year
    sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) with five years
    executed and three years suspended to supervised probation. In November
    2017, the trial court found that Geary violated his probation, and it ordered
    Geary to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC. Geary
    now appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked
    his suspended sentence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedure
    [3]   In 2013, Geary was charged with Class B felony attempted sexual misconduct
    with a minor, Class C felony child solicitation, Class D felony sexual battery,
    Class A misdemeanor sex offender internet offense, and a habitual offender
    enhancement.1 On March 27, 2014, Geary pleaded guilty to Class C felony
    child solicitation pursuant to a plea agreement that called for eight years in the
    DOC with five years executed and three years suspended to supervised
    probation. The trial court accepted Geary’s plea and sentenced him in
    accordance with its terms.
    1
    In 2014, the State added an additional charge of Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018                   Page 2 of 7
    [4]   Geary was released from the DOC in July 2016. As part of Geary’s supervised
    probation, he agreed to special probation conditions for adult sex offenders
    including: Condition 14, which states that Geary shall not engage in a sexual
    relationship with anyone who has a child under the age of sixteen unless given
    permission; Condition 17, which states that Geary shall not have any contact
    with anyone under the age of sixteen unless given court approval or after the
    successful completion of a court-approved sex offender treatment program; and
    Condition 25, which prohibits Geary from accessing certain web sites, chat
    rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by children. See Appellant’s
    App. pp. 38–40.
    [5]   On September 22, 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke Geary’s suspended
    sentence for violating the above three conditions. The State alleged that Geary
    violated Condition 14 by having a sexual relationship with L.B., who had a
    two-year-old child, M.B., at the time. And Geary had a sexual relationship with
    C.D., who had two children at the time, three-year-old S.D. and eight-month-
    old L.O. He allegedly violated Condition 17 by having contact with M.B. three
    to four times and contact with S.D. and L.O. over twenty times. Finally, the
    State alleged Geary violated Condition 25 by sending messages to L.B. via
    Facebook messenger.
    [6]   On November 1, 2017, the trial court held a fact-finding and sentencing hearing
    on the State’s petition. During the hearing, Geary admitted that all three
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018   Page 3 of 7
    violations were true. The court then ordered Geary to serve the 1,095-day2
    remainder of his suspended sentence to be executed in the DOC. Geary now
    appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   Geary contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
    serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Geary does
    not deny that he violated the terms of his probation; to the contrary, he
    admitted to having done so. He claims only that the trial court abused its
    discretion in ordering the execution of the entirety of the suspended sentence
    because although “rules were broken . . . rehabilitation is not served by simply
    throwing [him] aside when the process is difficult.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. The
    State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Geary’s
    conditions of probation “do not exist solely to rehabilitate offenders” but
    “[t]hey also serve the critical function of protecting the community from
    offenders.” Appellee’s Br. at 8–9.
    [8]   Upon a finding of a probation violation, a trial court may impose one or more
    of the following sanctions:
    (1)      Continue the person on probation, with or without
    modifying or enlarging the conditions.
    2
    Because Geary had been in jail since September 27, 2017, he had 82 days of credit time, and thus his
    remaining executed sentence at the time of the hearing was 1,013 days.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018               Page 4 of 7
    (2)     Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than
    one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
    (3)     Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
    suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
    
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3
    (h).
    [9]    A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in a probation program; rather,
    such placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not
    a right. Abernathy v. State, 
    852 N.E.2d 1016
    , 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We
    review the trial court’s sentencing decisions on probation violations for an
    abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse
    of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
    the facts and circumstances before the court. 
    Id.
     The trial court should be given
    considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed following the revocation of
    probation. 
    Id.
     Consequently, so long as proper procedures have been followed,
    the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence after revoking
    probation. Goonen v. State, 
    705 N.E.2d 209
    , 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also
    I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).
    [10]   Here, Geary was on probation for Class C felony child solicitation, and thus he
    was subject to certain special probation conditions for adult sex offenders.
    Geary readily admits to violating three of those probation conditions. See Tr.
    pp. 16–18. And Geary’s counsel stated during the hearing, “yes, my client
    technically violated these rules.” Id. at 22. The trial court later told Geary, “you
    had to follow the rules . . . these conditions aren’t that hard to do, and I would
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018   Page 5 of 7
    find that it’s appropriate both for the protection of the community, particularly
    for the children involved, that you would be ordered to serve the balance of
    your suspended sentence.” Id. at 24. We agree.
    [11]   Geary’s only argument on appeal seems to be that the rehabilitative nature of
    probation is not served by ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended
    sentence in the DOC. See Appellant’s Br. at 6–7. However, Geary actively
    chose to violate three conditions of his probation. See Beeler v. State, 
    959 N.E.2d 828
    , 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that violating a single condition is
    sufficient for a trial court to revoke probation), trans. denied. He knew what the
    conditions were, because he signed off on them. Moreover, he never attempted
    to notify the probation department that he was in relationships with these two
    women. Instead, Geary chose to disregard the conditions and the consequences
    of any potential violation. See Weida v. State, 
    94 N.E.3d 682
    , 687 (Ind. 2018).
    [12]   We also note that Geary has a prior conviction for child molestation in
    Georgia. And he violated the probation conditions in that case by having
    contact with two different minor children than those discussed in this appeal.
    Therefore, although we recognize that rehabilitation is a primary concern
    during sentencing, our supreme court has explained that “judges must have the
    ability to move with alacrity to protect public safety when adjudicated offenders
    violate the conditions of their sentences.” Stephens v. State, 
    818 N.E.2d 936
    , 941
    (Ind. 2004). And this is precisely what the trial court did here.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018   Page 6 of 7
    Conclusion
    [13]   Because Geary overtly failed to abide by three probation conditions he agreed
    to follow, and because of his prior criminal history, the trial court was well
    within its discretion to order him to serve the 1,095-day balance of his
    previously suspended sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1711-CR-2724 | May 30, 2018   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 34A02-1711-CR-2724

Filed Date: 5/30/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021