Tyler Beathea v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 17 2015, 8:58 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marielena Duerring Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Beathea, September 17, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1411-CR-404
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable George W.
Appellee-Plaintiff Biddlecome, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-1212-FB-122
Mathias, Judge.
[1]   Following a jury trial, Tyler Beathea (“Beathea”) was convicted in Elkhart
Superior Court of Class B felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury of a
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child and Class D felony neglect of a dependent and sentenced to eighteen years
to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction. Beathea now appeals and
presents two issues for our review:
I.   Whether Beathea was denied a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense to the battery charge when he was not permitted to
introduce testimony from the emergency room doctor that the
victim’s injuries were not “serious” and;
II.   Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that the victim
suffered serious bodily injury and that Beathea committed neglect of a
dependent.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On December 23, 2012, Brook Jackson (“Jackson”) worked a double shift from
9:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. at a nearby gas station. Jackson wanted to finish up
her last minute Christmas shopping with her brother after work. Tyler Beathea
(“Beathea”), Jackson’s boyfriend at the time, offered to take care of Jackson’s
three-year-old daughter, A.L., while she worked the double shift and finished
her shopping. Beathea had watched A.L. on two prior occasions, and A.L.
“liked him very much.” Tr. p. 161.
[3]   Sometime that morning, A.L. wet the bed, and Beathea became infuriated.
Beathea shouted profanities at A.L. and then pulled A.L.’s hair. He then picked
her up by her hair, threw her in the air, dropped her on the bed, and struck her
on the top of the head five times. Tr. pp. 328, 336-37. Beathea did not seek any
medical attention for A.L. after the incident.
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[4]   Jackson arrived home around 12:45 a.m. on December 24, 2012. A.L. was
asleep. Several minutes later, A.L. awoke, and Jackson noticed that A.L. had a
large bump on the right side of her head and that her entire head was swollen.
Jackson asked Beathea what happened to A.L., but he responded that he did
not know. Jackson noticed that A.L. was quiet and would not speak to Beathea,
which was “very abnormal” for her. Tr. pp. 168-69.
[5]   Jackson took A.L. to the emergency room to be treated for her injuries,
accompanied by her brother and Beathea. Over the next several hours at the
hospital, A.L.’s injuries worsened. A.L. remained very quiet and winced when
touched. The nurse assessed A.L.’s pain at a six out of ten on the flat score
scale, a pain assessment for children. Her head turned pink beginning on the
right side, but spread across her head, turning into a “purplish discoloration.”
Tr. p. 227.
[6]   Doctors ordered a CT scan along with various other x-rays that determined
A.L. suffered bleeding on several areas in the soft tissue of her scalp. The
emergency room doctor diagnosed the injury as a “cephalohematoma,” and the
hospital administered Tylenol to A.L. The doctor instructed Jackson to give
A.L. Tylenol or ibuprofen and use ice to reduce the swelling.
[7]   The hospital staff suspected child abuse, and the emergency room nurse began
the necessary paperwork for the referral to Child Protective Services. Jackson
was cooperative, while Beathea refused to answer the nurse’s questions and
became flustered. A heated dispute arose in the room, and the nurse asked
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Beathea to go to the waiting room. Instead of complying with the nurse’s
request, Beathea left the hospital. Approximately seven hours after arriving at
the hospital, A.L. was released from the emergency room, and Jackson took her
to Child Protective Services to be interviewed.
[8]   On the evening of December 24, 2012, A.L.’s eyes became red and swollen
with clear discharge. Jackson took her back to the hospital, and she was
released the same day. A.L.’s eyes completely swelled shut on December 25,
2012, and A.L. was unable to open any of her Christmas gifts that day or
participate in family festivities without great assistance. Her eyes remained
swollen shut for two to three months, and it took nearly a year for A.L’s
swelling and bruising to completely heal. A.L. was apprehensive when Jackson
brushed her hair, and her head remained tender at the time of trial.
[9]   Beathea was charged with Class B felony battery resulting in serious bodily
injury of a child and Class D felony neglect of a dependent. A jury trial was
held on September 15-17, 2014. During trial, the emergency room doctor
described A.L.’s injuries. On cross-examination, Beathea questioned the doctor
about the degree of the injuries he found during A.L.’s examination. Beathea
specifically asked the doctor to opine on whether A.L. suffered “serious”
injuries based on the doctor’s examination. The State objected that asking the
doctor to determine whether the injury was “serious” called for a legal
conclusion, because serious bodily injury was an element of the offense in this
case. The trial court sustained the State’s objection.
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[10]   The jury found Beathea guilty as charged. The trial court ordered Beathea to
serve eighteen years executed at the Department of Correction. Beathea now
appeals.
I. Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Complete Defense
[11]   Beathea argues that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense when the trial court sustained the State’s objection to the
emergency room doctor testifying to whether or not A.L.’s injuries were
“serious.” He contends that his defense was premised on whether the State
could prove that he inflicted serious bodily injury, and his defense was
eliminated because the trial court refused to allow the doctor to opine on
whether A.L.’s injuries were “serious.” Tr. pp. 256-57.
[12]   The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the trial court’s sound
discretion, and that decision is “afforded a great deal of deference on appeal.”
Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Bacher v. State, 686
N.E.2d 791, 793). We review the trial court’s ruling on the admission or
exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d
1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997). We reverse only where the decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d
386, 390 (Ind. 1997). Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Fox v.
State, 717 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
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[13]   Although a defendant’s right to present a defense is of utmost importance, it is
not absolute. Parker v. State, 965 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “The
accused, as is required by the State must comply with established rules of
procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Id.
[14]   Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) provides:
Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent,
guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of
allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or
legal conclusions.
[15]   The trial court sustained the State’s objection to the doctor’s testimony and
stated, “The witness cannot interpret whether or not the element of serious
bodily injury is established or not established as a matter of opinion. And he
may not render a [sic] opinion on whether or not the State has proved an
element of the charge.” Tr. p. 257. We agree. See Schumm v. State, 868 N.E.2d
1202, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a police officer who issued a
citation to a driver for driving with improper headlights could not testify to
whether the vehicle’s taillights complied with department of transportation
regulations because it was a legal conclusion).
[16]   Beathea asked the doctor whether A.L’s injuries satisfied the definition of one
of the essential elements of the charged crime, which would have amounted to
the doctor opining on whether the State had proven Beathea guilty of battery
resulting in serious bodily injury. The doctor was not aware that the term
“serious” had a specialized legal meaning different than its vernacular meaning.
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The trial court correctly classified the testimony as a legal conclusion and
sustained the State’s objection. C.f. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147,
151 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that if the terms used by the witness have a separate,
distinct, and specialized meaning in the law different from the present in the
vernacular, exclusion is appropriate).
[17]   Even if the trial court had abused its discretion by excluding the testimony, any
error would be harmless. “Trial court error is harmless if the probable impact of
the error on the jury, in light of all of the evidence, is sufficiently minor such
that it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Bald v. State, 766
N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 1002
(Ind. 2000)). No evidence exists to show that the doctor knew that there was a
legal definition related to “serious” injury, so the doctor’s classification of
A.L.’s injuries as “serious” would not have affected the jury’s outcome in
determining if her injuries met the legal definition of “serious.” Further, the
State presented testimony from several other witnesses who established the
extent and seriousness of A.L.’s injuries. The jury properly considered this
testimony to determine whether A.L.’s injuries were “serious.”
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[18]   Beathea argues that neither of his convictions was supported by sufficient
evidence. “Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a
conviction, a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of witnesses, and respects the jury’s exclusive province to weigh
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conflicting evidence. Montgomery v. State, 878 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict. Id. We must affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
A. Serious Bodily Injury
[19]   Beathea does not dispute that he battered A.L. but rather claims that the battery
did not result in serious bodily injury.
[20]   Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1(a) (1) provides:
A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another
person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits
battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is:
(4) a Class B felony if it results in serious bodily injury to a
person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed
by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.
[21]   Under Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-292,
“serious bodily injury” is defined as bodily injury that
causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2)
unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.
[22]   Whether bodily injury is “serious” is a question of degree and, therefore, is
appropriately reserved for the trier of fact. Sutton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 694, 697
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). No bright line rule differentiates “bodily injury” from
“serious bodily injury.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004).
“Within the framework provided by the definition, it remains for the factfinder
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to determine the question of degree: that the bodily injury is serious.” Ricks v.
State, 446 N.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
[23]   Beathea argues that the State failed to prove serious bodily injury because,
“…[t]he only testimony that referred to ‘loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member or organ’ was that concerning of the tissues around A.L.’s eyes.
No medical testimony was given concerning whether the swelling caused a
‘protracted loss or impairment’ of A.L.’s vision. Nor was there any testimony
that established that A.L.’s vision was impaired for a significant period of
time.” Appellant’s Br. at 8-9.
[24]   However, the State presented evidence at trial that could lead a jury to
determine that A.L.’s injuries were serious due to extreme pain and permanent
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.
The jury could reasonably conclude that A.L. suffered extreme pain when
Beathea picked her up by the hair, threw her on the bed, and struck her in the
head five times. Hours later, A.L.’s head and eyes became swollen and she
cried and winced in pain after the incident occurred. The nurse in the
emergency room assessed A.L.’s pain at a six out of ten and testified that she
could tell by A.L’s body language that she was in pain. Tr. p. 281. Further,
A.L.’s injuries did not heal for nearly one year after the incident, and she still
remained sensitive about others touching or combing her hair at the time of
trial.
[25]   The State’s evidence also established that A.L.’s injuries were serious because
she experienced protracted loss of use or impairment of her vision. In
Mendenhall v. State, this court held that evidence was sufficient to show
protracted loss of use of right eye where eye was swollen shut and victim felt
pain all around that eye. Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 569 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (affirming that evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim suffered
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serious bodily injury). After being struck by Beathea, A.L. suffered internal
bleeding and a pooling of blood outside the skull, beneath the skin, which
caused her eyes to swell completely shut. She was unable to open her eyes for
two to three months and it took almost one year for all of the bruising and
swelling to subside.
[26]   For all of these reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Beathea inflicted
serious bodily injury on A.L.
B. Neglect of a Dependent
[27]   Beathea also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that he committed Class D felony neglect of a dependent. Specifically, Beathea
contends that no evidence was introduced to establish that his delay in
reporting his conduct actually caused harm to A.L. Appellant’s Br. at 11.
[28]   Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4 (a)(1) provides,
a person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed
voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly
or intentionally places the dependent in a situation that
endangers the dependent’s life or health commits neglect of
a dependent, a Class D felony.
[29]   A person knowingly commits neglect of a child when he is “subjectively aware
of a high probability that he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.”
Sanders v. State, 734 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Because such a
finding requires one to resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the
defendant’s mental state, the appellate courts must look to all the surrounding
circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper. McMichael v.
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State, 471 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984) (citing Perkins v. State, 392
N.E.2d 490, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).
[30]   At trial, the State presented testimony that Beathea endangered A.L.’s health by
failing to seek medical attention after he caused her injury and by refusing to
tell the doctors, nurses, or anyone else how A.L. was injured until after she
received medical treatment. A jury could reasonably conclude that Beathea
knew that A.L. needed medical attention after he injured her and that by failing
to help her seek treatment, he endangered her health. The State’s evidence
showed that Beathea struck A.L. numerous times in the morning sometime
after she wet the bed. A.L. remained alone with Beathea for another twelve to
sixteen hours without receiving any medical care until her mother returned at
nearly 1:00 a.m. the next day.
[31]   A reasonable person in Beathea’s position as A.L.’s caregiver would have
concluded that a three year old who had been picked up by her hair, dropped,
and struck several times in the head would need medical attention. Further,
during this time period and before Jackson returned, A.L.’s head began
swelling, which should have alerted Beathea that A.L. required medical
attention. When Jackson arrived home, she noticed the bump and swelling on
A.L.’s head and immediately sought medical care for her daughter, as any
reasonable person would do. Beathea should have been aware of a high
probability that he placed A.L. in a dangerous situation. Sanders, supra.
[32]   Beathea further argues that there is a lack of testimony that A.L.’s life or health
was subjected to an actual and appreciable danger due to Beathea’s initial
denial of responsibility or any speculated “delay” in treatment. Appellant’s Br.
at 10. Thankfully, A.L. did not suffer more serious consequences from her
injuries, but her symptoms were real and appreciable dangers that required a
medical evaluation. A.L. suffered multiple blows to the head and swelling,
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which presented a risk for fracture or potential bleeding in the brain. Medical
attention was therefore necessary to determine the extent of her injuries and to
order appropriate treatment. See Sample v. State, 601 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992) (citing Johnson v. State, 555 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990)). (The State must prove that the actor subjected the dependent to a danger
that was actual and appreciable, but this does not mean that a delay in seeking
treatment must actually result in injury to dependent).
[33]   For all these reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence at
trial from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Beathea
committed Class D felony neglect of a dependent.
Conclusion
[34]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the emergency room
doctor’s testimony regarding whether A.L.’s injuries were serious because
testimony was an inadmissible legal conclusion under Indiana Evidence Rule
704(b). Further, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Beathea’s
Class B felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury of a child and Class D
felony neglect of a dependent.
[35]   Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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