Todd A. Bylsma v. Diana (Bylsma) Smith (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 02 2017, 5:59 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Cindy L. Kenworthy
Cindy L. Kenworthy, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Thomas L. Landwerlen
Landwerlen & Rothkopf, L.L.P.
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Todd A. Bylsma, May 2, 2017
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
74A01-1611-DR-2525
v. Appeal from the Spencer Circuit
Court
Diana (Bylsma) Smith, The Honorable Keith A. Meier,
Appellee-Petitioner Special and Senior Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
74C01-0704-DR-0149
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Todd Bylsma (Father) appeals the trial court’s order requiring that he pay a
portion of his daughter’s postsecondary educational expenses and denying his
request that the trial court find Diana Smith (Mother) in contempt. Father
raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by finding that his
daughter, Robyn, did not repudiate Father; (2) the trial court erroneously
calculated Father’s income and Robyn’s post-secondary educational expenses;
and (3) the trial court erred by finding that Mother was not in contempt.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Father and Mother were married in July 1994, and one child—Robyn—was
born of the marriage on January 26, 1996. The marriage was dissolved in July
2007. The parents agreed to share joint custody, with Mother being the primary
physical custodian and Father having parenting time according to the Indiana
Parenting Time Guidelines. Father also agreed to pay child support in the
amount of $500 per month.
[3] During Robyn’s teenage years, her relationship with Father deteriorated
dramatically. She graduated from high school in the spring of 2014 and
enrolled in Purdue University in the fall of 2014.
[4] On July 9, 2014, Mother filed a petition for educational support, seeking a court
order that Father contribute to Robyn’s college education. On September 15,
2014, Father filed a petition seeking Mother found in contempt for her alleged
failures to abide by the dissolution decree. On October 8, 2014, Father filed a
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petition to modify the dissolution decree. The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on all pending motions on June 29, 2016, and on October 23, 2016, it
entered an order granting Mother’s petition and denying Father’s contempt
petition. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] At the outset, we note that Mother has not filed an appellee’s brief in this
matter. It is well established that our Court “will not undertake the burden of
developing arguments for the appellee.” In re Adoption of N.W.R., 971 N.E.2d
110, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Moreover, we apply “a less stringent standard of
review” and “may reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie
error,” which is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.”
Id. at 113.
I. Repudiation
[6] Father first argues that the trial court erred by finding that Robyn has not
repudiated her relationship with Father. A determination regarding repudiation
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Koontz v. Scott, 60 N.E.3d 1080,
1082-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We will reverse only if the trial court’s order is
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the
court has misinterpreted the law. Id. In conducting our review, we will
consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment.
Id.[7] This Court has recently explained the doctrine of repudiation:
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There is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to provide a
college education for their children. In determining whether to
order parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education,
the trial court must consider whether and to what extent the
parents, if still married, would have contributed to college
expenses. Where an adult child repudiates a parent, however,
that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect the repudiation
has on the parent’s contribution to college expenses.
Repudiation is defined as a “complete refusal” by the adult child
to participate in a relationship with the parent. A finding
regarding repudiation is particularly fact sensitive.
Id. at 183 (internal citations omitted).
[8] Here, the trial court entered an excellent, thorough, and detailed order
explaining why it concluded that Robyn has not repudiated her relationship
with Father. In relevant part, the court found as follows:
4. On October 9 and 13, 2012, when Robyn was 16 and a
Junior in high school, Father send her duplicate emails asking if
she wanted to go to her cousin, Katie’s, wedding. . . . Later in
October, a telephone conversation occurred between Robyn and
Father which proved to be their last verbal communication.
Although the evidence was somewhat confusing, it ostensibly
involved Father telling Robyn he was not taking her to her
cousin’s wedding because she never confirmed with him (she did
attend however but Father did not), that he was not taking her to
his parents at Thanksgiving because he had had no contact with
her and that Robyn had prioritized extracurricular activities over
spending time with him. Whatever the content of the
conversation, important to the Court’s decision was that Father
yelled at Robyn, she cried, and he hung up. There was no
evidence Father has ever apologized for either yelling at her or
hanging up on her.
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***
6. Robyn testified at the hearing and, during cross-
examination by Father’s counsel, began crying when she was
questioned about her cousin’s wedding, the October 12, 2012
telephone call with Father and her depression during her
Sophmore [sic] year in high school.
***
8. On December 19, 2012, Robyn initiated a conversation by
email with Father asking “Are you going to be with the family on
Christmas? I’ll be at Grandma and Grandpa’s all week.” The
next morning Father replied:
Not this year. . . . Haven’t gotten a response from any of
my emails in the last few months, so didn’t really plan on
seeing you at Christmas and we have made plans for the
week.
I have been told, you don’t want to talk to me because I
am a horrible person. Why the sudden email at Christmas
time?
Maybe if you can respond to an email or two, I can try to
see about having you stay here for a few days when we get
the pool open. We will need to have a talk before you are
able to stay here.
Merry Christmas, Todd
9. Robyn responded by email on December 20, 2012:
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Why the sudden email at Christmas time? It’s Christmas.
The family never saw you on Thanksgiving. You never
went to Katie’s wedding. Grandma and Grandpa are
trying, but they’ve been shut out. Last time we talked on
the phone, I ended up in tears, and you hung up. I’ve felt
like I’ve been walking on eggshells, but I sucked it up and
asked you about Christmas because we’re family, and
that’s what Christmas is for. If you have plans with Beth
and Krista [Father’s wife and stepdaughter], that’s fine,
but don’t forget about the rest of your family. I haven’t
forgotten you; I’m just afraid of further confrontation.
10. Father responded on December 21, 2012 . . . :
. . . If I am as terrible to you as you told your grandma, let
me know if you’d like me to leave you alone to avoid
those eggshells. If that is your choice, don’t worry, I’ve
been in tears because of you too.
***
12. [In February 2013, Robyn invited Father to see her
perform in Les Miserables] and instructed him on how to obtain
tickets. His response that day, which the Court found curios [sic]
was “Would you like for us to come and watch? Thanks, Todd
Bylsma”
13. On June 16, 2013 Robyn emailed Father “Happy Father’s
Day!” There is no evidence of a response from Father.
14. . . . [O]n July 29, 2013, [Robyn sent her Father an email]
telling him about her Alabama trip, how she has been busy, she
was getting ready to attend her last band camp, she changed from
marching trumpet to baritone, and she informed him of her SAT
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and ACT scores that summer: 2090 and 32 respectively,
punctuating the note with “WHOO!” and signing it “That’s all
for now. I miss you too.” There was no evidence of a response
from Father nor could he recall making a response, although the
Court would have expected some congratulatory comment
and/or expression of pride from Father.
***
16. [Robyn then invited Father to attend Senior Night and
walk her down the field at a football game in October; he said he
could not come. She also told him about other football games, at
which she would be playing in the band, in October and
November. There is no evidence he attended either game.]
17. February 3, 2014, after Robyn turned 18 years of age, she
sent an email to Father informing him of her lead role in the
spring musical along with the show dates and time in March and
stated “A lot of the family is coming to see it, and I would hope
to see you there as well. Love, bye” He responded:
Robyn,
You have made the decision that you do not want me to
be part of your life, and have communicated through my
parents that you don’t want to talk with you [sic] own
father. I am confused on the invite to your play. I think
that until we are able to somehow have a relationship
where you can talk with me, then I don’t know why this
would matter to me. . . .
Father’s statement if correct, that is, that she does not want to
“talk” to him, did not suggest to the Court that she does not want
to communicate nor that she was completely repudiating him,
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but that she was more comfortable with written communication.
Moreover, there is no evidence that he had attempted direct
verbal communication with her prior to that time. The Court
also felt he was not responding as it would expect a parent to
respond.
18. In her email response of February 4, 2014 Robyn told
Father:
I NEVER said that I didn’t want to be a part of your life. I
don’t care what your secondary sources are, but you most
certainly did not hear them from me.
Think of this from my perspective. Two years ago, you
told the grandparents, without asking me, that I would not
be visiting for Thanksgiving because you didn’t think I
enjoyed myself at their house. They were hurt by this, but
I emailed them and told them I still had every desire to see
the family for the holiday. After they agreed to let me
stay, you suddenly decided not to join the rest of us for
Thanksgiving dinner. After that, you were absent for
Christmas, Katie’s wedding, Blake’s wedding . . . . What
message do you think that sent to me?
If you’re so hurt by this lack of communication, then you
could make the effort to see the family again, at least for
the holidays, because it’s not just me who’s missing out,
it’s everyone.
19. Father responded about 3 hours later:
. . . The lack of communication is with you, not my
family. The wedge that was driven between my family
and I was about you, and because of the things you were
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saying to your Grandma. This is why I missed all the
family functions. Your [sic] 18 now, so step up and take
some responsibility for how you treat people, play them
against each other, and your lack of respect or
communication with my side of the family. Your
grandparents and I are well aware of how we got to this
point, and how you got my own parents to turn on me, I
have your emails to them. We are clear about how we got
to where we are and your name seems to come up. . . .
20. Robyn responded 24 minutes later:
Whatever is between you and your parents is not my fault.
It’s this kind of twisting of words that makes me so afraid
to try to talk to you.
The invitation still stands.
There is no evidence that Father responded or attended the
musical.
21. Robyn emailed Father on February 11, 2014, stating “In
case you were still considering the spring musical, the show has
been moved to April 4-6.” He responded:
Thanks. Probably not going to make the show, but let me
know if you want to come spend some time together.
Would love to see you this summer. Todd Bylsma
There is no evidence he took any initiative to set up a summer
visit. He placed the burden on her to do so.
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22. July 12, 2014, Robyn sent [an email to Father telling him
Happy Birthday and inviting him to another show she was in
later that summer.]
He responded the same day:
Thanks. Probably not going to make the show, but let me
know if you want to come spend some time together.
Would love to see you this summer. Todd Bylsma
There is no evidence he took any initiative to set up a visit and
again placed the burden on her to do so.
***
24. On Tuesday, February 10, 2015, when Robyn was 19
years old and attending Purdue, [she sent an email to Father
inviting him to three major performances she would be in that
spring for the Purdue Symphonic Band.]
25. Father responded on Friday February 13, 2015:
It’s great to hear from you, it’s been awhile.
Thank you for the invitation to your performances and I
will let you know which one I will be at, but honestly I
would much rather see you one on one in person. I miss
seeing you. . . .
26. There was no evidence . . . that Father actually attended
any of the productions. This was also the last email
communication from Father to Robyn.
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***
29. Father has not attempted to enforce parenting time since
January 2008 because Robyn was engaged in a large number of
activities she’d miss if she visited Father and he felt she’d resent
him for exercising parenting time and he did not wish to become
an irritant to her.
***
31. Robyn invited Father to all events that mattered to her but
he did not attend any of her high school activities in her junior or
senior year including her high school graduation, although he
received an invitation three (3) days prior, which he stated was
too late. Father testified he sent a graduation card but Robyn
testified she did not receive the card. Father desired to have one-
on-one visits with Robyn, rather than attending events or shows
that she was involved in and important to her. However, he
admitted that he never made any request for specific dates or
times to meet and she did not reject any specific attempts by him
at reconciliation. Since Robyn’s 18th birthday, Father has not
contacted her regarding specific times to visit with her,
notwithstanding that he stated it is not a child’s responsibility to
coordinate parenting time. The evidence did not support a
finding or conclusion that Robyn refused to visit with Father nor
does the evidence support a finding or conclusion that Mother
prevented parenting time.
***
34. Robyn did not know Father’s home address.
***
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36. . . . Robyn could not recall the last time she had seen
Father prior to the trial date.
***
38. There is no credible evidence Robyn has stated she does
not wish to see Father (she testified she did), that she never
wanted a relationship with him, that she does not respect Father,
that she has repudiated his authority as her parent, that she has
threatened him, that she has repeatedly and completely failed to
respond to him when he contacts her, or considers their
relationship ended.
39. The evidence did not support a finding or conclusion that
Father has considered his role in creating the current relationship
with Robyn nor that he was accepting any responsibility for the
status of that relationship.
40. Because the trial was conducted in a small hearing room,
rather than the courtroom, when Robyn testified at the hearing
(which was in very close physical proximity to Father), the Court
did not discern any evidence, in her eyes, words or actions, of
hatred or even animous [sic] towards Father.
Conclusion(s):
1. Father and Robyn clearly have a weak and, perhaps,
strained relationship but the evidence did not support a finding or
conclusion that Robyn has completely refused to participate in a
relationship with Father or has completely repudiated the parent-
child relationship with Father, either before or after she turned
18.
Discussion:
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***
6. The Court considered that Robyn might have feigned a
relationship with Father in order to avoid a repudiation defense,
but the Court would have expected a totally different tenor and
content to her emails. Having seen and heard Robyn testify and
considering the evidence as a whole, the Court discounted that
possibility. . . . It appears that Robyn is afraid of confrontation
with her Father. . . . While Robyn is clearly intelligent, her
emails suggest a typical teenage response, while Father appears
to hold her to an adult standard and not with “open arms,”
relying instead upon her chronological age as being the criteria
for adult maturity. . . . The Court did not understand why Father
did not do more to reach out to Robyn including attending her
events, why he had not initiated telephone contact with her or
took steps to obtain parenting time, other than to place the
burden [on] Robyn to set it up. . . . She appears to reach out to
Father only to be met by his request that she do something more
to further their relationship, indicating he wants the relationship
to be on his terms. His ending emails to Robyn with “Todd” or
“Todd Bylsma” are not appropriate, could be considered as rude
and send the wrong and inappropriate, if not confusing, message.
The Court also sensed he was condescending. . . . In sum, the
Court felt Father’s actions have been chiefly motivated by the
specter of having to pay college expenses for Robyn, not
manifesting a true desire to restore or further the Father-daughter
relationship.
7. . . . Other than emails, and perhaps some cards or email
wishes, in every other way, it appeared that Father disappeared
from Robyn’s life.
8. . . . However one characterizes the relation[ship], it is not
repudiation and Father must share responsibility for the
relationship.
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9. . . . The Court felt Father contributed to the status of the
relationship with Robyn. The Court is convinced that Robyn has
left open the possibility of rebuilding a relationship with
Father. . . .
Appellant’s App. p. 3-25 (internal citations and emphases omitted).
[9] As noted above, repudiation must involve a complete refusal by an adult child
to participate in a relationship with the parent. Here, the trial court examined
the evidence in the record before it and reasonably concluded that Robyn has
not, in fact, refused to participate in a relationship with Father. To the
contrary, it appears that she made repeated attempts, both before and after she
reached the age of eighteen, to engage and reengage in a relationship with him.
He repeatedly declined her invitations to events in which she was participating
and that held great importance for her. He made no attempts to call her or to
engage in parenting time with her. He placed the full burden of maintaining the
relationship on a teenager, which is unfair to his daughter regardless of her age.
The trial court also had the benefit of observing the parties in person and based
its conclusions, in part, on those in-person observations. We cannot and will
not second-guess those assessments.
[10] Father’s arguments to the contrary merely amount to a request that we reweigh
evidence and re-assess witness credibility—a request we decline. We find no
error in the trial court’s conclusion that Robyn has not repudiated her
relationship with her Father and that he is, therefore, responsible for a portion
of her post-secondary educational expenses.
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II. Calculation of Father’s Income and Robyn’s
Expenses
[11] Post-secondary educational expenses are in the nature of child support. Schacht
v. Schacht, 892 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We place a strong
emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations. Id.A trial court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid, and we will
reverse only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Young v. Young, 891
N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008).
[12] First, Father argues that the trial court erred in the way it calculated his income
for the purpose of apportioning post-secondary educational expenses. With
respect to Father’s income, the trial court found as follows:
. . . His income, as reported on his federal income tax returns,
was $95,169 in 2012 as an account manager, $107,321.78 in
2013, and $138,076.62 in 2014. In November 2014 Father
started a business, GlassFire, Inc., with another individual
wherein he is a shareholder. He serves as an IT Engineer. As a
result of his entering into this business, his income dropped to
$16,963 in 2015 but he is now earning $5,000.00 per month and
expects that he will be able to sell his business in several years for
$6,000,000.00. There is no evidence that Father was terminated
from his prior employment, that he disliked it, that he could not
have remained at this prior position, or that he considered,
attempted, or is unable to obtain supplemental income after
starting the new company. In computing his financial obligation,
the Court chose to attribute his average income for 2012, 2013,
2014, plus his $60,000.00 projected income for 2016, all of which
averages $100,141.85 per year or $1,925.80 per week.
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Appellant’s App. p. 27 (internal citation omitted).
[13] Indiana Child Support Guideline 3A(3) provides that “[i]f a court finds a parent
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support
shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income. A
determination of potential income shall be made by determining employment
potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor’s work history,
occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in
the community.” The Commentary further states that “[o]bviously, a great deal
of discretion will have to be used in this determination [of potential income].”
Specific to post-secondary educational expenses, the Guideline 8(b) states that
in calculating and apportioning such expenses, the trial court should “weigh the
ability of each parent to contribute to payment of the expense . . . . [I]t should
apportion the expenses between the parents and the child, taking into
consideration the incomes and overall financial condition of the parents and the
child . . . .”
[14] In this case, the trial court examined Father’s income and employment history
and made an implicit determination that, when he started his own business in
November 2014, he became voluntarily unemployed. The trial court then
examined Father’s income history, current income, and future income potential
in its calculation of his income for the purpose of apportioning the post-
secondary educational expenses. In other words, the trial court took into
consideration Father’s income and overall financial condition, as suggested by
the Guidelines. Given the wide latitude we give to trial courts with respect to
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the calculation of a parent’s income for these purposes, we find no error in the
trial court’s decisionmaking process regarding Father’s income in this case.
[15] Second, Father argues that the trial court’s order leaves the door open to require
him to pay towards Robyn’s future educational expenses beyond her bachelor’s
degree. The trial court has authority and discretion to award post-secondary
educational expenses and to determine the amount of such an award. Warner v.
Warner, 725 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Father is correct that the
term “postsecondary” does not include graduate school or other educational
expenses beyond a bachelor’s degree. Allen v. Allen, 54 N.E.3d 344, 349 (Ind.
2016).
[16] Here, Father notes that Robyn testified that she needs 120 credits to graduate
from Purdue and that, because she was an extremely successful high school
student who entered the university with many credits already accumulated, she
would accumulate her needed hours by the end of the fall 2016 semester. He
complains that “Robyn’s intention is to continue attending college classes until
either Spring, 2018 . . . or Fall, 2018.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17. As Robyn
explained, in addition to her physics major, she is also pursuing a minor in
computer science. Therefore, to complete her chosen bachelor’s degree, Robyn
needs to accumulate more than 120 hours. The trial court’s order requires
Father to pay a portion of Robyn’s undergraduate college and related expenses.
At no point does it explicitly or implicitly require him to maintain financial
responsibility after she obtains her bachelor’s degree. Perhaps, rather than
complaining about the ambitious degree Robyn is pursuing, Father should
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focus on being proud and supportive of his intelligent, driven, successful
daughter. We find no error on this issue.
III. Contempt
[17] Finally, Father contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to have
Mother found in contempt of the dissolution decree. The determination of
whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We
will reverse only if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law. Id.[18] Generally, a person who willfully disobeys any order lawfully issued by any
court of record is guilty of indirect contempt of court. Davidson v. State, 836
N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Here, Father argues that Mother has
disobeyed the dissolution decree by failing to keep Father informed of Robyn’s
school and extracurricular activities. He argues that “as a result of a planned,
persistent and deliberate pattern of conduct, Mother succeeded in excluding
Father from any meaningful participation in Robyn’s life as a parent.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 21. He notes that the dissolution decree provides that they
were to share joint custody, which implies that they “would share authority and
responsibility for the major decisions concerning Robyn’s upbringing, including
her education, healthcare, and religious training.” Id.[19] Initially, the trial court found that “there were several instances where Father
was informed of or should have recognized or assumed that Robyn was going
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to college.” Appellant’s App. p. 32. It cited to multiple emails to Father from
both Robyn and Mother in the record referring to Robyn’s plans to attend
college; among other things, Robyn told him about her SAT and ACT scores
and referred to the process of filling out college applications.
[20] Furthermore, the trial court noted that, while the dissolution decree refers to
joint custody, it neither defined the term nor specifically addressed legal
custody. “Moreover, [the dissolution decree does] not specifically impose an
obligation on Mother to take those actions which Father alleges Mother failed
to take. . . . The Decree was not clear and certain as to either parent’s obligation
in regard to Father’s allegation.” Id. at 33. Additionally, Father did not take
the initiative to ask Mother for the information he complains he failed to
receive, nor did he seek judicial relief until she filed the petition asking that he
contribute to Robyn’s college expenses:
10. Father’s last request to Mother for Robyn’s school
information was early in her high school career. Robyn’s high
school records were available on line and Mother provided the
school with Father’s contact information and email so as to allow
him to obtain all school information directly from the school.
The school would email parents of activities, grades, schedules,
etc. . . . Father failed to make any inquiries to Mother to request
any information about school or activities, notwithstanding that
he possessed her telephone number and email address. Further,
there is no evidence Mother took any steps to prevent Father
from obtaining school information. Father admitted that he did
not obtain information directly from the school, although he was
permitted to do so . . . . In view of Father having no
communication with Mother, making no requests to her for any
information about Robyn, and in view of the lack of any in-
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person contact or telephone calls between Father and the child
after fall 2012, it was reasonable for Mother to assume either that
Father had no interest in receiving school or activity information
or that he was obtaining such information directly from the
school. The Court finds that her failure to provide such
information was not willful and, even if it were, it does not
constitute a violation of the Decree.
11. Father did not file any petitions regarding custody,
parenting time, or education information between [an order
clarifying parenting time] entered on January 3, 2008 and the
filing of the Contempt on September 15, 2014, nor is there any
evidence he contacted Mother in an attempt to resolve any issues
related to the allegations which formed the basis of the Contempt
during that time period.
Id. at 34-35. The trial court found that Father did not prove that Mother
intentionally and willfully violated the dissolution decree. It further found that
Father was being dishonest about his motives:
The Court inferred from the evidence that the timing of the filing
of such Contempt after the child had already graduated from
high school demonstrates that Father likely filed such petition as
a response to Mother’s Petition for Educational Support. The
Court further inferred that had Father been interested in
obtaining information about Robyn’s education and college
plans, and in being a part of the process of selecting a college, he
would have made an effort in that regard. Failing that, he should
have filed his Contempt long before he did. Instead, he sat on his
rights and filed the Contempt months after Robyn had graduated
from high school.
Id. at 37.
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[21] Father argues that the trial court erred by focusing on the fact that the term
“joint custody” is not defined in the dissolution decree, pointing out that the
term is defined by statute. Even if we were to agree with this contention solely
for argument’s sake, we do not find the trial court’s ruling to be erroneous. The
trial court cited to a wealth of evidence in the record establishing that Father
made little to no effort to seek the information he complains he did not receive.
He had the right to get the information from the school; he did not do so. He
had the right to ask Mother for the information; he did not. He had the right to
seek judicial intervention; he did not (until Mother asked him to help pay for
Robyn’s college expenses). When Robyn referred to her college application
process to him, he showed no curiosity, asking no questions or showing any
interest whatsoever in his daughter’s post-high school plans. Under these
circumstances, we agree that it was reasonable for Mother to assume that he
simply had no interest in this information and that her failure to provide it did
not constitute a willful violation of the dissolution decree. Therefore, the trial
court did not err by denying Father’s petition to have her found in contempt.
[22] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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