Zachary Clark v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                              FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                          Nov 30 2016, 8:57 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                              and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    T. Andrew Perkins                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Peterson Waggoner & Perkins, LLP                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Rochester, Indiana
    Lyubov Gore
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Zachary Clark,                                          November 30, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    25A05-1606-CR-1454
    v.                                              Appeal from the Fulton Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Wayne E. Steele,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    25D01-1408-FB-449
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 1 of 7
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Zachary Clark appeals one of his convictions and his sentence after he pleaded
    guilty to aggravated battery, as a Class B felony, and involuntary manslaughter,
    as a Class C felony. Clark presents two issues for our review:
    1.      Whether his convictions violate double jeopardy
    principles.
    2.      Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offenses and his character.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On May 24, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Clark, who was intoxicated,
    entered a tavern in Rochester, ordered a drink, and sat in a booth. The
    bartender could tell Clark was intoxicated, so she made him a drink with a
    small amount of alcohol in it and served him. At some point, Clark passed out
    and slept for about one hour. Clark eventually woke up and began vomiting on
    himself. Clark then stood up and walked towards a bar employee and struck
    him with his fist. Clark then approached Tony Coleman, whom Clark did not
    know and with whom he had had no prior interactions, and Clark “hit
    Coleman in the head with his right fist,” knocking him to the ground. State’s
    Ex. 1. Coleman’s mother, Cheri, was there, and she “jumped on Clark” and
    they fell to the ground, but Clark eventually made his way out of the tavern. 
    Id. Coleman was
    unconscious on the floor, and someone called 9-1-1. Emergency
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 2 of 7
    responders were unsuccessful in their attempts to help Coleman, and, after he
    was transported to a nearby hospital, Coleman was pronounced dead. Police
    officers located Clark at a nearby campground and arrested him. Clark’s
    alcohol concentration was measured at .12 gram per 210 liters of his breath.
    [3]   The State charged Clark with aggravated battery, as a Class B felony, and
    involuntary manslaughter, as a Class C felony. On March 15, 2016, Clark
    pleaded guilty as charged. And on May 24, the trial court sentenced Clark to
    concurrent sentences of twenty years for aggravated battery and eight years for
    involuntary manslaughter. In its sentencing statement, the trial court stated as
    follows:
    (B) That these are the aggravating circumstances: Nature and
    circumstances of the offense, particularly as to Count 1, where
    the aggravated battery actually resulted in death of the victim.
    The attack was unprovoked on a total stranger and [the] victim
    was blindsided while dining with his mother.
    (C) That these are the mitigating circumstances: Minimal
    criminal history; expressed remorse but actually has no
    recollection of the events; plea of guilty was more a pragmatic
    decision as [the] evidence [was] overwhelming; employment and
    family support.
    Order of Judgment of Conviction at 1. This appeal ensued.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 3 of 7
    Discussion and Decision
    Issue One: Double Jeopardy
    [4]   Clark first contends that the trial court violated the prohibition against double
    jeopardy under the Indiana Constitution when it entered judgment of
    conviction for both aggravated battery and involuntary manslaughter. But, as
    our supreme court has held, “Defendants waive a whole panoply of rights by
    voluntarily pleading guilty. These include the right to a jury trial, the right
    against self-incrimination, the right of appeal, and the right to attack collaterally
    one’s plea based on double jeopardy.” Mapp v. State, 
    770 N.E.2d 332
    , 334-35 (Ind.
    2002) (emphasis added). Because Clark pleaded guilty to both aggravated
    battery and involuntary manslaughter, his double jeopardy challenge under the
    Indiana Constitution is waived. 
    Id. Issue Two:
    Sentence
    [5]   Clark also contends that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule
    7(B) permits an Indiana appellate court to “revise a sentence authorized by
    statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
    that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender.” We assess the trial court’s recognition or
    nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining
    whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 
    856 N.E.2d 142
    , 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The principal role of appellate review is to
    “leaven the outliers.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind. 2008). A
    defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 4 of 7
    inappropriateness standard of review. Roush v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 801
    , 812 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2007).
    [6]   An appellant bears the burden of showing that both prongs of the inquiry favor
    revision of his sentence. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    Here, Clark contends only that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his
    character, but he makes no argument regarding the nature of the offenses.
    Accordingly, we agree with the State that Clark has waived this issue for our
    review. See Anderson v. State, 
    989 N.E.2d 823
    , 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
    denied.
    [7]   Waiver notwithstanding, Clark’s argument on appeal is without merit.
    Regarding the nature of the offenses, Clark was so intoxicated that he passed
    out and began vomiting on himself when he woke up. Clark then punched two
    random people in the tavern, unprovoked, one of whom, Coleman, he killed
    with one blow to the head. Clark killed Coleman in front of Coleman’s mother,
    who unsuccessfully tried to prevent Clark from fleeing the scene. We cannot
    say that Clark’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses.
    [8]   Still, Clark maintains that his sentence should be revised based on his good
    character. In support of that contention, Clark points out the following: his
    criminal history consists of a single juvenile adjudication in 2003; he was found
    to be at a low risk to reoffend; “many individuals” wrote letters of support to
    the trial court and “most stressed his nonviolent nature”; those individuals
    stated that Clark has a “history of selflessness” and is “a helpful man with a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 5 of 7
    good work ethic”; he is “easy-going”; he has a “stable work history”; these
    offenses were described by friends and family as completely “out of character”
    for Clark; and he showed remorse in a statement to Coleman’s family.
    Appellant’s Br. at 10-12.
    [9]    The State responds that Clark’s juvenile adjudication for minor consuming is
    “particularly significant in this case because of [his] intoxication during the
    commission of this offense.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. And the State points out
    that: his juvenile adjudication “did not deter [Clark] from continuing to
    consume alcohol to the point where he passes out and kills someone a decade
    later”; Clark has admitted that, prior to these offenses, he would drink “6 to 10
    beers at a setting [sic]”; Clark’s contention that he is a non-violent person “is
    belied by his actions” in becoming intoxicated to the point of passing out,
    punching two strangers without provocation, and punching Coleman with such
    force that he killed him. 
    Id. at 14-15;
    Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 14-15. The
    State also maintains that Clark’s behavior “was not that of someone who is a
    ‘family man’” in that Clark was at the tavern in a state of extreme intoxication
    while his wife was nine-months pregnant and one week away from giving birth
    to their second child. Appellee’s Br. at 16. Finally, the State points out that
    Clark waited almost two years after Coleman’s death to express remorse to the
    family or plead guilty.
    [10]   For all of those reasons, we agree with the State that Clark’s sentence is not
    inappropriate in light of his character. The trial court considered all of the
    evidence regarding Clark’s character and imposed the twenty-year aggregate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 6 of 7
    sentence. We cannot say that, given the nature of the offenses and Clark’s
    character, his sentence is an outlier.
    [11]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1606-CR-1454 | November 30, 2016   Page 7 of 7