In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.R., J.B., & T.R. (Minor Children) and S.R. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this May 30 2019, 9:08 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination May 30, 2019
of the Parent–Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: J.R., J.B., & T.R. (Minor 18A-JT-3071
Children) Appeal from the Tippecanoe
and Superior Court
The Hon. Faith A. Graham,
S.R. (Mother),1 Judge
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause Nos.
79D03-1803-JT-44
v. 79D03-1803-JT-45
79D03-1803-JT-46
The Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
1
The parental rights of T.B., the biological father of J.B. and T.R., and D.W., the alleged biological father of
J.R., were also terminated in proceedings below. Neither participates in this appeal.
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] S.R. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of T.R., J.B., and J.R. (collectively,
“the Children”). In December of 2015, the Indiana Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) removed the Children from Mother’s home after receiving a
report that she had left them alone for several hours. After the juvenile court
found the Children to be children in need of services (“CHINS”), it ordered
Mother to participate in various services. Visitation could not occur
immediately because Mother was incarcerated throughout much of 2016 and
the early part of 2017. Mother’s compliance with the visitation order was
initially good but eventually deteriorated. Moreover, visitation was often
tumultuous, involving a lack of discipline and/or arguments with the Children
and/or the visitation supervisors. Mother was also largely noncompliant with
the other ordered services, including orders to receive individual and family
therapy. At the same time, the Children had developed varying degrees of
behavioral issues, and J.R. and J.B. entered individual therapy. In March of
2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights in the Children
(“the TPR Petitions”). At the termination hearing, the two DCS family case
managers who had worked on the cases and the Children’s court-appointed
special advocate (“CASA”) all opined that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the Children’s best interests. Following the hearing, the juvenile
court granted the TPR Petitions. Mother contends that DCS failed to establish
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that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Because we disagree, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother is the biological mother of T.R. (DOB June 4, 2011), J.B. (DOB March
21, 2010), and J.R. (DOB January 30, 2009). On or around December 22,
2015, DCS received reports that Mother had left the Children alone for
approximately six and one-half hours in her Lafayette home. DCS removed the
Children and petitioned to have them found to be CHINS on December 23,
2015. On February 19, 2016, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing,
after which it found the Children to be CHINS. On March 18, 2016, the
juvenile court ordered Mother, inter alia, to maintain contact with DCS,
participate in a mental-health evaluation and follow all recommendations, and
participate in home-based case management.
[3] There was initially no visitation referral because Mother was incarcerated off
and on from March of 2016 until March of 2017. DCS Family Case Manager
Ambyr Wade (“FCM Wade”) met with Mother on March 5, 2017, to arrange
visitation with the Children in Indianapolis, where Mother was living with an
aunt. Initially, Mother only had visitation with J.B., who was also living in
Indianapolis. In July of 2017, Mother moved to Gary, where J.R. was residing
at the time. By August, arrangements had been made for visitation with the
Children to occur in Gary, with J.B. being transported from Indianapolis and
T.R. being transported from White County, where he was residing.
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[4] At first, Mother was complaint with visitation with J.B. in Indianapolis, not
missing any scheduled visitations. The situation seemed to deteriorate after
Mother’s move to Gary, however. Harold Daniels started supervising visits in
September of 2017 and observed that the first visits he supervised were “rough.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Mother did “some name calling” and did not properly
discipline Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 151. She “grabbed [J.R.] roughly on a couple
of occasions. She called him like a cry baby.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 151–52. Mother
also fell asleep during visits in September and October. Mother was not
receptive to Daniels’s feedback and she would yell and curse at him.
[5] Stephanie Parr supervised visits beginning in November of 2017. Parr
attempted to work with Mother on parenting education, but Mother resisted.
Mother also declined Parr’s attempts to help her with home-based case work
and housing. By November of 2017, Mother’s participation in visits declined to
the point where she missed half of her visits, and this continued through
February of 2018. Mother missed all of the visits in March and April of 2018.
[6] When Mother did not attend scheduled visitation with the Children, they
reacted negatively. In May of 2018, a visitation supervisor ended a visit fifteen
minutes in because Mother and J.R. were yelling at each other. On June 2,
2018, Parr ended a visit early because Mother and J.R. were arguing. Parr
explained that Mother and J.R. got into an “angry argument” that escalated to
the point where they were “toe-to-toe” with each other. Tr. Vol. II p. 78. Parr
ended the visit because J.R. was “almost out of control” and Mother’s “very
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stern” redirection of J.R. was not appropriate given that he was only nine years
old. Tr. Vol. II pp. 78–79.
[7] As for other ordered services, Mother told DCS after she moved to Gary in July
of 2017 that she did not want to continue with individual therapy. Mother had
only participated in six sessions before she moved. DCS then referred Mother
for family therapy, but she did not want to participate in that either. Still, a
service provider tried to work with Mother on individual therapy, and the
provider supervised therapeutic visits with Children from November of 2017
until the service closed out in May of 2018. The goals were for Mother to work
on communication and set appropriate boundaries with Children. Mother,
however, only scheduled five sessions—four in November of 2017 and one in
January of 2018.
[8] Before Mother’s move to Gary, she had completed an initial intake for a
mental-health evaluation in Indianapolis but had never gone back to complete
it. Mother did not complete a second referral until February of 2018. Mother
did not timely arrive for her evaluation, and when the examiner called her,
Mother said that she had forgotten about the appointment. When Mother
arrived, the examiner observed that she “appeared agitated and hostile with
aggressive mood.” Ex. Vol. II p. 5. After approximately two hours, Mother
agreed to undergo testing. Mother’s testing indicated (1) that she had a valid,
elevated abuse score which often resulted in physical child abuse; (2) that she
had “inappropriate expectations for her children which exceeded their
developmental capabilities[;]” (3) that she lacked “understanding of normal
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child growth and development[;]” (4) “a consistent reversal of family roles,
where children are used to meet adult needs[;]” (5) that “she has extremely
variable and unpredictable moods, an embittered and resentful irritability” and
lacked empathy; and (6) that she “lacks insight, good judgment, and exercises
poor decision making[.]” Ex. Vol. II pp. 7, 8, 10. The evaluator’s clinical
impressions were (1) bipolar I disorder, current/most recent episode depressed,
with psychotic features; (2) generalized anxiety disorder; (3) paranoid
personality disorder; (4) unspecified personality disorder,
negativistic/antagonistic type; and (5) narcissistic personality traits. The
evaluator recommended that Mother participate in therapy, receive “extensive
parenting education[,]” and be evaluated for possible medication management.
Ex. Vol. II p. 10.
[9] Meanwhile, on March 23, 2018, DCS filed the TPR Petitions. On June 19,
August 27, and September 11, 2018, the juvenile court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the TPR Petitions. A DCS report to the juvenile court
showed that the Children had been acting out and getting in trouble at school
and home. Inter alia, (1) J.B. and J.R. had become physical with their peers and
teachers; (2) J.B. had become defiant with teachers, roamed the halls, had lain
down and refused to get up, had hit other students and staff, was stealing, and
had recently been diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”); (3) J.R. continued to have outbursts, be defiant, and get upset
when Mother did not visit; and (4) T.R. had also acted out at school and
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urinated on himself on several occasions. J.B. and J.R. were both in individual
therapy as of June 19, 2018.
[10] The then nine-year-old J.R. had completed a psychological evaluation in March
of 2018, and the report was released on April 5 and later admitted as DCS
Exhibit 4. J.R. exhibited “[p]roblematic behaviors” including “insubordination,
fire-setting, verbal/physical aggression, impulsivity, lying, and difficulties with
peer relationships.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 4. In one instance, J.R. fought with a
younger child at his school “and responded by stomping on the child’s face with
his boot.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 5. J.R. had previously been diagnosed with
oppositional defiant disorder and ADHD, and his psychiatrist had sent a letter
to DCS in November of 2017 noting that that he had been suspended from
school at least three times since August of 2017, including once for bringing a
toy gun and threatening to “blow the brains out” of a peer. Ex. Vol. IV p. 14.
J.R. “becomes more defiant [and] irritable” when Mother cancels visits. Ex.
Vol. IV p. 5. The evaluator noted that J.R. “has seen a significant amount of
trauma throughout his life, including significant neglect in the home and
repeated abandonment.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 10. The evaluator’s clinical
impressions of J.R. included disruptive mood dysregulation disorder; ADHD,
unspecified type; and major depressive disorder, recurrent and moderate. The
evaluator recommended that J.R. receive the assurance of a nurturing, stable
home environment; family therapy with his siblings; counseling; and
medication management but did not recommend therapy with Mother.
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[11] Therapist Traci Coney began providing J.R. with individual therapy in May of
2017 and was still working with him as of June of 2018. J.R.’s therapeutic
goals are to “decrease his behavior problems, discuss his traumatic past,
emotional regulation and for him to learn skills to manage […] symptoms from
his diagnosis.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Coney’s description of J.R.’s behavioral issues
echoed what was in his psychological evaluation. According to Coney, J.R.
needs to continue in therapy because of the inconsistency, abandonment, and
neglect that he had experienced.
[12] Coney started working with J.B. in May of 2018, but only had approximately
four sessions with her by June 19. J.B.’s therapeutic goals were to address her
sadness and impulse control. J.B. had improved in therapy, and Coney
recommended that she continue. Coney also recommended that J.B. be
evaluated to see if medication would help with her ADHD.
[13] Home-based therapist Bonnie Atkins worked with all three Children in August
and September of 2016 and stopped working with T.R. in September of 2016,
J.B. in February of 2017, and J.R. in March of 2017. Atkins observed “a lot of
fighting” between the Children in their foster home, with Atkins noting that
they “had a hard time getting through a [board] game without one of them
becoming very escalated[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 58. Atkins indicated that J.R.
progressed when she worked with him, learning coping skills for anger, while
J.B. progressed “quite a bit[,]” becoming able to use coping skills when
frustrated or upset and identify “safe” persons. Tr. Vol. II p. 58–59.
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[14] Hilary Laughner was appointed as Children’s CASA in February of 2018.
CASA Laughner testified that she was concerned with Mother’s lack of
consistency in participating in services, and the Children’s negative reactions
when Mother missed visits. CASA Laughner noted Mother’s lack of
documentation regarding Mother’s concerns, her dishonesty, her lack of
responsibility, and that Mother became verbally aggressive when confronted
with issues. CASA Laughner was also concerned with Mother’s failure to
properly supervise Children during visits and her lack of housing and
employment stability. CASA Laughner noted that J.R. was more verbally and
physically aggressive and that J.B. exhibited “an increase in behaviors” when
Mother missed her visitation appointments. Tr. Vol. III p. 4.
[15] FCM Christopher Lamar took over the case from FCM Wade in May of 2018.
FCM Lamar and CASA Laughner testified that at a child and family team
meeting in May of 2018, Mother seemed to blame everyone else for the case
going on for so long, became verbally aggressive, and left the room. Mother
was still not accepting responsibility and she “still blames DCS and everyone
else for her current situation.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 242.
[16] FCM Wade testified that termination was in Children’s best interests because
they need to know what is going to happen to them after three years of not
knowing. FCM Lamar also testified that termination was in Children’s best
interest because Children need permanency “soon” and Mother had not made
enough progress. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 236. CASA Laughner testified that termination
was in the Children’s best interests because “they deserve permanency, they
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need something that’s stab[le,] they deserve to know what the next step is[, a]nd
so as individuals that they can grow and that they can be given a stable life.”
Tr. Vol. III pp. 10–11. CASA Laughner opined that continuing the parent-
child relationship between Mother and the Children would be harmful to them.
DCS’s plan for the Children if the court granted termination was adoption. J.B.
and T.R were in pre-adoptive placements, and J.R.’s placement was uncertain
and awaiting the outcome of the termination hearing. On November 21, 2018,
the juvenile court entered its orders terminating Mother’s parental rights in the
Children.
Discussion and Decision
[17] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further,
we acknowledge that the parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued
relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are of a
constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights
when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.
In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,
parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s
interest in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the
parent–child relationship. Id.
[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental
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Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider
the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes
findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to
assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment
terminating a parent–child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn
therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal
conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact
or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[19] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) governs what DCS must allege and establish
to support a termination of parental rights, namely
(A) that […] the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
[….]
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
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[…]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
[20] Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests. We are mindful
that in determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the juvenile
court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the
totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798
N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id.
Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of a GAL
regarding a child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is
in the child’s best interests. In the matter of Y.E.C., 534 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992). FCMs Wade and Lamar and CASA Laughner all testified that
termination was in the Children’s best interests, essentially all on the basis that
they needed and deserved permanence. While this testimony is likely sufficient
to support the juvenile court’s conclusion to that effect, it is not as though this
testimony is unsupported by other evidence in the record.
[21] The record contains ample evidence that Mother’s compliance with visitation
and other services was sporadic at best, and her attitude toward service
providers has consistently been antagonistic, noncooperative, and even abusive
at times. Mother did not cooperate with attempts to provide her with
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individual therapy, despite a mental-health evaluator’s conclusion that it was
needed. Mother also refused to fully participate in family therapy and declined
offers for home-based services and assistance in finding housing. Mother has
repeatedly blamed the Children’s removal on others and has denied that she
requires any services at all.
[22] Moreover, the record indicates that this case has taken a heavy toll on the
Children. The Children have all exhibited behavioral problems to varying
degrees since their removal—up to and including violence against teachers and
peers—with J.R.’s and J.B.’s issues being severe enough to warrant individual
therapy. CASA Laughner noted that while the Children’s negative behaviors
increased when Mother missed visitation, Mother failed to properly supervise
them when she did attend. In summary, while the Children’s removal from
Mother’s care introduced instability into their lives, Mother showed little
inclination to take any of the steps necessary to secure their return to her.
[23] Mother points to evidence that her compliance with services improved after
DCS filed the TPR Petitions. While we are mindful that the juvenile court
must assess the parent’s ability to care for the children as of the date of the
termination proceeding and consider any evidence of changed conditions, it
should also consider the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct as a means of
determining the probability of future detrimental behavior. Rowlett v.
Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied. The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate
evidence of changed conditions, and, given the evidence of Mother’s
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demonstrated history of temporary compliance followed by regression, we will
not second-guess its conclusions. See S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. Mother has
not established that the juvenile court’s determination that termination was in
the Children’s best interests was clearly erroneous.
[24] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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