In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.M. and A.N.M. (Minor Children), Roberta L. Renbarger (Guardian Ad Litem) v. A.Y.M. (Mother) and A.M.M. (Father) (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                 FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                         Aug 29 2019, 7:29 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                         CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Roberta L. Renbarger                                     MOTHER
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                      Donald J. Frew
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    FATHER
    Nicholas A. Adams
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                         August 29, 2019
    of the Parent–Child Relationship                         Court of Appeals Case No.
    of A.M. and A.N.M. (Minor                                19A-JT-605
    Children),                                               Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Roberta L. Renbarger (Guardian                           Court
    Ad Litem),                                               The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
    Judge
    Appellant-Petitioner,
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    v.                                               02D08-1802-JT-35
    02D08-1802-JT-36
    A.Y.M. (Mother), and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-605| August 29, 2019                 Page 1 of 9
    A.M.M. (Father),
    Appellees-Respondents.
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   A.Y.M. (“Mother”) and A.M.M. (“Father) are the biological parents of A.M.
    (born September 3, 2014) and A.N.M. (born September 18, 2015), (collectively
    “the Children”). In March of 2015, A.M. was adjudicated to be a child in need
    of services (“CHINS”). In August of 2016, A.N.M. was adjudicated to be a
    CHINS. In February of 2018, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
    petitioned for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the
    Children. On February 13, 2019, the juvenile court denied DCS’s petition.
    Guardian ad Litem Roberta Renbarger (“GAL Renbarger”) contends that the
    juvenile court’s denial of DCS’s termination petition was clearly erroneous.
    Because we disagree, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) are the biological parents of the
    Children. On March 3, 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated A.M. to be a
    CHINS, and on August 1, 2016, it adjudicated A.N.M. to be a CHINS. The
    Children were eventually placed into foster care. The juvenile court ordered
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    Parents to complete services outlined in a parent participation plan (“PPP”).
    Mother’s PPP required her to, inter alia, maintain safe and appropriate housing,
    cooperate with DCS, submit to a diagnostic assessment, enroll in individual
    and family counseling, enroll in home-based services, complete parenting
    instruction, take any prescribed medication, and visit with Children. Father’s
    PPP required him to, inter alia, abide by the terms of his probation, maintain
    safe and appropriate housing, cooperate with DCS, submit to a diagnostic
    assessment, enroll in individual and family counseling, enroll in home-based
    services, complete parenting instruction, complete a psychological and
    psychiatric evaluation, and visit with Children.
    [3]   Over the next several years, Parents failed to complete certain services and, as a
    result, the juvenile court modified the permanency plans from reunification to
    termination of parental rights. On February 27, 2018, DCS petitioned for the
    termination of both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the Children. On
    August 7, August 22, August 28, September 17, and November 14, 2018, the
    juvenile court held a factfinding hearing regarding the termination petition. The
    juvenile court found the following:
    20. Daniel Born of the Bowen Center testified that [Father]
    completed a psychological evaluation, which by the Center’s
    protocol was a parenting assessment. He was deemed to be at a
    parenting Risk Level I. He was referred to home based services
    and dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT). [Father] did not
    complete his home based services at the Bowen Center. He did
    attend some individual therapeutic sessions, however. Although
    [Father] was characterized as being noncompliant, he was
    successfully discharged in May, 2016. From the testimony of his
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    Bowen Center therapist, Marla Vandergrift, [Father] completed
    his individual therapy. She does not believe him to have any
    mental health issues.
    21. The parents participated in home based services with Tracy
    Pierce of SCAN, Inc. From her testimony the Court finds that
    [Father] completed his parenting instruction. He has secured
    employment and housing.
    22. [Father] lives in South Whitely, Indiana with his girlfriend
    and their children, a three year old and a six month old.
    23. He did not visit the children in this case between August,
    2017 and November 12, 2018. Weekly visits have since been
    scheduled.
    24. [Mother] completed the first phase of a psychological
    evaluation with Dr. David Lombard. He concluded that her
    responses were overly defensive and, without further testing,
    could not conclude a final diagnosis. [Mother] did not return for
    the second evaluation. He therefore provisionally diagnosed
    [Mother] as suffering from major depression disorder, Attention
    Deficit Disorder, and as a victim of domestic violence and sexual
    assault. He also noted in his report a rule out diagnosis for
    personality disorder and bipolar disorder (State’s Exhibit 5).
    25. According to the testimony of Wendy Gaseiger, a skills coach
    with the Bowen Center, the Court finds that [Mother] has not
    shown progress in her visits from that which was observed in
    September 2017. [Mother], on occasion, concludes the visits
    before the scheduled time. She struggles to divide her attention
    between the children and does not follow through with
    discipline.
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    26. In October 2017, [Mother] was referred for home based
    services at SCAN, Inc. From the testimony of Shelby Knepper-
    Seidel, a former home based case worker with SCAN, the Court
    finds that [Mother] participated in a parenting education program
    and was making progress toward her goals. [Mother] worked in
    multiple jobs to supplement her income. The case worker
    testified that she was told that she was “too much of a
    cheerleader” for the mother and was directed to re-write her case
    notes. Nicole Houston, a subsequent home based case manager,
    testified that [Mother] was not making progress and her services
    had been on hold since June 2018.
    27. From the testimony of Jason Cook, a clinical psychologist
    with Park Center, Inc. the Court finds that [Mother] enrolled in
    and attended dialectical behavioral therapy. She was consistent
    in her attendance. She was interactive and appropriate in her
    interactions in the group segment of the treatment. [Mother]
    completed all of the treatment cycles except the integration of
    skills portion. Respondent’s Exhibit (AA) reflects a report to
    [DCS] that [Mother] completed the “DBT skills training group”.
    To his knowledge she did not complete the advance therapy
    section he recommended. He noted that [Mother] received some
    benefit from the services but did not believe she had integrated
    the skills she learned.
    28. [Mother] has secured housing with her mother. Her mother is
    quadriplegic. [Mother] provides for her daily care.
    29. [Mother] is employed.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 53–54. GAL Renbarger testified that she believed it
    was in the Children’s best interests that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights be
    terminated. On February 13, 2019, the juvenile court denied the petition to
    terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, concluding that DCS failed to
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    prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability
    that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside of Parents’ home would not be remedied.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
    Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). The
    parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our
    culture.” Neal v. DeKalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 
    796 N.E.2d 280
    , 286 (Ind.
    2003) (internal citations omitted). Parental rights, however, are not absolute
    and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper
    disposition of a petition to terminate the parent–child relationship. 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147
    . Therefore, when parents are unwilling or unable to fulfill their
    parental responsibilities their rights may be terminated. 
    Id. [5] In
    reviewing the termination of parental rights on appeal, we neither reweigh
    the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Doe v. Daviess Cty. Div. of
    Children & Family Servs., 
    669 N.E.2d 192
    , 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are
    most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment. 
    Id. Where, as
    here, a juvenile
    court has entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, our standard of
    review is two-tiered. 
    Id. First, we
    determine whether the evidence supports the
    factual findings, and second, whether the factual findings support the judgment.
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    Id. The juvenile
    court’s findings and judgment will only be set aside if found to
    be clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A finding
    is clearly erroneous if no facts or inferences
    drawn therefrom support it. In re R.J., 
    829 N.E.2d 1032
    , 1035 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2005). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the
    juvenile court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.”
    
    Id. [6] Indiana
    Code section 31-35-2-4(b) dictates what DCS is required to establish to
    support a termination of parental rights. Of relevance to this case, DCS was
    required to establish by clear and convincing evidence
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside the home of the
    parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to the well-being of the child.
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). In challenging the juvenile court’s denial of the
    termination petition, GAL Renbarger contends that the juvenile court
    erroneously concluded that DCS failed to establish that there was a reasonable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-605| August 29, 2019     Page 7 of 9
    probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside of Parents’ home will not be remedied.1
    [7]            In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the
    child[ren]’s removal … will not be remedied, we engage in a two-
    step analysis[.] First, we identify the conditions that led to
    removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable
    probability that those conditions will not be remedied. In the
    second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the
    time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration
    evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent
    improvements against habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine
    whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
    deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court,
    which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more
    heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.
    Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions
    does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior
    is the best predictor of their future behavior.
    In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 642–43 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and
    footnote omitted, first and third set of brackets in original, second set added).
    [8]   Here, the conditions that led to the Children’s removal were allegations of
    abuse and/or neglect. GAL Renbarger contends, specifically, that Parents’
    partial completion of some ordered services and failure to visit the Children for
    extended periods of time demonstrates that the juvenile court erred in
    1
    GAL Renbarger does not challenge the juvenile court’s conclusion that DCS failed to establish that there is
    a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-being
    of the Children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-605| August 29, 2019                        Page 8 of 9
    concluding that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the conditions
    that led to the Children’s removal would not be remedied. GAL Renbarger’s
    contention is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge witness
    credibility, which we will not do. See 
    Doe, 669 N.E.2d at 194
    . Moreover, it is
    not as though the juvenile court’s determination is unsupported by evidence in
    the record. While the juvenile court found that Parents had not completed all of
    the ordered services, it did find that Parents completed or made progress
    towards completing services. It also found that Parents were employed,
    maintained housing, and that Father had resumed scheduled visitation with the
    Children. That said, we conclude that GAL Renbarger has failed to establish
    that the juvenile court’s denial of DCS’s termination petition was clearly
    erroneous.
    [9]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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