In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: An.G. and A.G. (Minor Children), and A.G. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      Jan 10 2020, 9:05 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                      CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Deidre L. Monroe                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Public Defender’s Office                                 Attorney General of Indiana
    Crown Point, Indiana
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        January 10, 2020
    Child Relationship of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JT-1272
    An.G. and A.G. (Minor Children),
    Appeal from the Lake Superior
    and                                                      Court
    A.G. (Mother)                                            The Honorable Thomas P.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Stefaniak, Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    v.                                               45D06-1812-JT-353
    45D06-1812-JT-354
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner,
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020                   Page 1 of 22
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   A.G. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two
    children and presents the sole issue of whether the juvenile court’s order
    terminating her parental rights was clearly erroneous. Concluding it was not
    clearly erroneous, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Mother is the biological mother of An.G., born April 23, 2016, and Al.G.,1
    born March 23, 2018 (collectively “Children”).
    [3]   On July 10, 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received
    a report alleging that Mother had physically abused An.G., her then fifteen-
    month-old child. An.G. had been brought to St. Catherine’s Hospital severely
    injured and without parents. Amanda Cruze, DCS assessment worker, went to
    the hospital where she observed blood in An.G.’s nose and bruising on her
    temple. An.G. was unable to move in the bed; “[s]he just laid there.” Fact
    Finding Hearing (“Transcript”), Volume II at 17. She refused to eat or drink
    and did not want to be picked up. If touched, An.G. would scream. An.G.
    was diagnosed with fractures to the tibia and fibula of her left leg, as well as a
    1
    The official designation of this case is In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of An.G. and
    A.G. and Mother. We have referred to A.G. as Al.G. in this opinion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020                 Page 2 of 22
    brain bleed. In addition, An.G. was underweight, weighing only sixteen
    pounds at the time.
    [4]   Cruze called Mother several times and police visited her home, where she lived
    with her step-father, Gene Hill, and Gene’s mother. However, Mother was
    unable to be reached or located. The next day, An.G. was transferred to Riley
    Hospital and underwent additional medical testing, which revealed a skull
    fracture, four rib fractures, finger fractures, and three spinal fractures. An.G.
    was born with a severe liver condition2 and DCS’ assessment revealed that
    An.G. had been an in-home child in need of services (“CHINS”) from October
    2016 through February 2017 based on medical neglect by Mother. Specifically,
    Mother had failed to take An.G. to her scheduled medical appointments in
    order to secure An.G. a spot on the transplant list. As part of the 2016 case,
    Mother completed a parenting assessment and took An.G. to her scheduled
    appointments during the relevant time frame. DCS closed the case in February
    2017.
    [5]   On July 11, 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging An.G. to be a CHINS. Due to
    inadequate service of process on Mother, the juvenile court continued the initial
    detention hearing and ordered that An.G. remain in temporary custody of
    DCS. On August 1, 2017, Cruze spoke with Mother about the allegations.
    2
    An.G. was born with biliary atresia “which means [her] bile ducts are not functioning correctly so bile
    builds up in her liver which infuses toxins into her body.” Exhibits at 20. If untreated, the condition is life
    threatening.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020                     Page 3 of 22
    During their conversation, Mother admitted that she punched An.G. three or
    four times “thinking she [w]as a pillow” and then stopped. 
    Id. at 19.
    DCS
    recommended that Mother complete a parenting assessment and follow all
    recommendations; complete parenting education and a clinical assessment;
    participate in therapy; and engage in homebased casework. See Exhibits at 27-
    28. Following a liver transplant in August 2017, An.G. was placed in foster
    care. Around the same time, Mother began meeting with an individual
    therapist twice each week.
    [6]   On November 15, 2017, the juvenile court held a pretrial hearing during which
    Mother admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition. The juvenile court
    adjudicated An.G. a CHINS, adopted DCS’ recommended parent participation
    plan, and also ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse assessment,
    follow recommendations, and submit to random drug screens.
    [7]   On March 23, 2018, during An.G.’s CHINS case, Mother gave birth to Al.G.
    The next day, DCS received a report that Mother tested positive for marijuana
    at the time of Al.G.’s birth. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana three
    weeks prior to Al.G.’s birth and three times3 during her pregnancy. Al.G.
    tested positive for THC. On March 25, Stephanie Gonzales, DCS family case
    manager, met with Mother at the hospital where she read her the allegations
    3
    It is unclear whether Mother’s marijuana use three weeks prior to Al.G.’s birth is included in her admission
    that she smoked marijuana three times during her pregnancy.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020                  Page 4 of 22
    contained in the report. Mother admitted the allegations and the two spoke
    briefly about the open CHINS case regarding An.G.
    [8]   Due to Mother’s non-compliance with the open CHINS case, the severity of
    An.G.’s injuries, and Mother’s substance abuse, DCS recommended that Al.G.
    be placed outside of Mother’s care. At an initial detention hearing, the juvenile
    court found out of home placement to be in Al.G.’s best interests. The juvenile
    court ordered Mother to continue with services that had been ordered in the
    open CHINS case of An.G., submit to random drug screens, and participate in
    supervised visitations with Al.G. On March 27, Al.G. was removed from
    Mother’s care and placed in foster care. The same day, DCS filed a petition
    alleging Al.G. was a CHINS. The juvenile court held a hearing on June 11,
    2018, during which Mother made a “general admission” that Al.G. was a
    CHINS and the juvenile court adjudicated her as such. Exhibits at 64. Mother
    was ordered to complete a psychological evaluation, submit to random drug
    screens, and attend supervised visitation with Al.G.
    [9]   In an August progress report, DCS reported that Mother has been non-
    compliant with individual therapy and homebased casework, and inconsistent
    with supervised visitation and in submitting to drug screens. DCS further
    reported that Mother refuses to utilize homebased casework even though she is
    in need of housing and employment. In September 2018, Mother’s therapist
    took a full-time position elsewhere and transferred Mother’s individual therapy
    service, but Mother stopped attending therapy at this time and never returned.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 5 of 22
    On September 17, the juvenile court issued an order changing Children’s
    permanency plan from reunification to adoption. 
    Id. at 79-84.
    [10]   In November, DCS filed another progress report detailing Mother’s non-
    compliance with services: Mother has met with her therapist only once in
    recent months and has not made any therapeutic progress; Mother has
    “continually cancell[ed] visits,” arrived twenty to thirty minutes late, or failed
    to show for supervised visits with Children; she has only met with her
    homebased caseworker once since September; Mother’s compliance with the
    drug screens has been inconsistent; and Mother has only attended one of
    An.G.’s weekly medical appointments despite ample opportunity to attend
    others. 
    Id. at 90.
    [11]   On December 14, 2018, DCS filed its verified petition to terminate Mother’s
    parental rights. Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 16-18.4 Although Mother
    was required to submit to two drug screens each week, she only submitted to six
    between November 30, 2018 and January 25, 2019. In the fall of 2018 and in
    January of 2019, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. In a March
    2019 progress report, DCS reported that Mother continues to be non-compliant
    with all services.
    4
    As the State points out, Mother failed to include DCS’ petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
    Al.G. and the chronological case summary in her Appendix.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020                 Page 6 of 22
    [12]   A fact-finding hearing was held on April 25, 2019 during which Mother
    appeared via telephone.5 Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an
    order terminating Mother’s parental rights and found, in pertinent part:
    Mother was sporadic with her attendance in her participation
    with the service providers. Mother lived with her stepfather and
    others and would not actively participate in her counseling
    sessions when they were conducted in the home. It was believed
    that stepfather was abusive towards [M]other. There is also
    alleged drug usage in the home. Mother could not obtain mental
    stability while residing in the home with the abuser.
    The therapy sessions were then moved to an agency in an effort
    to engage Mother. Mother initially became engaged and her
    participation increased. It was discovered that [M]other was
    abused and did not have a good relationship with either of her
    parents. Mother was then abusive to her [C]hildren due to her
    learned behaviors. The therapist attempted to help [M]other
    process the trauma, teach [her] to become attached, teach [her]
    coping skills, and build up [her] self-esteem. Mother was not
    consistent with the therapy offered and it was difficult for
    [M]other to overcome the past trauma due to her lack of
    attendance and participation. It was determined that [M]other
    would need several years of therapy in order to adequately parent
    any children. Mother has a long history with abuse that
    negatively affects her parenting skills. Mother also has severe
    attachment issues [and] voluntarily stopped all participation in
    the therapy since September of 2018. Due to [M]other’s lack of
    participation in the therapy, the [C]hildren’s safety would be at
    5
    Mother had car trouble and was unable to physically appear at the fact-finding hearing. Mother’s counsel
    was present at the hearing and the juvenile court allowed Mother to participate via telephone.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020               Page 7 of 22
    risk if placed in [M]other’s care because [her] erratic behavior is
    likely to persist.
    . . . [An.G.] does not have any significant bond with her
    [M]other. [An.G.] needs constant and consistent medical care
    which she is . . . unlikely to receive if placed with her [M]other
    because [M]other doesn’t follow through when she is required
    to. . . .
    Mother has not completed the parenting education [but] was
    given hands-on parenting at the visitations in an effort to teach
    [her] to properly parent the [C]hildren. Mother continues to
    have to be redirected at the visits and does not understand
    [An.G.]’s medical needs nor does [M]other follow the strict diet
    that [An.G.] has to be on. Mother continues to cancel her
    visitations [and] . . . is unable to complete the service or
    participate in the service. Mother did not speak to the [C]hildren
    and would often just stare at the [C]hildren. Mother had to be
    redirected at the visitations for the safety of the [C]hildren.
    Mother’s visitations did not progress. Mother would leave the
    room with her [C]hildren unsupervised. The service provider
    had to have a constant watch on [M]other even after two years,
    due to [M]other’s unpredictable behaviors with the [C]hildren. . .
    .
    Home based casework services were offered to [M]other in an
    effort . . . to gain independent housing away from her abusers.
    Mother did not participate nor did she ever obtain independent
    housing.
    Although [M]other somewhat participated in the services offered,
    they were always sporadic and no progress has been made in
    reunifying with her [C]hildren. Mother is non-compliant and
    sporadic with submitting to her drug screens. Mother has tested
    positive for methamphetamines on her screen in January of 2019
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 8 of 22
    and another in the fall of 2018. Mother has not attended the
    CHINS review hearings . . . since September of 2018.
    Mother has not participated in the medical care for [An.G. and]
    has not attended the medical appointments . . . and always has a
    variety of excuses of why she is unable to attend. . . .
    ***
    Due to none of the fathers being interested in parenting these
    [C]hildren and [M]other’s non-compliance with the case plan,
    [her] lack of progress in her parenting skills, [her] unsafe and
    unstable housing, and [her] lack of gaining mental and emotional
    stability, the [C]hildren’s placement with a parent is unlikely to
    be obtained in the near future. After two years, [M]other is not
    any closer to reunification with her [C]hildren. All efforts to
    engage [M]other have failed.
    [Mother] is [not] providing any emotional or financial support for
    the [C]hildren[,] has [not] completed any case plan for
    reunification[, and] is [not] in a position to properly parent these
    [C]hildren. . . .
    The [C]hildren remain outside of [Mother]’s care. The original
    allegations of neglect have not been remedied[. Mother has not]
    demonstrated an ability to independently parent the [C]hildren
    and provide the necessary care, support and supervision. There
    is no basis for assuming [she] will complete the necessary services
    and find [herself] in a position to receive the [C]hildren into the
    home. [Mother] failed to utilize the available services and make
    the necessary efforts to remedy the conditions, which led to
    intervention by DCS and the Court.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 9 of 22
    The [C]hildren continue to reside in stable foster homes which
    has indicated both a willingness and ability to adopt both
    [C]hildren. It would be unfair to the [C]hildren to delay such
    permanency on the very remote likelihood of [Mother’s]
    committing to and completing services.
    Appealed Order 2-3. Based on these findings, the juvenile court concluded that
    there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Children’s
    removal and continued placement outside of Mother’s care will not be
    remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to Children’s well-being. The juvenile court also concluded that
    termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s best interest and DCS
    has a satisfactory plan for Children, namely adoption. Mother now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [13]   The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right
    of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The law provides for the
    termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
    parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 
    892 N.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    Although we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most
    valued relationships in our culture,” we also recognize that “parental interests
    are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining
    the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 10 of 22
    Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal
    quotations omitted). The involuntary termination of one’s parental rights is the
    most extreme sanction a court can impose because termination severs all rights
    of a parent to his or her children. See In re T.F., 
    743 N.E.2d 766
    , 773 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2001), trans. denied. As such, termination is intended as a last resort,
    available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. 
    Id. The purpose
    of
    terminating parental rights is to protect children, not to punish parents. In re
    
    D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265
    .
    [14]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family
    & Children, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Instead, we
    consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable
    inferences that can be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. In deference
    to the trial court’s
    unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment
    terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re
    L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1161
    (2002). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the decision, we
    must affirm. 
    Id. [15] The
    juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon as required
    by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8(c), and we therefore apply a two-tiered
    standard of review. 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147
    . We first determine whether the
    evidence supports the findings, then determine whether the findings support the
    judgment. 
    Id. “Findings are
    clearly erroneous only when the record contains
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 11 of 22
    no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings
    do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the
    judgment thereon. 
    Id. II. Statutory
    Framework for Termination
    [16]   To terminate parental rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires DCS
    to prove, in relevant part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    DCS must prove the foregoing elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind.
    Code § 31-37-14-2; In re V.A., 
    51 N.E.3d 1140
    , 1144 (Ind. 2016). However,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 12 of 22
    because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive the juvenile court need
    only find one of the three elements in that subsection has been proven by clear
    and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re I.A., 
    903 N.E.2d 146
    , 153 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2009). If a juvenile court determines the allegations of the petition are
    true, then the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code §
    31-35-2-8(a).
    A. Remedy of Conditions
    [17]   First, we note that Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s
    findings; therefore, we accept the findings as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 
    681 N.E.2d 744
    , 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Mother challenges the juvenile court’s
    conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to
    Children’s removal and continued placement outside of Mother’s care will not
    be remedied. Mother maintains that the juvenile court “failed to look at the
    obvious fact that [she] had mental health issues” and argues that she
    substantially complied with the case plan. Brief of Appellant at 12. We
    disagree.
    [18]   We engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether such conditions will be
    remedied: “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child’s] placement
    and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is a
    reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re K.T.K.,
    
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1231 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted). Here, An.G. was
    removed from Mother’s care due to physical abuse and neglect by Mother.
    Al.G. was removed due to Mother’s substance abuse issues, An.G.’s open
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 13 of 22
    CHINS case, and the extent of An.G.’s injuries. After removal, Children
    remained outside of Mother’s care due to her instability and inability to safely
    and effectively parent the Children.
    [19]   With respect to the second step, a juvenile court assesses whether a reasonable
    probability exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal or continued
    placement outside his parent’s care will not be remedied by judging the parent’s
    fitness to care for the child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
    consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643
    (Ind. 2014). Habitual conduct may include criminal history, drug and alcohol
    abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate
    housing and employment, but the services offered to the parent and the parent’s
    response to those services can also be evidence of whether conditions will be
    remedied. A.D.S v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2013), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out
    all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable
    probability the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re 
    I.A., 903 N.E.2d at 154
    .
    [20]   The evidence in the record reveals that Mother failed to comply with the parent
    participation plan. Mother was ordered to participate in individual therapy on
    a weekly basis. Ellen Minter, therapist with Northstar, began working with
    Mother in July 2017 and worked with her for almost one year. Initially,
    Mother engaged in therapy twice each week at Mother’s home. At some point,
    visits were moved to Minter’s office and Mother’s compliance increased.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 14 of 22
    Mother’s compliance again increased after the emergency hearing regarding
    Al.G. However, Mother ultimately stopped therapy in September 2018. When
    asked whether Mother was compliant with therapy, Minter testified, “No.
    Sometimes. I mean she met when she wanted to.” Tr., Vol. II at 30. She
    explained, “Sometimes [Mother] would cancel, sometimes she wouldn’t be
    there. It just depends, . . . I [would] call every week, hey are we meeting this
    week. Sometimes she would say no, sometimes she would [say] yeah. It just
    depended on what she wanted to do[.]” 
    Id. [21] It
    took Mother about six months to open up to Minter, which is not unusual.
    Once Minter built a rapport with Mother, she learned that Mother suffers from
    past trauma, which affects her ability to parent. Minter testified that if Mother
    does not address her trauma, she will continue to be abusive to those she loves.
    With respect to progress, Minter stated that with the level of trauma suffered by
    Mother, not much progress could be made in one year, but she believed Mother
    had made some progress – albeit slow. Mother progressed in processing her
    trauma but “[i]n the other areas of her life, progress was not being made[,]” 
    id. at 40.,
    and Minter “felt that [Mother] would need progressive years of therapy
    before she [would be] ready to be able to parent effectively[,]” 
    id. at 35.
    In
    September 2018, Minter obtained a full-time job elsewhere and transferred
    Mother’s services, but Mother never engaged in therapy after Minter left. At
    some point, Mother completed the intake for the psychological assessment;
    however, she failed to complete the recommended evaluation to determine
    whether she had any underlying mental health needs.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 15 of 22
    [22]   Christina Thomas, caseworker at Northstar, received a referral for supervised
    visitations, parenting education, hands-on parenting, and homebased casework
    for Mother. At the fact-finding hearing, Thomas testified that Mother’s
    attendance at visits was inconsistent. She stated that Mother attends more of
    An.G.’s visits than Al.G.’s, and Mother cancels more than half of those with
    Al.G. and was not prepared for visits she did have with Al.G. “Sometimes
    when we have court hearings, [Mother will] increase her attendance, but then it
    wains [sic] back off . . . until the next court date.” 
    Id. at 61.
    [23]   In March 2018, Lisa Sternberg, DCS case manager, began working with
    Mother. She testified that Mother has been “very inconsistent” with supervised
    visitation. 
    Id. at 46.
    Since the beginning of April 2019, Mother has only
    attended five visits despite the opportunity to attend as many as three visits each
    week. Sternberg explained that Mother would often cancel, no show, or leave
    the visits early, citing her work schedule.
    [24]   Thomas described Mother’s behavior during visits as unpredictable and often
    impulsive; Mother “acts more like an older sibling than mom. She taunts and
    provokes misbehavior at times.” 
    Id. at 63.
    In working with Mother, Thomas
    and Sternberg both had to constantly redirect Mother. On one occasion, after
    An.G. had surgery, Thomas instructed Mother not to pick An.G. up because
    she had forty-two staples in her abdomen; however, the first thing Mother did
    was reach down to pick An.G. up. Ultimately, Thomas opined that Mother is
    incapable of predicting safety issues and as a result, she had to intervene for the
    safety of the Children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 16 of 22
    [25]   The record also reveals that Mother has failed to remedy her substance abuse
    issues. Mother completed the substance abuse assessment, which
    recommended drug screens and therapy. However, Mother has not been
    consistent in submitting to the required twice weekly drug screens and Mother
    did not participate in substance abuse therapy, which was “supposed to be
    somewhat included with the [individual] therapy” but she had not participated
    in individual therapy since September 2018. 
    Id. at 47.
    Although Mother’s most
    recent drug screen on April 1, 2019 was negative, she has had “multiple positive
    screens for marijuana; marijuana and alcohol; and she had two screens for
    methamphetamines[,]” one in January of 2019 and one in the fall of 2018. 
    Id. at 46.
    DCS used Mother’s compliance with her drug screens as a way of
    determining whether Mother would be able to keep up with An.G.’s strict
    medication routine. Mother did not comply with the random drug screens as
    she often failed to call in each morning, as required.
    [26]   Sternberg testified that since Children’s removal, Mother has failed to provide
    them with any financial or emotional support, and Mother has not completed
    any of her case plan toward reunification. Sternberg’s ongoing concerns with
    Mother include Mother’s non-compliance with services, failure to complete any
    case goals, and inability to parent and bond with Children. Sternberg further
    testified that the reasons for DCS’ involvement in this case have not been
    remedied and that Mother’s inconsistency in engaging in services is preventing
    her from moving forward.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 17 of 22
    [27]   Mother has also failed to attend An.G.’s medical appointments. “Mother has
    not . . . shown any type of initiative to attend medical appointments. [DCS
    has] given her multiple chances . . . [and s]he’s only attended one visit with
    [An.G.’s] liver team[,]” in October 2018. 
    Id. at 50.
    In addition, Mother did not
    engage in a single wellness or dental appointment.
    [28]   Mother’s housing situation, which has remained unchanged, was problematic
    and posed a safety concern for the Children. Sternberg explained that although
    Mother has maintained housing throughout this case, it is not an appropriate or
    suitable place for the Children. She further stated that there were safety
    concerns in the house because the night Mother injured An.G., no one in the
    house protected An.G. and there were reports of abuse and drug issues in the
    home. At a team meeting in September 2018, Mother’s stepfather, Hill, was
    allegedly in the basement of the home consuming drugs. In addition, Minter
    opined that Hill was abusive toward Mother. “He triggered her a lot, her anger,
    very manipulative with her. She didn’t have much stability if she didn’t do
    what he wanted, he would kick her out.” 
    Id. at 32.
    In working with
    homebased services, one of Mother’s goals was to obtain her own house or
    apartment but Mother was not compliant with these services and she failed to
    achieve her housing goal as she remains in the same home with Hill.
    [29]   The juvenile court found that all services to engage Mother have failed.
    Thomas and Sternberg both testified that there was nothing else DCS or the
    other service providers could have done to help Mother reunify with Children.
    Thomas stated that she would encourage Mother to make wise choices, but
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 18 of 22
    Mother does not take her advice. Thomas explained, “[F]or two years, I’ve
    been hoping for that change, . . . [b]ut, despite my efforts, I haven’t seen a
    change, so I don’t see it happening any time soon.” 
    Id. at 66.
    Although
    Thomas would expect Mother to have progressed from supervised visits given
    the length of time she has been working with Mother, she would not
    recommend that Mother have unsupervised visits. In fact, Thomas testified
    that Mother is not in a condition to safely parent Children and even
    recommended reduced visits.
    [30]   We have often noted that evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack
    of commitment to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services
    demonstrates the requisite reasonable probability that the conditions will not
    change. 
    Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372
    . Such is the case here. There is ample
    evidence in the record establishing Mother’s non-compliance with the case
    plan, preventing her from making any progress toward reunification.
    Therefore, we agree with the juvenile court that the evidence establishes a
    reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s continued
    placement outside of Mother’s care will not be remedied. See, e.g., In re 
    E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 644
    (findings regarding a parent’s continued non-compliance with
    services supported juvenile court’s conclusion the conditions under which
    children were removed from the parent’s care would not be remedied).
    B. Best Interests
    [31]   Mother also takes issue with the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of
    her parental rights is in Children’s best interests. Mother contends that the
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    juvenile court “failed to address the pain and suffering that the [C]hildren will
    indeed experience when they realize that they will not have any further contact
    with their Mother.” Br. of Appellant at 14.
    [32]   To determine the best interests of children, the juvenile court looks to the
    totality of the evidence and must subordinate the interests of the parents to
    those of the children. In re 
    D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267
    . “A child’s need for
    permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a
    child[.]” In re D.L., 
    814 N.E.2d 1022
    , 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
    The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before
    terminating parental rights. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children,
    
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    [33]   The record reveals that An.G. was removed from Mother’s care at fifteen
    months old and Al.G. was removed at four days old. Since removal, Children
    have not returned to Mother’s care due to Mother’s non-compliance with
    services, instability, and inability to safely parent Children. At the fact-finding
    hearing, Sternberg testified that she believes termination of Mother’s parental
    rights and adoption is in Children’s best interests. With respect to An.G.’s
    medical needs, Sternberg explained some of her concerns given Mother’s non-
    compliance and inability to parent:
    [W]e have given [Mother] aptitude (sic) opportunities to go to
    [An.G.’s medical] appointments. . . . [M]other knows of
    [An.G.’s] condition and some of the concerns, however, because
    [M]other has not been there for the last almost two years now, a
    lot of things have changed in her medical history. . . . [T]he
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    medication is very strict [and] . . . [An.G.’s] Medicaid has to
    always stay active. Sometimes the pharmacies in the area cannot
    do her medications, so that means you have to do a random trip
    the next morning down t[o] Riley[] to get the prescription
    refilled. So, the transportation would be an issue. Making sure
    the Medicaid is . . . up to date. We have also attempted with
    [M]other to see if . . . [An.G.] was back in her care, how she
    could remember and be able to be consistent with the
    medi[c]ations. We offered [Mother] an opportunity to use [her]
    drug screens as an opportunity to be consistent. Make sure every
    morning [she is] up at 8am, [she] call[s] right at 8am to show that
    [she] could call in, which would mean that’s when [she’s] waking
    up to give [An.G.] her medicine, and [M]other has failed to do
    that. As she’s non-compliant with her screens and she does not
    call in daily.
    Tr., Vol. II at 51-52. Therefore, given Mother’s lack of progress, she is not in
    any condition to be able to provide An.G. with the proper medical care she
    requires or provide Children with other necessary care. It is clear that Mother is
    unable to independently parent the Children or provide An.G. with the
    requisite medical care, and she has failed to remedy her instability and
    substance abuse issues. And, as the juvenile court noted, Children need and
    deserve permanency and “[i]t would be unfair to the [C]hildren to delay such
    permanency on the very remote likelihood of [Mother] committing to and
    completing services.” Appealed Order at 3. The evidence in the record
    supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that, based on the totality of the
    evidence, termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s best interests.
    Conclusion
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1272 | January 10, 2020   Page 21 of 22
    [34]   We conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the
    juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and therefore,
    the juvenile court’s order was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [35]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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