In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.W. and L.W. (Minor Children), And B.W. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                              Mar 26 2020, 10:02 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                 CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Brooke L. Scheurich                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Rensselaer, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Natalie F. Weiss
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        March 26, 2020
    Child Relationship of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JT-2499
    E.W. and L.W. (Minor
    Children),                                               Appeal from the Jasper Circuit
    Court
    And
    The Honorable John D. Potter,
    B.W. (Mother),                                           Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    37C01-1907-JT-102 & 37C01-1907-
    v.                                               JT-103
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020                   Page 1 of 16
    Riley, Judge.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Respondent, B.W. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s termination of
    her parental rights to her minor children, E.W. and L.W. (Children).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Mother raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
    Department of Child Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence
    supporting the termination of the parent-child relationship.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Mother and D.D. (Father) 1 are the biological parents to the Children, L.W.,
    born on May 11, 2016, and E.W., born on August 20, 2017. L.W. was initially
    adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) prior to E.W.’s birth, in
    which Mother admitted to battling a drug addiction for eight years. On August
    21, 2017, both Children were removed from Mother’s care due to allegations of
    abuse and neglect after E.W. tested positive for narcotics at birth and Mother
    tested positive for methamphetamines. E.W. could not breath at birth and had
    to be intubated. On October 17, 2017, after Mother admitted the allegations of
    1
    Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and does not participate in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020                     Page 2 of 16
    the CHINS petition, the trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS and
    instituted a parental participation order, ordering Mother to, among others:
    engage in programs and assessments as directed by the Family Case Manager
    (FCM) and keep all appointments; complete a substance abuse assessment and
    follow all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug and alcohol
    screens; and maintain a safe and stable house and secure employment.
    [5]   On December 12, 2017, Mother entered inpatient care at the Women’s Bureau
    in Fort Wayne for a nine-month program of intensive drug treatment. While an
    inpatient, Mother had negative drug screens. She participated in visitation
    through Lifeline, and then started a trial home visit in April of 2018 in an
    apartment provided at the treatment facility, where Mother lived with the
    Children. On August 19, 2018, Mother discharged herself even though the
    program was not completed and moved to her grandmother’s home with the
    Children. DCS performed a drug screen on Mother after she checked herself
    out of the facility and it was negative. Shortly thereafter, Mother obtained
    housing in Fort Wayne through the Fort Wayne Housing Authority. On
    September 12, 2018, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and on
    September 17, 2018, E.W. tested positive for methamphetamine. The trial
    home visit ended on September 17, 2018.
    [6]   After the trial home visit with the Children ended, Mother commenced
    substance abuse services at Park Center. She received three referrals for
    assessment, and on February 1, 2019, Mother failed to appear. On April 15,
    2019, Mother completed her intake but failed to participate in any of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 3 of 16
    recommended services. DCS made two referrals for inpatient treatment;
    however, these referrals were closed after Mother failed to comply. Mother was
    also referred to Park Center for medication management but was non-
    compliant. DCS made two referrals for Mother for mental health assessments
    on October 18, 2018 and again in March of 2019. While Mother completed the
    assessments, she became non-compliant when referred for a psychological
    examination.
    [7]   After the Children were removed on September 17, 2018, DCS re-started
    Mother’s drug screens. Of the drug screens at the Women’s Bureau, Park
    Center, and collected by DCS, Mother had 69 no-shows, 23 positive screens, 1
    refusal, and 68 negative screens. Mother’s 23 positive screens included positive
    results for methamphetamine, amphetamines, cocaine, heroin, morphine, and
    fentanyl. Her negative screens occurred mainly while she was an inpatient at
    the Women’s Bureau. Mother’s hair follicle screens were positive at 30, 60, and
    90 days for methamphetamine, except for the last hair follicle screen on March
    4, 2019, which was positive only at 60 and 90 days for methamphetamine.
    [8]   On April 30, 2019, the FCM visited Mother. During this visit, Mother passed
    out, nodded off twice, and passed out again while signing a consent form for a
    drug screen. Mother appeared pale, had open sores, and showed a lot of weight
    loss since January 2019. Mother claimed not have used any drugs since the
    trial home visit ended in September 2018.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 4 of 16
    [9]    DCS offered 62 visits with the Children of which Mother only attended 45.
    After the four-month trial home visit ended, DCS offered 43 visits. Mother
    attended 30, but during the period from April 11, 2019, through May 25, 2019,
    there were no visits as Mother failed to remain in contact with DCS for 6
    weeks.
    [10]   On April 19, 2019, Mother was charged with possession of methamphetamine
    and syringe offenses. At the June 4, 2019, child and family team meeting,
    Mother admitted to being an addict but denied using all of the drugs that
    appeared in the drug screens. She claimed to not have used opiates for several
    years. Three days later, on June 7, 2019, a police officer stopped Mother for
    driving a car with her driving privileges suspended. After a methamphetamine
    pipe and pills were located in the car, Mother was charged with maintaining a
    common nuisance, possession of a legend drug, and paraphernalia.
    [11]   On July 3, 2019, DCS filed its petition for termination of Mother’s parental
    rights. On September 6, 2019, Southlake Mental Health notified DCS that
    Mother had completed a fourteen-day inpatient program. On September 13,
    2019, the trial court conducted a factfinding hearing on DCS’s petition. At the
    time of the termination hearing, Mother had started participating in intensive
    outpatient program classes and Narcotics Anonymous meetings. On
    September 25, 2019, the trial court issued its Order, terminating Mother’s
    parental rights and concluding, in pertinent part:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 5 of 16
    53. There is a bond between Mother and her [C]hildren.
    54. Mother knows she needs to get clean for herself, let alone her
    [C]hildren.
    55. Mother, although she appears to be on the right track at this
    eleventh hour, relies on different relatives for places to stay,
    transportation to treatment and classes and for all of her support.
    Mother is unable to support and take care of herself while she is
    currently pregnant, fighting for her sobriety and facing criminal
    charges in two counties.
    56. Mother’s claims of support from her family are more tangible
    at this time, as she can turn to her family for support instead of
    drugs; however, living with her family this past summer was
    when she was arrested in Lake County on felony drug charges.
    57. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
    to the well-being of the [C]hildren.
    58. Mother, until the last few weeks before the termination, was
    testing positive for methamphetamine, fentanyl and other illegal
    narcotics.
    59. Mother has two separate felony criminal drug cases pending
    in two different counties—Lake and Noble.
    60. Visitation with Mother is going well, especially since the
    termination was filed, and the visitation supervisor recommends
    continued visitation.
    61. Mother recently started mental health counseling on her own
    and as of September 6, 2019, the [DCS] was notified by
    Southlake Mental Health that Mother had completed a fourteen-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 6 of 16
    day inpatient program. Mother is still fighting and trying to treat
    her drug addiction problem.
    62. The recent eleventh-hour actions of Mother to attend N.A.,
    attend inpatient treatment at Southlake Mental Health with
    follow-up IOP care, attend visitations regularly, and
    communicate with her caseworker amount to “too little too late.”
    The record of counseling and treatment followed by serious
    prolonged relapses are a much more reliable prognostication of
    Mother’s behavior, which poses a threat to the [C]hildren’s well-
    being.
    63. Mother, except for this eleventh-hour attempt of self-
    treatment, has repeatedly denied or downplayed her drug use and
    addictions, which thwarted her recovery and sobriety.
    64. Mother’s use of fentanyl recently shows a danger to Mother’s
    safety and health per the Park Center counselor. Fentanyl is a
    very hard opiate that indicates addiction is increasing.
    65. There is a satisfactory plan of care and treatment for the
    [C]hildren. The [DCS] discussed adoption with Mother at the
    last two Child and Family Team Meetings. The current
    permanency plan was changed to adoption in July of 2019. The
    current placement with the pre-adoptive foster family is going
    very well for the [C]hildren.
    66. Termination is in the best interests of the [C]hildren. Mother
    has continued to use illegal substances, was offered IOP in the
    first case, inpatient in the second case, and IOP in the second
    case, without success. Now Mother has two pending criminal
    cases for drugs and Mother overdosed at work in April of 2019.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 7 of 16
    67. These two [C]hildren have had no permanency with Mother
    bouncing in and out of their lives between drug use relapses. Her
    recent ditch efforts, i.e., rehab and counseling, on her own do not
    outweigh the two years of conduct of Mother in this case.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 193-95).
    [12]   Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [13]   Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to her Child. The
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
    Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). “A
    parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is
    ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Troxel v.
    Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 65 (2000)). However, parental rights “are not absolute
    and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the proper
    disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” 
    Id.
     If “parents are unable
    or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,” termination of parental
    rights is appropriate. 
    Id.
     We recognize that the termination of a parent-child
    relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last
    resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural
    relationship between parent and child have failed.’” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 8 of 16
    Servs., 
    39 N.E.3d 641
    , 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty.
    Office of Family & Children, 
    841 N.E.2d 615
    , 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
    [14]   Indiana courts rely on a “deferential standard of review in cases concerning the
    termination of parental rights” due to the trial court’s “unique position to assess
    the evidence.” In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d 212
    , 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    dismissed. Our court neither reweighs evidence nor assesses the credibility of
    witnesses. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1229 (Ind.
    2013). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences that
    support the trial court’s judgment, and we accord deference to the trial court’s
    “opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand.” 
    Id.
    II. Termination of Parental Rights Statute
    [15]   In order to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, DCS must prove:
    (A) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
    months under a dispositional decree.
    ****
    (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
    under the supervision of a local office . . . for at least fifteen (15)
    months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
    with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of
    the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] . . . ;
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 9 of 16
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a [CHINS];
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2). DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements by
    clear and convincing evidence. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    15 N.E.3d 85
    ,
    92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the
    existence of a fact to be highly probable.” 
    Id.
    A. Conditions which Led to Removal 2
    [16]   Mother’s main claim is focused on the allegation that there is insufficient
    evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the conditions which
    resulted in the removal of the Children have not been remedied. It is well
    established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
    termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed
    conditions.” Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Children & Family Servs., 
    656 N.E.2d 2
    Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; therefore, DCS is required to prove
    only one of three listed elements. See In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d at 220-21
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020                   Page 10 of 16
    824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. In judging fitness, a trial court may
    properly consider, among other things, a parent’s substance abuse and lack of
    adequate housing and employment. McBride v. Monroe Co. OFC, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court may also consider a parent’s
    failure to respond to services. Lang v. Starke Co. OFC, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 372 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated
    to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
    deprivation.” Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 828. A trial court “need not wait until the
    children are irreversibly influenced by their deficient lifestyle such that their
    physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating
    the parent-child relationship.” Id. Furthermore, “[c]lear and convincing
    evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly
    inadequate for the child’s very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear
    and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development
    are threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at
    1230.
    [17]   In support of her argument that the conditions which resulted in the removal of
    the Children have been remedied, Mother refers to her voluntary inpatient
    enrollment at Southlake Mental Health and her participation in an intensive
    outpatient program after DCS filed its petition for termination of her parental
    rights.
    [18]   A trial court is “within its discretion to disregard the efforts Mother made only
    shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily Mother’s history of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 11 of 16
    conduct prior to those efforts.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. “Requiring trial
    courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from
    finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.”
    In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014). Mindful of this guideline, we note
    that the evidence presented clearly and convincingly shows that a reasonable
    probability exists that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal from
    Mother’s care will not be remedied. Although Mother exhibited a recent
    turnaround in behavior the trial court was entitled to weigh the evidence as it
    found appropriate in the context of this case, and found that Mother’s prior
    conduct was more telling than the efforts she exerted prior to the termination
    hearing. We agree.
    [19]   During the CHINS proceedings Mother used methamphetamine,
    amphetamines, cocaine, heroin, morphine, and recently, fentanyl. Of the drug
    screens collected at the Women’s Bureau, Park Center, and by DCS, Mother
    either failed to appear, tested positive, or refused to test for approximately 58
    percent of the tests. Mother’s most recent drug screen, on July 15, 2019, was
    positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl, signaling an increase in Mother’s
    drug abuse. Mother was recently charged with two drug-related offenses. Even
    during a home visit, the FCM observed Mother to be under the influence, as
    she passed out and nodded off. Even though Mother had a seemingly apparent
    period of sobriety while at the Women’s Bureau from December 12, 2017
    through August 19, 2018, the evidence actually indicates that Mother was using
    methamphetamine by June 2018 as Mother’s September 2018 hair follicle test
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 12 of 16
    tested positive for methamphetamine at the 90-day mark. DCS made two
    referrals for inpatient treatment; these referrals were closed due to Mother’s
    non-compliance. She was referred to Park Center for medication management,
    but was not compliant.
    [20]   After the four-month trial home visit ended, DCS offered 43 supervised visits
    with the Children. Mother attended 30 visits but during the period from April
    11, 2019 through May 25, 2019, there were no visits as Mother had failed to
    remain in communication with DCS.
    [21]   Mother now claims that the trial court should have taken into account the
    testimony of a therapist Mother worked with at Park Center. However, the trial
    court is not required to assess the same weight to the evidence as a party. See
    Thompson v. State, 
    804 N.E.2d 1146
    , 1149 (Ind. 2004). The trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in focusing on Mother’s eight-year history of substance
    abuse and failure to engage in treatment, rather than on Mother’s change in
    behavior after DCS filed its petition to terminate her parental rights. In re C.M.,
    
    675 N.E.2d 1134
    , 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that “it [is] within the
    province of the trial court, as the finder of fact, to ignore or discredit . . .
    evidence” of remedial efforts made shortly before the termination hearing).
    Accordingly, when considered as a whole, we find the evidence sufficient to
    demonstrate a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the
    removal of the Children would not be remedied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 13 of 16
    B. Best Interests of the Children
    [22]   Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the
    Children’s best interests. The premise of her argument focuses on the evidence
    that when visitation occurred, Mother’s visits with her Children went well. The
    visitation reports were favorable and she interacted appropriately with the
    Children. To determine whether termination is in a child’s best interests, the
    trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The court must subordinate the
    interests of the parents to those of the child and need not wait until a child is
    irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. 
    Id.
    [23]   Here, Mother was addicted to drugs and exposed the Children to drugs in the
    past. In fact, E.W. tested positive for narcotics at birth, had to be intubated,
    and again tested positive on September 17, 2018. Mother has pending criminal
    charges and recently overdosed at work in April of 2019. FCM stated that
    Mother is “using more drugs, she’s showing that she’s using more drugs to still
    get that high, than we were looking at the beginning of the case.” (Transcript p.
    86). FCM testified that L.W. has been in his Mother’s care for thirteen months
    of his life, five months of which were the trial home visit, while E.W. has never
    been in Mother’s care without DCS supervision. Mother cannot fulfill her
    parental obligations and is not able to provide a stable environment for the
    Children. While the Children’s CASA testified that Mother is a very good
    parent and the Children are bonded with her, CASA recommended termination
    because “we’re now three years and . . . I don’t know in my own mind how
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 14 of 16
    long it would take to ever know thoroughly that we could know that she’s drug-
    free and be a safe situation for the” Children. (Tr. p. 128).
    [24]   The FCM testified that the Children are thriving in their foster care placement
    and that foster parents are willing to adopt them. The Children are bonded and
    enjoy permanency; “[t]ermination, allowing for a subsequent adoption, would
    provide them with the opportunity to be adopted into a safe, stable, consistent,
    and permanent environment where all their needs will continue to be met, and
    where they can grow.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1159.
    [25]   Mother failed to avail herself of the opportunities and services offered by DCS
    to reunite with the Children and made no progress nor commitment during the
    proceedings of the case. While we are cognizant of the progress she made after
    DCS filed its petition for termination, it was too little, too late. We agree with
    the trial court’s assessment that “the record of counseling and treatment
    followed by serious prolonged relapses are a much more reliable
    prognostication of Mother’s behavior, which poses a threat to the [C]hildren’s
    well-being.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 194). “[C]hildren cannot wait
    indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” In
    re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 648 (Ind. 2014). Even though “the ultimate purpose of
    the law is to protect the child, the parent-child relationship will give way when
    it is no longer in the child’s interest to maintain this relationship.” In re B.D.J.,
    
    728 N.E.2d 195
    , 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 15 of 16
    [26]   Mother’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment for the Children,
    together with her current inability to do the same, supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the
    Children. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
    CONCLUSION
    [27]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing
    evidence to support the trial court’s Order to terminate Mother’s parental rights
    to the Children.
    [28]   Affirmed.
    [29]   Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2499 | March 26, 2020   Page 16 of 16