In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: De.D., M.S., A.D. (Minor Children) and D.D. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 20 2020, 8:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Antonio G. Sisson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Termination of the November 20, 2020
Parent-Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-JT-1044
De.D., M.S., A.D. (Minor Children),
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
and Court
D.D. (Mother), The Honorable Kimberly Dowling,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
The Honorable Amanda Yonally,
v. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause Nos.
Indiana Department of Child 18C02-1908-JT-183
Serivces, 18C02-1908-JT-184
18C02-1908-JT-185
Appellee-Petitioner,
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] D.D. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her
minor children and presents the sole issue of whether the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights was clearly erroneous. Concluding it was not,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother has four biological children, three of whom are the subject of this
appeal: A.D., born September 10, 2015; M.S.,1 born January 17, 2014; and
De.D.,2 born September 1, 2011 (collectively, “Children”). Mother’s youngest
child, Av.D., was born during these proceedings and was later adjudicated a
child in need of services (“CHINS”) but was not included in this termination
action. Children’s fathers do not participate in this appeal.
[3] On April 20, 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received
a report alleging that A.D. was at Muncie City Hall because police conducted a
raid at the home of the relative with whom A.D. was staying. The relative and
other adults in the home were arrested and Mother could not be located,
leaving the child without a caregiver. DCS family case manager (“FCM”)
1
In portions of the record, this child’s initials appear as “M.D.” However, in the juvenile court’s order
terminating Mother’s parental rights as to this child, the initials are “M.S.” Therefore, we refer to this child
as M.S. throughout this opinion.
2
Mother and this child have the same initials. Therefore, to differentiate between the two, we refer to this
child as “De.D.” throughout our opinion.
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Steve Oetting responded to the call, went to City Hall, and detained A.D.
Hours later, FCM Oetting was able to reach Mother, who stated she was not in
Muncie; they agreed to meet the next day. A.D. was removed and placed in
relative care.
[4] On April 24, DCS filed a petition alleging A.D. was a CHINS. An
initial/detention hearing was held the same day and A.D. remained in her
existing placement. The next day, a children and family team meeting was held
with Mother and Mother’s grandparents during which Mother indicated “she
was still actively using [illicit drugs] and . . . was effectively homeless[.]”
Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 45. At the time, Mother had been staying
with friends or family. DCS did not believe A.D. was safe due to Mother’s
substance abuse and lack of appropriate housing.
[5] Four days later, on April 28, DCS received a report that Mother had been
admitted to the hospital for a suicide attempt. Mother also admitted to using
heroin and cocaine and being homeless. At this time, DCS learned that Mother
had two other children. The same day, DCS detained De.D. and M.S. and
placed them with R.S., an individual DCS believed to be the father of both
children.3 On May 2, DCS filed petitions alleging M.S. and De.D. were
CHINS.
3
DCS later learned R.S. was only M.S.’s biological father.
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[6] The Children were subsequently adjudicated CHINS.4 Following a hearing, the
juvenile court issued dispositional decrees5 ordering Mother to (among other
things): maintain contact with the FCM; maintain suitable housing and
income; refrain from consuming illegal substances; complete a parenting
assessment and follow all recommendations, such as home-based counseling;
complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all treatment
recommendations; submit to random drug screens; and attend visitation. See
Exhibits, Volume 1 at 18-19, 153-54; id., Vol. 2 at 60-62. DCS made
appropriate referrals for Mother.
[7] From April 2017 to December 2018, Rachael Green of A Work in Progress
supervised Mother’s visitations with Children. Visits occurred twice each week
for two- to three-hour sessions. Mother was cooperative and consistent with
most visits; however, Green testified that Mother would “get off track and then
get back on track.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 91. In other words, Mother would be
inconsistent for several weeks and then consistent for several months. Green
was able to tell if Mother was using drugs again. If sober, Mother would have
planned activities and engage with the Children. If not sober, Mother would
lay on the couch and not interact with the Children. Ultimately, Green
4
M.S. and De.D. were adjudicated CHINS in October 2017 and A.D. was adjudicated as such in June 2018.
5
Dispositional orders regarding De.D. and M.S. were issued in December 2017 and the dispositional order
regarding A.D. was issued in June 2018.
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believed Mother improved her parenting skills but not enough to move to
unsupervised visits.
[8] During this time, Mother went to rehab twice. Mother first went to Volunteers
of America for twenty-eight days where she completed the first phase but did
not want to complete the second phase of the program. Mother was sober for
several months but then relapsed. It was also recommended that Mother attend
Meridian Health Services’ Maternal Treatment Program, a six month to one-
year program for mothers struggling with substance abuse, and individual
therapy. Mandalyn Castanon conducted Mother’s initial assessment during
which Mother admitted she struggled with heroin abuse, as well as other
substances in the past. Castanon testified that Mother suffers from opioid,
amphetamine, cocaine, and cannabis use disorders, major depressive disorder,
moderate and post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar disorder; Mother also
has a history of suicide attempts.
[9] Mother began individual therapy but did not attend the Maternal Treatment
Program group sessions. She did well in the beginning but after several therapy
sessions, Mother relapsed and went to rehab at Meridian’s Addictions Recovery
Center (“Arc”) in Richmond, for twenty-eight to thirty-days of substance abuse
treatment. Mother completed the treatment and was referred to individual
outpatient treatment (“IOT”) at Meridian. In December 2018, Mother attended
orientation, six of eight IOT sessions, and two individual therapy sessions.
Mother then relapsed by using methamphetamine and heroin. Meridian
continued to reach out to Mother through January 2019 but was unable to get
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in touch with her and Mother never returned to individual therapy. In
February, Meridian closed out services for Mother. At some point, Mother also
sought treatment at Vivitrol Program two or three times and went to Wayside
Mission, a shelter with NA/AA meetings, for a few months.
[10] On November 16, 2018, De.D. and M.S. were placed with their maternal great-
grandmother. From December 2018 to June 2019, Takeya Davis of A Work in
Progress supervised Mother’s visitations and conducted home-based counseling
where they focused on obtaining appropriate shelter and employment for
Mother. Although Mother was consistent with home-based counseling, she did
not obtain stable housing or maintain employment. Mother had three or four
jobs but was unable to keep them. Mother submitted multiple applications for
housing and at times, she would stay on the streets or in someone else’s vehicle.
Davis suggested that Mother live at a shelter; however, Mother refused because
she “didn’t like the curfew of the shelter [and] would prefer just to be on the
streets or stay over [at] different people’s homes[.]” Tr., Vol. 2 at 87. With
respect to substance abuse, Mother had a three-week period of sobriety during
this time. Davis believed Mother’s main barrier to obtaining housing and
employment was “simply not being able to maintain sobriety” and opined that
Mother was under the influence during visitation seventy-five percent of the
time. Id. at 71, 84. At some point, Davis signed Mother up for rehab, but
Mother did not attend. Davis never recommended that Mother move to
unsupervised parenting time. Ultimately, Davis stopped working with Mother
because A Work for Progress lost its contract with DCS.
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[11] Mother began working with DCS FCM Charlene Lynn in March 2018 and
generally maintained contact with Lynn. Mother submitted to weekly drug
screens “on occasion.” Id. at 191. Mother should have submitted to 125 drug
screens. Instead, she submitted to fifty-seven drug screens, thirty-five of which
were positive for “some sort of illicit substance.” Id.
[12] On May 17 and July 15, 2019, the juvenile court issued orders changing
Children’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The juvenile court
found that Mother failed to comply with the case plan, consistently participate
in services, or submit to drug screens; Mother also continued to use drugs. On
August 9, DCS filed its verified petitions for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights to Children. See Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at
33-42. A court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) was assigned to the case.
[13] In September 2019, Sean McRoberts of Lifeline Youth and Family Services
received a referral to supervise Mother’s visitation. At the September 26 and
October 9 visits, Mother was prepared; she provided snacks for the Children
and interacted well. However, Mother failed to attend a scheduled visit on
October 3. McRoberts tried to contact her but received no response. The next
day, the two spoke and Mother stated she was experiencing withdrawal
symptoms.
[14] On October 10, Mother checked into the Harriett House in Fort Wayne, a six-
to nine-month addiction treatment facility for women with children. Residents
of the program are required to participate in a minimum of fifteen groups per
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week, which focus on addiction, anger management, parenting, self-esteem,
and life management skills. Upon arrival, Mother submitted to a drug screen
and tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC. Mother
admitted she used drugs the day before. Mother’s drug screen on October 13
was negative but her drug screen on October 14 was positive for THC. Since
attending, Mother has done well and is working on earning her GED and
obtaining employment. She attends fifteen groups each week at Harriett House,
therapy, and seven NA/AA meetings outside the facility. She has been
compliant, cooperative, and made improvements. Since beginning treatment,
she has had three supervised visits with the Children and her level of
engagement has improved.
[15] A fact-finding hearing was held on December 10 and 17, 2019. On April 22,
2020, the juvenile court issued its orders6 terminating Mother’s parental rights
to Children and found, in pertinent part:
93. [M]other is still in the early stages of the [Harriett House]
program, is unable to look for employment, and does not have a
plan for stable housing outside of the facility.
94. There is no plan at this time as to where [M]other will live
or how she will support herself after the treatment ends.
6
The juvenile court issued separate termination orders regarding each child. The findings of fact and
conclusions of law are substantially the same. Therefore, we quote from only one order.
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95. At the time of the termination fact finding, Mother appears
to be doing well in the treatment program and appears to be
clean from substances[.] However, [M]other has only been in
this latest program for two (2) months[.]
96. According to [M]other’s pattern of sobriety, she is able to
maintain sobriety only during a treatment program but for no
more than two (2) or three (3) months after treatment.
97. Mother is still within the time frame of a treatment
program and it is simply too early to guarantee if this treatment
will be long lasting for [M]other or simply part of her two (2) to
three (3) month pattern of sobriety after completing treatment.
98. Simply put, from the Court’s perspective, the crux of this
case is Mother’s substance use disorder. There is no question
that she is a terrific mother when she is sober. She parents
appropriately, is affectionate, and can provide for them.
However, Mother has not been able to, despite all of the services
offered by DCS, remain sober. The Court finds that DCS
provided all of the services possible to help [M]other. And now,
at the time of the hearing, Mother is yet again attempting
treatment. The Court lauds [M]other’s efforts and her tenacity.
However, . . . the [C]hildren should not be subjected to Mother’s
continued inconsistency and . . . it is not in their best interests to
have to continue to wait and see whether Mother can sustain her
treatment goals.
***
114. DCS has made treatment facilities available to [M]other or
encouraged [her] to engage in treatment throughout the CHIN[S]
case by making at least nine (9) referrals for treatment to facilities
such as the VOA, Arc of Richmond, Maternal Treatment
Program, IOP, Vivitrol Program, Wayside Mission and the
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Harriett House. Sometimes, multiple referrals were made for the
same treatment program before [M]other engaged.
***
116. Mother established a pattern of using drugs, wanting to go
to rehab, becoming sober for two (2) to three (3) months, and
then relapsing.
117. The longest period of sobriety for [M]other has been three
months.
***
128. [W]hile [M]other is making yet another serious attempt at
treatment, the [C]hildren have been removed for such a long
period of time that termination is in their best interests. The
Court sympathizes with [M]other and her struggle with
addiction, however, the [C]hildren should not be in a position of
tortured waiting for her to succeed.
***
174. The Court finds [M]other’s latest attempt at treatment to
be a last ditch effort to delay permanency for [the Children] and
allowing her to do so only delays permanency for [the Children]
and is not a substitute for [her] lack of engagement in services or
lack of sobriety throughout 2 ½ years of the CHINS case.
Appealed Order [for M.S.] at 8-10, 14. Based on these findings, the juvenile
court concluded there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to
the Children’s removal and continued placement outside of the home will not
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be remedied and that the continuation of the parent child relationship poses a
threat to the Children’s well-being. The juvenile court also concluded
termination is in the best interests of the Children. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[16] We begin by emphasizing that the right of parents to establish a home and raise
their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied. The law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are
unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892
N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Although we acknowledge that the
parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our
culture[,]” we also recognize that “parental interests are not absolute and must
be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of
a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family &
Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). The
involuntary termination of one’s parental rights is the most extreme sanction a
court can impose because termination severs all rights of a parent to his or her
children. See In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
As such, termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other
reasonable efforts have failed. Id. The purpose of terminating parental rights is
to protect children, not to punish parents. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.
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[17] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. In deference to the trial
court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment
terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re
L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1161 (2002). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the decision, we
must affirm. Id.
[18] The juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon as required
by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8(c), and we therefore apply a two-tiered
standard of review. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We first determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, then determine whether the findings support the
judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains
no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671
N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings
do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the
judgment thereon. Id.
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II. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights
A. Statutory Framework
[19] To terminate parental rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires DCS
to prove, in relevant part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
DCS must prove the foregoing elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind.
Code § 31-37-14-2; In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). However,
because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive the juvenile court need
only find one of the three elements has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). If a
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juvenile court determines the allegations of the petition are true, then the court
shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
B. Remedy of Conditions
[20] We begin by noting that Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s
findings; therefore, we accept the findings as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 681
N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Mother challenges the juvenile court’s
conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
in Children’s removal and continued placement outside of her care will not be
remedied because she completed a few treatment programs and has been sober
for two months. See Appellant’s Brief at 23. We disagree and conclude the
evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion.
[21] In determining whether such conditions will be remedied, we engage in a two-
step analysis: “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to [Children’s]
placement and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is
a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted). With respect
to the second step, a juvenile court assesses whether a reasonable probability
exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal or continued placement
outside his parent’s care will not be remedied by judging the parent’s fitness to
care for the child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643
(Ind. 2014). The juvenile court must also balance a parent’s recent
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improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine the likelihood
of future neglect. Id. Habitual conduct may include criminal history, drug and
alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
adequate housing and employment, but the services offered to the parent and
the parent’s response to those services can also be evidence of whether
conditions will be remedied. A.D.S v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150,
1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide
evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that
there is a reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re
I.A., 903 N.E.2d at 154.
[22] Here, Children were initially removed from Mother and remained outside of
her care due to Mother’s substance abuse, lack of housing, and inability to
provide for Children.
[23] Since DCS became involved in this case two and a half years ago, Mother has
never been able to maintain sobriety for more than two or three months at a
time. Instead, the overwhelming evidence reveals that, during this time,
Mother went to seven different treatment programs, only some of which she
completed, and has demonstrated a consistent pattern of going to treatment,
maintaining sobriety for a short period of time, relapsing, and then returning to
rehab.
[24] At the fact-finding hearing, Green, who supervised Mother’s visits from April
2017 to December 2018, testified to this pattern, stating that Mother would do
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well and then “slowly decrease[.]” Tr., Vol. 2 at 92. Green explained that the
pattern presents safety concerns if Children were to be returned to Mother and
ultimately, never recommended that Mother move to unsupervised visitation.
FCM Lynn was assigned to this case in March 2018 and echoed Green’s
testimony about Mother’s concerning pattern. At the fact-finding hearing, she
testified that Mother “would go through the treatment, she would become
sober, and . . . you knew she was sober. She was happier, she was more
confident. [A]nd then she would relapse again.” Id. at 188. Even Mother
acknowledged this. She testified, “I would go to treatment, stay sober, then
relapse. And it kinda was a pattern but . . . now I’m sixty-three days clean[.]”
Id. at 237.
[25] Davis, who worked with Mother for six or seven months, testified that she
believed Mother was under the influence in seventy-five percent of the visits she
supervised. She stated, “[W]hen . . . sober, [Mother is an] excellent mother
[and a]lways a hundred percent engaged” but when Mother is not sober, there
is “no way . . . she could parent.” Id. at 74, 76. She also testified that DCS
offered Mother “every possible support that they had . . . from rehab to
counseling to classes. Like, everything possible was offered . . . nothing that
anyone else could offer. It’s just within [Mother], like that, that click has to
happen for her.” Id. at 80. For example, before March 2018, FCM Lynn
opined that “there were probably nine different referrals [for Mother] at one
time or another for inpatient and outpatient” substance abuse treatment. Id. at
187.
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[26] Despite services offered by DCS and numerous treatment programs, Mother
failed to maintain sobriety for more than a few months at a time. And although
Mother had several jobs, she was unable to maintain employment or secure
stable and appropriate housing. At the time of the fact-finding hearing in
December 2019, Mother’s last positive drug screen was in October 2019, she
was in treatment at Harriett House, and had been sober for approximately two
months. There is no question Mother loves the Children and is capable of
parenting when she is sober. But unfortunately, Mother’s recent progress is
consistent with her historical pattern of seeking treatment, maintaining a few
months of sobriety, and then relapsing.
[27] The juvenile court found Mother’s “latest attempt at treatment to be a last ditch
effort to delay permanency for [the Children] and allowing her to do so only
delays permanency for [the Children] and is not a substitute for [M]other’s lack
of engagement in services or lack of sobriety throughout 2 ½ years of the
CHINS case.” Appealed Order [for M.S.] at 14. Here, the juvenile court
weighed Mother’s historical pattern of conduct more heavily than her recent
progress, a task solely within its discretion. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at
1234. We conclude there is ample evidence in the record to support the
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juvenile court’s conclusion there is a reasonable probability that Mother’s
substance abuse and inability to provide for the Children will not be remedied.7
B. Best Interests
[28] Mother also claims DCS failed to prove that termination of her parental rights
is in the Children’s best interests. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. However, Mother
fails to support this assertion with any argument, and it is therefore waived. See
Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions
of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.”).
Nonetheless, we briefly address this issue.
[29] “Permanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a
child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). To determine the best
interests of children, the juvenile court looks to the totality of the evidence and
must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. In re D.D.,
804 N.E.2d at 267. The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly
harmed before terminating parental rights. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Recommendations of the FCM and CASA, in addition to evidence that the
conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by
7
Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children. Having concluded the evidence is sufficient to show
a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children’s removal and continued placement outside of
Mother’s care will not be remedied, we need not consider whether the parent-child relationship poses a threat
to Children’s well-being. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209.
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clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. In
re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[30] Here, CASA Lynne Cooper and FCM Charlene Lynn both testified at the fact-
finding hearing that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s
best interests. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 170-71, 198-99. Lynn testified that despite
Mother’s recent improvement, DCS’ position regarding the Children has not
changed because Mother still lacks housing and income, and she needs to
continue to stay in treatment. She explained, “[A]t this point the only certainty
that I see is she has to . . . take care of herself before she can take care of her
children or she’s not ever going to be successful.” Id. at 197. Similarly, Cooper
stated, “[Mother] is doing super well. I really am optimistic and hopeful for
her. But these girls need permanency and we’re looking at six months out
again and with an uncertain future and the girls don’t need an uncertain future.
They need a future that they can count on.” Id. at 170. Based on the length of
time the Children have been outside of Mother’s care, Cooper believed
termination of Mother’s rights and adoption is in the Children’s best interests.
See id. at 170-71. Having already concluded there is evidence that the
conditions resulting in Children’s removal will not be remedied, this testimony
is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination
of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s best interests. See In re A.S., 17
N.E.3d at 1005.
Conclusion
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[31] We conclude DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. Therefore, the
termination order was not clearly erroneous, and the judgment of the juvenile
court is affirmed.
[32] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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