Cornelius Crawford v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 23 2020, 9:18 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cornelius Crawford, December 23, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1324
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G01-2002-F5-5239
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Cornelius Crawford (“Crawford”) appeals his sentence following his guilty plea
to Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen
years of age1 and Level 5 felony battery by bodily injury to a public safety
official.2 Crawford argues that: (1) remand is required to correct the sentencing
order and abstract of judgment because the oral and written sentencing
statements conflict; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
his offense and his character. We conclude that remand is necessary to correct
the sentencing order and that Crawford has failed to show that his sentence is
inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm his sentence and remand with instructions.
[2] We affirm and remand with instructions.
Issues
1. Whether this case should be remanded to correct the sentencing order
and abstract of judgment.
2. Whether Crawford’s sentence is inappropriate.
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.
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Facts
[3] In February 2020, the State charged Crawford with the following five counts:
(1) Level 5 felony battery resulting in injury to a person less than fourteen years
of age; (2) Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety
official; (3) Level 6 felony domestic battery; (4) Level 6 felony strangulation;
and (5) Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
[4] In June 2020, the trial court held a combined guilty plea and sentencing
hearing, wherein Crawford pled guilty to the two Level 5 felonies. In exchange
for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Pursuant to the
terms of the plea agreement, Crawford and the State agreed that Crawford
would receive a four-year sentence for Count 1 and a consecutive one-year
sentence for Count 2. The agreement left placement “open to argument.”
(App. Vol. 2 at 63).
[5] The trial court asked for a factual basis for the plea agreement, and the State
provided the following basis:
If this matter proceeded to trial, the State of Indiana would have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about February 4 th,
2020, Cornelius Crawford, a person at least eighteen years of age,
did knowingly touch M.T., a person under the age of fourteen, in a
rude, insolent or angry manner, by grabbing M.T., resulting in
bodily injury, that is: pain. Count II, on or about February 4th,
2020, Cornelius Crawford did knowingly touch J.D., a public
safety officer in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, by kicking J.D.,
while said officer was engaged in the execution of his official
duties, resulting in bodily injury, that is: a red mark and/or pain.
Furthermore, on or about February 4th, 2020, I.M.P.D. officers
were dispatched to an address on Bolton Court regarding a
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domestic disturbance. Officers knocked on the door and A.T.[]
opened the door. A male later identified as Cornelius Crawford
was standing behind Ms. T. Officers asked if anyone had called
the police and Cornelius Crawford said, “No.” After noticing that
Ms. T.[] was trying to say – she was trying to quietly say
something, officers told Mr. Crawford to step outside and another
officer went inside with Ms. T. Ms. T.[] stated that Mr. Crawford
got upset with her seven year old son, M.T.[] because he was
playing loud music and dancing. Mr. Crawford put his open hand
around M.T.’s neck and applied pressure and Mr. Crawford held
him down on the living room couch. M.T.[] later told officers that
Mr. Crawford hurt him while he held him down on the couch and
squeezed his neck. Officers placed Mr. Crawford under arrest
without incident. As officers began walking Mr. Crawford away
from the apartment, he kicked the door of the apartment open and
said he wanted to kiss the kids goodbye. M.T.[] began to run
away. Mr. Crawford then kicked Officer D., causing pain and
redness to his shin. Officers were eventually able to gain control
of Mr. Crawford, all of which occurred in Marion County and all
of which is contrary to the laws of the State of Indiana.
(Tr. 14-15). Crawford agreed that the factual basis was true and accurate, and
the trial court entered judgments of conviction for both counts.
[6] Thereafter, Crawford testified about his criminal history, substance abuse, and
mental health issues. Crawford explained that his criminal history included
two misdemeanor disorderly conduct convictions from Indiana and
Pennsylvania and one misdemeanor driving under the influence conviction
from Ohio. When asked whether he was under the influence of alcohol when
he committed the offenses, Crawford responded “[v]ery much so, yes.” (Tr.
19). Crawford also informed the court that he had recently been diagnosed
with schizophrenia and that he had been undergoing treatment for his mental
health and alcohol issues prior to the instant case.
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[7] The trial court then heard argument from Crawford’s counsel, who argued that
Crawford’s sentence should be served on probation. The State requested that
“at least some time be served in the Department of Correction[].” (Tr. 24). The
trial court sentenced Crawford as follows:
[F]our years on Count I. That sentence will be served as follows:
Two years will be executed . . . [in] the Indiana Department of
Correction[] and two years will be on probation. Under Count II,
which is to run consecutive to Count I, you will serve a sentence of
one year. That one[-]year sentence will be suspended and be on
probation. So, you will have two years in the Department of
Correction[] and three years on probation.
(Tr. 25). As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered that Crawford complete
a domestic violence counseling program and a substance abuse evaluation and
any recommended treatment. The trial court also found that Crawford had
served 135 actual days and was entitled to forty-five (45) days of good time
credit, for a total of 180 days of credit time.
[8] Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court issued its written sentencing
order. In the order, the court stated that Crawford had been sentenced to four
(4) years with two (2) years suspended for Count 1. For Count 2, the order
stated that Crawford had been sentenced to 365 days with 185 days suspended.
Crawford now appeals.
Decision
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[9] Crawford argues that: (1) remand is necessary to correct the written sentencing
statements; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate. We address each of his
contentions in turn.
1. Remand
[10] Crawford contends, and the State agrees, that remand is necessary to correct the
written sentencing order and the abstract of judgment.3 Specifically, Crawford
argues that the trial court intended to sentence him under Count 2 to a one-year
sentence suspended to probation. However, the sentencing order states that
only 185 days were suspended.
[11] When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them
together to discern the intent of the sentencing court. Walker v. State, 932
N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied. We may remand the case
for correction of clerical errors if the trial court’s intent is unambiguous. See
Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 445 n.8 (Ind. 1999) (“Based on the
unambiguous nature of the trial court’s oral sentencing pronouncement, we
conclude that the Abstract of Judgment and Sentencing Order contain clerical
errors and remand this case for correction of those errors.”).
[12] Here, the oral sentencing statement is clear that the trial court intended to
sentence Crawford to one-year suspended to probation for Count 2. Indeed, the
3
Crawford did not include a copy of his abstract of judgment in his appellate appendix.
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trial court stated that the “one[-]year sentence will be suspended and be on
probation.” (Tr. 25). Despite this oral statement, the trial court’s written
sentencing order suspends only 185 days of the one-year sentence.
Accordingly, based upon the unambiguous nature of the trial court’s oral
sentencing pronouncement, we remand this case to the trial court with
instructions to correct the sentencing order to reflect its oral sentencing
statement and to enter a new sentencing order, abstract of judgment, and CCS
entry to reflect a one-year sentence suspended to probation for Count 2.
2. Inappropriate Sentence
[13] Crawford also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we
may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the
trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The defendant bears the
burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v.
State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a Rule 7(B)
review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding
principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing
statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis is not
to determine whether another sentence is more appropriate but rather whether
the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876
(Ind. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), reh’g denied.
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Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.
Our authority for sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare
and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018).
[14] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
the starting point the General Assembly has selected as an appropriate sentence
for the crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, Crawford pled
guilty to Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than
fourteen years of age and Level 5 felony battery by bodily injury to a public
safety official. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is “for a fixed term of
between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3)
years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court sentenced Crawford, pursuant to his
plea agreement, to an aggregate five-year sentence.
[15] Turning to the nature of Crawford’s offenses, this Court has recognized that the
nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the
commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. Perry v. State, 78
N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, Crawford, who was thirty-six-years-
old at the time, committed two violent offenses: one against a seven-year-old
child and the other against a public safety official. Against the seven-year-old
child, Crawford placed his open hand around the child’s neck, applied pressure,
and held him down on the living room couch simply because he was playing
music and dancing. Thereafter, Crawford kicked a public safety official.
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[16] Turning to Crawford’s character, we acknowledge that he suffers from mental
health and substance abuse issues. However, Crawford does have a criminal
history. He has three prior misdemeanor convictions in three different states,
which reflect poorly on his character. See Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that even a minor criminal record reflects poorly
on a defendant’s character), trans. denied. Crawford’s criminal history shows
that he has an inability or unwillingness to conform his behavior to the rule of
law.
[17] Crawford has not persuaded us that the nature of his offenses and his character
make his five-year aggregate sentence inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm the
sentence imposed by the trial court.
[18] Affirmed and remanded.
Vaidik, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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