Michael Lee Rich v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 09 2020, 8:46 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
Christa K. Kumming
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Lee Rich, December 9, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1421
v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D01-1808-F4-2925
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1421 | December 9, 2020 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] Michael Lee Rich (“Rich”) was serving a sentence through community
corrections when the State filed a petition alleging that Rich violated the terms
of his placement. After Rich admitted to violating several terms, the trial court
revoked his placement and ordered Rich to serve the balance of his sentence in
the Indiana Department of Correction (the “DOC”). Rich now appeals,
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his placement.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Rich received a five-year sentence for Burglary.1 The court ordered him to serve
the time in community corrections and authorized placement on work release.
[4] In October 2019, Rich was placed on work release. In February 2020, the State
filed a petition alleging that Rich violated the terms of work release by (1)
possessing cigarettes in November 2019; (2) failing to report his location for
more than four hours in December 2019; (3) being in an unauthorized area on
more than one occasion; (4) testing positive for THC on January 2, 2020; (5)
testing positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and THC on January
1
At a combined sentencing hearing, Rich received a separate five-year sentence in a different cause that was
imposed consecutively to the instant sentence. At times, the record refers to an aggregate sentence of ten
years. Because the appealed order ultimately affected only the instant sentence, we focus on that sentence.
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10, 2020; (6) possessing a lighter in February 2020; (7) possessing a “green leafy
synthetic lookalike substance” in February 2020; (8) failing to pay fees; and (9)
absconding from work release on February 21, 2020. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 153. The State asked the trial court to revoke Rich’s placement and order
Rich to serve the balance of his sentence in the Vigo County Jail or the DOC.
[5] At a July 2020 hearing, Rich denied that he absconded from placement but
otherwise admitted to the allegations. The court found that Rich violated the
rules and inquired about evidence “as to disposition.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. The
parties then presented evidence and argument. Among the evidence was
testimony that Rich absconded on February 21, 2020, the day the State filed the
petition. The State argued that the evidence “show[s] that [Rich] is clearly a
poor candidate for any type of [c]ommunity [c]orrections in the future.” Id. at
19. The court ultimately decided to revoke Rich’s placement, ordering Rich to
serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC. The court recommended that
Rich be placed in the Purposeful Incarceration program and noted that it would
consider a sentence modification upon successful completion of the program.
[6] Rich now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] “Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to
commitment to the [DOC] and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial
court.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). Because of similarities
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between community corrections and probation, the “standard of review for
revocation of a community corrections placement is the same standard as for a
probation revocation.” Bennett v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019).
That is, we review for an abuse of discretion, which occurs “when the decision
is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.[8] The trial court has broad discretion to revoke an alternative placement. See Cox,
706 N.E.2d at 549-50. Indeed, as the Indiana Supreme Court has observed,
“judges must have the ability to move with alacrity to protect public safety
when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences. Put
differently, obstacles to revoking an alternative sentence may diminish the
likelihood of community corrections placements being made in the first place.”
Id. at 550. Furthermore, a defendant “is not entitled to serve a sentence in
either probation or a community corrections program. Rather, placement in
either is a ‘matter of grace’ and a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a
right.’” Id. at 549 (quoting Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995)). Ultimately, once a trial court has “exercised its grace” and ordered an
alternative placement, the trial court “should have considerable leeway in
deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
[9] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5(b), if a person on community
corrections “violates the terms of the placement, the [State] may request that
the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or [the
DOC] for the remainder of the person’s sentence.” It is implicit, then, that the
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court has inherent authority to grant the State’s request.2 See Cox, 706 N.E.2d at
550 (noting that flexibility in revocation procedures is “necessary to permit the
court to exercise its inherent power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders”);
Flowers v. State, 101 N.E.3d 242, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that a court
may grant a request to revoke the placement and “consider[] other alternatives
as well”). Generally, revocation is a two-step process whereby the court must
first identify a violation of the terms, then it must “determine if the violation
warrants revocation[.]” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008).
[10] Rich does not dispute that he violated the terms of work release. Rather, he
challenges the decision to revoke his placement for violating those terms.3 In
challenging his placement in the DOC, Rich argues that he struggled with
substance abuse and was undergoing stress. He notes that his younger brother
had been diagnosed with cancer and that Rich was soon to be the father of
twins—stressors that led to a “backslide with sobriety.” Br. of Appellant at 10.
2
The statute pertaining to revoking probation enumerates actions a court may take upon the State’s request.
See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (stating that, upon finding that a person violated a condition of probation, the
court may continue the person on probation, extend the probationary period, or order execution of all or part
of a suspended sentence). However, the statute pertaining to revoking placement in community corrections
does not contain similar language regarding the court’s authority. Compare id. with I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5; see
Breda v. State, 142 N.E.3d 482, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (discussing the effect of a 2015 amendment).
3
Among Rich’s contentions is that, before revoking his placement for a failure to pay fees, the court should
have inquired into the reason for the failure to pay. Because Rich admitted to violating other terms, we need
not address this issue and will instead base our analysis on other admitted violations. See Jaynes v. State, 437
N.E.2d 137, 140 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (regarding certain grounds for revocation as mere surplusage).
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[11] Rich also points out that he did not admit to the allegation of absconding.4 He
argues that “some of the rule violations were minimal” and “were dealt with
adequately by the work release facility already.” Id. at 8. Rich asserts that, “for
each rule violation, [he] received a sanction from the work release center,
whether it be a verbal warning, increased restrictions on his freedom, or taking
of his credit time of up to 14 days per violation.” Id. at 11.
[12] Notably, even a single violation supports revoking the placement. See I.C. § 35-
38-2.6-5; cf. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013) (“[P]robation may
be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition.”); Cox, 706 N.E.2d at
550 (noting that “judges must have the ability to move with alacrity . . . when
adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences”). Although
there is evidence that Rich was undergoing stress, he was nevertheless bound by
the terms of work release. Shortly after being granted this conditional liberty,
Rich repeatedly violated the terms. Indeed, Rich failed to report his location for
several hours. He entered unauthorized areas on more than one occasion. He
also tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and THC.
Although Rich characterizes some violations as minimal, he displayed a pattern
of violating the terms. Moreover, Rich continued to violate the terms even after
the work release center imposed less-severe consequences. In light of Rich’s
4
Rich asserts that it is unclear whether the trial court found a violation for absconding, so it would be
improper to base the revocation on absconding. The testimony about absconding was presented after the
court found a violation and had turned to evidence “as to disposition.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. We note that
revocation procedures “are to be flexible.” Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550. In any case, we need not address this
issue and will instead base our opinion only on the admitted violations. See Jaynes, 437 N.E.2d at 140 n.3.
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ongoing disobedience, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking the placement and ordering Rich to serve his sentence in the DOC.
[13] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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