Wayne Anderson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                   FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                           Dec 10 2020, 8:41 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                            CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                             Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald E.C. Leicht                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Peru, Indiana                                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Wayne Anderson,                                         December 10, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-CR-1129
    v.                                              Appeal from the Howard Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       Appeal from the Howard Superior
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Court
    The Honorable William C.
    Menges, Jr., Judge and Special
    Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    34D01-1112-FC-294, 34D02-1112-
    FC-292, and 34C01-1604-F5-73
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020              Page 1 of 7
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Defendant, Wayne Anderson (Anderson), appeals the trial court’s
    revocation of his probation and imposition of his previously-suspended
    sentence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUES
    [3]   Anderson presents one issue for our review, which we restate as the following
    three issues:
    (1) Whether Anderson has forfeited his argument for additional credit time
    in his sentence imposed by the trial court in August of 2012;
    (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating his credit time
    in the current charge; and
    (3) Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct Anderson of his right
    to appeal.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   In October of 2011, Anderson made a purchase at Kroger with a counterfeit
    check in the amount of $144.04. On December 9, 2011, the State filed an
    Information, charging Anderson with Class C felony forgery under Cause
    number 34D01-1112-FC-292 (FC-292). On the same day he made the purchase
    at Kroger, Anderson also made a purchase at Marsh with a counterfeit check in
    the amount of $138.28 for which he was charged with a Class C felony forgery
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 2 of 7
    in Cause number 34D02-1112-FC-294 (FC-294). On August 7, 2012, Anderson
    was sentenced to eight years, with four years executed and the balance
    suspended to probation. He was granted a total of 123 days of credit time from
    January 24, 2012 through May 15, 2012, and from May 16, 2012 through May
    25, 2012. On June 6, 2014, Anderson commenced his probation.
    [5]   On April 1, 2016, the State filed an Information under Cause number 34C01-
    1604-F5-73 (F5-73), charging Anderson with Counts I-II, conspiracy to commit
    fraud on a financial institution, Level 5 felonies; Count III, counterfeiting, a
    Level 3 felony; Counts IV-VII, counterfeiting, Level 6 felonies; and an habitual
    offender enhancement. On September 27, 2017, Anderson pled guilty to Level
    5 felony conspiracy to commit fraud on a financial institution, in exchange for
    the remaining charges being dismissed by the State. The trial court sentenced
    Anderson to six years, to run concurrently to his remaining sentence in FC-292
    and FC-294.
    [6]   On May 23, 2019, Anderson’s sentence in all three Causes was modified and he
    entered the Howard County Re-entry Court. On February 26, 2020, Anderson
    failed to appear for a status hearing and the trial court issued a warrant for his
    arrest. On March 26, 2020, Anderson was terminated from the Re-entry
    Program and the State filed a petition to revoke Anderson’s suspended
    sentence. On May 5, 2020, he pled true to the allegations in the State’s petition
    to revoke. On May 7, 2020, during a factfinding hearing, the trial court
    concluded that Anderson had violated his probation and ordered the balance of
    his remaining sentence in all three Causes to be executed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 3 of 7
    [7]    Anderson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [8]    Probation is a matter of grace left to a trial court’s discretion, not a right to
    which a criminal defendant is entitled. Terpstra v. State, 
    138 N.E. 3d 278
    , 284
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. A probation violation hearing is a civil
    proceeding, and the State must prove the alleged probation violation by a
    preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id.
     Our standard of review of the sufficiency of
    the evidence supporting the revocation of probation is similar to our standard of
    review for other matters: we consider only the evidence most favorable to the
    judgment without regard to weight or credibility and will affirm if there is
    substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion
    that a probationer has violated any condition of probation. 
    Id.
    II. Credit Time in FC-292 & FC-294
    [9]    Claiming that he was entitled to day-to-day credit, Anderson contends that the
    trial court abused its discretion when it calculated its credit time for his original
    sentence in 2012.
    [10]   The record reflects that on August 7, 2012, Anderson was sentenced to eight
    years, with four years executed and the balance suspended to probation. At the
    sentencing hearing, he was granted a total of 123 days of credit time from
    January 24, 2012 through May 15, 2012, and from May 16, 2012 through May
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 4 of 7
    25, 2012. Indiana Appellate Rule 9 (A)(1) provides a party with thirty days
    after the entry of final judgment in which to file a timely appeal. “Unless the
    notice of appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited.” Ind. App.
    R. 9(A)(5). As Anderson failed to appeal his credit time calculation within
    thirty days of August 7, 2012, he has now forfeited his appeal on this issue.
    III. Credit Time in F5-73
    [11]   Next, Anderson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in the
    calculation of his credit time in F5-73. In F5-73, Anderson was sentenced to a
    Level 5 felony. “A person who is not a credit restricted felon and who is
    imprisoned for a crime other than a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor or
    imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime other than a Level 6 felony
    or misdemeanor is initially assigned to Class B.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4
    (b). “A
    person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three
    (3) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or
    sentencing.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1(c). Anderson served forty-one actual days while
    awaiting sentencing, for which the trial court gave him credit for fifty-five days
    by applying I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1(c). Therefore, the trial court properly calculated
    his credit time in F5-73 and did not abuse its discretion.
    IV. Right to Appeal
    [12]   Lastly, Anderson claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct him of
    his appellate rights at the close of the fact-finding hearing on the State’s petition
    to revoke his probation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 5 of 7
    [13]   Indiana Criminal Rule 11 (emphasis added) provides, in relevant part, that:
    Following the sentencing of a defendant after a trial or following
    a judgment revoking probation of a defendant found to have
    violated the terms of his probation after a contested felony probation
    revocation proceeding, the judge shall immediately advise the
    defendant as follows:
    (1) that he is entitled to take an appeal or file a motion to correct
    error;
    (2) that if he wishes to file a motion to correct error, it must be
    done within thirty (30) days of the sentencing;
    (3) that if he wishes to take an appeal, he must file a Notice of
    Appeal designating what is to be included in the record on appeal
    within thirty (30) days after the sentencing or within thirty (30)
    days after the motion to correct error is denied or deemed denied,
    if one is filed; if the Notice of Appeal is not timely filed, the right
    to appeal may be forfeited []
    The evidence reflects that on May 5, 2020, Anderson signed a waiver of rights,
    acknowledging that he changed his “plea from false to true in connection with
    the [p]etition to [r]evoke [] currently pending” against him. (Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II, p. 148). The sentencing order, entered on May 19, 2020 on the State’s
    petition, also recognized that Anderson withdrew his “former plea of false and
    enter[ed] a plea of true to the allegations contained” in the petition to revoke.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 153). Accordingly, the fact-finding hearing on the
    State’s petition was not a contested felony probation revocation proceeding,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 6 of 7
    and, pursuant to Criminal Rule 11, the trial court was not required to advise
    Anderson of his appellate rights following the imposition of the sentence.
    [14]   However, even if the trial court was required to give the appellate instruction,
    its failure to do so amounted to harmless error. Failure by a trial court to advise
    the defendant of his right to appeal is harmless if “defendant lost none of his
    rights by reason of the trial court’s initial failure to tell him what his rights were
    and has demonstrated no harm.” Carter v. State, 
    438 N.E.2d 738
    , 740-41 (Ind.
    1982). At the May 7, 2020 fact-finding hearing, the trial court informed
    Anderson that he was “entitled to appeal the sentence if he so desire[d]” but
    was not entitled to the appellate instruction. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 40).
    Anderson timely filed his notice to appeal and failed to now demonstrate any
    harm.
    CONCLUSION
    [15]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Anderson forfeited his appellate
    review for additional credit time in FC-292 and FC-294; the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in calculating his credit time in F5-73; and the trial court
    was not required to instruct Anderson of his right to appeal pursuant to
    Criminal Rule 11.
    [16]   We affirm.
    [17]   May, J. and Altice, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1129 | December 10, 2020   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20A-CR-1129

Filed Date: 12/10/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/10/2020