William R. Evans v. Keith Butts (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  Dec 23 2015, 9:06 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William R. Evans                                        Gregory F. Zoeller
    New Castle, Indiana                                     Attorney General
    Kyle Hunter
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    William R. Evans,                                       December 23, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    33A01-1402-MI-61
    v.                                              Appeal from the Henry Circuit
    Court
    Keith Butts,                                            The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    33C02-1310-MI-104
    Vaidik, Chief Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015         Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   William Evans was convicted of rape in 1986 and released on parole in 2012.
    Following a hearing, the parole board revoked his parole for four violations in
    2013. Evans filed a petition claiming that because two of the violations were
    improper, he was being illegally held in custody. However, even if those two
    violations were improper, the other two violations support the revocation. We
    therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Evans’ petition and affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Evans, who was convicted of rape and five additional felonies in 1986, was
    released on parole in April 2012. Relevant terms of his parole included: 1)
    Rule 2 – notify your supervising parole officer of a change in your residence
    address; and 2) Rule 10 – comply with all directives from your supervising
    parole officer. The Parole Board also imposed the Parole Stipulations for Sex
    Offenders, State Form 49108, which included the following relevant terms of
    parole: 3) Rule 10(4) – no contact with any children, including your own; and
    4) Rule 10(5) – no living within 1000 feet of a place where children could
    reasonably be expected to congregate. The Indiana Parole Board imposed
    Rules 10(4) and 10(5) without including a determination that he posed a risk to
    minors.
    [3]   Evans was alleged to have violated the terms and conditions of his parole in
    October 2012. Following a hearing, the parole board revoked Evans’ parole for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015   Page 2 of 6
    multiple violations in December 2012, and he was incarcerated in the New
    Castle Correctional Facility. Specifically, the parole board found that Evans
    committed the following parole violations: 1) Rule 2 – failed to notify his
    parole supervising officer of a change in his residence address; 2) Rule 10 –
    failed to comply with his supervising officer’s directive that he not move to a
    specific address in Fairfield, Ohio, where his girlfriend and daughter lived; 3)
    Rule 10(4) – lived in a residence with six minor children; and 4) Rule 10(5) –
    lived within 1000 feet of soccer fields where children could reasonably be
    expected to congregate.
    [4]   In October 2013, Evans filed a habeas corpus petition alleging he was being
    illegally held in custody by Keith Butts, superintendent of the correctional
    facility, because his parole had been improperly revoked. Evans specifically
    explained that Rules 10(4) and 10(5), the parole stipulations for sex offenders,
    did not apply to him because the victim of his assault was an adult. Butts filed
    a motion to dismiss Evans’ petition, which the trial court granted. Evans
    appealed, and shortly after he filed his appellate brief, Butts filed a motion to
    remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the Indiana
    Supreme Court’s decision in Bleeke v. Lemmons, 
    6 N.E.3d 907
     (Ind. 2014).
    There, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that Bleeke’s parole conditions
    limiting his rights to interact with his children were not reasonably related to his
    successful reintegration into the community. 
    Id. at 917
    .
    [5]   On remand, Butts filed a motion for summary disposition. The trial court
    properly treated Evans’ petition claiming that his parole had been improperly
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015   Page 3 of 6
    revoked as one for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court explained
    that pursuant to Bleeke, a determination whether Rules 10(4) and 10(5) were
    reasonably related to Evans’ successful reintegration into the community would
    require further evaluation and fact finding by the parole board. However, the
    trial court concluded that such an evaluation was unnecessary in this case
    because Evans also violated Parole Rules 2 and 10, which supported the
    revocation of his parole. The trial court therefore denied Evans’ petition and
    granted Butts’ motion for summary disposition. Evans appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   At the outset we note that Evans proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se
    is held to the rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith
    v. Donahue, 
    907 N.E.2d 553
    , 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert.
    dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not
    know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to
    accomplish. 
    Id.
     When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for
    us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule
    for the orderly and proper conduct of the appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 
    844 N.E.2d 494
    , 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In light of this standard, we further note that
    although Evans raises seven issues in his appellate brief, we consolidate them
    all into one: whether there is sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his
    parole.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015   Page 4 of 6
    [7]   In Harris we held that a challenge to revocation of parole will be treated as a
    petition for post-conviction relief. See Harris v. State, 
    836 N.E.2d 267
    , 272 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. As such, Evans bears the burden of establishing
    relief by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id.
     On appeal from the denial of
    post-conviction relief, we will only disturb a post-conviction court’s decision
    when the evidence is uncontradicted and leads to but one conclusion, and the
    post-conviction court reached the opposite conclusion. 
    Id.
    [8]   The practice of releasing prisoners on parole is an integral part of the
    penological system. 
    Id.
     In Indiana, a prisoner is released on parole only upon
    his agreement to certain conditions. 
    Id.
     A parole agreement is a contract
    between the prisoner and the State and may be subject to certain conditions
    imposed at the time of the granting of parole. 
    Id. at 272-73
    . Where conditions
    have been imposed, the parolee is bound by them. 
    Id. at 273
    . The parole board
    has the power to determine whether prisoners serving an indeterminate
    sentence should be released on parole and under what conditions. 
    Id.
     The
    conditions must be reasonably related to the parolee’s successful reintegration
    into the community and not unduly restrictive of a fundamental right. 
    Id.
     The
    parole board has broad discretion in determining whether or not to revoke an
    offender’s parole. Hawkins v. Jenkins, 
    374 N.E.2d 496
    , 500 (Ind. 1978).
    [9]   Here, the trial court concluded that Evans’ violation of Rules 2 and 10 alone
    supported the revocation of his parole. Evans challenges neither the sufficiency
    of the evidence to support his violation of these rules nor the revocation of his
    parole based upon his violation of them. Further, because Evans’ parole was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015   Page 5 of 6
    revoked on the basis of these two violations, we do not need to reach Evans’
    Bleeke argument. The evidence does not lead unerringly and unmistakably to a
    decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court, and we find no
    error in the post-conviction court’s denial of Evans’ petition and the grant of
    Butts’ motion.
    [10]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1402-MI-61| December 23, 2015   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 33A01-1402-MI-61

Filed Date: 12/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2015