Krasimir Pavlov v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not
    be regarded as precedent or cited
    before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of
    res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
    law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    DONALD J. FREW                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    JESSE R. DRUM
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Jun 12 2014, 10:27 am
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    KRASIMIR PAVLOV,                                  )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                       )
    )
    vs.                                 )     No. 02A03-1311-CR-443
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                 )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                        )
    APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Wendy Davis, Judge
    Cause No. 02D05-1303-FD-261
    June 12, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    ROBB, Judge
    Case Summary and Issue
    Krasimir Pavlov appeals his convictions for battery and criminal trespass, raising a
    single issue for our review: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
    Pavlov’s convictions. Concluding there was sufficient evidence to support Pavlov’s
    convictions, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On March 3, 2013, Pavlov entered a coffee shop in Fort Wayne and attempted to
    order a beer, which the shop did not serve. He then ordered a coffee and proceeded to sit
    down on the floor. An employee of the coffee shop, Courtney Burgess, asked Pavlov to
    sit in a chair. Pavlov sat in a chair then slammed his coffee down, spilling it everywhere.
    Burgess asked Pavlov to leave. After Pavlov did not leave, Burgess called the police.
    Fort Wayne Police Officers Barry Pruser and Tina Blackburn responded to the call that
    there was an unwanted party inside the coffee shop.
    When the officers arrived, Burgess pointed at Pavlov, who was crouching on the
    ground in a fetal position. The officers asked Pavlov to stand up and follow them
    outside, and Pavlov complied. Once outside, Officer Pruser asked Pavlov to provide
    identification, at which point Pavlov slapped Officer Pruser in the side of the head,
    knocking off his glasses and causing him pain. A brief struggle ensued, and Pavlov was
    arrested.
    The State charged Pavlov with battery, a Class D felony, and criminal trespass, a
    Class A misdemeanor. A jury trial was held in September 2013, and the jury found
    Pavlov guilty as charged. Pavlov received concurrent executed sentences of one year and
    2
    one hundred eighty-three days for battery and one year for criminal trespass. This appeal
    followed.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    When reviewing a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, the reviewing court
    will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we must
    respect “the jury’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence.” McHenry v. State,
    
    820 N.E.2d 124
    , 126 (Ind. 2005) (citation omitted). We consider only the probative
    evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. 
    Id. And we
    must affirm “if
    the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have
    allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    II. Sufficiency of Evidence
    Pavlov argues on appeal that the State did not present sufficient evidence to
    support either of his two convictions. We address each conviction below and conclude
    the State offered sufficient evidence to prove both crimes.
    A. Criminal Trespass
    A person commits criminal trespass when he, “not having a contractual interest in
    the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another
    person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person’s agent.” Ind.
    Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2). Pavlov contends that there was insufficient evidence presented
    at trial to convict him of this crime because the State neglected to have Burgess identify
    Pavlov at trial as the person who had refused to leave the coffee shop. The State
    3
    concedes that an in-court identification was not made by Burgess. However, it points out
    that the police arrived at the coffee house in response to a complaint of an unwanted party
    inside the coffee shop and that employees in the coffee shop pointed out Pavlov when the
    officers arrived. We believe this evidence is sufficient to create an inference that Pavlov
    was the person who refused to leave the coffee shop when asked by Burgess. Therefore,
    there was sufficient evidence to identify Pavlov as the trespasser.
    Pavlov also maintains that the evidence was not sufficient to show he knowingly
    committed criminal trespass.1 Pavlov’s argument on this point results primarily from a
    misreading of a portion of the trial transcript where Burgess states she is unable to
    explain how she knew Pavlov could understand her requests for him to leave. That said,
    the evidence is sufficient to show Pavlov was aware of his conduct, as he was able to
    understand and comply with other requests made by Burgess and the officers during the
    same event. The evidence was sufficient to prove Pavlov acted with the requisite mens
    rea.
    B. Battery
    Next, Pavlov claims the State failed to prove he committed battery against Officer
    Pruser either “knowingly” or “intentionally.”                    Pavlov’s argument relies on his own
    testimony given at trial that he has been diagnosed with “post-traumatic disorder” and
    “bi-polar [sic].” Transcript at 140. As the State points out, Pavlov did not raise an
    insanity defense at trial or otherwise claim he was mentally incapable of harboring the
    requisite mens rea. The State also points to testimony by Officer Pruser that indicates
    1
    A person acts “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is
    doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b).
    4
    Pavlov’s act of slapping him in the head was knowing and voluntary. We view Pavlov’s
    argument as a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
    Conclusion
    Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence to support Pavlov’s convictions
    for criminal trespass and battery, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A03-1311-CR-443

Filed Date: 6/12/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021