Matthew Hostetler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Feb 20 2019, 8:51 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Assistant Section Chief, Criminal
Appeals
Erik J. Bryant
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Matthew Hostetler, February 20, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-265
v. Appeal from the Ripley Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey Sharp,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
69D01-1603-F6-62
Darden, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-265 | February 20, 2019 Page 1 of 7
Statement of the Case
[1] Appellant Matthew Hostetler appeals the trial court’s imposition of a portion of
his previously suspended sentence following his admission to violating his
probation. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Hostetler presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the
trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve a portion of his
previously suspended sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 9, 2016, Hostetler pleaded guilty to battery with moderate bodily
injury as a Level 6 felony resulting from his attack on his step-father while
1
armed with a knife. The trial court sentenced him to 910 days with 545 days
suspended to probation. The terms of Hostetler’s probation prohibited him
from committing another criminal offense.
[4] On November 2, 2017, the State filed a petition alleging Hostetler had violated
his probation by committing a new criminal offense, specifically escape as a
Level 6 felony. At a hearing on the State’s petition on January 17, 2018,
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).
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Hostetler admitted the violation. The court then ordered him to serve 365 days
of his suspended sentence and terminated his probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Hostetler contends the trial court abused its discretion when, upon revoking his
probation, it ordered him to serve a portion of his previously suspended
sentence. A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence on probation; rather,
such placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not
a right. Davis v. State, 743 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans denied.
Further, probation is a criminal sanction for which a convicted defendant
specifically agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of
imprisonment. Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied. These restrictions are designed to ensure that the probation serves
as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the public is not harmed by a
probationer living within the community. Jones v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1146, 1148
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[6] At the time of Hostetler’s violation, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) (2015)
provided that if the court finds a violation of a condition of probation, it may:
(1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying the conditions;
(2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year; and/or
(3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial
sentencing. (Emphasis added). A trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation
violations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wilkerson v. State, 918
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N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
[7] We begin with the incidents leading up to the present violation. Hostetler had
been living with his mother’s ex-husband when the two men got into an
argument. His mother’s ex-husband threatened to kick him out so, “in fear of
being homeless,” Hostetler “basically panicked and started a house fire.” Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 8. Based on this incident, he was charged with arson.
[8] While Hostetler was out on bond for his arson charge, he attacked his step-
father with a knife and was charged with battery with moderate bodily injury,
the underlying charge in this case.
[9] Hostetler was subsequently convicted of the arson and sentenced to five years of
probation served on house arrest. While he was on house arrest, he cut off his
ankle bracelet because he was “about to get evicted and [he] panicked.” Id. at
7. Hostetler was charged with the offense of escape in a new cause, and the
State also filed a petition to revoke his probation in this cause. He was
convicted of the escape charge and was sentenced to 730 days, suspended to
probation.
[10] In his brief to this Court, Hostetler asserts that several mitigating factors
warrant a more lenient sentence. These factors include his acceptance of
responsibility which saved the State time and money, the fact that his violation
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was a relatively minor one, the existence of his mental health condition, and his
work history.
[11] When imposing a sentence in a probation revocation proceeding, the trial court
is not required to consider mitigating circumstances, with one exception: the
probationer’s mental state. Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 n.2 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995). Specifically, it is the probationer’s mental state “at the time
and under the circumstances of the alleged violation” that is to be considered.
Id. at 222. Nevertheless, while the trial court is obligated in a revocation
proceeding to consider evidence of a defendant’s mental disease or defect as a
factor in its dispositional determination, that evidence is not dispositive of a
case. Id. at 222-23. Rather, it is well within the prerogative of the court to
determine that, under the circumstances of a particular case, the defendant’s
alleged mental condition does not excuse or mitigate the probation violation.
Id. at 223.
[12] At the hearing, Hostetler asked the court to consider that he pleaded guilty but
mentally ill to the arson charge “because [he] was off of [his] medication when
the fire happened.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 9. He also stated that he had been receiving
treatment since his placement on house arrest. This information showed the
trial court only that Hostetler’s alleged mental condition had an effect on his
behavior at the time he committed arson. The violation at issue here is the escape
charge. Thus, with regard to Hostetler’ mental state at the time he committed
escape, this information shows, at most, that he was receiving treatment.
Therefore, Hostetler’s statements at the revocation hearing that he was
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receiving treatment at the time he violated his probation by committing the
offense of escape were not so conclusive as to compel the court to find that the
probation violation was excused or mitigated by his alleged mental condition.
[13] In addition, Hostetler appears to invoke Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) by arguing
that the court’s imposition of 365 days of his previously suspended sentence is
error “in light of the nature of the violation and the status of the offender.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 4. Rule 7(B) review and revision of sentences, however, does
not apply to sanctions imposed in probation revocation proceedings. Prewitt,
878 N.E.2d at 188 (whether court’s sanction is inappropriate in light of nature
of offense and character of offender “is not the correct standard to apply when
reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation violation”).
[14] At the time of disposition, Hostetler was only twenty years old. Yet at this
relatively young age, he had already accumulated convictions of arson, battery
with moderate bodily injury, and escape. He committed the battery while out
on bond on the arson charge, and he committed the escape while on probation
for the battery. Moreover, he claims his probation violation was minor and that
he simply “was not where he was supposed to be.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10.
However, he testified at his revocation hearing that he cut off his ankle bracelet
and was missing from house arrest until he was apprehended the following
afternoon.
[15] Hostetler has demonstrated his unwillingness to comply with the conditions of
his probation and to take advantage of the opportunities for alternatives to
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incarceration afforded him by the trial court. Here, the trial court graciously
ordered him to serve only a portion of his previously suspended sentence and
closed out his probation early. We find no error.
Conclusion
[16] For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in ordering Hostetler to serve a portion of his previously suspended
sentence upon revocation of his probation in this matter.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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