In Re the Involuntary Commitment of: L.T. v. Columbus Regional Hospital Mental Health Center (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Apr 26 2017, 6:51 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the
CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
Benjamin Loheide Steven J. Cohen
Law Office of Benjamin Loheide Zeigler Cohen & Koch
Columbus, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re the Involuntary April 26, 2017
Commitment of: Court of Appeals Case No.
03A01-1611-MH-2543
L.T.,
Appeal from the Bartholomew
Appellant-Respondent, Superior Court
The Hon. James D. Worton, Judge
v.
Trial Court Cause No.
03D01-1609-MH-5380
Columbus Regional Hospital
Mental Health Center,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In early September of 2016, Appellant-Respondent L.T. was found wandering
the streets of Franklin, Indiana, and was admitted to Appellee-Petitioner
Columbus Regional Hospital Mental Health Center (“the Hospital”). L.T.
believed that unknown persons were attempting to control her through pod-
casts. The Hospital treated L.T. with anti-psychotic medication and kept her
for approximately two weeks. L.T. refused to take advantage of any of the
placement options offered by the Hospital, and returned the next day,
essentially looking for a place to stay, leaving when told she could not stay
without being admitted. Around a week later, L.T. was found sitting outside
during a storm and was returned to the Hospital. L.T. had not taken
medications as directed since her discharge and was still experiencing similar
delusions as before. A Hospital psychiatrist diagnosed L.T. with schizophrenia,
delusions, auditory hallucinations, and paranoia. Eventually, the Hospital
applied for a commitment order. After the commitment hearing, the trial court
found L.T. to be mentally ill and gravely disabled and ordered her involuntarily
committed. L.T. contends that the Hospital failed to establish that she was
gravely disabled. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Before September 29, 2016, L.T. had a significant history of mental illness,
including a two-year commitment at the Richmond State Hospital that began in
2013. Following that commitment, L.T. was released to Centerstone Group,
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which she left of her own accord. Since leaving Centerstone, L.T. has struggled
with housing, has not complied with treatment, and “fell out of the system.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 9.
[3] On September 6, 2016, L.T. was admitted to the Hospital after being found
wandering around Franklin. L.T. had been homeless for approximately two to
three weeks and “thought she was being controlled through pod-casts and that
electronics such as cell phones[] and I-pads were somehow controlling her.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 6. L.T. also believed that she was a victim of voodoo, persons
were burning her hair and skin, and somebody had recently shot at her. The
Hospital started L.T. on anti-psychotic medication and held her for
approximately two weeks before discharging her on September 19, 2016.
Although the Hospital offered L.T. group home, shelter, and subacute facility
placements, L.T. was not interested in any of those options and was “quite
adamant that she wanted to find her own apartment.” Tr. Vol. II p. 6.
[4] L.T. returned to the Hospital on September 20, 2016, asking if she could stay “a
few days[,]” but left when told that she would have to be admitted to the
Hospital in order to stay. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. On September 28, 2016, L.T. was
returned to the Hospital after being found sitting outside during a storm, but
was not admitted until the next day. By this point, police had become involved
and were concerned about L.T.’s mental state. L.T. had not taken Zyprexa as
directed after being discharged on September 19, 2016. L.T. was verbalizing
the same delusions as she had previously, i.e., her beliefs that persons were
trying to kill her, she had been “framed[,]” and “something happened” during
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her previous admission to the Hospital. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Dr. Michael Stark, the
Hospital’s inpatient psychiatrist, diagnosed L.T. with schizophrenia, delusions,
auditory hallucinations, and paranoia. On September 29, 2016, an application
for emergency detention of L.T. was filed on behalf of the Hospital.
[5] On October 7, 2016, a commitment hearing was held, at which Dr. Stark and
L.T. testified. In the opinion of Dr. Stark, L.T.’s significant delusions and
paranoia has led to her difficulty in providing housing for herself. L.T. has not
complied with medications upon discharge from the Hospital, and her attempts
to secure assistance from family or friends were unsuccessful. Dr. Stark also
opined that involuntary commitment would be helpful to ensure compliance
with medicinal therapy and to explore options for housing and that out-patient
treatment would be inadequate. Dr. Stark believes that the least restrictive
environment in which L.T. could receive treatment for her mental illness would
be a regular commitment1 and that state hospitalization would likely be
necessary.
[6] L.T. testified concerning the pod-casts, telling the trial court, “I don’t know
how they do it, through Satellite, or how they do it, but they will put talking in
and around by head” and claimed to have recorded some of that talking. Tr.
1
In Indiana, an adult person may be civilly committed either voluntarily or involuntarily. Involuntary civil
commitment may occur under four circumstances if certain statutorily regulated conditions are satisfied,
including “Regular Commitment” for an indefinite period of time that may exceed 90 days pursuant to
Indiana Code chapter 12-26-7.
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Vol. II p. 12. When L.T. played back what she claimed was a tape recording of
the voices she had heard, nothing was audible. Following the hearing, the trial
court ordered a regular commitment, finding that L.T. was suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia, was gravely disabled, and was in need of regular
commitment for a period expected to exceed ninety days. The trial court’s
order also found that state hospitalization was the least restrictive environment
suitable for necessary care and treatment and authorized the mental health staff
to give L.T. whatever treatment was deemed necessary, regardless of consent.
Discussion and Decision
Whether L.T.’s Involuntary Commitment Is
Supported by Sufficient Evidence
[7] L.T. contends that the Hospital produced insufficient evidence to sustain her
involuntary commitment.
To obtain an involuntary regular commitment of an individual, a
“petitioner is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or
gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that
individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (2012).
….
“[T]he purpose of civil commitment proceedings is dual: to
protect the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose
liberty is at stake.” In re Commitment of Roberts, 723 N.E.2d 474,
476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. not sought.… To satisfy the
requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary
commitment must be shown “by clear and convincing evidence
…. [which] not only communicates the relative importance our
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legal system attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary
commitment, but … also has the function of reducing the chance
of inappropriate commitments.” Commitment of J.B. v. Midtown
Mental Health Ctr., 581 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted), trans. denied.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
determination made under the statutory requirement of clear and
convincing evidence, an appellate court will affirm if,
“considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable
inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing
witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find [the
necessary elements] proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind.
1988).
Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind.
2015) (footnote omitted, first and second ellipses added).
[8] The trial court found that L.T. was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and
she does not contest the conclusion that she suffered from a mental illness. L.T.
does, however, contest the trial court’s finding that she was gravely disabled as
defined in Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96:
“Gravely disabled”, for purposes of IC 12-26, means a condition
in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger
of coming to harm because the individual:
(1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food, clothing,
shelter, or other essential human needs; or
(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration
of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that
results in the individual’s inability to function independently.
[9] Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 is written in the disjunctive, requiring a
petitioner to prove only one prong of the definition of “gravely disabled”:
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As we have often noted, because this statute is written in the
disjunctive, a trial court’s finding of grave disability survives if we
find that there was sufficient evidence to prove either that the
individual is unable to provide for his basic needs or that his
judgment, reasoning, or behavior is so impaired or deteriorated
that it results in his inability to function independently.
Civil Commitment of W.S. v. Eskenazi Health, Midtown Cmty. Mental Health, 23
N.E.3d 29, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. So, to the extent that L.T.
argues that the Hospital was required to establish both prongs of section 12-7-2-
96, this is incorrect.
[10] That said, we conclude that, at the very least, the Hospital produced sufficient
evidence to establish by clear and convincing evidence that L.T. was unable to
provide shelter for herself prior to her commitment. Following her release from
a two-year commitment at Richmond State Hospital, L.T. was released to
Centerstone Group, after which she struggled to find housing. On September 6,
2016, when L.T. was admitted to the Hospital after being found wandering
around Franklin, Indiana, she had been homeless for approximately two to
three weeks. After the Hospital discharged L.T. on September 19, 2016, she
was not interested in any of the placement options offered by the Hospital and
was “quite adamant that she wanted to find her own apartment.” Tr. Vol. II p.
6. L.T. returned to the Hospital the very next day, asking if she could stay “a
few days[,]” but left when told that she would have to be admitted to the
Hospital in order to stay. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. On September 28, 2016, L.T. was
returned to the Hospital after being found sitting outside during a storm.
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[11] In addition to the substantial evidence that L.T. had not secured housing for
herself in the days and weeks prior to her commitment, there was evidence that
she would be unable to do so moving forward. Dr. Stark opined that L.T.’s
mental illness, specifically her significant delusions and paranoia, led to her
inability to secure housing. Moreover, the record indicates that there are no
family or friends willing or able to provide L.T. with housing or assistance, and
nobody appeared at the October 7, 2016, hearing to support her. The Hospital
established by clear and convincing evidence that L.T. is mentally ill and
gravely disabled pursuant to Indiana Code subsection 12-7-2-96(1).
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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