Gage Peters v. Dennis J Quakenbush, II ( 2024 )

FILED
Sep 13 2024, 8:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Gage Peters,
Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Dennis J. Quakenbush, II, and Christina Reagle,
Appellees-Defendants
September 13, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-PL-405
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge
The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
29D03-2308-PL-7853
Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
Judge Bailey concurs in result with separate opinion.
Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion.
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Altice, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Eight years after being convicted of a sex offense in Illinois, where he was
required to register as a sex offender for ten years, Gage Peters visited Florida
for a week. While there, he registered as a sex offender as required by Florida
law, which imposes a lifetime registration requirement on sex offenders. Peters
later moved to Indiana, where he was informed that, due to his Florida
obligation, he was subject to a lifetime registration requirement pursuant to Ind.
Code § 11-8-8-19(f), often called the other-jurisdiction provision.
[2] Peters filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Hamilton County
Sheriff Dennis J. Quakenbush, II (the Sheriff) and Christina Reagle, in her
official capacity as the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction
(the DOC), seeking a declaration that, under Indiana law, he is required to
register only for a period of ten years. The DOC filed a motion to dismiss, in
which the Sheriff joined. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
Sheriff and the DOC. Peters appeals, claiming that he is not subject to a
lifetime registration requirement.
[3] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[4] Peters is currently a resident of Indiana. In October 2013, he was convicted in
Illinois of criminal sexual abuse/force, which Peters asserts is substantially
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similar to Indiana’s offense of Level 6 felony sexual battery. Illinois required
that he register as a sex offender for a period of ten years, which he did, with his
ten-year period beginning on October 15, 2013.
[5] In August 2016, Peters moved to Indiana and complied with his duty to register
here. The DOC advised him by letter that, under Indiana’s Sex and Violent
Offender Act (SORA), his registration period was ten years. The letter further
advised, “In the event circumstances related to your registration requirement
change, this determination is subject to modification.” Appendix at 18.
[6] In January 2021, Peters moved back to Illinois. He visited Florida from
September 28 through October 4, 2021. Pursuant to Florida law that requires a
sex offender to register if they are in the state for a period of three days or more,
Peters registered in Florida and provided the address of his temporary residence
there. As part of his registration, Peters signed a “Notice of Sexual Predator
and Sexual Offender Obligations” (the Notice). Id. at 21. In the Notice, he
agreed: “I MUST maintain registration for the duration of my life. {F.S.
943.0435(11); 776.21(6)(I)}.” Id. at 23. The Notice also advised Peters that his
registration would be published on the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement’s (FDLE) public sexual predator and offender website. When his
visit to Florida ended, Peters returned to Illinois and continued with the
requirements of his registration there.
[7] On May 27, 2022, after moving back to Indiana, Peters registered with the
Hamilton County Sheriff Department (HCSD). HCSD’s “Sex or Violent
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Offender Registration Form” reflected that Peters’s “Registration Start Date”
was October 15, 2013 and his “Registration End Date” was October 15, 2023.
Id. at 29. Peters received and signed a separate form with advisements of an
offender’s duties and obligations. Among other things, Peters was advised: “A
person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction
shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period
described in this section, whichever is longer. (See IC 11-8-8-14 and IC 11-8-8-
19).” Id. at 31.
[8] In February 2023, HCSD sent Peters a letter advising him that, following
review of his file, “[i]t has been determined that you are required to register for
Lifetime as Sex Offender” and that his registration would be updated
accordingly. 1 Id. at 35. The letter explained that the change in status was “due
to the State of Florida registration laws when you resided there.” Id.[9] On August 21, 2023, Peters filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against
the Sheriff and the DOC, seeking relief from the change in his registration
period. The DOC filed a motion to dismiss, in which the Sheriff later joined.
Because the DOC attached files from the Florida and national sex offender
public websites, the trial court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order on
January 29, 2024, finding that no genuine of material fact existed and that
1
According to Peters, he initiated an administrative appeal through the DOC but, to date, has not received a
response.
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“[Peters] is required to register for life in the state of Indiana because he is
required to do so in the state of Florida.” Id. at 134. The court dismissed
Peters’s complaint for declaratory judgment and entered judgment as a matter
of law in favor of the DOC and the Sheriff. Peters now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
[10] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Here, the
relevant facts are undisputed. The only issue is the proper interpretation of the
other-jurisdiction provision. Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that we
review de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Tyson v. State, 51
N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016). Our primary goal in interpreting any statute is to
effectuate legislative intent. N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. 2013). If a
statute is clear and unambiguous, courts do not apply any rules of construction
other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Id.[11] As is relevant to this appeal, the Indiana legislature amended SORA in 2006 to
add the following category of registrants: “a person who is required to register
as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction.” Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-4.5(b)(1)
(defining a sex offender as “a person who is required to register as a sex
offender in any jurisdiction”) and -5(b)(1) (similarly defining a sex and violent
offender). In 2007, SORA was amended to address the length of registration
for this category of registrants, adding the “other-jurisdiction” provision: “A
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person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction shall
register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this
section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) (emphasis added).
[12] The parties agree that an offender who visits Florida and stays for more than
three days in a calendar year must register in Florida and that all offenders are
required to register for life. See generally Fla. Stat. § 943.0435. Applying the
other-jurisdiction provision to Peters, the trial court found that Peters was
required to register for life in Indiana. Peters asserts, for a couple of reasons,
that his “temporary requirement to register in Florida while he was on vacation
did not follow him home to Indiana.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.
A. “Independent Requirement” to Register
[13] Peters’s primary claim is that the other-jurisdiction provision “does not apply to
him because he has no independent requirement to register” in Florida. Id. at 9.
He maintains that because Florida imposed the lifetime registration obligation
based on the Illinois conviction – and not due to a Florida conviction, which
would have provided an “independent” basis for that state to require
registration – the other-jurisdiction provision does not apply. Peters’s argument
in this regard is based on our court’s recent decision in Marroquin v. Reagle, 228
N.E.3d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), transfer pending, where Marroquin was
convicted in Indiana of an offense that did not trigger a requirement to register
as a sex offender in Indiana. Marroquin moved to Virginia, where he was
required to register for life due to his Indiana conviction. Upon relocating back
to Indiana, Marroquin was informed that he was subject to a lifetime
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registration requirement. Marroquin sought a declaratory judgment that he
need not register in Indiana, which the trial court denied.
[14] Marroquin appealed, contending that that the other-jurisdiction provision does
not apply “when there is no ‘independent requirement’ to register” in the other
jurisdiction. Id. at 1150. A panel of this court agreed, holding that since
Marroquin had no independent requirement to register in the other jurisdiction
– there, Virginia, which required him to register strictly based on his Indiana
conviction – he was not subject to lifetime registration in Indiana under the
other-jurisdiction provision. Peters argues that in his case, just as in Marroquin,
there was no independent requirement that he register in Florida – as his
obligation to register there was based on his Illinois conviction – and, therefore,
he is not subject to a lifetime registration period in Indiana.
[15] We respectfully disagree with our colleagues in Marroquin and decline to follow
it. In concluding that the other-jurisdiction provision did not apply to
Marroquin, the court reasoned, “[T]he purpose of [the provision] is to ensure
that a person who is required to register in another jurisdiction because of a sex
offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid registration by moving to Indiana.” Id. at
1151 (italics added). However, the plain language of the other-jurisdiction
provision does not require that the obligation to register in the other state be
“because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction.” Indeed, it makes no reference to
the state where the crime was committed. Rather, the statute states only that
“[a] person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any
jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction[.]”
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I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). The Marroquin decision thus reads words into the statute
that are not there. Finding, as we do, that the other-jurisdiction provision is
unambiguous, we will not wade into attempting to discern the statute’s
intended purpose. And we decline to adopt the Marroquin panel’s position that,
in order for the other-jurisdiction provision to apply, the other state’s obligation
must be based on an “independent requirement” to register “because of a sex
offense in that jurisdiction.” 228 N.E.3d at 1151.
[16] Rather, we are guided by Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016). There,
our Supreme Court upheld the Indiana registration requirement of an offender
who was required to register in Iowa as a sex offender based on a prior Indiana
conviction, and, upon moving back to Indiana, was notified that he was
required to register as a serious violent felon. On appeal, Ammons sought relief
from the registration requirement claiming it violated Indiana’s ex post facto
clause because, at the time he committed the offense, Indiana had no
registration requirement.
[17] The Ammons Court upheld the requirement to register, explaining that, when
Ammons moved back to Indiana, “Indiana law required . . . that offenders who
are under a registration obligation in another state must register when they
move to Indiana.” 50 N.E.3d at 144 (citing I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) and -5(b)(1)).
Although decided in the context of an ex post facto claim, the result reached in
Ammons was based on the fact that Ammons had moved back to Indiana from
Iowa, where he had a registration requirement due to his Indiana conviction.
In other words, despite the lack of an independent requirement in Iowa for
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Ammons to register, the Supreme Court applied the other-jurisdiction statute
and required him to register here upon moving back from Iowa. 2
[18] Our decision today is also consistent with this court’s recent holding in Shibli v.
State, 231 N.E.3d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), transfer pending, where Shibli was
convicted of Class C felony child molesting in 1998 and, after serving a period
of incarceration, was released to parole. At the time of his conviction, SORA
required that he register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. In January
2003, he transferred his parole to Florida, which required him to register as a
sex offender for life. When he moved back to Indiana in 2021, he did not
register as a sex offender, and the State later charged him with two counts of
failure to register. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges, and
on appeal, he asserted that application of the other-jurisdiction provision –
enacted in 2007 – violated Indiana’s ex post facto clause.
[19] Among other reasons, Shibli challenged his registration requirement because it
was “based solely on Florida law, and not on any additional registerable
offense,” which we find to be akin to Peters’s claim that the other-jurisdiction
provision is inapplicable to him because Florida lacked any “independent
2
The Marroquin court acknowledged Ammons but found it did not control Marroquin’s appeal because
Ammons did not address Marroquin’s statutory argument that the other-jurisdiction provision did not apply to
him. This analysis overlooks the doctrine of judicial restraint, directing that we “must refrain from deciding
constitutional questions unless no non-constitutional grounds present themselves for resolving the case under
consideration.” Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, if the other-jurisdiction
statute did not apply at all, the Ammons Court would have so said and avoided reaching Ammons’s
constitutional ex post facto claim.
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requirement” for imposing the lifetime registration obligation. Id. at 283. The
Shibli court expressly rejected the “lack of any additional registerable offense”
argument, stating,
[I]t “is immaterial to the analysis whether Indiana law is
maintaining, extending, or modifying its own duties or those of
another state. Likewise, it is irrelevant where or when the
conviction occurred, as long as another state imposed a lawful
registration obligation on the offender[.]”
Id. at 284 (quoting Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th
Cir. 2021)). Here, Florida imposed a lawful lifetime registration requirement,
and Peters was subject to it, pursuant to the other-jurisdiction provision, when
he moved to Indiana.
B. Public Notification versus Offender Registration
[20] In challenging application of the other-jurisdiction provision, Peters also
suggests that his visit to Florida triggered only “a temporary obligation” for him
to register while he was in the state but, once he left, “he no longer has a duty to
register in Florida.” Appellant’s Brief at 9, 14-15. Peters concedes that his profile
remains on Florida’s FDLE online sex offender registry but argues that the
inclusion of an individual’s profile on a registry “serves to notify the community
of the person’s presence in the state but does not impose an independent duty
on the person to register, nor does it alter or extend one’s duty to register.” Id.
at 14. Peters’s argument appears to be that because he is not currently required
to report in person to Florida law enforcement or update his registration, there
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was no current registration requirement in Florida to transfer to Indiana under
the other-jurisdiction provision. We are unpersuaded.
[21] At the time he moved to Indiana in 2022, Peters was under a lifetime obligation
in Florida to register as a sex offender. The fact that he currently does not need
to report in person to Florida police is not dispositive. Peters’s information
remains on Florida’s public website, and if he were to re-enter Florida, he
would indeed have a duty to report to authorities and, if he remained there, a
duty to update his registration. His obligation to register as a sex offender in
Florida is a lifetime requirement.
C. Conclusion
[22] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[O]ur General Assembly has quite
clearly determined who is required to register: [SORA] directs us to defer to
other states’ sex offender designations, apparently in an effort to protect our
own residents.” State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 370 n.2 (Ind. 2016). We find that
the plain language of the other-jurisdiction provision compels registration for
individuals with out-of-state registration obligations regardless of the source of
those obligations. Because Peters is subject to a lifetime registration obligation
in Florida, he is required, pursuant to Indiana’s other-jurisdiction provision, to
register as a sex offender for life in Indiana. 3 Accordingly, the trial court
3
Peters highlights that application of the other-jurisdiction provision to his situation would “effectively
prohibit[]” registrants from “ever leaving Indiana, even on vacation” if a “week-long visit to Florida”
“automatically converted” a ten-year registration period to a lifelong requirement. Appellant’s Reply Brief at
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properly entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff and the DOC on Peters’s
declaratory judgment complaint.
[23] Judgment affirmed.
Judge Bailey concurs in result with separate opinion.
Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion.
10-11. He further maintains that the lifelong requirement “can never be removed” because, although some
lifetime registrants in Indiana may seek removal after ten years, he cannot “due to the Florida obligation”
and “also cannot seek removal of the registration requirement in Florida because he is still required to register
in Indiana.” Id. at 11. If such is indeed the case, and we make no determination in that regard, we are not
unsympathetic to the plight. However, while such consequences might be worthy of the legislature’s
consideration, they are not pertinent to our interpretation and application of what we find to be an
unambiguous statute.
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
David A. Arthur
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Adam S. Willfond
Assistant County Attorney
Noblesville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-405 | September 13, 2024 Page 13 of 16
Bailey, Judge, concurring in result.
[24] The statutory provision at issue, the “other jurisdiction provision” employs
plain language:
A person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender
in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the
other jurisdiction or the period described in this section,
whichever is longer.
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). I agree with the majority that we cannot simply add
words to a statute “that are not there” in order to restrict application. Majority
Opinion at 8. “[I]it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say
as it is to recognize what it does say.” Rush v. Elkhart Cty. Plan Comm’n, 698
N.E.2d 1211, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. Courts will not add to a
statute something “that the legislature has purposely omitted.” Id.[25] A literal application of the “other jurisdiction provision” equates to
enforceability without recourse for the registrant. But under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the judgments, acts, and records of a sister state are prima facie
valid, not absolutely valid:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution mandates that full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state. Full faith and credit means that the judgment
of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect,
in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state
where it was pronounced. Indiana has codified this notion at
Indiana Code § 34-39-4-3, which provides that records and
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judicial proceedings from courts in other states “shall have full
faith and credit given to them in any court in Indiana as by law
or usage they have in the courts in which they originated.” Full
faith and credit commands deference to the judgments of foreign
courts, and the judgment of a sister state, regular and complete
upon its face, is prima facie valid.
Gardner v. Pierce, 838 N.E.2d 546, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quotations and
citations omitted).
[26] It is uncontested that Florida imposed upon Peters a lifetime reporting
requirement. But I am troubled by the lack of any constraint upon blanket
enforcement in this State regardless of where the crime originated and how
onerous the subsequent reporting requirements are. We are placed in the
position of imposing a lifetime requirement of registration for conduct that is
twice removed from this jurisdiction. The offense was committed in Illinois
and the lifetime registration requirement was imposed by Florida. Application
of the “other jurisdiction provision” with no questions asked borders upon the
absurd. Indeed, even if Peters – in Florida for a week of vacation – was
provided with notice that he would be subject to a lifetime reporting
requirement if he lingered three days, it is illogical that Peters was transformed
into a Florida resident upon the third day. Florida is simply wrong. For these
reasons, I concur in result.
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Mathias, Judge, dissenting.
[27] I respectfully dissent. I would adopt the reasoning set out in Marroquin and hold
that Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f) “doesn’t apply when . . . there is no
‘independent requirement’ to register” in Florida. 228 N.E.3d at 1151. As Judge
Bailey aptly points out, “[w]e are placed in the position of imposing a lifetime
requirement of registration for conduct that is twice removed from this
jurisdiction.” Supra, at 14. To apply the statute in that manner, when Peters
visited Florida for only one week, is simply absurd.
[28] Under the absurdity doctrine, we “give a statute ‘its obvious intended effect
despite its plain text.’” Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., 140 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Ind.
2020) (quoting R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1042 (Ind. 2018)). “The doctrine
is ‘strong medicine’ because it ‘defeats even the plain meaning of statutes.’” Id.(quoting Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 477 (Ind. 2017)). Our legislature cannot
have intended to impose a lifetime registry requirement based on a one-week
vacation, and I would grant the relief Peters requests in his complaint for
declaratory judgment.
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