Linda Salmon v. Rita M Tafelski ( 2024 )

IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Linda Salmon,
May 17 2024, 8:31 am
Appellant-Defendant, CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Rita M. Tafelski,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
May 17, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-CT-2173
Appeal from the
Lake Superior Court
The Honorable
John M. Sedia, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45D01-1304-CT-29
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2173 | May 17, 2024 Page 1 of 14
Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
Judges Crone and Weissmann concur.
Najam, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Linda Salmon brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion for
summary judgment on Rita Tafelski’s complaint for tortious interference with
Tafelski’s inheritance from her mother’s estate. Tafelski’s mother died
intestate. Tafelski alleged that Salmon had exerted undue influence and
engaged in fraud causing the decedent to make inter vivos transfers of property
that benefited Salmon and would otherwise have been included in the
decedent’s estate and ultimately in Tafelski’s inheritance. The trial court held
that Tafelski could maintain an independent action for tortious interference
with her inheritance outside the estate. We conclude, however, that in asserting
her claims Tafelski failed to pursue remedies pursuant to our probate code and
that Salmon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse and remand
with instructions that Salmon’s motion for summary judgment be granted.
Issue
[2] Both the threshold and dispositive issue in this case is whether the heir of a
decedent who died intestate has authority to maintain an independent claim for
tortious interference with an inheritance outside the probate estate where a
remedy is available and adequate under the probate code.
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[3] First, regarding Tafelski’s claim that Indiana law does not require that a tortious
interference claimant exhaust her remedies under the probate code before
asserting an independent tort claim, we hold that a tort claimant may not
maintain an independent claim where a remedy under the probate code is
available and would provide adequate relief.
[4] Second, concerning Tafelski’s claim that there is no adequate remedy available
to her under the probate code, we hold that she had, but failed to exercise, the
adequate remedies available to her under the probate code.
[5] Third, with regard to Salmon’s claim that Tafelski does not have standing to
bring her action for tortious interference with an inheritance, conversion, fraud,
constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and intermeddling, we hold that
Tafelski does have standing to maintain her cause of action, which is subject to
her pursuit of a claim under the probate code where such a claim is available
and sustainable.
Facts and Procedural History
[6] Rita Tafelski is the daughter and sole heir of Suzanne Neitzel, who died
intestate on April 14, 2012. Linda Salmon is Neitzel’s sister, and following
Neitzel’s death, Salmon was appointed personal representative of her estate.
[7] Prior to her death, Neitzel’s health had been failing for some time, and in 2010,
Neitzel gave her power of attorney to Salmon. She also changed two of her
bank accounts to joint accounts with Salmon with right of survivorship. And,
according to Tafelski, Neitzel transferred to Salmon her shares in two family
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trucking companies in exchange for $100.00. Consequently, none of these
assets were included in Neitzel’s probate estate.
[8] In April 2013, Tafelski filed the instant lawsuit against Salmon for tortious
interference with an inheritance, conversion, fraud, constructive trust, breach of
fiduciary duty, and intermeddling (hereinafter collectively “tortious interference
with an inheritance”). Tafelski alleged that Salmon had exerted undue
influence over Neitzel and engaged in fraud when Neitzel established joint bank
accounts with Salmon and transferred her shares of stock to Salmon. Tafelski
maintained that the assets involved in these inter vivos transfers would have
been included in Neitzel’s estate were it not for Salmon’s misconduct. Tafelski
claimed that Salmon’s conduct amounted to a tortious interference with her
inheritance. This civil action was consolidated with the Neitzel estate for
purposes of discovery and pre-trial proceedings.
[9] In January 2014, Tafelski sought to remove Salmon as personal representative.
Salmon voluntarily resigned, and Tafelski was appointed as successor personal
representative. Thereafter, Salmon filed her final accounting showing she had
distributed to Tafelski all the assets of the estate, which totaled over $1 million.
The accounting also showed that the funds from the two joint bank accounts
totaled $126,645 and had been transferred to Salmon as surviving joint tenant.
[10] Throughout the next several years, the parties filed numerous discovery and
dispositive motions in these highly contentious proceedings. In June 2020,
Salmon moved to dismiss the estate action pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E). The
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probate court found that Tafelski had taken no significant action on behalf of
1
the estate for more than six years and granted the dismissal. Tafelski appealed
the dismissal to this Court, and we affirmed in a memorandum decision. Matter
of Est. of Neitzel, No. 21A-ES-1485 (Ind. Ct. App. April 13, 2022) (mem.), trans.
2
denied sub nom. Tafelski v. Salmon, 196 N.E.3d 686 (Ind.).
[11] This separate action was then transferred back to the trial court’s docket.
Salmon subsequently moved for summary judgment and asserted that Tafelski
had failed to designate evidence that would support her claims, that she lacked
standing to maintain an independent action, and that only the personal
representative of the decedent’s estate would be a proper party plaintiff. The
court denied Salmon’s motion and held that Tafelski could maintain an
independent action for tortious interference with her inheritance. The trial
court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and Salmon now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
1
The probate court also opined that “It is fundamental that only the Personal Representative of the
Decedent’s Estate has authority to sue for the recovery of a Decedent’s property alleged to have been
converted by another[]” and concluded that the statute of limitations had passed “for all claims which
[Tafelski] could have brought” as the Successor Personal Representative and that she was “time barred from
pursuing Salmon or any one[sic] else on behalf of the Neitzel Estate with regard to the Final Account, or
otherwise.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 40-41 (Order Dismissing Estate).
2
This Court also has previously considered an appeal that involved Tafelski and was indirectly related to the
current dispute. See M & K Truck Ctr. of Gary, LLC v. Tafelski, No. 23A-CT-1662 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2024)
(mem.).
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matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Pike Twp. Educ. Found., Inc. v. Rubenstein,
831 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Where, as here, the relevant facts
are not in dispute, we are presented with a pure question of law for which
summary judgment disposition is particularly appropriate. Pike Twp. Educ.
Found., 831 N.E.2d at 1241. We review pure questions of law de novo. Id.
[13] At the heart of this case is Tafelski’s claim for tortious interference with an
inheritance. This Court first recognized the tort of intentional interference with
an inheritance in Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In
doing so, we stated that such a cause of action arises when “‘[o]ne who by fraud
or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a
third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is
subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.’” Id. at 162(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979)). We further held that
this tort is not permitted “where the remedy of a will contest is available and
would provide the injured party with adequate relief.” Minton, 671 N.E.2d at
162. And we concluded that the remedies available under the will contest
adequately provided for the damages sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 163.
[14] More recently in Keith v. Dooley, 802 N.E.2d 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied, we relied on our decision in Minton to affirm the dismissal of an action
for interference with an inheritance. We did so because the tort action and a
will contest were pending at the same time, the remedies sought in each action
were substantially the same, and both actions involved substantially the same
parties and subject matter. Id. at 58.
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[15] Later, in Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied,
the daughters of the decedent initiated a will contest which also alleged in a
separate count that their father’s wife had tortiously interfered with their
inheritance. The trial court found that the remedy available under the will
contest would not provide adequate relief with respect to those assets which
passed outside the decedent’s estate and that the daughters had stated a valid
claim for tortious interference with their inheritance. Id. at 625. The court tried
both the will contest and the intentional interference claim together and granted
relief for the daughters on both counts, and we affirmed.
[16] In the present case, citing Minton and Keith, the trial court determined, in effect,
that those cases, which both involved will contests, were not controlling
because Neitzel died intestate and, therefore, that Tafelski had “no ability . . . to
contest a will.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 35 (Order Denying Motion for
Summary Judgment). Thus, the court held that it is permissible for Tafelski to
bring an independent action for tortious interference with an inheritance. Id.
[17] On appeal, Salmon contends Tafelski is not permitted to maintain an
independent claim for tortious interference with an inheritance outside the
3
probate estate. Salmon also maintains there are avenues available within the
3
Tafelski claims this argument is waived because Salmon raises it for the first time on appeal. See Appellee’s
Br. pp. 13-15. Tafelski asserts that in her motion for summary judgment, Salmon made only vague
arguments about Tafelski’s general lack of standing and that Salmon’s argument on the standing issue in her
motion for interlocutory appeal differs significantly from the argument she advances in her appellate brief.
We conclude that Salmon raised the issue of standing before the trial court and, indeed, the trial court
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probate code for Tafelski to address her allegations, but she failed to pursue
them. Tafelski counters that her independent tort action is permissible and not
subject to probate code restrictions.
[18] We first address the trial court’s interpretation of our holding in Minton to
support its determination that Tafelski could proceed with her independent tort
action. The probate code is the predicate for our opinion in Minton. Because
Minton died testate, we turned to the portion of the code dealing with wills and
observed that “a will contest is the exclusive means of challenging the validity
of a will.” 671 N.E.2d at 162 (citing Ind. Code § 29-1-7-17). Thus, we held that
an action for tortious interference with an inheritance is not permitted where
the remedy of a will contest is adequate. Id. However, we did not hold, and
our holding in Minton does not mean, the inverse—that where there is no will
and thus no will contest, a claimant has an unrestricted right to pursue a claim
for tortious interference with an inheritance.
[19] The distinction between whether the decedent died testate or intestate and,
hence, whether a will contest is available, is not dispositive of whether an
interested person has standing to maintain an independent tort claim for
interference with an inheritance. In Minton, Keith, and Moriarty, the decedent
died testate and there was a will contest. Until now, we have not had occasion
to look beyond a will contest and consider the operation and effect of our
addressed standing in its order denying Salmon’s motion for summary judgment, which is the subject of this
appeal. The issue of standing has not been waived.
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probate code on a tortious interference with an inheritance claim where the
decedent died intestate, and, hence, no will contest is available.
[20] The probate code governs the administration of decedents’ estates, both testate
and intestate. See Minton, 671 N.E.2d at 162 (testate estate); see Ind. Code § 29-
1-1-3(a)(32) (2021) (testate and intestate estates). The reach of the code is
comprehensive. It preempts and precludes common law actions that would
interfere with or impinge upon administration of a probate estate. Accordingly,
as we did in Minton, we turn to the “strictures” of the probate code. Section 29-
1-13-3 of the code provides:
Every personal representative shall have full power to maintain any suit
in any court of competent jurisdiction, in his name as such
personal representative, for any demand of whatever nature due the
decedent or his estate or for the recovery of possession of any property of
the estate or for trespass or waste committed on the estate of the
decedent in his lifetime, or while in the possession of the personal
representative[.]
Ind. Code § 29-1-13-3 (2024) (emphasis added).
[21] Inlow v. Henderson, Daily, Withrow & DeVoe, 787 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), trans. denied is the precedent that informs our opinion in this case. In
Inlow, we thoroughly explored the remedies available to interested persons and
addressed the preemptive effect of the probate code with regard to claims
available to the heirs of an intestate decedent. There, Inlow’s children asserted
claims for harms caused to the property of their father’s estate and which arose
from their status as heirs. In their view, the children had authority independent
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of the personal representative to maintain a suit. Noting that Section 29-1-13-3
“grants the personal representative complete authority to maintain any suit for
any demand due the decedent or the estate[]” and that “[n]o corresponding
statute grants an heir . . . the same power[,]” we held that the Inlow children, as
heirs, did not have the authority to bring direct claims against third parties.
Inlow, 787 N.E.2d at 391. We further held that the personal representative’s
authority to maintain suit for any demand due the decedent or his estate is
exclusive. Id. at 394.
[22] Nevertheless, Tafelski maintains she may bring her claim independent of the
personal representative given the non-probate nature of the contested assets and
because she is seeking reparation for harm she personally suffered, rather than
4
harm to Neitzel or her estate, as a result of Salmon’s alleged misconduct. The
harm alleged here, if proven, would be a harm against Neitzel during her
lifetime, which flowed through to her estate upon her death. Thus, Tafelski’s
claims are derived from her standing as an heir of her mother’s estate. While
the harm alleged may be “personal” to Tafelski in an ordinary sense, her claims
are subject to exhaustion of available remedies found in our probate code.
4
In support of her argument, Tafelski cites Scott v. Carrico, No. 59A01-1712-CT-2878, 2018 WL 6005661(Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2018), trans. denied, a memorandum decision of this Court. Memorandum decisions
issued before January 1, 2023 are not binding precedent and must not be cited, except to establish res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D)(2). Thus, pursuant to our rules of
appellate procedure, we may not consider Scott.
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[23] It is axiomatic that when an estate is administered, the rights of the heirs or
devisees, as the case may be, are subordinate to the first right and responsibility
of the personal representative to administer the assets and liabilities of the
decedent for the heirs or devisees and creditors of the estate. The personal
representative is “the focal point for collecting and managing estate assets,
including the prosecution of lawsuits on behalf of the estate.” Inlow, 787
N.E.2d at 394. This includes lawsuits filed on behalf of the estate to recover
assets that may at first blush appear to be non-probate assets but were
wrongfully diverted or misappropriated from the decedent through undue
influence, fraud, or other nefarious conduct.
[24] Nevertheless, in certain circumstances the probate code confers statutory
standing on heirs to intervene in the administration of an estate. For instance,
Section 29-1-13-10(a) (1982) allows “interested persons”— specifically defined
in Section 29-1-1-3(a)(18) to include heirs—to petition the probate court and
allege that a person has concealed, embezzled, converted, or disposed of any
real or personal property of the estate. Another means of intervention for heirs
is set forth in Section 29-1-13-16 (2024), which allows heirs to petition the
probate court for a determination of the proper action for collection when a
person is indebted to the estate and the personal representative is not diligently
pursuing collection of the indebtedness. And, a personal representative shall
have full power to maintain any suit for any demand due the decedent or her
estate or for the recovery of possession of any property of the estate as provided
under Section 29-1-13-3. Thus, although adequate relief was available to
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Tafelski under the probate code, she pursued none of these options, and she has
not shown that these remedies were not available to her or were inadequate.
[25] In sum, as we emphasized in Inlow, the probate code gives the personal
representative plenary authority to collect and manage the assets of the estate
and “specifically circumscribes the instances when heirs may inject themselves
into the administration of the estate.” 787 N.E.2d at 393. When an heir
believes the personal representative is neglecting his duty to the detriment of the
estate, the heir must follow the procedures of the probate code to rectify the
problem. Id. at 394. And, again, where “‘any person has, or is suspected to
have, concealed, embezzled, converted or disposed, of any real or personal
property belonging to the estate of a decedent,’” the probate court is vested with
the authority to “‘finally adjudicate the rights of the parties before the court
with respect to such property.’” Id. at 392 (quoting I.C. §§ 29-1-1-3, 29-1-13-
10).
[26] In Minton we qualified the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach when we
recognized the independent tort of tortious interference with an inheritance but
prohibited the tort “to be brought where the remedy of a will contest is available
and would provide the injured party with adequate relief.” 671 N.E.2d at 162.
Minton and its progeny, Keith and Moriarty, addressed only those circumstances
where the question presented is whether the remedy of a will contest is available
and would be adequate. Unlike our opinion in Inlow, those cases did not
contemplate or consider more broadly whether and, if so to what extent, an
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independent common law cause of action outside the estate where no will
contest is involved must also honor the requirements of our probate code.
[27] Today we follow our holding in Inlow that during administration, as well as
when administration of an estate is available, the action must be brought within
the probate proceeding. See Inlow, 787 N.E.2d at 394. This rule applies not
only where a will contest is available and would provide the injured party with
adequate relief, as in Minton, but across the board where, as here, a remedy
under probate code provisions is available and would provide adequate relief to
heirs and other persons interested in the estate who claim to have been injured.
Of course, this rule does not apply where there is no administration or where
administration is neither anticipated nor viable.
[28] The trial court determined that “Tafelski has standing to bring an action for the
tort of interference with an inheritance.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 35 (Order
Denying Motion for Summary Judgment). “Standing is a legal question we
review de novo.” City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022).
“The standing required to invoke a court’s authority can be conferred either
through common law or by statute.” Serbon v. City of East Chicago, 194 N.E.3d
84, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations omitted). Under Minton, Tafelski
has common law standing as Neitzel’s heir who claims to have been injured by
Salmon’s tortious interference with her inheritance. But that does not end our
inquiry. Here, while standing is inherent in the alleged tort, it is not alone
dispositive.
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Conclusion
[29] We conclude that Tafelski had adequate remedies under the probate code to
pursue her claim against Salmon and that she failed to avail herself of these
remedies. Accordingly, she is now precluded from maintaining an independent
claim for tortious interference with an inheritance, including its various alleged
subparts and iterations. Thus, Salmon is entitled to summary judgment on
Tafelski’s claim. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court
enter summary judgment for Salmon.
[30] Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
David J. Beach
Stephen A. Tyler
Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP
Hammond, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bryan L. Ciyou
Ciyou & Associates, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Anne Medlin Lowe
Fugate Gangstad Lowe LLC
Carmel, Indiana
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