Michelle Lavonne Walker v. State of Indiana ( 2024 )

IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Michelle Walker, FILED
Jul 19 2024, 9:34 am
Appellant-Defendant
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
July 19, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-CR-443
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court
The Honorable Jill R. Marcrum, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82D07-2306-CM-3905
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 1 of 6
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Michelle Walker appeals her conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass following a bench trial. She presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her
conviction.
[2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts are undisputed. On June 27, 2023, Walker was employed by
Grandy’s, a restaurant in Evansville. That evening, she was working at the front
counter when two managers, Destiny Neighbors and Lauren Evans (“Evans”),
asked Walker to leave the restaurant. Walker initially refused but eventually
left, and Jason Evans (“Jason”), another employee, locked the door. Jason had
observed that, just prior to being asked to leave, Walker “was acting normal
with the exception of a raised voice.” Tr. p. 14.
[4] For some period of time, Walker tried to regain entry to the restaurant. And at
some point, Neighbors let Walker back inside the restaurant. But Neighbors
and Evans again asked Walker to leave, and she refused. Someone called the
police, and when officers arrived, one asked Jason whether Walker had been
“barred” from the restaurant. Tr. p. 17. Jason responded, “We couldn’t make
that decision to bar her. We just wanted her to leave the property.” Id. at 18.
When Walker again refused to leave, she was arrested. Walker was not fired.
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[5] The State charged Walker with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. During
a bench trial, Jason was the sole witness for the State; neither manager testified.
The trial court found Walker guilty as charged. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Walker contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
conviction. Our standard of review is well settled.
When an appeal raises “a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we
do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the
witnesses . . . .” We consider only the probative evidence and the
reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. “We will
affirm ‘if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942
N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)).
[7] Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2022) provides that a person who, “not
having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to
leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the
other person or that person’s agent” commits Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass. (Emphasis added.) Walker argues that the State did not prove either
that (1) the property owner or the owner’s agent had asked her to leave or (2)
that she did not have a contractual interest in the property. Because the second
issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address Walker’s first argument.
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[8] The parties agree that, at the time of the alleged trespass, Walker had a
contractual interest in the property because she was an employee. The State
alleges, however, that her contractual interest was “limited” and that she
committed criminal trespass when she violated the terms of that limited
contractual interest. Appellee’s Br. at 12. Specifically, the State argues that
Walker’s contractual interest in the restaurant was “limited to the purpose of
providing customer service at the front counter and [she] could be terminated if
she was disruptive.” Id.[9] The State does not cite any evidence in support of that contention. Instead, the
State cites Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In
Taylor, we held that, because a student’s contractual interest in school premises
is inherently limited temporally and spatially, and because the defendant was
still on the premises more than two hours after his class had ended despite an
IPS police officer’s demand that he leave, the State had presented sufficient
evidence to prove criminal trespass. Id. at 1028 (citing A.E.B. v. State, 756
N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).
[10] We decline the State’s invitation to extend our holding in Taylor to the facts
here. In Taylor, the State presented evidence that the student “was scheduled to
attend class only from 8:15 to 10:15 a.m., and he was still at school around
noon.” Id. at 1026. The State also presented evidence that an IPS Police Officer
was charged with “mak[ing] sure that people aren’t hanging around the school
that aren’t supposed to be there[.]” Id. We held that, “[e]ven assuming that a
student has a contractual interest in school property, . . . we conclude that such
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an interest is limited temporally to when taking classes or engaged in other
school activities and limited spatially to areas necessary to the attendance
function.” Id. at 1028.
[11] In contrast, here, the State did not argue and presented no evidence at trial to
show that Walker’s contractual interest in the premises was limited during her
shift. Even assuming for purposes of this appeal that there is an inherent limit
on an employee’s contractual interest in her employer’s premises to not disrupt
business operations, there is simply no evidence that Walker exceeded any such
limit. Jason testified only that Walker “was acting normal with the exception of
a raised voice.” Tr. p. 14. The State did not present evidence, for example, that
Walker had upset any customers or other employees. Significantly, Jason did
not know why Walker was asked to leave the premises.
[12] We agree with Walker that our holding in Pogue v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, is applicable here. In Pogue, the State presented
evidence that a student’s contractual interest in his school’s premises was
limited in that it could be terminated if he became disruptive or was suspended
from his program. Id. at 1257-58. But the State in Pogue did not present
evidence either that the student had been disruptive or that he had been
suspended. Thus, we held that his conviction for criminal trespass was not
supported by the evidence and reversed. Id. at 1258. We acknowledged that
schools, as well as businesses . . . have a legitimate interest in
maintaining a safe environment and preserving order on their
premises. However, once a school or business has entered into an
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agreement with an individual which grants the individual a
contractual interest in its property, the individual may not be
found to have committed criminal trespass so long as the
individual’s contractual interest remains.
Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
[13] Likewise, here, without any evidence that Walker had exceeded any limits on
her contractual interest in the restaurant, the State could not prove that she
committed criminal trespass.
[14] For all these reasons, we reverse Walker’s conviction for criminal trespass.
[15] Reversed.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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