Harjit Kaur v. Amazon, Inc ( 2024 )

IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Harjit Kaur, Individually, and as the Special Administrator of
the Estate of Harvail Singh Dhillon, Deceased,
Appellant-Plaintiff FILED
Sep 27 2024, 10:01 am
v. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Amazon, Inc., et al.
Appellees-Defendants.
September 27, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-CT-2059
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
The Honorable J. Richard Campbell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D04-2212-CT-10006
Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
Judge Bailey concurs.
Judge Mathias concurs with separate opinion.
Altice, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 1 of 17
[1] This wrongful death action arises from an incident on October 20, 2022, where
Harvail Singh Dhillon was struck and killed by an oncoming truck after Dhillon
stepped out of his tractor-trailer truck onto a county road. Dhillon was en route
to a fulfillment center operated by Amazon, Inc. (Amazon) and owned by CF
Mount Comfort DST (collectively, Amazon) to deliver goods to the center.
[2] Harjit Kaur—Dhillon’s widow—(the Estate) filed an amended wrongful death
complaint 1 against Amazon, alleging negligent maintenance, design, and
control of the fulfillment center’s entrances. The Estate further alleged that
Amazon knew that the layout of its entrances and lack of lighting and defective
signage on its premises routinely endangered arriving truck drivers by causing
them to become confused and exit their trucks on the public road across from
the facility.
[3] Amazon filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Ind. Trial
Rule 12(C), arguing that the Estate’s allegations failed to establish that Amazon
owed a duty to Dhillon and that any negligence on Amazon’s part was not the
proximate cause of Dhillon’s death. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted Amazon’s motion, concluding that Amazon owed no duty to Dhillon
under Indiana law.
[4] The Estate appeals, arguing that granting Amazon’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings was error because it sufficiently alleged that Amazon had a duty
1
The trial court dismissed the Estate’s initial complaint without prejudice.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 2 of 17
to protect Dhillon from being struck by a third-party motorist. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts & Procedural History 2
[5] The facts, as set forth in the Estate’s amended complaint, are as follows: In
October 2022, Amazon contacted Dhillon, an independent contractor/truck
driver, about delivering goods to its fulfillment center in Greenfield. The
fulfillment center has three entrances that are accessible from County Road 300
North that runs along the south side of the center. When a motorist approaches
the facility from the west on County Road 300 North, he encounters two
entrances to the facility along the north side of the county road that are marked
with “no truck” signs. Appellants’ Appendix Vol. II at 36. There was no signage
posted at either of the two entrances to inform incoming truck drivers as to
where they were expected to enter the facility. The third entrance when
approaching from the west is the one to be used by delivery drivers, and it is
about 500 feet east of the fulfillment center building.
[6] At approximately 6:40 a.m. on October 20, 2022, while it was still dark,
Dhillon approached the fulfillment center from the west on 300 North to make
2
We heard oral argument in this case and in Oukbu v. Amazon, et. al, No. 24A-CT-00770, which presents the
same issue, on August 20, 2024, in the Court of Appeals courtroom at the Indiana Statehouse. We commend
counsel on the excellent quality of their written and oral advocacy. We hand down this case
contemporaneously with Oukbu.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 3 of 17
a delivery. After Dhillon encountered the second “no truck” entrance, he
became confused, as he could not discern any other entrances serving the
facility. As a result, Dhillon stopped his truck on County Road 300 North
across from the fulfillment facility, presumably to determine where he could
access the premises. This was Dhillon’s first trip to the fulfillment center, and
Amazon had not provided him with any instructions as to where to enter the
premises. Amazon only gave Dhillon the facility’s address and a delivery time.
[7] Immediately after Dhillon stepped out of his truck and onto the road, he was
struck and killed by a fuel tanker owned and operated by William McPhearson,
an employee of I.C.I. Transport, LLC (I.C.I.), that was traveling eastbound on
County Road 300 North. Forty-eight days prior to this incident, another truck
driver, Mahari Oukbu—the appellant in the appeal that we also decide today—
was struck by a vehicle after stopping his truck on the roadway across from the
fulfillment center. Like Dhillon, Oukbu was an independent contractor
traveling to the fulfillment center for the first time and drove past Amazon’s
westernmost entryway after noticing the small “no trucks” signs at the
entrances. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 33.
[8] Bruce Gibson, the driver who struck Oukbu, stated to a Greenfield police
officer at the scene, that “you see these truck drivers all the time stopping and
getting out here.” Id. at 34. Gibson further explained that on his way to work
each morning, he would notice truck drivers get out at the same spot “all the
time” because they were lost and did not know where to go. Id. An Amazon
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 4 of 17
employee told a Greenfield police officer that he sees “these lost truck drivers
get out of their trucks at this spot every day.” Id. at 35.
[9] On March 20, 2023, the Estate filed an amended complaint for wrongful death
against Amazon, 3 alleging that Dhillon was an invitee to whom Amazon owed
a duty of reasonable care, and that Amazon breached that duty because the
lighting and defective and confusing signage at the fulfillment center created a
hazard to delivery drivers. The Estate alleged that Amazon’s signage was
confusing because the first two entrances with the “no truck” signs were not
sufficiently illuminated, and there was no additional signage directing delivery
drivers to the proper entrance. Id. at 37. Thus, the Estate claimed that the
confusion Amazon created for the truck drivers posed “an imminent danger” to
all of Amazon’s invitees as well as to the general public “when these trucks
suddenly stopped and parked, blocking much of the street in the dark.” Id. at
36.
[10] After Amazon answered the complaint and denied the allegations, it moved for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to T.R. 12(C), arguing that the Estate’s
allegations failed to establish that Amazon owed a duty to Dhillon. The trial
court granted Amazon’s motion on June 23, 2023, determining that “Amazon
had no duty to guard against injury to [Dhillon] from the negligent acts of
3
While the amended complaint included negligence counts against McPhearson and I.C.I., neither
participates in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 5 of 17
someone over whom Amazon had no control and when the injury occurred off
Amazon’s premises.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 21.
[11] In arriving at that result, the trial court rejected the Estate’s reliance on Lutheran
Hosp. of Ind., Inc. v. Blaser, 634 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), where a
panel of this court determined that the defendant hospital was liable to the
plaintiff for her injuries after a vehicle struck her in the parking lot driveway
because the hospital permitted pedestrians and vehicles to use the designated
“exit” as an entrance to the lot with no safeguards or warnings. The trial court
observed that unlike the circumstances in Lutheran Hospital, the Estate did not
allege that Amazon created a hazardous condition on its premises and/or that
it exerted any control over McPhearson or County Road 300 North.
[12] The Estate now appeals.
Standard of Review
[13] A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to T.R. 12(C) attacks the
legal sufficiency of the pleadings. See Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 747 N.E.2d 1146,
1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In reviewing a trial court’s decision on
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we conduct a de novo review. Murray
v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ind. 2010). We only examine the
pleadings and any facts of which we may take judicial notice, with all well-
pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint taken as admitted. Waldrip v.
Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 6 of 17
[14] The test to be applied when ruling on a T.R. 12(C) motion is whether, in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and “with every intendment regarded
in his favor, the complaint is sufficient to constitute any valid claim.” Brugh v.
Milestone Contractors, 202 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied
(emphasis added). We will affirm the trial court’s judgment on a T.R. 12(C)
motion when it is clear from the face of the pleadings that one of the parties
cannot in any way succeed under the operative facts and allegations made
therein. Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind.
2014).
Discussion and Decision
[15] The Estate maintains that the trial court erred in granting Amazon’s T.R. 12
(C) motion because its complaint alleged that Amazon owed a duty to
Dhillon—its business invitee—to protect him from the foreseeable harm and the
dangerous conditions that Amazon created with the defective lighting and
signage on its premises. The Estate asserts that its complaint sufficiently alleged
that Amazon knew that the dangerous condition confused truck driver invitees
causing them to stop and get out of their truck in the road each day. The Estate
also claims that it pled sufficient facts to establish that Amazon’s breach of duty
proximately caused Dhillon’s death.
[16] A negligence claim is established by showing (1) a duty owed by the defendant
to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with
the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury proximately caused by
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 7 of 17
the breach of that duty. City of Indianapolis v. Johnson, 736 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000). Absent a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, there can
be no actionable negligence. Wiley v. ESG Sec. Inc., 187 N.E.3d 267, 272 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.
[17] In premises liability cases, whether a duty is owed depends primarily upon
whether the defendant was in control of the premises when the accident
occurred. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). Generally, a
landowner is not liable to its business invitees for the acts of a third-party over
whom it had no control, and when the injuries do not occur on the landowner’s
property. State v. Flanigan, 489 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans.
denied. On the other hand, liability is not limited to the area owned or leased
“but extends to adjoining areas which harbor a dangerous condition that is
created by the owner’s . . . use of such areas.” Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d
764, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied. A duty of reasonable care may be
extended beyond the business premises “when it is reasonable for invitees to
believe the invitor controls premises adjacent to his own or where the invitor
knows his invitees customarily use such adjacent premises in connection with
the invitation.” Id. at 772. Moreover, a person may not use his land in such a
way that would injure the interests of those not on his land, including users of
public ways. Justice v. CSX Transp., Inc., 908 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1990)
(applying Indiana law). When the activities conducted on the business
premises affect the risk of injury off the premises, “the landowner may be under
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 8 of 17
a duty to correct the condition or guard against foreseeable injuries.” Lutheran
Hosp., 634 N.E.2d at 870.
[18] Amazon asserts that our Supreme Court’s opinion in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats,
Inc., 173 N.E.3d 1031, 1041 (Ind. 2021), controls the outcome here. In Reece, a
motorcyclist traveling on a public roadway adjacent to Tyson’s property
suffered catastrophic injuries after colliding with a motorist. The motorcyclist’s
guardian brought an action against the other driver and Tyson, claiming that
Tyson was negligent “for allowing grass to grow so high on their property that
it blocked the view of the roadway.” Id. at 1033. In affirming the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment for Tyson, our Supreme Court held that “under the
facts of this case, Tyson owed no duty to the traveling public. The visual
obstruction was completely contained on its land and did not visit itself upon the
adjacent roadway.” Id. at 1041 (emphases added). In so holding, the Reece
Court adopted a bright line rule, providing that when the condition on the land
is contained on the land and does not create a physical intrusion that visits itself
on the adjacent roadway, the landowner does not owe a duty to travelers on the
roadway. See id. at 1034, 1040-41. The Reece holding was specifically confined
“to visual obstructions that do not come in contact with traveling motorists.” Id.
at 1041 (emphasis added).
[19] Unlike Reece, the Estate did not allege the presence of tall grass or any other
visual obstruction coming from Amazon’s property. Rather, the Estate pled
facts that Amazon’s duty to Dhillon arose from alleged defective lighting and
confusing signage at the entrances to the fulfillment center. Moreover, Reece
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involved a landowner’s duty to passing motorists on an adjacent highway, and
the Court specifically rejected the argument that such a duty should be the same
as that owed to a business invitee. See id. at 1040 n.3. In short, Reece is not
applicable in these circumstances.
[20] We find the facts and circumstances in this case more akin to those in Lutheran
Hospital. In that case, the plaintiff—Blaser—was a hospital visitor who was
struck by a vehicle in the hospital’s parking lot driveway. The evidence
established that the parking lot was located across the street from the hospital
and when Blaser was struck, “she was walking up the driveway of the parking
lot.” 634 N.E.2d at 867.
[21] The hospital appealed a jury award in Blaser’s favor, contending that the trial
court erred when it found that the hospital had a duty to Blaser when she was
struck by a car in the parking lot’s driveway, “a right-of-way over which [the
hospital] allege[d] it did not control and only had a duty to maintain.” Id. at
868. A panel of this court rejected the hospital’s argument and determined that
it owed a duty to Blaser beyond the boundaries of its premises because it
created a dangerous condition on its property, that pedestrians gravitated to and
were not discouraged from using. See id. at 869-70.
[22] In arriving at this result, the Lutheran Hospital Court noted the following:
. There was a circular drive in front of the hospital building with
a well-lit canopied entrance and a guard booth.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 10 of 17
. The exit driveway to the parking lot was directly across from
the building’s entrance.
. The hospital encouraged pedestrians to use the exit lane of the
parking lot by crossing the public roadway mid-block, rather than
at the marked crosswalks.
. There was a guardhouse on the parking lot side of the road
with an arrow pointing into it—though it was only meant to be
an entrance for delivery trucks. The public had no way of
knowing this until they were pulling into the exit driveway or
were right alongside it.
[23] In examining these facts, the Lutheran Hospital Court determined that the
hospital’s funneling of pedestrian and vehicular traffic into the driveway of the
parking lot “created a dangerous condition that the hospital was either cognizant of or
should have reasonably foreseen.” Id. at 869 (emphasis added). It was observed
that
By allowing pedestrians and automobiles to use the ‘exit’
driveway as an entrance to the parking lot without adequate
safeguards or warning to either, Lutheran used its premises, the
parking lot, in such a way to affect the risk of injury of its invitees
off its premises, the ‘exit’ driveway. Because Lutheran knew the
manner in which its invitees, both pedestrians and drivers,
customarily used the driveway of the ‘exit’ in connection with its
invitation, it is under a duty to correct the dangerous conditions
and guard against foreseeable injuries.
Id. at 870. The Lutheran Hospital Court also pointed out that the
hospital knew of the danger because it had “assured the city engineer
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 11 of 17
that it would discourage people from using the canopy entrance doors
as an entry and exit to the hospital.” Id. Nothing had been done,
however, “towards this end or to direct pedestrians to the crosswalks.”
Id.[24] Similar to the circumstances in Lutheran Hospital, the Estate pled facts
demonstrating that Amazon knew or should have known that truck drivers
attempting to enter its premises were confused about where to enter to make
their deliveries. Indeed, the facility’s confusing layout, signage, and lack of
lighting often prompted arriving truck drivers to exit their trucks on the county
road in hopes of learning where and how to enter the fulfillment center.
Moreover, the Estate’s allegations demonstrate that Dhillon’s death was
foreseeable to Amazon because another delivery truck driver had been struck by
a motorist at the same location and under similar circumstances less than two
months earlier. The driver of that vehicle told investigating police officers that
truck drivers routinely stop where Dhillon was struck and “get out” of their
trucks because they were confused and did not know where to enter the
fulfillment center. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 34. Additionally, an Amazon
employee told investigating officers that he sees lost truck drivers get out of
their trucks at that location “every day.” Id. at 35.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 12 of 17
[25] Given these circumstances, the Estate has sufficiently alleged that Amazon used
its premises in a manner that harbored a dangerous condition off its own
premises, i.e., on the county road, that affected the risk of injury to others.
And in accordance with the reasoning advanced in Lutheran Hospital, the Estate
properly alleged that Amazon had a duty to provide a “safe and suitable means
of ingress and egress,” including a “warning of or protection from danger. . . .”
Lutheran Hospital, 634 N.E.2d at 869. Put another way, the Estate sufficiently
alleged that Amazon’s lack of signage and its failure to direct delivery truck
drivers where to enter the fulfillment center created confusion and a dangerous
condition.
[26] In addition to the rationale advanced in Lutheran Hospital, we also find
Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 54 (2012) (Section 54) instructive. Section 54
provides that
(a) The possessor of land has a duty of reasonable care for
artificial conditions or conduct on the land that poses a risk of physical
harm to persons or property not on the land.
(b) For natural conditions on land that pose a risk of physical
harm to persons or property not on the land, the possessor of the
land
(1) has a duty of reasonable care if the land is commercial;
otherwise
(2) has a duty of reasonable care only if the possessor knows of the
risk or if the risk is obvious.
(c) Unless Subsection (b) applies, a possessor of land adjacent to a public
walkway has no duty under this Chapter with regard to a risk posed by
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 13 of 17
the condition of the walkway to pedestrians or others if the land
possessor did not create the risk.
(Emphasis added).
[27] While not specifically adopted in Indiana—yet accepted in other jurisdictions
—Section 54 pertains to the duty of reasonable care for conduct on one’s land
that creates risks to those not on the premises. For example, in Bradford v.
Universal Const. Co., Inc., 644 So.2d 864, 866 (Ala. 1994), it was held that a
landowner’s duty extends beyond the premises where the land abuts public
ways or sidewalks, and ordinary care requires that the owner not perform any
affirmative act that will create an unsafe condition in the public way fronting
his property. 4
[28] Here, the Estate alleged that Amazon controlled the way that delivery drivers
enter the premises and that it placed an artificial hazard, i.e., the “no trucks”
signage on its premises. The Estate also pled facts establishing that Amazon
had direct knowledge of the hazard it created and that it took no action to
4
See also Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., 186 Ariz. 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a delivery driver struck by
a passing vehicle while waiting on an adjacent street to enter the owner’s premises to deliver goods was a
business invitee to whom the owner owed a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition,
including the obligation to provide reasonably safe means of ingress and egress); Ollar v. Spakes, 601 S.W.2d
868, 870 (Ark. 1980) (when an owner or operator of a business learns or should have learned of a dangerous
condition existing adjacent to his property and fails to attempt to correct the condition or warn the invitees of
such danger, he is liable for negligence); Fleming v. Garnett, 646 A.2d 1308, 1313 (Conn. 1994) (owner of a
commercial driveway adjacent to public road owed a duty to passing motorists because he realized or should
have realized that tractor trailers exiting his property and entering the highway via neighboring driveway
would temporarily block both lanes of traffic); Langen v. Rushton, 360 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(shopping center owner owed a duty in developing and maintaining the facility, including the parking lot and
exits, to consider risks to motorists on adjacent highways); Boggs ex rel. Boggs v. Lay, 164 S.W.3d 4, 17 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2005) (observing that a duty is imposed on a property owner that artificially creates, through
negligence, or affirmative action, a condition on the public road that makes passage unsafe), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 14 of 17
provide instructions for its approaching truck drivers. In short, the Estate’s
complaint was sufficient to demonstrate that Amazon owed a duty of
reasonable care to Dhillon, and that Amazon’s actions—or inactions—created
a condition that made passage unsafe on the abutting public road.
[29] For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Amazon’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings. We therefore reverse and remand this
cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[30] Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Mathias, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 15 of 17
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Richard Cook
Brandon Yosha
Louis Buddy Yosha
Bryan C. Tisch
Alexander C. Trueblood
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Phillip G. Rizzo
Edward M. O’Brien
Cyrus G. Dutton, IV
Louisville, Kentucky
Barath S. Raman
Edmund L. Abel
J. Neal Bowling
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
Charles Hubley
Chase Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2059 | September 27, 2024 Page 16 of 17
Mathias, Judge, concurring.
[31] I write separately only to say that I would adopt the Restatement (Third) of
Torts § 54 (2012) to resolve the issues presented in this case, and I urge our
colleagues on the Supreme Court to do so.
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