Frame Station, Inc. d/b/a Framemakers v. The Foundry at 304, LLC ( 2024 )


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  •                                                                                   FILED
    Jan 25 2024, 8:56 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    James A.L. Buddenbaum                                      Lonnie D. Johnson
    Courtney L. Abshire                                        Justin K. Schwemmer
    Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse,                      Clendening Johnson & Bohrer,
    LLP                                                        P.C.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Bloomington, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Frame Station, Inc. d/b/a                                  January 25, 2024
    Framemakers,                                               Court of Appeals Case No.
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff,                        23A-CT-1426
    v.                                                  Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
    Court
    The Foundry at 304, LLC, Foundry
    WPR                                                        The Honorable Geoffrey J.
    Orrego, LLC and Foundry WPR                                Bradley, Judge
    Elmore, LLC,                                               Trial Court Cause No.
    53C01-2004-CT-751
    Appellees/Cross-Appellant-Defendants.
    Opinion by Judge Riley
    Judges Crone and Mathias concur.
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024                            Page 1 of 17
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff, Frame Station, Inc. d/b/a Framemakers
    (Framemakers), appeals the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon with respect to Framemakers’ right of use of its express easement across
    the property of Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant, The Foundry at 304,
    LLC, Foundry WPR Orrego, LLC, and Foundry WPR Elmore, LLC
    (collectively, Foundry).
    [2]   We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Framemakers presents one issue on appeal, while the Foundry presents one
    issue on cross-appeal. We consolidate both issues and restate these as the
    following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the
    Foundry did not interfere with Framemakers’ easement during the development
    and construction of the Foundry’s real estate project.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Framemakers, founded by Ulgis Augenbergs (Augenbergs) and a former
    business partner in 1976, is a private corporation that operates a retail custom
    picture frame store at 314 West Kirkwood Avenue in Bloomington, Indiana. In
    addition, Framemakers also operates a wholesale business in the same location,
    known as ‘Prime Chops’, that sells custom framing to other retail frame stores,
    mostly in central Indiana. Framemakers’ retail store relies almost entirely on
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 2 of 17
    walk-in retail customers for its business, and many customers will make several
    trips to the store to custom frame their artwork.
    [5]   The Foundry at 304, LLC is an Indiana limited liability company created to
    own and develop a multi-family and commercial real estate project (Project) on
    property located at 304 West Kirkwood Avenue, directly east of Framemakers’
    retail business. Foundry WPR Orrego, LLC and Foundry WPR Elmore, LLC
    own the commercial space on the first floor of the Project.
    [6]   Framemakers’ current location at 314 West Kirkwood Avenue, identified as
    Lot 154 of the City of Bloomington, is leased from Augenbergs and his spouse,
    and provides Framemakers with a parking lot directly behind and to the north
    of the building, along the alley between Kirkwood Avenue and Sixth Street.
    Lot 154 is accessed from Sixth Street via an easement originally granted by the
    First National Bank of Bloomington to Alma J. Henry (Framemakers’
    predecessor in interest) as the grantee and recorded on April 29, 1974
    (Easement). The specifically delineated Easement provides, in pertinent part:
    THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH, that the undersigned,
    FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BLOOMINGTON, hereinafter
    called GRANTOR, for and in consideration of the sum of One
    Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable considerations, not
    herein expressed, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
    does hereby quit claim, convey and grant to ALMA J. HENRY,
    of Monroe County, Indiana, hereinafter called GRANTEE, a
    non-exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress
    over and across the following described lands, to-wit:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 3 of 17
    A part of the In-Lot 198 in the City of Bloomington, Indiana,
    described as follows:
    An easement for ingress and egress over the following described
    tract: Beginning at a point 16.50 feet East of the Northwest
    corner of the said In-Lot 198 said point being on the South line of
    Sixth Street, thence South for a distance of 99.52 feet, thence
    S35ºW for a distance of 40.69 feet, thence South for a distance of
    3.78 feet, thence East for a distance of 12.0 feet to the Northwest
    corner of In-Lot 155, thence N 35ºE for a distance of 40.69 feet,
    thence North for a distance of 103.30 feet to the South line of
    Sixth Street, thence West over and along the said South line of
    Sixth Street for a distance of 12.00 feet to the place of beginning.
    Containing 1727 square feet, more or less.
    Said easement is for the use and benefit of the lands now
    owned by the GRANTEE, and described as follows, to-
    wit:
    In Lot One Hundred Fifty-Four (154) in the City of
    Bloomington, Indiana and shall run to and for the use and
    benefit of the above-described lands.
    It shall be the obligation of the GRANTOR to establish,
    construct and maintain the easement granted herein and
    GRANTOR hereby agrees that at all times during any
    construction on the premises of GRANTOR, adjacent to
    the present North and South alley, ingress and egress
    through the alley as now established, running north and
    south between Fifth and Sixth Streets, a portion of which
    is East of the lands of the Grantee, or the easement
    granted herein, there shall be no unobstructed use thereof
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024          Page 4 of 17
    for ingress and egress from Fifth Street to Sixth Street in
    the City of Bloomington, Indiana. 1
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 28-29).
    [7]   On February 9, 2000, Bank One, N.A. conveyed Lot 155, Lot 156, Lot 197,
    and Lot 198 to Elmore Y Orrego, LLC, which, in turn, on January 13, 2016,
    conveyed the Lots by special warranty deed to the Foundry. Both deeds are
    “subject to any and all easements, agreements, and any other encumbrances or
    restrictions of record.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 29-30).
    [8]   The Easement, which the Foundry is aware of, runs across Lot 198 in favor of
    Lot 154 and was created when the alley, which originally ran from Kirkwood
    Avenue to Sixth Street, was partially vacated from the northeast corner of
    Framemakers’ Lot 154 north to Sixth Street to make way for the Bank One
    drive-through lanes. The alley from the north edge of Framemakers’ Lot 154,
    which runs south to Kirkwood Avenue, remained in place. The Easement from
    Sixth Street runs south (parallel to the vacated alley) where it terminates at
    approximately the northeast corner of Framemakers’ Lot 154 and where the
    alley begins and runs to Kirkwood Avenue, providing continuous access from
    Sixth Street to Kirkwood Avenue.
    1
    The remainder of the Easement involved a now-extinguished right of first refusal to purchase and is not
    relevant to the dispute in this Cause.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024                             Page 5 of 17
    [9]   At some point in 2013 and 2014, the Foundry commenced the design and
    development of the Project, which was to occupy Lots 155, 156, 197, and 198.
    In 2016, the Foundry contracted with Onyx and East, LLC (Onyx) to construct
    the new commercial building. Pursuant to the terms of the contract entered
    into by the Foundry and Onyx, Onyx was responsible for supervision and
    direction of the Project and was mandated to confine the work to areas
    permitted by applicable laws, statutes, ordinances, codes, rules, and regulations.
    Beginning in June 2017, a large crane was placed in the Easement area,
    blocking access between Sixth Street and the Framemakers’ property. For the
    remainder of 2017, the evidence reflected the continuous obstruction of the
    Easement area by the ongoing construction on the Project. The obstructions
    were as simple as leaving a fence in the Easement or as severe as leaving
    construction materials and equipment unattended in the Easement, completely
    blocking its access. Over the period of time running from the middle of 2017,
    when the portable crane was installed in the Easement, through 2019, the
    Easement was continuously occupied by construction vehicles or materials.
    Tire marks on the Framemakers’ parking lot show that the Easement, alley, and
    parking lot were used as part of the construction site on a frequent basis.
    Despite being aware of the construction’s interference with Framemakers’
    Easement, at no point did the Foundry place any signage, issue written
    instructions, or take any other affirmative action to protect Framemakers’ rights
    to the ingress and egress on the Easement.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 6 of 17
    [10]   On April 30, 2020, Framemakers filed its Complaint against the Foundry,
    which it amended on May 5, 2020, seeking to address the interference and
    obstruction of the Easement by requesting an injunction to preserve and protect
    easement rights, an injunction to prohibit blocking the alley, damages for
    trespass to its property, and damages to the business of Framemakers.
    Framemakers did not pursue the injunctive relief and, after parties waived trial
    by jury, the case was tried before the bench on January 11-12, 2023, on the
    issues of interference, trespass, and damages to Framemakers’ business.
    [11]   On June 1, 2023, the trial court entered forty-three findings of fact and thirty-
    two conclusions thereon, issuing a judgment in favor of the Foundry. In
    interpreting the Easement, the trial court found that “neither party has alleged
    that the language of the Easement is ambiguous, and the [c]ourt finds that there
    is no ambiguity in the grant of the Easement.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38).
    Looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the language, the trial court
    noted that “the intention of the Easement grant was that Framemakers would
    have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when the grantor, the
    servient estate, had construction happening on its premises.” (Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II, p. 38). The court concluded that, based on the evidence before it, it was
    “clear that Onyx, and parties they employed, continuously and pervasively
    obstructed Framemakers’ Easement rights, either partially or in whole, in
    violation of the Easement grant.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). On the
    issue of trespass, the trial court found the Foundry not liable for the actions of
    their contractors and that there was no evidence that the Foundry trespassed on
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 7 of 17
    Framemakers’ property. With respect to the damages, the trial court concluded
    that the Foundry’s contractor was solely responsible for obstruction and
    interference with the Easement and that the Foundry was not liable for the
    contractors’ actions.
    [12]   Framemakers now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [13]   Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon sua sponte,
    “the findings control our review and the judgment only as to the issues those
    specific findings cover. Where there are no specific findings, a general
    judgment standard applies and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by
    the evidence adduced at trial.” Estate of Henry v. Woods, 
    77 N.E.3d 1200
    , 1204
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We apply a two-tier standard of review to the sua sponte
    findings and conclusions. 
    Id.
     First, we determine whether the evidence
    supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.
    
    Id.
     We will set aside findings and conclusions only if they are clearly
    erroneous, that is, when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting
    them. 
    Id.
     A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves
    us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Barkwill v. Cornelia H.
    Barkwill Revocable Trust, 
    902 N.E.2d 836
    , 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In
    conducting our review, we consider only the evidence favorable to the
    judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Estate of Henry, 77
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 8 of 17
    N.E.3d at 1204. We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we assess witness
    credibility. Id.
    II. Interference with Easement
    [14]   Framemakers contends that because the Easement grants Framemakers a non-
    possessory interest across the property of the Foundry and prohibits the
    Foundry from interfering with Framemakers’ use of the Easement, the trial
    court erred when it applied a negligence standard to a real estate easement
    dispute and concluded that the Foundry defeated the interest by allowing its
    contractors to interfere with Framemakers’ use of the Easement.
    [15]   As our supreme court has stated: “An easement is the right to use another’s
    land for a specified purpose. An easement appurtenant benefits adjoining land;
    an easement in gross benefits a specific individual. The land benefited by an
    easement is the dominant estate; the land burdened by an easement is the
    servient estate.” Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 
    111 N.E.3d 987
    , 990 (Ind.
    2018). And where—as here—an easement was “voluntarily created by a
    written instrument to serve a specified purpose,” the easement is known as an
    express easement. Easement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). When
    examining the scope of easement rights in Indiana, we “hold[ ] the parties to
    the agreement they—or their predecessors in interest—made when they
    negotiated their easement or acquired their property concerning the easement.”
    DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995; cf. Successor in Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary
    (11th ed. 2019) (noting a successor in interest “retains the same rights as the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 9 of 17
    original owner, with no change in substance”). In this way, Indiana common
    law “promotes certainty,” ensuring “property interests and corresponding
    property values remain stable and predictable.” DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995.
    [16]   It is well-established that easements are limited to the purpose for which they
    are granted. McCauley v. Harris, 
    928 N.E.2d 309
    , 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The
    owner of an easement, known as the dominant estate, possesses all rights
    necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement. 
    Id.
     The dominant estate
    holder may make repairs, improvements, or alterations that are reasonably
    necessary to make the grant of the easement effectual. 
    Id.
     The owner of the
    property over which the easement passes, known as the servient estate, may use
    his property in any manner and for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment
    of the easement, and the dominant estate cannot interfere with the use. 
    Id.
     “All
    rights necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement are possessed by
    the owner of the dominant estate, and it is the duty of the servient owner to
    permit the dominant owner to enjoy his easement without interference.” 
    Id.
    The servient owner “may not so use his land as to obstruct the easement or
    interfere with the enjoyment thereof by the owner of the dominant estate.” 
    Id.
    Moreover, the owner of the dominant estate cannot subject the servient estate
    to extra burdens, any more than the holder of the servient estate can materially
    impair or unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement. 
    Id.
    [17]   The Foundry, when taking ownership of Lot 198, had actual and constructive
    knowledge of the existence of the Easement and the rights granted to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024    Page 10 of 17
    Framemakers under the Easement. In interpreting the unambiguous language
    of the Easement, the trial court unequivocally concluded that
    the Easement unambiguously grant[s] Framemakers a ‘non-
    exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress’ over a
    specifically described portion of Lot 198, but it also explicitly
    provides that ‘there shall be no unobstructed use [of the
    [E]asement] for ingress and egress from Fifth Street to Sixth
    Street’ ‘during any construction on the premises of GRANTOR.’
    The plain and ordinary language of the Easement demonstrates
    that the intention of the Easement grant was that Framemakers
    would have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when
    the grantor, the servient estate, had construction happening on its
    premises.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). Finding, based on the evidence before it, that
    Framemakers’ Easement rights had been obstructed during the construction of
    the Project, the trial court, instead of concluding that the Foundry had
    interfered with Framemakers’ Easement rights, applied a negligence standard
    and determined that “Onyx [as the Foundry’s contractor], and parties they
    employed, continuously and pervasively obstructed Framemakers’ Easement
    rights, either partially or in whole, in violation of the Easement grant.”
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38.).
    [18]   In its conclusion that Onyx was in violation of Framemakers’ Easement rights,
    the trial court applied the general rule that “a principal is not bound by the acts
    of his agent unless they are performed within the scope of authority actually
    and ostensibly conferred upon him,” citing as authority Cincinnati H. & I.R. Co.
    v. Carper, 
    13 N.E. 122
    , 124 (Ind. 1887), as well as the rule that “courts have
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 11 of 17
    recognized that an independent contractor may create liability for his principal
    in certain circumstances,” citing Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 
    705 N.E.2d 962
    , 978
    (Ind. 1998). (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 39). The trial court continued to
    analyze this Cause pursuant to negligence principles and concluded that no
    exceptions to these rules applied and that Onyx, and not the Foundry as its
    principal, was responsible for the obstruction of and interference with the
    Easement.
    [19]   The trial court conflated the property law principles at play in the Easement
    rights determination between Framemakers and the Foundry with the
    negligence principles between the Foundry, as owner of the Project, and Onyx,
    as its contractor. Onyx is not a party to the Easement, and Framemakers is not
    a party to the construction contract entered into between the Foundry and
    Onyx. This case involves a written easement document where Framemakers
    has asserted that the servient estate owner interfered with and obstructed
    Framemakers’ enjoyment of its rights under the Easement. The Easement was
    entered into between Framemakers and the Foundry, and the Foundry is liable
    for violating Framemakers’ rights under the Easement.
    [20]   The only legal construction under which Framemakers could pursue Onyx for
    interfering with its Easement is by being in privity with the Foundry in its
    construction contract with Onyx. Generally, only parties to a contract or those
    in privity with the parties have rights under the contract. OEC Diasonics, Inc. v.
    Major, 
    674 N.E.2d 1312
    , 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, “one not a party
    to an agreement may nonetheless enforce it by demonstrating that the parties
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 12 of 17
    intended to protect him under the agreement by the imposition of a duty in his
    favor.” 
    Id.
     To be enforceable, it must clearly appear that it was the purpose or
    a purpose of the contract to impose an obligation on one of the contracting
    parties in favor of the third party. 
    Id.
     It is not enough that performance of the
    contract would be of benefit to the third party. 
    Id.
     It must appear that it was
    the intention of one of the parties to require performance of some part of it in
    favor of such third party and for his benefit, and that the other party to the
    agreement intended to assume the obligation thus imposed. 
    Id.
     The intent of
    the contracting parties to bestow rights upon a third party “must affirmatively
    appear from the language of the instrument when properly interpreted and
    construed.” Freigy v. Gargaro Co., 
    60 N.E.2d 288
    , 291 (1945).
    [21]   The construction agreement between the Foundry and Onyx does not indicate
    that the parties affirmatively placed a duty on Onyx to keep the Easement free
    of any obstructions. Rather, the boilerplate contractual language merely directs
    Onyx to confine the work to areas permitted by applicable laws, statutes,
    ordinances, codes, rules, and regulations, and specifically mentions that the
    “[a]greement is made solely and specifically between and for the benefit of the
    parties hereto, [], and no other person, individual, corporation or entity,
    whatsoever, shall have any rights, interests or claims hereunder or be entitled to
    any benefits under or on account of this [a]greement[.]” (Exh. Vol. VII, p. 60).
    [22]   Furthermore, every case cited by the trial court—and the Foundry—in support
    of its decision involved the negligent actions of contractors in relation to
    personal injury claims by third parties and not the intentional interference with
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024      Page 13 of 17
    easement rights between the parties to that easement which are rooted in a
    contract. See, e.g., Becker v. Kreilein, 
    770 N.E.2d 315
    , 318 (Ind. 2002) (“Indiana
    recognizes five exceptions to the general rule of non-liability of a principal for
    an independent contractor’s negligence[.]”); Gwinn v. Harry J. Kloeppel & Assoc.
    Inc., 
    9 N.E.3d 687
    , 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“The long standing general rule is
    that a principal is not liable for the negligence of a general contractor.”) These
    cases and principles have no application in determining the rights of the parties
    to the Easement. While these cited cases may provide guidance on the relative
    responsibilities of parties to a personal injury case, they do not provide guidance
    to the determination of the relative rights of parties to an express easement.
    [23]   The Foundry cites to Gray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
    624 N.E.2d 49
     (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1993), as standing for the proposition that one who hires an independent
    contractor is also not liable for the contractor’s torts, not just negligence. While
    it is true that the Gray case involved a nuisance claim and not a negligence
    claim, the court held that the principal could not escape liability for a nuisance
    claim related to PCB contamination by hiring an independent contractor whose
    work by nature would lead to a nuisance. 
    Id. at 54
    . Likewise here, the
    Foundry hired Onyx to construct a building, and the very nature of Onyx’s
    work resulted in the interference and obstruction of the Easement.
    [24]   In its cross-appeal, the Foundry posits that the trial court erred in its
    interpretation of the unambiguous language of the Easement. See Burkett v. Am.
    Family Ins. Group, 
    737 N.E.2d 447
    , 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An ambiguity
    does not exist merely because the parties proffer differing interpretations of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024        Page 14 of 17
    [contract] language.”). Focusing on the language in the Easement that “there
    shall be no unobstructed use [of the Easement] for ingress and egress from Fifth
    Street to Sixth Street” “during any construction on the premises of
    GRANTOR,” the Foundry asserts that the trial court’s interpretation that
    Framemakers should have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even
    when the Foundry had construction on its premises, would render the word
    “no” ineffective and meaningless. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). If the
    Easement was truly meant to give Framemakers unobstructed access during the
    construction on Foundry’s property, the Foundry contends that the Easement
    should have read, ‘there shall be unobstructed use for ingress and egress . . .
    during any construction.’ We disagree. “When construing an instrument
    granting an easement, the trial court must ascertain and give effect to the
    intention of the parties, which is determined by proper construction of the
    language of the instrument from an examination of all parts thereof.”
    McCauley, 
    928 N.E.2d at 314
    . In this light, “[p]articular words and phrases
    cannot be read alone, as the parties’ intention must be gleaned from the
    instruction as a whole.” 
    Id.
     Here, the Easement runs across Lot 198, as the
    servient estate, for the benefit of Lot 154, the dominant estate, and provides for
    a “non-exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress over and
    across [] Lot 198.” (Appellant’s App. Vol II, p. 68). The Easement further
    obligates the Foundry, as the grantor, to agree “that at all times during any
    construction on the premises of GRANTOR, [], there shall be no unobstructed
    use thereof for ingress and egress [].” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 68). A
    reading of all material parts of the Easement leads to the reasonable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 15 of 17
    construction that the parties intended for Framemakers, as grantee and owner
    of Lot 154, to have unobstructed ingress and egress. While the placement of
    the word “no” is confusing, the intent of the parties “must be gleaned from the
    instrument as a whole.” McCauley, 
    928 N.E.2d at 314
    . Accepting the
    Foundry’s interpretation would render all the preceding language of the
    Easement meaningless in favor of the puzzlingly placed word “no.” We find
    that the Easement’s unambiguous language demonstrates that Framemakers
    would enjoy unobstructed access, even when the Foundry had ongoing
    construction on the premises.
    [25]   Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in insulating the Foundry
    from liability under the Easement by applying negligence principles. Instead,
    Framemakers’ and the Foundry’s respective rights and obligations derive from
    the express Easement, which, by its unambiguous language, granted
    Framemakers unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when the
    Foundry, as the owner of the servient estate, had construction occurring on Lot
    198. Based on the evidence before it and undisputed by the parties, the trial
    court concluded that Framemakers’ Easement rights had been “continuously
    and pervasively obstructed [], either partially or in whole, in violation of the
    Easement grant.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). Therefore, we conclude
    that the Foundry interfered with Framemakers’ Easement rights by obstructing
    Framemakers’ access. We remand to the trial court for the determination of
    damages, if any.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024      Page 16 of 17
    CONCLUSION
    [26]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred by concluding that the
    Foundry did not interfere with Framemakers’ Easement during the
    development and construction of the Foundry’s Project.
    [27]   Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024   Page 17 of 17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23A-CT-01426

Filed Date: 1/25/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/25/2024