Marion County Superior Court Probation Department v. Cheryl Trapuzzano ( 2023 )

FILED
Nov 14 2023, 8:35 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Theodore E. Rokita Jacob M. O’Brien
Attorney General of Indiana Scott L. Starr
Starr Austen & Miller, LLP
Frances Barrow Logansport, Indiana
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Marion Superior Court November 14, 2023
Probation Department, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 23A-CT-61
Appeal from the Marion Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Bruce E. Petit,
Cheryl Trapuzzano and Jennifer Special Judge
Trapuzzano, as Co-Personal Trial Court Cause No.
Representatives of the Estate of 49D12-1603-CT-9812
Nathan Trapuzzano, Deceased,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Opinion by Judge Tavitas
Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.
Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023 Page 1 of 16
Case Summary
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the Marion Superior Court Probation Department
(“Probation Department”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for
summary judgment regarding claims brought by Cheryl Trapuzzano and
Jennifer Trapuzzano, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Nathan
Trapuzzano (“Trapuzzano”) (collectively, “the Estate”). The Estate brought
claims against the Probation Department after a probationer shot and killed
Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery. On appeal, the Probation Department
argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment
because: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2)
the Probation Department has common law immunity and immunity under the
Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) from liability for the Estate’s claims; and (3)
the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death.
We find one issue dispositive and hold that the Probation Department has
quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
Issue
[2] The Probation Department raises three issues. We find one issue dispositive,
which we restate as whether the trial court erred by determining that genuine
issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Probation Department has
quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims.
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Facts
[3] S.A. had an extensive juvenile history, which included offenses involving
handguns. In December 2013, the State alleged that S.A. committed acts that
would be auto theft, carrying a handgun without a license, possession of
marijuana, operating a vehicle without a license, fleeing law enforcement,
resisting law enforcement, and dangerous possession of a firearm if committed
by an adult. The juvenile court found the auto theft and resisting law
enforcement allegations to be true and dismissed the other charges. On
February 10, 2014, S.A. was given a suspended commitment to the Department
of Correction; placed on probation; placed on home confinement with his
uncle; ordered to attend school; submit to a substance abuse evaluation; and
attend counseling and the Restoring Excellence Program.
[4] Between February 11, 2014, and March 9, 2014, S.A. was in non-compliance
with the terms of his probation on at least fifteen occasions because he was not
at home during checks, was suspended from school, attended neither the
Restoring Excellence Program nor counseling, and failed to submit to a
substance abuse evaluation. Probation Department policy required S.A.’s
probation officer, Tracy McDonald, to file a notice with the juvenile court after
the third violation, but McDonald did not do so. On March 5, 2014,
McDonald’s supervisor, Christina Gibson, addressed the violations with
McDonald in an email and asked why they “shouldn’t go ahead and do a
[petition to modify] on [S.A.].” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 218.
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[5] On March 5, 2014, the Probation Department filed a petition for modification
of the dispositional decree. The Probation Department alleged that S.A.
received a five-day out of school suspension, failed to participate in the
Restoring Excellence Program, and had unauthorized leaves from his residence
on nine occasions. The Probation Department requested that the juvenile court
schedule a hearing on the matter but did not request any emergency relief or
request a change in S.A.’s placement. The juvenile court set the matter for a
hearing on April 7, 2014. While waiting on the April 7 hearing, S.A. continued
to violate the terms of his probation, burglarized a gun shop, shot a man outside
of a restaurant, and on April 1, 2014, shot and killed Trapuzzano during an
apparent robbery.
[6] In March 2016, the Estate filed a complaint against Marion County, the
Probation Department, the Marion Superior Court Executive Committee,
Christine Kerl, Tracy McDonald, and Marion County Community Corrections
Agency. 1 The complaint was amended twice, and the second amended
complaint alleged:
38. Defendants were negligent in many ways, including, without
limitation, by:
1
The parties do not mention whether the Estate filed a notice of tort claim pursuant to Indiana Code Section
34-13-3-8.
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a. Failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation and
administration of the Marion County Superior Court
Probation Department;
b. Failing to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the
responsibilities of probation officers in the Marion County
Superior Court Probation Department;
c. Failing to follow the policies and procedures of the
Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;
d. Failing to fulfill the mandatory duties of probation
officers as prescribed by Indiana Code 11-13-1-3;
e. Failing to fulfill the duties of probation officers as
required by the policies and procedures of the Marion
County Superior Court Probation Department;
f. Failing to properly supervise Tracy McDonald and/or
other probation officers;
g. Failing to properly hire, retain, train, oversee, and
employ Tracy McDonald and/or other probation officers;
h. Failing to properly monitor and/or supervise [S.A.] per
the terms of his probation; and
i. Failing to properly record, track, supervise, and notify
authorities of violations of [S.A.’s] home detention.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41-42.
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[7] The trial court dismissed all of the defendants except the Probation
Department, and the Probation Department filed a motion for summary
judgment. The Probation Department alleged that: (1) the Probation
Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department
had immunity from the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was
not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. The Estate filed a response,
and the trial court conducted a hearing in July 2022.
[8] In November 2022, the trial court denied the Probation Department’s motion.
The trial court concluded that: (1) the Probation Department owed a duty to
Trapuzzano; (2) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate quasi-
judicial immunity; (3) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate
discretionary function immunity under the ITCA; (4) law enforcement
immunity under the ITCA is inapplicable; and (5) genuine issues of material
fact exist regarding whether the Probation Department was the proximate cause
of Trapuzzano’s death. Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, the trial court
found:
13. Courts are reluctant to apply quasi-judicial immunity too
broadly and if the acts do not involve the judicial process so that
a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision making may be
stifled, then the person or act should not be shielded by
immunity. Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). While it is true that the filing of a notice of
probation violation should be considered an arm of the judicial
officer who is immune and entitled to quasi judicial immunity,
that may not be the case if the actor knowingly filed a false
probation violation. Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023 Page 6 of 16
Ct. App. 2019). In this cause, there is evidence that not only did
[the Probation Department] omit information in the Petition filed
with the Court which would be vital to the Court in determining
appropriate action to take, but they also made recommendations
contrary to their own belief and mandatory policies. I.C. 11-13-
1-1(C) creates a mandatory duty to notify the Court when a
violation of conditions or probation occurs and to keep accurate
records of cases investigated by Probation Department and make
these records available to the Court. Id. at 1144 ([e]mphasis
added). If the facts alleged by the [the Estate] as set out in the
depositions and emails from [Probation Department] employees
are true, then the trier-of-fact could find that not only was the
Petition filed by the [Probation Department] not in furtherance of
a judicial determination, but an actual deterrence to that process.
The [Estate] cites evidence that presiding Juvenile Judge Moores
was extremely angry and upset to not have been provided with
accurate information in the Violation of Probation Petition as
filed. This could further support a finding that Probation’s
actions were outside the protection of quasi-judicial immunity.
Based upon depositions of Christina Gibson, the trier-of-fact
could find that the probation officer intentionally withheld vital
information in the Petition filed which would negate the granting
of immunity. Parke City v. Ropak, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988).
14. The Court believes that there is also an issue of fact as to
whether Probation was carrying out a Court Order. In order for
judicial immunity to apply, the [d]efendant must be carrying out
an order of the Court. Preparing reports for the Court’s review to
assist the Court in making a judicial determination is closely tied
to a judicial proceeding. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). However, to omit vital information as is alleged in
the [Estate’s] cause of action may be found to be actions not
enforcing the Court’s Order, but rather a direct violation of that
Order. This is a question of fact for the trier and not appropriate
for summary judgment.
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15. The Court finds that there are sufficient questions of fact
which may negate the protection afforded through quasi-judicial
immunity and [the Probation Department’s] Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied on that ground.
*****
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 30-31. This Court then granted the Probation
Department permission to bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 14(B).
Discussion and Decision
[9] The Probation Department appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for
summary judgment. “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion
for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v.
DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)
(quoting Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs.,
128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
[10] The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie
showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden then shifts to the
non-moving party, which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of
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material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts
or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.
[11] We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo,
and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.” Schoettmer
v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “We limit our review to the
materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,
90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. Because the trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also reiterate that findings of fact
and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not
bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).
[12] In Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme
Court held: “In general, it is only after a determination is made that a
governmental defendant is not immune . . . that a court undertakes the analysis
of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances.” Accordingly,
we begin by addressing the parties’ immunity arguments. “More than forty
years ago, a series of judicial decisions almost entirely abolished common law
immunity for government entities and activities in this state.” F.D. v. Ind. Dep’t
of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 135-36 (Ind. 2013). “Under Indiana common law,
with very limited exception, governmental entities are thus subject to liability
under traditional tort theories.” Id. at 136. The three limited exceptions are
“crime prevention, appointments to public office, and judicial decision-
making.” Id. (citing Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 227) (emphasis added). In
response, the Indiana General Assembly passed the ITCA. “This statute
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granted absolute immunity to governmental entities in a number of specific
circumstances, and codified rules of liability for other areas of governmental
activity.” Id.
[13] Whether immunity applies is a question of law for the court, and the party
seeking immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that immunity applies. Id.
“The negligence of a defendant ‘is not relevant if it is immune. Immunity
assumes negligence but denies liability.’” Id. (quoting Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of
Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2002)).
[14] Although the parties discuss both common law quasi-judicial immunity and
immunity under the ITCA, we resolve this matter on the basis of common law
quasi-judicial immunity. “It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence
of any jurisdiction.” H.B. v. Indiana-Elkhart Div. of Fam. & Child., 713 N.E.2d
300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. “The underlying purpose of the
immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process.”
Id. “[T]he same policies that underlie the grant of absolute judicial immunity to
judges justify the grant of immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-
judicial functions.” Id. “Absolute judicial immunity therefore extends to
persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that
these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id.“In determining whether a person is entitled to judicial immunity, the United
States Supreme Court has established a functional approach, where the court
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looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who
performed it.” Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538
(1988)).
[15] “Probation in Indiana is a court function, and probation officers are trained,
tested, hired, and supervised directly by the judiciary.” Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d
320, 324 (Ind. 2005); see also Ind. Code Chapter 11-13-1 (discussing probation
administration); Ind. Admin. Rule 18 (discussing the governance of county
probation departments). Probation officers “serve at the pleasure of the
appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the
court.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c).
[16] This Court has held that individual probation officers were entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity where the plaintiff alleged that the probation officers
“exceeded the scope of their authority as probation officers by failing to
maintain accurate records and providing the sentencing court . . . with
knowingly false information.” Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139, 1143 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The plaintiff in Thornton alleged that probation
officers erroneously filed a petition to revoke probation where he was not on
probation. We noted that, “[p]ursuant to statute, probation officers have
mandatory duties, including, to ‘notify the court when a violation of a
condition of probation occurs’ and to ‘keep accurate records of cases
investigated by [them] and of all cases assigned to [them] by the court and make
these records available to the court upon request.’” Id. at 1143-44 (citing Ind.
Code § 11-13-1-3(7), (9)).
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[17] In Thornton, the probation officers “followed their statutory duty to notify the
court when a violation of a condition of probation occurred pursuant to the
original sentencing order . . . and their belief that Thornton was still on
probation at the time he committed new offenses because his probation had
been tolled when he served an executed sentence in an unrelated case.” Id. at
1144-45. We concluded that, “in filing the notice of probation violation, [the
probation officers] were ‘performing [a task] so integral or intertwined with the
judicial process’ that they should be ‘considered an arm of the judicial officer
who is immune.’” Id. at 1145. Accordingly, we held that the probation officers
were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment to the probation officers. See also J.A.W. v. State,
650 N.E.2d 1142, 1151-53 (holding that a probation officer had quasi-judicial
immunity despite the claims that the probation officer was “derelict in the
performance of his duties”), vacated in part and summarily aff’d in relevant part by
687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 n.3 (Ind. 1997).
[18] Here, as in Thornton, the Estate alleges that the Probation Department withheld
vital information from the petition for modification and intentionally provided
false information. We find little to distinguish the actions at issue here from the
actions at issue in Thornton. The Estate, however, argues that Thornton is
inapplicable because quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to governmental
entities. In support of this argument, the Estate cites federal cases addressing
Section 1983 claims. Our Court, however, has applied quasi-judicial immunity
to governmental entities in connection with other types of claims. In
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Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),
trans. denied, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation action against
several governmental entities, including the Indianapolis Police Department
(“IPD”) after IPD executed a trial court’s order to seize the property owner’s
bookstore. We held that IPD was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because
IPD’s actions were in furtherance of the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we
held that the City of Indianapolis could “not be held liable for protected actions
by IPD . . . .” Mendenhall, 717 N.E.2d at 1227.
[19] Similarly, in H.B., 713 N.E.2d at 302, children filed a complaint against the
State of Indiana—Elkhart County Office Division of Family and Children
(“DFC”). While the children were removed from their mother and her
boyfriend and placed in foster care, DFC became aware that the boyfriend
molested one of the children on a weekend visit. DFC did not report the abuse
to law enforcement and later recommended to the trial court that the children
be reunited with mother, who was still living with the boyfriend. The trial court
took the recommendation and reunited the children with their mother, and the
boyfriend later molested the children again. The complaint alleged that DFC
was negligent in recommending that the children be reunited with their mother
and by failing to report the first molestation to law enforcement.
[20] We held that DFC was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as follows:
[T]he case workers employed by the DFC were acting to assist
the juvenile court judge in his decisions regarding the care and
custody of the Children. The DFC and its employees were acting
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under the direction of Ind. Code § 31-6-11-11 (1988)[ 2], which
states that case workers from the DFC “shall assist the juvenile
court . . . during all stages of the proceedings in accordance with
the purposes of [the chapter regarding reporting and investigation
of child abuse and neglect].” Specifically, after the Children were
adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”), the case
workers were required to complete a case plan for the Children,
Ind. Code § 31-6-4-6.6 (1988)[ 3], and to prepare a predispositional
report that included a recommendation for the care, treatment,
and rehabilitation of the Children. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-15(1988).[ 4] The case workers, in addition to acting under the
statutes, were acting in accordance with the juvenile court’s order
to monitor the progress made by the Children, Mother and
Boyfriend. Further, the DFC’s recommendation to reunify the
Children with Mother was made during a judicial proceeding.
Thus, the case workers were acting as an arm of the juvenile
court judge by implementing the court’s order, and ultimately
recommending that the Children be returned to Mother. We
hold that . . . these were acts intimately associated with a judicial
proceeding and entitled the DFC to absolute immunity from suit.
Too, because the initial molestation took place after the Children
were adjudicated CHINS and came under the supervision of the
DFC, we hold that the failure of the DFC to report the 1989
molestation to law enforcement officials occurred in the course of
the DFC’s court-ordered duties[] and falls within the scope of the
DFC’s judicial immunity. Thus, the trial court did not err by
entering summary judgment for the State on its claim for judicial
immunity.
2
Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
3
Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
4
Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
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Id. at 302-03 (footnotes omitted); cf. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429, 433-34 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012) (distinguishing H.B. and holding that the Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where DCS’s
removal of the child was not at the direction of a court and occurred after the
CHINS proceedings had been closed), aff’d on reh’g by 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). Given our holdings in Mendenhall and H.B., we disagree with the
Estate’s contention that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to the
Probation Department.
[21] Finally, we note that the trial court focused on what it described as genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the probation officer intentionally withheld
vital information. Quasi-judicial immunity, like judicial immunity, is
“absolute.” Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 652 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020), trans. denied. “Such immunity totally insulates officials from
liability for actions taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity; the shield of
absolute immunity cannot be pierced even if the official acts in error,
maliciously, or corruptly.” Id. at 655. Regardless of whether the probation
officer’s conduct was intentional or negligent, quasi-judicial immunity applies.
Because the Probation Department has immunity from the Estate’s claims, we
need not address the parties’ other arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion for
summary judgment.
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Conclusion
[22] The Probation Department is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the Estate’s
claims, and the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion
for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
[23] Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
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