Mackenzie Taft v. Marilea Piper ( 2023 )

FILED
Nov 14 2023, 8:44 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Andrew T. Thomas
Blair N. Hedges
Cristin L. Just
Indiana Legal Services
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE
Fran Quigley
Health and Human Rights Clinic Indiana
University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
Adam Mueller
Indiana Justice Project
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-877 | November 14, 2023 Page 1 of 10
Mackenzie Taft, November 14, 2023
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-EV-877
v. Appeal from the Marion County
Center Township Small Claims
Marilea Piper, Court
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Jonathan P.
Sturgill, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49K01-2303-EV-1184
Opinion by Judge Bailey
Judges May and Felix concur.
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Mackenzie Taft appeals the small claims court’s judgment for Marilea Piper on
Piper’s complaint for eviction. Taft raises three issues for our review; however,
we find one issue to be dispositive: whether the small claim’s court denied her
due process rights when it granted relief on Piper’s complaint. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Piper owns a property on Webb Street in Indianapolis. Piper lives in Florida,
and her son resides in the Indianapolis property. According to Piper’s
allegation, in October 2022, Taft rented a room from Piper’s son, but Taft and
Piper’s son did not execute a lease agreement. When she moved in, Taft
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-877 | November 14, 2023 Page 2 of 10
brought several cats and a dog with her. On March 20, 2023, Piper filed a
Notice of Claim for emergency possession with the small claims court. In her
supporting affidavit, Piper alleged that Taft was “verbally abuse” to Piper’s
grandchildren and that Taft possessed a “pit bull” that was not covered by her
homeowner’s insurance. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 7.
[3] Three days later, the small claims court held a hearing on Piper’s Claim.
During the hearing, Piper, who appeared pro se, asserted that Taft was
“antagonizing” Piper’s grandchildren. Tr. at 8. She also stated that the garage
smelled “foul” because of Taft’s cats and that Taft’s dog “growl[ed]” at her. Id.
at 9. After Piper had finished her testimony, Taft’s attorney argued that the
allegations were untrue but that, even if they were true, they “would not
constitute sufficient grounds for an emergency eviction[.]” Id. at 10. Taft then
proceeded to testify that her dog is not a Pitbull but an American Bulldog, that
the dog is “not aggressive,” and that the dog stays in her room. Id. at 11. She
also testified that she has three litter boxes for the cats in the garage that she
cleans “every day.” Id. at 12. She further testified that the smell from the
garage is a result of rats that live in a broken-down car. And she testified that
she has never damaged anything or “physically or mentally harmed anybody.”
Id. at 13.
[4] At the conclusion of Taft’s testimony, the court determined that Piper’s petition
did not “warrant an emergency eviction.” Id. at 16. However, the court
pointed out that Taft did not have a lease and, as such, that she did not have
“any entitlements or rights to stay there[.]” Id. The court then stated that it
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would not “consider this an emergency eviction” but was “considering this just
as a traditional possession case.” Id. At that point, Taft’s attorney argued that,
because Taft did not have a lease, she was “by default month-to-month” and
entitled to thirty days’ notice prior to an eviction filing. Id. The court stated:
“You’re right.” Id. at 17.
[5] Taft then requested that the court dismiss Piper’s Claim, but the court denied
Taft’s motion. In particular, the court determined that Taft had been given
notice of Piper’s intent to reclaim the property on March 20 when Piper had
filed her Notice of Claim. The court then stated that it was giving Taft “thirty
days and if she is not out by then, then possession will be awarded to” Piper.
Id. Accordingly, the court set a “regular traditional possession hearing” for
April 20, thirty days after Piper had filed her notice. Id.
[6] Taft’s attorney attempted to confirm the time of the April 20 hearing, and the
court then stated:
How about that. That’s what I am going to do so that we don’t
have to come back here. I am going to grant possession as of the
30th.[ 1] So you have a right to be out of there. If you are not out
of there by the 30th, she has a right to seek enforcement of the
order.
1
It is not clear, but it appears as though the court’s reference here to the “30th" meant the thirtieth day after
Piper had filed her notice, not April 30.
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Id. at 18. 2 Taft objected and requested a hearing in order to have an
opportunity to present “traditional defenses.” Id. The court responded that
Taft “has no lease,” and then granted Piper possession as of April 24. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Taft appeals the small claims court’s judgment in favor of Piper. As a
preliminary matter, we observe that Piper has not filed an appellee’s brief.
Where an appellee fails to file a brief, we do not undertake to develop
arguments on that party’s behalf; rather, we may reverse upon a prima facie
showing of reversible error by the appellant. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196,
1199 (Ind. 2008). Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance,
or on the face of it.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind.
2014). This “prima facie error rule” relieves this Court from the burden of
controverting arguments advanced for reversal, a duty which remains with the
appellee. Simek v. Nolan, 64 N.E.3d 1237, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
2
Taft filed a motion to correct the transcript in which she asserted that the transcript was “incomplete.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. In particular, she contended that, between her counsel’s request to clarify the
time and the court’s statement, there was a conversation between the court and the bailiff and that the court’s
statement was in response to comments by the bailiff. She further asserted that the comments by the bailiff
are important because the bailiff “advise[d] the judge how to rule, and the judge then rule[d] as suggested by
the bailiff.” Id. at 12. The court reporter then submitted an affidavit and stated that, after a review of the
recording, “what is being said . . . is not audible” and that she was “unable to determine who was speaking,
what was said[,] and who the conversation was directed to.” Id. at 18. She then affirmed that the transcript
was “true, complete and accurate.” Id. Accordingly, the court denied Taft’s motion to correct the transcript.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-877 | November 14, 2023 Page 5 of 10
[8] Taft contends that the small claims court denied her due process rights when it
granted relief on Piper’s Claim. In general, judgments in small claims actions
are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.”
Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). When we review claims tried by the bench
without a jury, we will not set aside the judgment “unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “But this deferential
standard does not apply to the substantive rules of law,” which we review de
novo just as we do appeals from a court of general jurisdiction. Trinity Homes,
LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). Taft’s arguments present
questions of law, which we review de novo. See Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d
1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008).
[9] Here, Piper filed a Claim for emergency possession of her property. A petition
for emergency possession must:
(1) include an allegation specifying
(A) the violation, act, or omission caused or threatened by
a landlord or tenant; and
(B) the nature of the specific immediate and serious
(i) injury;
(ii) loss; or
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(iii) damage;
that the landlord or tenant has suffered or will suffer if the
violation, act or omission is not enjoined.
Ind. Code § 32-31-6-4 (2023).
[10] In her Notice of Claim, Piper alleged that Taft was verbally abusive to children
and that she had a dog not covered by insurance. At a hearing three days after
Piper had filed her notice, the court heard testimony from both parties and
ultimately concluded that Piper’s petition “doesn’t warrant an emergency
eviction.” Tr. at 16. As such, the court stated that, while it would not consider
this “an emergency action,” it was “considering this just a traditional
possession case.” Id. The court then began to set the matter for a hearing thirty
days from the date Piper had filed her notice but ultimately granted Piper
possession of her property as of April 24.
[11] Taft contends that the small claims court violated her due process rights when it
changed the hearing from a hearing on Piper’s notice for emergency possession
to a standard eviction proceeding. In particular, Taft contends that the court
deprived her of “adequate notice” of the standard eviction proceedings and that
the court denied her an opportunity to “prepare defenses and [an] opportunity
to be heard on any defense.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. The Indiana University
McKinney School of Law Health and Human Rights Clinic and the Indiana
Justice Project, as amici, similarly contend that the practice followed by the
small claims court, “where Ms. Taft was ordered to move from her home
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without the Court providing the tenant and her counsel an opportunity to
defend the claims of a non-emergency possession, reflects the basis for longtime
concerns about due process protections in eviction cases[.]” Amici Br. at 5-6.
We must agree.
[12] As our Supreme Court has stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving
any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
the law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “Generally stated, due
process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an
opportunity to confront witnesses.” Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). The “opportunity to be heard” is a fundamental
requirement of due process. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). In Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972),
the Supreme Court explained that this principle includes “an
opportunity to present every available defense.”
Morton, 898 N.E.2d 1196.
[13] Here, when the court changed the hearing from one on Piper’s notice of
emergency possession to a traditional eviction case—an action that was not
requested by Piper—and then immediately ruled in favor of Piper without a
hearing, it denied Taft any notice of a nonemergency eviction action, which
resulted in Taft not having an opportunity to see any allegations that Piper may
have alleged in a nonemergency eviction notice. Further, because Taft did not
receive notice of the allegations, she was wholly unable to develop any
defenses, let alone present them.
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[14] In other words, the court denied Taft all of her due process rights. Indeed, she
was not given notice of the nonemergency eviction petition or hearing, she was
not given an opportunity to be heard on any nonemergency allegations, and she
was not given an opportunity to confront witnesses. In addition, the court
deprived her of any opportunity to develop or present any defense to such a
claim.
[15] As our Court has recently noted: “We are not insensitive to the realities of
small claims courtroom adjudication. Dockets are crowded and litigants are
frequently unrepresented by counsel.” Johnson v. Hous. Auth. Of South Bend, 204
N.E.3d 940, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). And we are aware that this is especially
true in Marion County. However, a crowded docket does not excuse a small
claims court from depriving a litigant of her due process rights. And, here, we
hold that the small claims court did not just deny Taft any one due process
right, it essentially denied her any of her due process rights.
Conclusion
[16] The small claims court violated Taft’s due process rights when it did not give
her adequate notice of the hearing on the nonemergency eviction claim and
when it did not allow her to prepare and present her defenses. 3 We therefore
3
Because we conclude that the court violated Taft’s due process rights, we need not address Taft’s additional
arguments that the small claims court should have dismissed Piper’s notice after it concluded that no
emergency existed or that the court did not act in an unbiased manner.
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reverse the small claims court’s order on Piper’s Notice of Claim for emergency
possession.4
[17] Reversed.
May, J., and Felix, J., concur.
4
We express no opinion on the merits of any nonemergency eviction action Piper may chose to file.
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