Roger Oswaldo Mendez-Vasquez v. State of Indiana ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                                                                               FILED
    Aug 23 2023, 8:48 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Christopher J. Evans                                       Theodore E. Rokita
    Dyllan M. Kemp                                             Attorney General of Indiana
    Dollard Evans Whalin LLP                                   Evan Matthew Comer
    Noblesville, Indiana                                       Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Roger Mendez-Vasquez,                                      August 23, 2023
    Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    23A-CR-226
    v.
    Appeal from the Hamilton
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,
    The Honorable Darren Murphy,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29D07-2202-F6-1187
    Opinion by Judge Bradford
    Judge Riley concurs.
    Judge Weissmann dissents with separate opinion.
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                                Page 1 of 16
    Case Summary
    [1]   In February of 2022, Fishers Police Officer Jospeh Ryder stopped a truck driven
    by Roger Mendez-Vasquez after witnessing a traffic infraction and determining
    that the truck’s registration had expired. Officer Ryder discovered that
    Mendez-Vasquez had never had a valid driver’s license in Indiana, arrested
    him, decided to impound his truck, and performed an inventory search. During
    the search, Officer Ryder discovered items that led to a charge of and
    conviction for Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession. Mendez-Vasquez
    contends that Officer Ryder’s inventory search of his truck was unconstitutional
    and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
    recovered during it. Because we disagree, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On February 24, 2022, Officer Ryder was following a black truck driven by
    Mendez-Vasquez westbound on 96th Street in Hamilton County when he saw
    him activate his turn signal less than 200 feet away from the intersection with
    Wading Crane Avenue and make an “unexpected” right turn. Tr. Vol. II p. 8.
    Officer Ryder determined that Mendez-Vasquez’s license plate had expired the
    month before and suspected that he had turned suddenly in an attempt to avoid
    him, so he pulled his police car onto nearby Springstone Road and waited to
    see if Mendez-Vasquez would return to the area. Shortly thereafter, Officer
    Ryder again spotted Mendez-Vasquez’s truck westbound on 96th Street. Officer
    Ryder initiated a traffic stop and observed that Mendez-Vasquez was the
    vehicle’s driver and sole occupant. Mendez-Vasquez produced some
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 2 of 16
    identification but not a valid driver’s license, and Officer Ryder learned that a
    person with Mendez-Vasquez’s name had an active warrant for his arrest from
    Marion County for operating a vehicle without ever having received a license.
    Once Officer Ryder confirmed Mendez-Vasquez’s identity, he arrested him.
    [3]   After Mendez-Vasquez was taken into custody, Officer Ryder decided to have
    the truck impounded. At the time, the Fishers Police Department had a policy
    regarding inventory searches of impounded vehicles, pursuant to which officers
    are required to “log the property of value that is located within the vehicle and
    put it into the inventory log sheet.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. Before beginning his
    search, Officer Ryder asked Mendez-Vasquez to identify items of value that he
    wanted in the inventory, and Mendez-Vasquez replied that he had “a lot of
    tools[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 13.
    [4]   During his inventory search, Officer Ryder found a purse in the passenger
    compartment, which was the same purse from which Mendez-Vasquez had
    retrieved his identification after he was stopped. When Officer Ryder opened
    the purse, he observed a glass smoking pipe with a substance inside that
    appeared to be a pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. Inside the
    compartment in the truck’s armrest, Officer Ryder located a small, partially
    transparent plastic container, which contained a light-colored, crystal-like
    substance, which was later determined to be methamphetamine.
    [5]   On February 25, 2022, the State charged Mendez-Vasquez with Level 6 felony
    possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor unlawful possession
    of paraphernalia. Mendez-Vasquez’s bench trial began on January 17, 2023.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023        Page 3 of 16
    Mendez-Vasquez did not object to the impoundment of his truck on Fourth
    Amendment grounds. Mendez-Vasquez, however, did object to the inventory
    search of the vehicle, claiming that the search of the purse in which the
    contraband was discovered was outside the scope of a permissible inventory
    search because Mendez-Vasquez had not identified the purse as an object of
    value prior to the initiation of the search. The trial court overruled Mendez-
    Vasquez’s objection and permitted Officer Ryder to testify about the items he
    had located inside the purse and truck. The trial court ultimately found
    Mendez-Vasquez guilty of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and
    not guilty Class C misdemeanor unlawful possession of paraphernalia. The
    trial court sentenced Mendez-Vasquez to 654 days of incarceration.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   A constitutional challenge to the admission of the fruits of a warrantless search
    at a criminal trial implicates the Fourth Amendment’s and Article 1, section
    11’s, exclusionary rules, which means that the issue is properly left to the trial
    court’s discretion over the admission of evidence. Wilson v. State, 
    765 N.E.2d 1265
    , 1272 (Ind. 2002). We review such decisions for abuse of that discretion.
    Clark v. State, 
    994 N.E.2d 252
    , 259 (Ind. 2013). Although the ultimate question
    of a search’s constitutionality is a matter of law that courts review de novo,
    Guilmette v. State, 
    14 N.E.3d 38
    , 40 (Ind. 2014), Fourth Amendment claims are,
    by their nature, fact-sensitive inquiries, and a trial court’s determination of the
    facts is entitled to deference. Campos v. State, 
    885 N.E.2d 590
    , 596 (Ind. 2008).
    Reversal of a conviction is appropriate only if a defendant can show that the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023          Page 4 of 16
    admission of evidence was contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances presented by his case or based on a misinterpretation of the law.
    Smith v. State, 
    754 N.E.2d 502
    , 504 (Ind. 2001).
    I.      Article 1, section 11
    Mendez-Vasquez contends for the first time on appeal that the impoundment
    and inventory search of his truck violated his rights against unreasonable search
    and seizure pursuant to Article 1, section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. It is,
    however, well-settled that an issue must first be raised in the trial court by
    raising a timely objection, and the failure to do so results in waiver of the claim
    on appeal. Durden v. State, 
    99 N.E.3d 645
    , 652 (Ind. 2018). When Mendez-
    Vasquez objected to the admission of the purse’s contents at trial, Mendez-
    Vasquez claimed that they were “fruit of the poisonous tree” under the Fourth
    and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution but made no
    mention of Article 1, section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. Consequently, he
    has waived his Indiana constitutional claims for appellate review. See Durden,
    99 N.E.3d at 652.
    II. Fourth Amendment
    [7]   As for Mendez-Vasquez’s federal claims, the Fourth Amendment generally
    requires that police obtain a warrant to conduct a search of a defendant’s
    person, house, papers, or effects unless one of the Amendment’s “well-
    delineated” exceptions applies. Katz v. U.S., 
    389 U.S. 347
    , 357 (1967). As
    courts have long recognized, one of these exceptions occurs when police
    officers conduct an inventory search following the impoundment of a vehicle.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 5 of 16
    Wilford v. State, 
    50 N.E.3d 371
    , 374 (Ind. 2016). The purpose behind the
    inventory-search exception is to “protect an owner’s property while it is in the
    custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
    property, and to guard the police from danger.” Colorado v. Bertine, 
    479 U.S. 367
    , 372 (1987). An inventory search’s validity is determined based on a two-
    part test: first, because the need for an inventory arises from an impound, the
    State must establish that the impoundment is valid under either statute or as a
    matter of community caretaking; and second, courts must consider whether the
    scope of the inventory search was reasonable. Fair v. State, 
    627 N.E.2d 427
    , 431
    (Ind. 1993).
    [8]   Mendez-Vasquez claims for the first time on appeal that Officer Ryder’s
    impoundment of his truck was unconstitutional; consequently, this claim is
    waived for appellate review. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652. This leaves us only
    with Mendez-Vasquez’s contention that the scope of the inventory search of his
    truck was unconstitutionally broad. Even when a vehicle is validly impounded,
    the inventory search itself “must be conducted pursuant to standard police
    procedures.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435. The purpose of this requirement is to
    make sure that the search is carried out in a manner that serves the objectives
    justifying inventory searches and that sufficiently limits the discretion of the
    officer so that the search cannot become a pretext for a general rummaging for
    incriminating evidence. Combs v. State, 
    168 N.E.3d 985
    , 995 (Ind. 2021). That
    said, even when an inventory search is conducted according to a policy, it is
    possible for the policy, as established by the record, to be so broad as to be the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 6 of 16
    equivalent of having no policy at all. See, e.g., Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436. This is
    what Mendez-Vasquez argues.
    [9]    For its part, the State argues that Officer Ryder’s testimony provided sufficient
    detail regarding his department’s policy to conclude that it sufficiently regulated
    officer discretion. Specifically, the State points to Officer Ryder’s testimony
    that he was required to log items “of value,” required to note whether the items
    were taken to a locker or left in the vehicle, and permitted to only search
    containers that might contain valuables. The only real point of contention is
    whether an inventory-search policy that requires officers to inventory items that
    are “of value” is sufficiently restrictive of officer discretion to pass constitutional
    muster. We conclude that it is.
    [10]   We agree with the State that limiting the inventory search to items “of value,”
    i.e., items that the police could reasonably expect to be the subject of complaint
    were they to disappear or be damaged while in police custody, serves the
    purposes of the inventory-search exception while disallowing a general
    rummaging for incriminating evidence. For example, a purse and its contents
    can be inventoried because they are likely to be of value to the owner while,
    without more, items such as discarded paper bags cannot be searched because
    they are not likely to be of value. While it may be tempting to imagine a policy
    with additional guidance for determining value such that officer discretion is
    further limited, we are somewhat at a loss to understand how such a policy
    could be workable in practice. Attempting to craft an inventory-search policy
    based on apparent monetary value (perhaps the only more-or-less objective
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 7 of 16
    criterion that could realistically be added to such a policy) strikes us as an
    exercise in futility, because an item of no apparent monetary value may
    nonetheless have great practical or sentimental value to its owner.
    [11]   Another possibility would be to require the officer to rely on the vehicle
    occupant’s identification of items of value. This, however, is also inadequate,
    because the occupant would then be able to defeat any inventory search at all
    by denying that there was anything of value in the vehicle, which would
    completely thwart the purposes of inventory-search procedures, which are to
    “protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
    against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police
    from danger.” Bertine, 
    479 U.S. at 372
    . Perhaps the best practice when
    identifying items of value for purposes of an inventory search is to combine the
    exercise of officer judgment with the identification of specific items of value by
    the vehicle’s occupant, as Officer Ryder did here. In any event, we conclude
    that the inventory-search policy here, which required that items of value be
    inventoried and was followed by Officer Ryder, sufficiently constrains the
    exercise of officer discretion and is therefore constitutional. See Peete v. State,
    
    678 N.E.2d 415
    , 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that trial counsel was not
    ineffective for failing to challenge an inventory search where the search policy
    at issue provided that “‘the officer is required to go through the vehicle, the
    interior of the vehicle and the trunk of the vehicle to ascertain if there is any
    valuable property or contraband or basically it is designed to protect the private
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 8 of 16
    party from loss [of] the property and the wrecker lots and the police department,
    for liability’”) (record citation omitted and brackets in Peete), trans. denied.
    [12]   While we acknowledge the similarity between the policy at issue in this case
    and the policies found to be unconstitutionally vague in Fair and Sams v. State,
    
    71 N.E.3d 372
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), we nonetheless conclude that those cases
    are distinguishable on the facts. In Fair, the police officer testified as follows
    regarding his police department’s inventory-search policy: “Officer Wager
    testified only that ‘we conduct an inventory search of the car to see what kind of
    items are in it. If there’s anything valuable that might need to be placed in the
    property room or otherwise noted as being in the car.’” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436
    (emphasis in original). In contrast to this case, however, the Court noted
    several indicia of pretext harmful to the State’s position, including that the
    vehicle was searched at the scene by an officer responsible for criminal
    investigations; the officer made no note of Fair’s personal effects, focusing
    instead on the contraband; there was no indication that inventory sheets were
    ever completed; and it was unclear that the vehicle was ever actually
    impounded. The Fair Court concluded that the search at issue was
    unreasonable because “[t]here was no testimony whatsoever that provided the
    particulars of the policy and, therefore, it is not possible for this Court to
    determine whether the seemingly suspicious circumstances which attended the search
    were in fact irregular.” Id. (emphasis added).
    [13]   Here, however, the record contains few of the “seemingly suspicious
    circumstances” that were so suggestive of pretext in Fair. Id. Officer Ryder
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 9 of 16
    testified that the Fishers Police Department’s inventory policy was to inventory
    items of value and note them on an inventory log sheet, and even Mendez-
    Vasquez does not dispute that his purse was an item of value that contained
    items of value. Officer Ryder testified that the items in the vehicle were entered
    on an inventory sheet by another officer. Officer Ryder testified in greater
    detail regarding the Fishers Police policy than did the officer regarding the
    policy in Fair, including that it specifically allowed closed containers to be
    opened so long as they could contain items of value. Finally, there is no
    indication that anything was searched and inventoried that was not of value,
    which would indicate pretext. Because the Fair Court was evaluating the search
    policy against a backdrop of strong indicia of pretext that are not present in this
    case, we conclude that Fair does not require reversal.
    [14]   Mendez-Vasquez also relies on our decision in Sams, in which the testimony
    regarding the inventory policy was “[w]e look at the vehicle and make sure
    anything that would be valuable [is inventoried], if you look at [it and
    determine] that’s valuable[.]” 
    71 N.E.3d at 379
     (first three sets of brackets in
    Sams). In reversing the trial court’s decision to admit evidence found in the
    inventory search, we observed that the above policy was
    indistinguishable from what Fair held to be no policy at all:
    “[W]e conduct an inventory search of the car [to see if] there’s
    anything valuable that might need to be ... noted as being in the
    car....” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436; see also Rhodes v. State, 
    50 N.E.3d 378
    , 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (invalidating inventory search)
    (inventory “to make sure no valuables are left inside the vehicle
    before it’s towed”), trans. denied. In part, this is because
    inventory searches are definitionally searches for valuables (and,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 10 of 16
    to some degree, dangers). See [South Dakota v. Opperman, 
    428 U.S. 364
    , 369–70 (1976)]. Without further definition by
    standardized criteria, a policy “to inventory for valuables” gives
    officers unconstitutionally broad discretion. There is nothing in
    the record of what standardized criteria GPD officers use to
    decide what is “valuable” under the policy.
    Sams, 
    71 N.E.3d at 380
    .
    [15]   In Sams, however, it was not necessary to reach the question of the policy’s
    unconstitutionality because the officers did not follow the policy, searching a
    discarded fast-food paper bag that they did not even bother to claim was
    valuable. 
    Id. at 375
    . The search of the fast-food bag therefore failed to fulfill
    any valid administrative purpose of an inventory search, creating an inference
    of pretext that the State could not counter. Because it was not necessary to
    reach the question of whether the policy itself was invalid in Sams, any
    declaration on the subject was rendered obiter dictum. In summary, because we
    conclude that Fair and Sams are distinguishable on the facts, they do not require
    reversal in this case.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Riley, J., concurs.
    Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 11 of 16
    Weissmann, Judge, dissenting.
    I respectfully dissent.
    [16]   The State bears the burden to prove that an inventory search was conducted in
    good faith under standardized inventory procedures that sufficiently curtail the
    discretion of the searching officer. Combs v. State, 
    168 N.E.3d 985
    , 995 (Ind.
    2021) (citing Florida v. Wells, 
    495 U.S. 1
    , 4 (1990)), cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 1125 (2022)
    . Based on this scant record, I cannot conclude that this search passes
    constitutional muster.
    [17]   The State’s evidence of a proper inventory search amounts largely to the
    following testimony from the arresting officer:
    Q: And does Fishers have a procedure on how to conduct an
    inventory of a vehicle?
    A: Yes, we are to log the property of value that is located within
    the vehicle and put it into the inventory log sheet. I had another
    officer come and assist me and when he responded he stated that
    he would do the paperwork for the logging of the vehicle.
    Q: Did you follow this procedure when inventorying the
    defendant's vehicle?
    A: I did.
    Tr. Vol. II p.13. But since the arresting officer passed off the “paperwork” of
    the search to a different officer, his testimony can only go so far towards
    ensuring the proper procedures were followed. 
    Id.
     To that end, the State failed
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023          Page 12 of 16
    to elicit testimony from the officer responsible for the administrative work and
    neglected to admit into evidence the inventory sheets themselves, proof of
    impoundment, or the written text of Fishers’ inventory search policy. Thus,
    despite the majority’s claim to the contrary, this case shares almost all the
    pretextual concerns that led to suppression in Fair v. State, 
    627 N.E.2d 427
    , 436
    (Ind. 1993).
    [18]   As in Fair, Mendez-Vasquez’s truck was (1) searched at the crime scene by (2)
    an officer responsible for, and with extensive experience in, criminal drug
    enforcement. As in Fair, (3) the record contains only the searching officer’s
    testimony—not the officer who filled out the paperwork. And as in Fair, there
    is no evidence of (4) completed inventory sheets, or (5) actual impoundment of
    the truck.1 The only indicator of a pretextual search not present here is that
    Officer Ryder asked about, and appears to have kept track of, Mendez-
    Vasquez’s personal items. Yet, based on the State’s failure to enter the
    inventory log sheets into evidence—or elicit testimony from the officer who
    filled out the sheets—Officer Ryder’s brief testimony that “[he] did” follow the
    proper procedures of an inventory search falls short of the State’s burden. Tr.
    Vol. II p. 13.
    [19]   While the majority makes much of Officer Ryder’s clarification that Fishers’
    policy allowed him to open closed containers so long as they might contain
    1
    I don’t doubt that the truck was impounded based on Mr. Mendez-Vasquez’s appellate arguments. But this
    concession on appeal does not relieve the State of its burden of showing a constitutionally permissible
    inventory search.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                         Page 13 of 16
    valuables, this fails to calm my fear of pretext, as it does little to establish the
    existence of the necessary procedural safeguards. This is the critical inquiry
    courts must undergo in determining the constitutionality of inventory searches.
    For instance, Indiana has consistently required the State to explain not just what
    the inventory search policy is, but how the officer’s actions matched those
    procedures in practice. See, e.g., Wilford v. State, 
    50 N.E.3d 371
    , 377–78 (Ind.
    2016); Sams v. State, 
    71 N.E.3d 372
    , 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017);2 Rhodes v. State,
    
    50 N.E.3d 378
    , 382–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Whitley v. State, 
    47 N.E.3d 640
    ,
    647–48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Indeed, our Supreme Court has explicitly stated:
    Simply put, [a] passing reference to “our procedures in that
    situation” fails to “provide the particulars of the policy” as Fair
    requires. On this record, we know literally nothing about the
    substance of the “procedures” the officer referenced, let alone
    how his actions adhered to those procedures. Without these
    “particulars,” then, we cannot evaluate whether this
    impoundment was a reasonable exercise of the community-
    caretaking function and not merely pretext for an inventory
    search.
    Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 377–78 (internal citation omitted).
    [20]   Here, all we know is that officers look for valuables. But how does an officer
    gauge value? How does an officer determine which containers may be opened
    2
    In Sams, our court made two things clear: (1) a policy consisting only of searching for “anything valuable”
    was unconstitutional; and (2) the officer’s repeated deviations from that policy required reversal. The
    majority incorrectly relegates the first premise to irrelevant dicta. If anything, this has the dicta analysis
    backwards. Sams, 
    71 N.E.3d at 383
     (holding “even if” the inventory search policy was constitutional, “the
    officers’ major deviation from that regime” also required reversal).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                               Page 14 of 16
    to log items of value? Requiring an answer to such basic questions is not too
    much to ask where the State is attempting to justify a warrantless search. See,
    e.g., Sams, 
    71 N.E.3d at
    379–80; People v. Mortel, 
    197 A.D.3d 196
    , 233 (N.Y.
    2021) (Chambers, J., concurring in part) (“Surely, if the standardized procedure
    in this case were limited to what [the officer] actually described, namely a
    generalized instruction to ‘go through the vehicle’ and ‘note all the valuables,’ it
    would be difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that such a procedure is
    designed to meet the legitimate objective of the search while limiting the
    discretion of the officer in the field.”); U.S. v. Mundy, 
    621 F.3d 283
    , 290–91 (3rd
    Cir. 2010) (holding constitutional inventory search policy “for valuable items”
    that sufficiently explained procedural safeguards); U.S. v. Battle, 
    370 Fed. Appx. 426
    , 429 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); U.S. v. Kimes, 
    246 F.3d 800
     (6th Cir. 2001)
    (same). In short, exactly like in Wilford, we know nothing about the substance
    of the procedures used here, let alone whether Officer Ryder’s actions adhered
    to that policy.3
    [21]   Though the State relied on the inventory exception to justify the search of the
    purse, it failed to establish the necessary showing to ensure the search passed
    3
    This is not to say that I disagree with the majority’s view that usefulness or practicality may be a
    component of a lawful inventory search policy. Slip Op. ¶¶ 10-12. But the majority’s discussion on this point
    is just conjecture because the State failed to provide the evidence necessary to properly review Fishers’
    inventory search procedures. The only case the majority opinion affirmatively cites for its position—without
    having to explain away the opposite result—possessed the evidence necessary to review the substance of the
    procedures lacking here. 
    Id.
     ¶ 11 (citing Peete v. State, 
    678 N.E.2d 415
    , 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
    inventory search constitutional where the officer “testified articulately” about his actions in conducting the
    search, explained how the general procedures of an inventory search matched his actions, and the written
    policy was entered into evidence)).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                               Page 15 of 16
    constitutional muster. Based on this failure in the State’s burden of proof, I
    would grant Mr. Mendez-Vasquez’s motion to suppress.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023      Page 16 of 16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23A-CR-00226

Filed Date: 8/23/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2023