Shane Willingham v. Anderson Center ( 2023 )

FILED
Aug 14 2023, 8:55 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael J. Bruzzeese Kelly K. McFadden
SMID Law, LLC Michael E. O’Neill
Fishers, Indiana Daniel F. Ford
O’Neill McFadden & Willett LLP
Schererville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shane Willingham, August 14, 2023
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-CT-459
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
Anderson Center, The Honorable Mark K. Dudley,
Appellee. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C06-2207-CT-91
Opinion by Judge Brown
Judges Crone and Felix concur.
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 1 of 12
[1] Shane Willingham appeals the dismissal of his complaint and asserts his claim
was not governed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 24, 2022, Willingham filed a Complaint for Damages against
Anderson Center – St. Vincent Anderson Regional Hospital (“Anderson
Center”). The complaint alleged:
2. The Anderson Center is a treatment facility for persons with
addictions and mental illnesses. It offers outpatient services as
well as residential treatment programs.
3. In July of 2020, Plaintiff, then a minor child, was a resident of
The Anderson Center.[1] Plaintiff had checked in for
psychological treatment following his most recent suicide
attempt.
4. Plaintiff had brought with him to The Anderson Center a
history of mental and emotional issues and previous suicide
attempts.
5. Plaintiff was in need of The Anderson Center’s psychological
services as a result of suffering a sexual assault at the hands of
his step-father as a young boy. The trauma Plaintiff suffered
plagued him throughout his young life and contributed to his
history of depression, pornography addiction, and suicidal
thoughts and attempts.
6. The Anderson Center holds itself out as being equipped to
provide “hope, health and strength” to individuals just like
1
The complaint did not provide Willingham’s age. Willingham asserts on appeal that he is “a proverbial
‘eggshell plaintiff,’ more susceptible to damage due to an inappropriate sexual contact than would be a
typical sixteen year old child.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 2 of 12
Plaintiff who suffer from addiction and mental illness, and it
was this hope, health, and strength Plaintiff sought in taking
up residency to receive treatment.
7. Instead, Plaintiff received further emotional damage as a result
of The Anderson Center’s negligence.
8. The Anderson Center was well aware of Plaintiff’s
psychological history and owed him a duty of care in his
treatment. It failed in that duty.
9. In the early morning of July 25, 2020, an Anderson Center
employee located Plaintiff in the room of a female resident.
On this and prior occasions the two had had sex.
10. Their relationship should have been impossible had The
Anderson Center followed its policies and procedures which
include mandatory resident room checks in fifteen-minute
intervals and the locking of the doors between the boys’ and
girls’ units. These procedures are designed specifically to
prevent unsupervised co-mingling between the residents each
of whom, presumably, like Plaintiff, suffer from varying
degrees of psychological trauma and mental illness.
11. On information and belief, the motion activated cameras at
The Anderson Center were fully functioning the morning of
July 25, 2020 and yet detected exactly zero movement
indicating that The Anderson Center neglected to perform
even a single one of its mandatory resident room checks.
12. On information and belief, after the sexual relationship
between the two vulnerable patients was discovered,
employees of The Anderson Center attempted to cover up
their grossly negligent conduct by falsifying documentation of
the room checks.
13. Plaintiff was already in a fragile place mentally and
emotionally, hence his seeking help from The Anderson
Center. As a result of its negligence, Plaintiff has suffered and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 3 of 12
continues to suffer from permanent and irrevocable mental
anguish and emotional trauma.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 12-14.
[3] In August 2022, Anderson Center filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind.
Trial Rule 12(B)(1) arguing that Willingham alleged “what amount[ed] to a
breach in the standard of care in a medical setting” and the alleged actions were
covered by Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act (the “MMA”). Appellee’s
Appendix Volume II at 3. It argued Willingham had not convened a medical
review panel as required by the MMA and requested the dismissal of the
complaint. In a supporting memorandum, Anderson Center argued “[t]here is
a clear connection between the alleged negligent conduct and the healthcare
relationship” between it and Willingham. Id. at 14. In September 2022,
Willingham filed a response arguing that his allegations “focused on [Anderson
Center’s] negligence in the supervision and security of its minor residents not on
any particular medical treatment or procedure.” Id. at 18. On January 26,
2023, the court held a hearing at which it heard argument.
[4] On February 1, 2023, the court issued an order which provided:
Order Granting the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
The court, after reviewing the party’s briefing and argument
grants [Anderson Center’s] Motion to Dismiss because
[Willingham’s] complaint falls within the [MMA]. The complaint
alleges a breach of medical care that resulted in damage to
Willingham.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 4 of 12
The evidence before the court is limited to the parties’
pleadings. . . . The complaint alleges that Willingham was an
inpatient psychological patient at a facility operated by the Anderson
Center. Willingham alleges he was damaged when he was able to
leave his room, enter the room of another patient and engage in
intercourse with that other patient in contravention of the Anderson
Center’s policies and procedures. Willingham specifically alleged
“The Anderson Center was well aware of Plaintiff’s psychological
history and owed him a duty of care in his treatment. It failed in that
duty.” Complaint paragraph 8.
An analogous case is Anonymous Hospital Inc v. Doe, 996
N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)[, trans. denied]. In Doe, the plaintiff
was a psychiatric patient at the defendant’s facility. While receiving
treatment[,] [s]he engaged in sexual activities with another patient.
She alleged that she was damaged as a result of these interactions
with the other patient. The Court of Appeals ruled that her claim
sounded in medical negligence. The Court concluded:
To prevail upon her claim, Doe must show that employees of
Anonymous Hospital deviated from the applicable standard of
medical care as to her. The fact-finder should be presented
with evidence on the applicable standard of care for a
physician prescribing psychotropic drugs in a confined setting.
Accordingly, the Complaint falls within the purview of the
MMA. Partial summary judgment was improvidently granted
to Doe on this issue.
Id. at 336.
As in Doe, Willingham here is alleging that the Anderson
Center failed to adhere to the applicable standard of care in treating
him as a patient. An analysis of Willingham’s complaint requires
inquiry into what medication he was taking or not taking, the level of
appropriate supervision for a patient with his presenting symptoms,
and whether the policies and procedures regarding room checks and
locked doors were appropriate for a patient presenting with
Willingham’s condition. These all involve medical decision-making
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 5 of 12
specific to Willingham and as a result, his complaint alleges a claim
sounding in medical negligence. The court dismisses Willingham’s
complaint without prejudice.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 2-3.
Discussion
[5] The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Willingham’s complaint.
Where a trial court rules on a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss based on a
paper record and oral argument, our review is de novo. GKN Co. v. Magness, 744
N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001). The MMA requires the presentation of the
proposed complaint to a medical review panel before an action may be
commenced in a court in Indiana. Cortez v. Ind. Univ. Health Inc., 151 N.E.3d
332, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Metz as Next Friend of Metz v. Saint Joseph
Reg’l Med. Ctr.-Plymouth Campus, Inc., 115 N.E.3d 489, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4)), trans. denied. 2 “Essentially, the [MMA] grants
subject matter jurisdiction over medical malpractice actions first to the medical
review panel, and then to the trial court.” Id. (citing Metz, 115 N.E.3d at 494(citations omitted)). The MMA defines “malpractice” as “a tort or breach of
contract based on health care or professional services that were provided, or
2
Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4 provides:
Notwithstanding section 1 of this chapter, and except as provided in sections 5 and 6 of this chapter,
an action against a health care provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before:
(1) the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel
established under IC 34-18-10 (or IC 27-12-10 before its repeal); and
(2) an opinion is given by the panel.
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that should have been provided, by a health care provider, to a patient.” Ind.
Code § 34-18-2-18. A patient is “an individual who receives or should have
received health care from a health care provider, under a contract, express or
implied, and includes a person having a claim of any kind, whether derivative
or otherwise, as a result of alleged malpractice on the part of a health care
provider.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-22. Health care is “an act or treatment
performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by a
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s
medical care, treatment, or confinement.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-13.
[6] In Howard Reg’l Health Sys. v. Gordon, the Indiana Supreme Court held:
Indiana courts understand the [MMA] to cover “curative or salutary
conduct of a health care provider acting within his or her professional
capacity,” Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997), but not conduct “unrelated to the promotion of a patient’s
health or the provider’s exercise of professional expertise, skill, or
judgment.” Collins v. Thakkar, 552 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990). To determine whether the Act is applicable, the court looks to
the substance of a claim. Van Sice v. Sentany, 595 N.E.2d 264 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, regardless of what label a plaintiff uses, claims that boil down
to a “question of whether a given course of treatment was medically
proper and within the appropriate standard” are the “quintessence of
a malpractice case.” Id. at 267 (plaintiff’s claims of fraud and battery
fell within the [MMA] because the first was essentially a claim that
the defendant failed to adhere to a standard of care and the second
was a claim that the defendant did not obtain informed consent for a
procedure); Popovich v. Danielson, 896 N.E.2d 1196, 1202-1204 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (though styled as assault and battery, fraud, breach of
contract, and defamation, all plaintiff’s claims involved defendant’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-459 | August 14, 2023 Page 7 of 12
exercise of professional judgment and involved actions taken while
providing medical care and thus the requirements of the [MMA]
applied).
By contrast, to fall outside the [MMA] a health care provider’s
actions must be demonstrably unrelated to the promotion of the
plaintiff’s health or an exercise of the provider’s professional
expertise, skill, or judgment. Kuester v. Inman, 758 N.E.2d 96 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001); Collins, 552 N.E.2d at 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)
([MMA] held inapplicable in cases where the conduct involved was
“unrelated to the promotion of a patient’s health or the provider’s
exercise of professional expertise, skill or judgment”).
952 N.E.2d 182, 185-186 (Ind. 2011).
[7] In Metz, this Court held:
To be outside the MMA, “a health care provider’s actions must be
demonstrably unrelated to the promotion of the plaintiff’s health or
an exercise of the provider’s professional expertise, skill, or
judgment.” [Howard, 952 N.E.2d] at 186. “‘[T]he test is whether the
claim is based on the provider’s behavior or practices while acting in
his professional capacity as a provider of medical services.’”
Robertson [v. Anonymous Clinic], 63 N.E.3d [349,] 358 [(Ind. Ct. App.
2016)] (quoting Madison Ctr., Inc. v. R.R.K., 853 N.E.2d 1286, 1288
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied)[, trans. denied]. We have also
noted that:
A case sounds in ordinary negligence [rather than medical
negligence] where the factual issues are capable of
resolution by a jury without application of the standard of
care prevalent in the local medical community. By
contrast, a claim falls under the [MMA] where there is a
causal connection between the conduct complained of and
the nature of the patient-health care provider relationship.
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Id. (quoting Terry v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 17 N.E.3d 389, 393
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Metz, 115 N.E.3d at 495. We have also stated “the current test under Trial Rule
12(B)(1) as to whether the [MMA] applies to specific misconduct is to
determine whether that misconduct arises naturally or predictably from the
relationship between the health care provider and patient or from an
opportunity provided by that relationship.” Martinez v. Oaklawn Psychiatric Ctr.,
Inc., 128 N.E.3d 549, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), clarified on reh’g, trans. denied.
[8] Willingham contends that his claim is not governed by the MMA. He argues
“[t]he operative facts center on negligence in the Anderson Center’s security
and supervision duties, duties willfully undertaken by Anderson Center, duties
unrelated to any medical care, and duties not specifically ‘prescribed’ for [his]
treatment.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. He argues his allegations that Anderson
Center failed to adhere to its procedures with respect to resident room checks
and keeping the doors between male and female units locked “do not center on
‘Health care’ as defined by Indiana Code 34-18-2-13.” Id. at 12. He argues the
allegations are not within the expertise of a medical review panel and do not
center on whether his particular diagnosis required the security protocols. He
asserts the standard of care at issue “is not a medical standard of care, but a
standard related to an entity’s performance of security protocols it had
adopted.” Id. at 24.
[9] Anderson Center maintains the trial court correctly determined that
Willingham’s claim is governed by the MMA. It argues his allegations were
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based on the behavior and practices of its employees while acting in their
professional capacity as providers of medical services to promote the patient’s
health. It maintains his claim was based on the failure of its employees “to
provide the services and procedures put in place as part of his medical
treatment.” Appellee’s Brief at 17. It argues “[t]he fifteen-minute checks are
not ‘security’ checks done just to ensure a patient is in his or her room” but to
“make sure the patient is well, has not self-harmed, [and] is not in crisis . . . .”
Id. It further contends there was a causal connection between the conduct
complained of and the nature of the patient-health care provider relationship,
“it is clear Willingham is making a claim that Anderson Center had a duty to
provide psychological and mental health treatment to him, and that it failed to
perform that duty,” and “[t]he alleged breach of duty is directly related to the
curative conduct of a health care provider . . . .” Id. at 20. It notes that
Willingham “specifically alleges [it] violated its duty of care in treatment to
him.” Id. at 23 (citing Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 13).
[10] The record reveals that Willingham’s complaint alleged that Anderson Center is
a treatment facility for persons with addictions and mental illnesses and offers
residential treatment programs. Willingham alleged that he “checked in for
psychological treatment following his most recent suicide attempt,” he “had
brought with him . . . a history of mental and emotional issues and previous
suicide attempts,” he “was in need of The Anderson Center’s psychological
services,” and the “trauma [he] suffered plagued him throughout his young life
and contributed to his history of depression, pornography addiction, and
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suicidal thoughts and attempts.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 12-13.
Willingham essentially asserted that he was placed in a position of undue
vulnerability due to the decisions and actions of Anderson Center employees in
light of his mental and emotional issues, suicide attempts, psychological
trauma, pornography addiction, and need for psychological services. In his
complaint, Willingham alleged that he was damaged by Anderson Center’s
negligence and claimed: “Anderson Center was well aware of [his]
psychological history and owed him a duty of care in his treatment. It failed in
that duty.” Id. at 13.
[11] In light of the allegations, we cannot say that the alleged actions by Anderson
Center and its employees were demonstrably unrelated to the promotion of
Willingham’s health or that there is not a causal connection between the alleged
actions and the nature of the patient-health care provider relationship.
Willingham’s breach of duty claim is, in substance, a medical malpractice
claim, and accordingly the trial court did not err in granting Anderson Center’s
motion to dismiss and dismissing the claim without prejudice. See Anonymous
Hosp., 996 N.E.2d at 331-336 (observing the plaintiff was admitted to a
hospital’s psychiatric ward for in-patient psychiatric care, at some point she was
placed on monitoring where staff were to check on her every fifteen minutes,
and she engaged in sexual activity with another patient; noting the plaintiff’s
“participation in sexual acts . . . was not accomplished by force or threat of
force,” “the gravamen of [her] complaint is that she was rendered incompetent
to make an informed decision regarding sexual conduct because of psychotropic
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drugs prescribed for her,” and “[i]n other words, she was allegedly placed in a
position of undue vulnerability because of decisions made by her treating
physician, that is, which medications and what dosage were appropriate for her
care while she was confined in close proximity to other patients”; and
concluding the complaint fell within the purview of the MMA).
[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
[13] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Felix, J., concur.
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