Hoagland Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Clear Lake ( 2024 )

FILED
Oct 08 2024, 8:59 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
IN THE Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Hoagland Family Limited Partnership, Dan Hoagland in his
capacity as general partner and limited partner, and Karen
Hoagland in her capacity as general partner and limited partner,
Appellants-Plaintiffs
v.
Town of Clear Lake, Clear Lake Town Council, Clear Lake
Board of Works a.k.a Sewer Board, Darin Thorp individually
and/or in his official capacity, Molly Weber individually and/or
in her official capacity, Brent Schlosser individually and/or in
his official capacity, Dan Rippe individually and/or in his
official capacity, George Schenkel individually and/or in his
official capacity, Tyson Johnston individually and/or in his
official capacity, Guy Rodgers individually and/or in his official
capacity, Bonnie Brown individually and/or in her official
capacity, Hawk, Haynie, Kammeyer & Smith, LLP and its
partners, David K. Hawk, individually and/or in his official
capacity, Engineering Resources, Inc., Derek Frederickson
individually and/or in his official capacity, Clear Lake Electric,
Inc., Adam Bressler individually and/or in his official capacity
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 1 of 15
with Clear Lake Electric Inc., John Doe, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
Jane Doe, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
Appellees-Defendants
October 8, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-PL-2808
Appeal from the Steuben Superior Court
The Honorable William C. Fee, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
76D01-2305-PL-237
Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
Judges May and Felix concur.
Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Hoagland Family Limited Partnership and its partners Dan Hoagland and
Karen Hoagland (collectively, “Hoagland”) appeal the trial court’s dismissal of
their complaint against the Town of Clear Lake (the “Town”); the Clear Lake
Town Council; the Clear Lake Board of Works; various government officials;
attorney David Hawk and his law firm Hawk, Haynie, Kammeyer & Smith,
LLP; Engineering Resources, Inc.; Derek Frederickson; Clear Lake Electric,
Inc.; and Adam Bressler (all collectively, “Defendants”).
[2] Hoagland presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 2 of 15
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Hoagland’s case “with
prejudice” where another trial court already exercised
authority over the case?
2. Did Hoagland have a right to amend its complaint after the
trial court dismissed the case?
[3] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] Since 2010, Hoagland and the Town have been embroiled in litigation in the
Steuben Circuit Court under cause number 76C01-1006-PL-425 (“Cause 425”).
Cause 425 originated when the Town sought to compel Hoagland to connect
three residential properties to the Town’s sewer system. See Town of Clear Lake
v. Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship, 75 N.E.3d 1081, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied. Cause 425 has resulted in three appeals to this Court and is still pending
in the Steuben Circuit Court.
[5] Hoagland filed this case in May 2023 in the Steuben Superior Court alleging
“various due process violations and Indiana and Federal Constitutional and
Civil rights violations relating to the installation of electrical and sewer facilities
under and on Hoagland’s property.” Appellants’ Br. at 8. On June 19, the Town
moved for dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(8), arguing Hoagland’s
complaint sought to relitigate the issues and challenge the trial court’s orders in
Cause 425 and should be dismissed because the same action was already
pending in another Indiana court. The Town also moved to stay the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 3 of 15
proceedings until Hoagland voluntarily dismissed the case or the trial court
heard the Town’s Rule 12(B)(8) motion.
[6] The trial court granted the motion to stay until voluntary dismissal. But when
Hoagland did not move to dismiss, the trial court held a hearing on the Town’s
Rule 12(B)(8) motion, in which all other Defendants joined. At the end of the
hearing, the trial court orally granted the motion to dismiss. About three weeks
later, the trial court entered a written order dismissing the case with prejudice.
The order stated, in pertinent part:
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the above captioned cause shall
be and is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice, as to Defendant
Town of Clear Lake and all other Defendants therein named.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 21.
[7] Ten days after the written order, Hoagland filed an amended complaint, which
Defendants moved to strike. While the motions to strike were pending,
Hoagland moved to correct error challenging the trial court’s Rule 12(B)(8)
dismissal. In a combined order, the trial court granted Defendants’ motions to
strike the amended complaint and gave Defendants additional time to respond
to Hoagland’s motion to correct error. The trial court eventually denied the
motion to correct error, and Hoagland timely appealed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 4 of 15
1. The trial court did not err in dismissing the case with
prejudice.
[8] Hoagland first argues the trial court erred by dismissing its case with prejudice.
When an action is pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction, other
Indiana courts must defer to the first court’s extant authority over the case.
State ex rel. Meade v. Marshall Superior Court II, 644 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Ind. 1994).
“Courts observe this deference in the interests of fairness to litigants, comity
between and among the courts of this state, and judicial efficiency.” Id. at 88–
89. This principle is implemented by Rule 12(B)(8), which allows a party to
move for dismissal on the grounds the same action is pending in another
Indiana court. Id. at 89 (citing the precursor to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(8)). The
rule applies when the parties, subject matter, and remedies are precisely or
substantially the same. Id. We review de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(8) because it raises a question of law.
Walker v. Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 178 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App.
2021), trans. denied.
[9] Here, the trial court determined dismissal under Rule 12(B)(8) was appropriate.
During arguments, the trial court asked Hoagland, “If the Court were to take
this matter up, don’t we have competing forums here?” Tr. Vol. 1 at 14.
Hoagland conceded, “under certain cause of actions I believe so.” Id. The trial
court’s written order did not specify a reason for dismissing the action, but
when pronouncing its decision at the hearing, the trial court determined “it’s
the same litigation.” Id. at 16.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 5 of 15
[10] On appeal, Hoagland presents us with no arguments about the overlap in
parties, subject matter, and remedies between this case and Cause 425. Nor
does Hoagland explain whether or how an amended complaint could cure the
defects the trial court identified. Hoagland even concedes the trial court did not
err in dismissing the original complaint under Rule 12(B)(8). See Appellants’ Br.
at 16 n.3 (“Hoagland does not contest, for purposes of this argument, that the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Motion to Dismiss of the
original complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(8).”). Accordingly, Hoagland
has waived any argument that this cause of action and Cause 425 were not
precisely or substantially the same. See Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp.,
829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (“The law is well settled that grounds for error
may only be framed in an appellant’s initial brief and if addressed for the first
time in the reply brief, they are waived.”).
[11] After the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, Hoagland tendered an
amended complaint, which the trial court struck on the Town’s motion.
Hoagland’s chief concern on appeal is the trial court’s dismissal “with
prejudice” acts as a dismissal on the merits and therefore denies it the
opportunity to litigate the issues or amend the complaint. In this way,
Hoagland is more concerned about what procedures should have been available
to it after the trial court dismissed under Rule 12(B)(8) than the merits of the
dismissal decision itself.
[12] The general rule is “a dismissal with prejudice is a dismissal on the merits, and
as such, it is conclusive of the rights of the parties and res judicata as to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 6 of 15
questions that might have been litigated.” Hart v. Webster, 894 N.E.2d 1032,
1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Mounts v. Evansville Redev. Comm’n, 831
N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). We have affirmed a Rule
12(B)(8) dismissal with prejudice where a party could not amend the complaint
to avoid overlap of the parties, subject matter, or remedies. See Beatty v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Grp., 893 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 n.2, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming
a dismissal under Rule 12(B)(8) with prejudice in part because “no amendment
to the [plaintiffs’] complaint could cure the Trial Rule 12(B)(8) defect”). As
Hoagland makes no argument on appeal challenging the trial court’s Rule
12(B)(8) decision or explaining how it would amend its complaint to avoid the
Rule 12(B)(8) problem that plagued the original complaint, we decline to
reverse the trial court’s dismissal order.
[13] Still, Hoagland points us to other authority suggesting Rule 12(B)(8) should not
be considered a dismissal on the merits, and therefore the trial court erred in
dismissing “with prejudice.” First, Hoagland asserts dismissals under most
other sections of Trial Rule 12(B) are not judgments on the merits and therefore
Rule 12(B)(8) dismissals should not be. 1 For example, “dismissal under Trial
1
Under Trial Rule 12(B), a party may plead eight defenses by motion:
(1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) Incorrect venue under Trial Rule 75, or any statutory provision. The disposition of this
motion shall be consistent with Trial Rule 75,
(4) Insufficiency of process;
(5) Insufficiency of service of process;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 7 of 15
Rule 12(B)(1) [lack of subject matter jurisdiction] is not an adjudication on the
merits nor is it res judicata.” Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282,
1286 (Ind. 1994) (citations omitted). As our Supreme Court has explained, this
is because a 12(B)(1) motion “presents a threshold question concerning the
court’s power to act. When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action
it takes is void.” Id. See also Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438
(7th Cir. 2004) (“A suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cannot also be
dismissed ‘with prejudice’; that’s a disposition on the merits, which only a court
with jurisdiction may render. ‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’ are
mutually exclusive.”) (citation omitted). 2
[14] In the past, our Supreme Court explained the basis of Rule 12(B)(8) in
jurisdictional terms:
An unseemly conflict of jurisdiction exists between two courts of
coordinate jurisdiction where both exert authority over cases
between the same parties and involving the same subject matter
and issues. In such instances the jurisdiction of the court first
acquiring such jurisdiction is deemed exclusive until the case is
finally disposed of on appeal or otherwise. And, in such
instances this Court will enforce such exclusivity of jurisdiction
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which shall include failure to name
the real party in interest under Rule 17;
(7) Failure to join a party needed for just adjudication under Rule 19;
(8) The same action pending in another state court of this state.
T.R. 12(B).
2
This is in accord with Trial Rule 41(B), which provides: “…Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, . . . any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” T.R. 41(B) (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 8 of 15
by prohibiting the court last acquiring such jurisdiction from
further exercise thereof.
State ex rel Intern. Harvester Co. v. Allen Cir. Ct., 352 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1976)
(citations omitted); see also Pivarnik v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 636 N.E.2d 131, 135
(Ind. 1994) (“When two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the
same case, the jurisdiction of the court first acquiring such jurisdiction is
deemed exclusive until the case is finally disposed of on appeal or otherwise.”)
(quotation omitted); State ex rel. Ferger v. Cir. Ct. of Marion Cnty., 84 N.E.2d 585,
587 (Ind. 1949) (“Two courts of concurrent jurisdiction may have jurisdiction of
the same class of cases, and may acquire jurisdiction of the same person, but
where one of the two first acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter and person in a
particular case, the jurisdiction becomes exclusive.”).
[15] But in more recent years, our Supreme Court has backed away from the
concept of “jurisdiction over a particular case” because such terminology is
inaccurate. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006) (holding Indiana
trial courts possess only two kinds of jurisdiction, subject matter and personal,
and phrases “like ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’ confuse actual jurisdiction
with legal error, and we will be better off ceasing such characterizations”). For
this reason, a panel of this Court has held “the mere fact that the same action is
being prosecuted simultaneously in two Indiana courts does not implicate
jurisdictional concerns.” Irmscher Suppliers, Inc. v. Capital Crossing Bank, 887
N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (also observing failure to move to dismiss
under Rule 12(B)(8) or file a responsive pleading asserting the defense may
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 9 of 15
result in waiver of legal error). When the same case is pending in another
court, a court defers to the first court to promote fairness to litigants, comity
between courts, and judicial efficiency. Meade, 644 N.E.2d at 88–89. And as
the Irmscher Court observed, “‘comity is not a mandatory rule of law, but is a
rule of practice, convenience, and courtesy.’” 887 N.E.2d at 100 (quoting
George S. May Int’l Co. v. King, 629 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans.
denied).
[16] Here, the trial court had the jurisdiction to decide the case and could have
decided the claims, although to do so would risk inconsistent or conflicting
judgments. See Beatty, 893 N.E.2d at 1087 (“Trial Rule 12(B)(8) is meant to
avoid the risk of conflicting judgments or other confusion that can result from
two courts exercising simultaneous jurisdiction over the same or substantially
same action.”). But after examining the complaint and deciding this case is
precisely or substantially the same as Cause 425, the trial court deferred to the
first court’s authority. This is the preferred approach, as Meade instructs courts
“must” defer to the first court’s authority over the case when the same case is
pending in another court. 644 N.E.2d at 88.
[17] Critically, the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice did not deprive Hoagland of
its day in court. Hoagland’s remedy lies in the tribunal already exercising its
authority over the case: the trial court hearing Cause 425. As such, Hoagland
cannot show harm from the dismissal with prejudice because the case is already
pending in another court. Put simply, Hoagland does not need another bite at the
apple. And because Hoagland appealed the trial court’s Rule 12(B)(8) dismissal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 10 of 15
but failed to challenge the substance of the court’s decision—that is, the court’s
determination the parties, subject matter, and remedies are precisely or
substantially the same—Hoagland presents us with no basis for reversal of the
court’s dismissal order. See Beatty, 893 N.E.2d at 1087. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s dismissal of Hoagland’s complaint with prejudice.
2. Hoagland did not have a right to amend its complaint after
the trial court dismissed the cause of action.
[18] Hoagland next argues the trial rules confer on a party the right to amend a
pleading after Rule 12(B)(8) dismissal and therefore the trial court erred by
striking its amended complaint. In making this argument, Hoagland asks us to
interpret the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. Interpretation of our trial rules
is a question of law we review de novo. Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217,
1219 (Ind. 2019). When construing a trial rule, we employ the standard tools of
statutory interpretation. Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194, 197 n.3 (Ind.
2001). We start with the plain language of the rule, giving its words their
ordinary meaning and considering the structure of the rule as a whole. See West
v. Off. of Ind. Sec. of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016).
[19] First, Hoagland contends the right to amendment after a dismissal under Rule
12(B)(8) is the same as under Rule 12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted). Trial Rule 12(B) specifically permits one amendment of
the complaint after dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6):
When a motion to dismiss is sustained for failure to state a claim
under subdivision (B)(6) of this rule the pleading may be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 11 of 15
amended once as of right pursuant to Rule 15(A) within ten [10]
days after service of notice of the court’s order sustaining the
motion and thereafter with permission of the court pursuant to
such rule.
T.R. 12(B). The plain language of this section of Rule 12(B) applies only to
Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal. Rule 12(B) does not confer a right to amendment after
dismissal under Rule 12(B)(8), and we decline Hoagland’s request to read into
the trial rule language that is not there.
[20] Hoagland also contends it had a right to amend its complaint under Trial Rule
15(A). The rule provides, in relevant part: “A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . .
. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court[.]” T.R.
15(A). In other words, when no responsive pleading to the original complaint
has been filed, the plaintiff has a right to amend its complaint and there is no
need to seek the permission of the trial court. Comer v. Gohil, 664 N.E.2d 389,
393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
[21] As Hoagland asserts, a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for
purposes of Rule 15(A). Id. And in at least one case, we have permitted a party
to amend a complaint after Rule 12(B)(8) dismissal. See id. (on appeal of a Rule
12(B)(8) dismissal, remanding with instructions to the trial court to permit
amendment of a medical malpractice complaint where plaintiff could amend
the complaint to avoid the statutory prerequisite to first present the complaint to
the medical review board).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 12 of 15
[22] Even so, we need not decide whether Rule 15(A) always confers a right to
amend after Rule 12(B)(8) dismissal. Assuming arguendo Hoagland could
amend its complaint to avoid its Rule 12(B)(8) problem, we find dispositive the
fact that Hoagland tendered its amended complaint after the trial court
dismissed the case completely.
[23] The trial court orally granted the Town’s motion to dismiss at the hearing, then
three weeks later entered a written order stating, “the above captioned cause
shall be and is hereby DISMISSED[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 21. “A trial
court’s entry sustaining a motion to dismiss that goes on to adjudge the case
dismissed constitutes a final judgment.” Thacker v. Bartlett, 785 N.E.2d 621, 624
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see also Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1111 (7th Cir. 1984) (when interpreting the federal counterparts to our Trial
Rules, holding the right to amend a complaint once as a matter of course does
not survive a dismissal of the entire case). Once the trial court dismissed the
suit, any right Hoagland may have had to amend the complaint was
extinguished. Hoagland’s next available courses of action were to (1) raise its
claims in Cause 425; (2) appeal the judgment; or (3) seek the trial court’s
permission to amend the complaint under Trial Rule 15(A) after moving to
correct error under Trial Rule 59 or requesting relief from the judgment under
Trial Rule 60. Because Hoagland had no right to amend its complaint after
dismissal of the case, the trial court did not err in striking its amended
complaint.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 13 of 15
Conclusion
[24] The trial court did not err in dismissing Hoagland’s complaint with prejudice.
Hoagland had no right to amend its complaint after the trial court dismissed the
case.
[25] Affirmed.
May, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Michael H. Michmerhuizen
Barrett McNagny LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES TOWN OF CLEAR LAKE, CLEAR LAKE TOWN
COUNCIL, CLEAR LAKE BOARD OF WORKS, DARIN THORP, MOLLY WEBER,
BRENT SCHOLOSSER, DAN RIPPE, GEORGE SCHENKEL, TYSON JOHNSTON,
GUY RODGERS, BONNIE BROWN, HAWK, HAYNE, KAMMEYER & SMITH, LLP,
AND DAVID K. HAWK
David K. Hawk
Michael D. Hawk
Hawk, Haynie, Kammeyer & Smith, LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Mark J. Crandley
Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES ENGINEERING RESOURCES, INC., AND DEREK
FREDERICKSON
William E. Kelley, Jr.,
Evan M. Norris
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
Carmel, IN
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 14 of 15
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES CLEAR LAKE ELECTRIC, INC., AND ADAM
BRESSLER
John M. Haecker
Hamilton Law, LLC
Auburn, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2808 | October 8, 2024 Page 15 of 15